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The story is told of an occasion during the Westminster Assembly in which George
Gillespie rose to defend, in the words of Samuel Rutherford, "the right of the Lord
Jesus Christ to govern the Church which He has purchased with His own blood"
against the Erastianism of John Selden. As Gillespie returned to his seat, after, in
Selden's own words, having "swept away the learning and labour of ten years of my
life," his friends scrambled to examine the scrap of paper on which they assumed were
written the notes that formed the basis for his successful oral apology. The only words
they found were these, repeated over and over again: "Da lucem Domine!"1 The reason
I tell this well-known story is this: during the course of the current project 1 have often
found myself repeating these very words, or others to the same effect (!), as I worked
my way through Rutherford's theology and his Examen Arminianismi. Having now
completed my work, I can look back with gratitude for the divine light I did receive
(some may question this after reading my thesis!) and for the guidance, support,
assistance, encouragement, and constructive criticism that I received from those nearest
to me.
First among the individuals to whom I owe so much is, quite rightly, my
doctoral supervisor Prof. David A.S. Fergusson. For his graciousness, even when
pointing out the weaknesses in my argument, his promptness in reading everything I
wrote and immediately discussing it with me in spite of his own tremendously hectic
schedule, his reputation as a scholar, and his concern for the welfare of the worldwide
church, I will ever hold him in high regard. To my co-second supervisors, Prof. David
F. Wright (now retired) and Dr. Susan Hardman-Moore, I too owe great thanks for the
guidance, constructive criticism, and enthusiasm they contributed to this project. I am
also deeply grateful to the entire faculty of New College, who saw enough promise in
this project to award me a faculty scholarship for the three years that I was in residence
in Edinburgh. I am thankful for their foresight and assistance and only hope that the
end product does not fall too far short of their early expectations. In the course of my
research, I have been greatly blessed by the able and friendly help that I received from
library staffs around the country, chief among which are the New College library—
most especially, Eileen Dickson (now retired), Sheila Dunn, and Margo Taylor—the
main library's special collections department—most especially Sheila Noble—the
National Library of Scotland, and the St. Andrews University Library. To these folk,
too, I am heartily thankful. I am grateful to Drs. John Coffey and Jane Dawson,.who
examined my thesis and contributed valuable insight into and helpful criticism of my
interpretation of Rutherford and seventeenth-century thought.
During the course of my time in Edinburgh, I was ministered to by many
individuals within the Free Church of Scotland. To them, a word of thanks is in order.
The Principal of the Free Church of Scotland College, the Rev. Donald Macleod,
graciously received me, encouraged me when and where he could and, allowed me to
glean from his experiences as a minister and scholar. His wisdom, especially in regard to
the unity of the church, helpfully colored the way that I understood Rutherford's
1 "Give light, O Lord!" Accounts of this story can be found, e.g., in Alexander Whyte, Samuel Rutherford
and Some of his Correspondents (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier, 1894), 153-4; and
Marcus Loane, Makers ofReligious Freedom in the Seventeenth Century (London: InterVarsity, 1960), 77.
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struggle with the Arminians. I am also grateful for the friendship and unflagging
support provided to me and my family by the Rev. Derek Lamont—minister of St.
Columba's Free Church—his wife Catriona, the kirk session at St. Columba's, and our
many friends there. We thank them all for their kindnesses, too numerous to count, and
for their show of Christian love and concern, all of which helped us in making the
transition from living in the States to living in Edinburgh. A special word of thanks is
due to Derek Lamont and the kirk session at St. Columba's—the Rev. Billy Graham, the
Rev. Archie Boyd, Calum Ferguson, Colin Rogerson, Norman MacKay, John Scoales,
and the late Alistair MacDonald—for welcoming me amongst them and for
demonstrating to me what it means to be "full of grace and truth."
Intellectually, I owe a debt of gratitude to Drs. John Coffey and Richard A.
Muller, for their tremendous works on Rutherford and the post-Reformation period,
respectively. But perhaps my most direct intellectual debt is owed to Drs. J. Ligon
Duncan III, Derek W.FL Thomas, and W. Duncan Rankin, for their commitments to
scholarship and to the church and for the examples they provided me in word and deed
at Reformed Theological Seminary and First Presbyterian Church (PCA) in Jackson,
Mississippi. Special thanks go to Ligon Duncan—who first helped me to refine my
thinking in regard to the eventual topic for this thesis and who has served as my mentor,
boss, teacher, and friend over the last eight years—and to Duncan Rankin, who invested
countless hours shepherding me and helping me to improve the quality of my writing
and research. It is to these two men that I dedicate this work in recognition of their
investment in my life. Whatever positive features there are in this thesis is due in large
part to their influence and patient instruction. But, as it is often said—and righdy so-
whatever flaws this thesis contains remain only and wholly my own. Before moving on,
I also need to thank my good friend and "American twin"—that is, until he left to live
in Strathpeffer—Hunter Bailey. Hunter's encouragements and discussions in historical
theology provided needed help along the way in clarifying my own thinking and in
energizing me to press on in my work.
In every other way, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the session and
many friends of First Presbyterian Church (PCA), Jackson, MS. Without their financial
support, we would not have had the means to live in Edinburgh for three years during
the course of this project. We are thankful for their love and support. Chief among our
benefactors there—and among our dearest friends as well—are Phillip and Debbie
Parker, Jeff and Sarah Skelton, Harper and Beth Keeler, and Trent and Kandy Butler.
To them, I say, as a fellow-churchman once said in my hearing, "I will be in your debt
for at least the first thousand years of eternity!" Also among our dearest friends,
although not in Jackson but in Cheltenham, England, are the Rev. Tim Horn and his
wife, Sarah. We are grateful for their generous friendship and thankful for the times we
have been able to share over the last three years together in Britain.
There are many others in Jackson and beyond who have supported and
encouraged us. Because this work has been made possible in large part because of
them, I would like to list their names as a way of offering an enduring thank you:
LCDR. Scott and Kim Lemasters (my brother-in-law and sister), Derek and Beth Miller
(my wife's brother-in-law and sister), Jeff and Faith Richard (my brother and sister-in-
law), John Andrew and Kelly Griffin, Will and Suzanne Edgar, Stewart and Vicki
Swayze, Dr. Jimmy and Finney Moore, Dr. Charles and Anne Pringle, Allan and Carolyn
Edgar, Orrin and Jo Lynn Swayze, Crane and Nan Kipp, Dr. Larkin and Cynthia Carter,
Dr. A1 and Betsy Chestnut, Amanda Jones, Ford and Donna Terry, Ron and Michelle
V
Veazey, Jeff and Brady Warren, Dr. Jim and Sue Ann Stewart, Jan Hyde, Ken and Becky
Fairly, and Vic and Madeline Clark.
In this respect, thanks must also go to the session and congregation of the First
Presbyterian Church (PCA) in Gulfport, MS, where I currently serve as Senior Minister.
They too have been unflagging in their support of this project and in their desire to see
me finish it. I am thankful particularly for their willingness to allow me time away in the
midst of our recovery and rebuilding efforts in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, so that I
could prepare my dissertation for its final submission. Tim and Libby Murr graciously
provided the necessary accommodation for this venture, allowing me to work in serene
surroundings just a little further east on the Gulf Coast.
As is usually the case when giving acknowledgment of thanks, family comes last.
I am not altogether certain why that is. Perhaps it is because we have asked from them
the greatest sacrifice and, therefore, owe them the greatest debt of gratitude. It would
certainly seem to be true in my own case anyway. I would, therefore, be quite remiss if I
did not express deep thanks to my parents, the Rev. Gus and Alice Richard—their
lifetime of sacrifices (often unappreciated at the time) have helped to make me what I
am today—and to my wife's parents, Jack and Jane Buck. Both sets of parents have
been steadfast and overwhelmingly generous in their support and patience (well,
usually!) while we were, literally, an ocean apart. To my children, Schyler and Jane
Barton, I owe thanks for their willingness to allow me to take them away from their
grandparents and other family and friends for three years (even though, as I write this, I
am conscious that they are probably too young to know why I am thanking them at all!).
Most of all, however, I owe the greatest thanks to my wife, Jennifer, mainly because I
have asked her to make the greatest sacrifice by far. She has endured my constant ups
and downs (I, like Rutherford, am a "man of extremes"—just ask Jennifer!) and the
challenges of living daily with a four-hundred year old house guest for just over three
years, of being separated from her family and the vast majority of our earthly
possessions, and of coping with the anxieties associated with finishing this project and
beginning the next phase of our lives together on the Hurricane-Katrina-ravaged
Mississippi Gulf Coast. I have no trouble in admitting that she is my "better half," or,
more biblically, my "suitable helper." I am thankful to the Lord for graciously




Samuel Rutherford (c.1600-1661) is without a doubt one of the most influential figures
in post-Reformation Scotland. Among his contemporaries, he is unsurpassed in terms
of his literary output, his standing within the church, and his ardent advocacy of
Calvinist and Presbyterian doctrine. He is best remembered today both for his political
thought, as memorialized in Lex, Rex, and for his nearly mystical piety, so graphically
depicted in his Letters. But his theology has been almost completely overlooked. Of the
rather modest attention that Rutherford's theology has received, a large percentage has
either incorrectly appraised it as hyper-Calvinist or misunderstood it at one point or
another. This thesis hopes to fill both lacunae, first by simply presenting Rutherford's
theology and, second, by seeking to correct previous misinformation in regard to it.
The terminus a quo for the study is the doctrine of revelation; the terminus ad quern is
assurance of salvation. Even though Rutherford has no proper systematic theology text,
he does have one treatise that is perhaps closer than any other to such a text—the
Examen A.rminianismi, arguably his magnum opus. The Examen, which consists of lectures
Rutherford delivered to his students at St. Andrews University, has regrettably been
even more overlooked than his theology. No work yet to date interacts with the
contents of the Examen in any significant way. In order to fill this gap, the current study
will give special attention to this treatise. Because it is a work of polemical theology,
aimed chiefly against the Arminians, the Examen provides us with a glimpse into the
condition of Calvinism in seventeenth-century Scotland, which is especially evident in
the context of Calvinism's reaction to Arminian theology. While many may argue that
the seventeenth century was the apex of Calvinism's golden age in Scotland, this thesis
will tell a somewhat different story, a story of desperation and intrigue and of Calvinism
at the precipice of defeat.
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Chapter 1: Contextualizing Rutherford
1.1: Introduction
A study of the theology of Samuel Rutherford (c.l600-1661) is long overdue. As an
individual, he is arguably the leading theologian of Scodand's Second Reformadon,1 a
man of great importance and influence both in his day and in succeeding generations,
extending even to our own. He was perhaps the most influential of the Scottish
commissioners to the Westminster Assembly and, as such, is instrumental in
interpreting Westminster theology.2 He was responsible for training ministers and
church leaders as a professor of divinity at St. Mary's College in St. Andrews for
approximately 21 years. He published thirteen major theological treatises, amounting to
just over 7,000 pages of text,3 not to mention other works, including sermons, letters, an
in-depth catechism (totalling 562 questions and answers—over five times the number in
1 With few exceptions, historians and theologians recognize the importance of Samuel Rutherford to the
work of the Reformation in Scodand. Kingsley G. Rendell, in his "new biography," believes that
Rutherford is an "indispensable link" between the beginning of the Reformadon in the late sixteenth
century and its conclusion in the late seventeenth century (Samuel Rutherford:A New Biography ofthe Man <&
his Ministry [Fearn, Ross-shire: Christian Focus, 2003], 9). James Walker calls Rutherford "the greatest"
theologian of Scodand's "so-called second Reformation" {The Theology and Theologians ofScotland 1560-1750
[Edinburgh: Knox Press, 21982], 7-8). Robert Gilmour identifies him as "the most distinctively
representative Scotsman in the first half of the seventeenth century" {Samuel Rutheford:A Study Biographical
and Somewhat Critical, in the History ofthe Scottish Covenants [Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, 1904],
ix). William M. Campbell refers to him as "the greatest and most learned of Scodand's theologians" {The
Triumph ofPresbyterianism [Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1958], 90). And Michael Lynch, perhaps speaking
most objectively, describes him as the "leading theoretician of the Covenanting Kirk" {Scotland: A New
History [London: Pimlico, 2001], 251). Even Rutherford's contemporaries praised him as a "great man"
and "learned author" (e.g., John Owen, The Works ofJohn Owen, 24 vols., ed. William Goold [London:
Johnstone & Hunter, 1850-55], 10:608).
2 John Coffey notes that the Scots commissioners exercised "an influence out of all proportion to their
numbers" at Westminster (Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel Rcutberford
[Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997], 52). Among the Scots delegates, Rutherford remained in
London longer than any other; and he alone received commendation from the Assembly "for the great
assistance he...afforded to [the] Assembly, in his constant attendance upon the debates of it" (Alexander
F. Mitchell and John Struthers, eds., Minutes of the Sessions of the Westminster Assembly of Divines [Edinburgh
and London: Blackwood and Sons, 1874], 151, 487-8). It seems likely, therefore, in light of Rutherford's
authoritarian nature, that he would have exerted tremendous influence upon the Assembly, probably
more so than any other Scotsman and, perhaps, more so than any Englishman as well.
3 In chronological order these are Exercitationes apologeticae pro divina gratia (Amsterdam, 1636); M Peaceable
and Temperate Pleafor Pauls Presbyterie in Scotland (London, 1642); The Due Right ofPresbyteries (London, 1644);
The Tryal and Triumph of Earth (London, 1645); The Divine Right of Church Government and Excommunication
(London, 1646); Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himselfe (London, 1647); A Survey of the Spirituall
AntiChrist (London, 1648); A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty ofConscience (London, 1649); Disputatio
scholastica de divina providentia (Edinburgh, 1649); The Covenant ofLife Opened (Edinburgh, 1655); A Survey of
the Survey of that Sumtne ofChurch-Discipline Penned by Mr. Thomas Hooker (London, 1658); Influences of the Life of
Grace (London, 1659); and Examen Arminianismi (Utrecht, 1668). AD but the first and last are in 4°.
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the Westminster Shorter Catechism), and a variety of political writings, all of which
increase our total by nearly 3,000 pages.4 When we add Rutherford's unpublished
manuscripts and sermons to this collection and a commentary on Isaiah that was
tragically lost at the Restoration,5 we have a literary output that clearly rivals that ofJohn
Owen (1616-1683), who is quite possibly England's premier Reformed theologian of the
seventeenth century.6 And, yet, Rutherford's thinking has received comparatively little
attention in the scholarship of the period, especially in relation to that of Owen.7
Of the scholarly attention that Rutherford has received, the majority has been
confined either to his political thought, as contained in Lex, Rex,8 or to his spirituality, as
reflected in the Letters? Only a handful of works have examined his theology.
4 A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House ofCommons, January 31, 1644 (London, 1644); Lex, Rex, or The
Law and the Prince (London, 1644); A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Lords, June 25, 1645
(London, 1645); The Last and Heavenly Speeches and Glorious Departure of John Gordoun, Viscount Kenmuir
(Edinburgh, 1649); The Power and Prevalenty of Prayer (Edinburgh?, 1713); A Testimony to the Work of
Reformation in Britaine and Ireland (Glasgow, 1719); Fourteen Communion Sermons (Glasgow: Glass, 1877);
Quaint Sermons (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1885); Ane Catachisme conteining the Soume of Christian
Religion, in Catechisms of the Second Reformation, ed. Alexander F. Mitchell (London: James Nisbet, 1886); and
Letters ofSamuel Raitherford (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, 1891).
5 John Coffey lists 10 unpublished manuscripts containing upwards of 40 sermons, a theological discourse
on supralapsarianism, and a political treatise on the power of the civil magistracy (Politics, Religion and the
British Revolutions, 272). Faith Cook mentions the Isaiah commentary in her Samuel Raitherford and his Friends
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1992), 22.
6 The twenty-four volumes of Owen's Works account for approximately 13,700 pages.
7 Perhaps the most demonstrable and, yet, basic, evidence for this claim lies in the simple fact that Owen's
works have been republished, kept in print, and are readily accessible for all to read, whereas the majority
of Rutherford's writings have never been republished since the seventeenth century, and his Latin
treatises have remained untranslated.
8 William M. Campbell, "Lex, Rex and its Author," RSCHS 7 (1941), 204-28; O.K. Webb, "The Political
Thought of Samuel Rutherford" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1964); J.F. Maclear,
"Samuel Rutherford: The Law and the King," in Calvinism and the Political Order, eds. George L. Hunt and
John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965), 65-87; Richard Flinn, "Samuel Rutherford and Puritan
Political Theory," Journal ofChristian Reconstruction 5 (1978-9), 49-74; Timothy D. Hall, "Rutherford, Locke,
and the Declaration: The Connection" (unpublished Th.M. dissertation, Dallas Theological Seminary,
1984); J.P. Burgess, "The Problem of Scripture and Political Affairs as Reflected in the Puritan
Revolution: Samuel Rutherford, Thomas Goodwin, John Goodwin, and Gerard Winstanley"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1986); W.D.J. McKay, "Samuel Rutherford on
Civil Government" (unpublished M.Th. dissertation, Queen's University, Belfast, 1986); C.E. Rae, "The
Political Thought of Samuel Rutherford" (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Guelph, 1991);
John Ford, "Lex, rex iusto posita: Samuel Rutherford on the origins of government," in Scots and Britons:
Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603, ed. Roger Mason (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1994),
262-90; John L. Marshall, "Natural Law and the Covenant: The Place of Natural Law in the Covenantal
Framework of Samuel Rutherford's Lex ReV (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Westminster Theological
Seminary, 1995); and Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions.
9 Alexander Whyte, Samuel Rsttheford and Some of his Correspondents (Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson &
Ferrier, 1894); Adam Philip, The Devotional Literature ofScotland (London: James Clarke, 1920), 116-25; C.N.
Button, "Scottish Mysticism in the Seventeenth Century, with Special Reference to Samuel Rutherford"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1927); Hugh Martin, Great Christian Books
2
Sometimes, as in the case of David Strickland's discussion of union with Christ or
William M. Campbell's writings on ecclesiology, only one specific aspect of Rutherford's
theology has been studied.10 At other times, his theology has been considered more
broadly but only in the most superficial of terms. Such is the case with the chapter-
length surveys provided by James Walker, John Macleod, M. Charles Bell, T.F.
Torrance, and John Coffey.11 Only one book-length study currently exists that presents
Rutherford's theology more broadly and, yet, also in sufficient depth. But, as its dtle
suggests, this work concentrates on the scholastic nature of Rutherford's theology rather
than on presenting it in a systematic manner.12 It contains little discussion of his
soteriology and no reference at all to what is perhaps his magnum opus theologiae, the
Examen A.rminianismi (1668). As a result, it overlooks several key features of
Rutherford's theology that are found only in the Examen. Furthermore, it devotes only
cursory attention to Rutherford's dispute with the Arminians, even though it draws
heavily upon his first treatise against them, the Exercitationes apologeticae pro divina gratia
(1636). Clearly the time is at hand to revisit Rutherford's theology and to produce a
comprehensive, systematic, book-length analysis of it. The current study seeks to
accomplish just this task by setting forth his theology as it is developed primarily in the
Examen A.rminianismi and anchored within the context of his dispute with the Arminians.
(London: SCM Press, 1945), chapter 3;J.M. Ross, "Samuel Rutherford," The Month (July 1975), 207-11;
John M. Brentnall, Samuel Rutherford in Aberdeen (Inverness: John Eccles, c. 1981); R.S. Louden, "Samuel
Rutherford," in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Spirituality, ed. Gordon S. Wakefield (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1983), 345; J.K. Cameron, "The Piety of Samuel Rutherford (c. 1621-1661): A Neglected
Feature of Seventeenth Century Scottish Calvinism," NAvK 65 (1985), 153-9; Hans Meier, "Love, Law,
and Lucre: Images in Rutherfiird's Letters," in Historical and Editorial Essays in Medieval and Early Modern
EnglishforJohan Gerritsen, eds. Mary-Jo Arn and Hanneke Wirtjes (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1985),
77-96; Agnes M. Machar, "A Scottish Mystic," The Andover Review 6 (1986), 379-95; Faith Cook, Grace in
Winter. Rutherford in Verse (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1989); idem, Samuel Rutherford and his Friends-, M.
Roberts, "Samuel Rutherford: The Comings and Goings of the Heavenly Bridegroom," in The Trials of
Puritanism: Papers read at the 1993 Westminster Conference (privately published, 1994), 119-34.
10 Strickland, "Union with Christ in the Theology of Samuel Rutherford: An Examination of his Doctrine
of the Holy Spirit" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1972); Campbell, "Samuel
Rutherford, propagandist and exponent of Scottish Presbyterianism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Edinburgh, 1937); idem, Triumph ofPresbyterianism, 73-93. For other works interacting with
Rutherford's ecclesiology, see Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions, 188-224; and, in a really
broad sense, David G. Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 1590-1638 (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000).
11 Walker, Theology and Theologians ofScotland, 8-13; Macleod, Scottish Theology in Relation to Church History Since
the Reformation (Edinburgh: Publications Committee of the Free Church of Scotland, 1943), 68-78; Bell,
Calvin and Scottish Theology: The Doctrine ofAssurance (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1985), 70-91; Torrance,
Scottish Theology: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 93-111; Coffey,
Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions, 114-45.
12 San-Deog Kim, "Time and Eternity: A Study in Samuel Rutherford's theology, with Reference to His
Use of Scholastic Method" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Aberdeen, 2002).
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Why the Examen? Quite simply, it is the closest thing that Rutherford has to a
proper systematic theology text. James Walker, noticing this, has aptly described the
Examen as "an excellent theological manual."13 In one sense this should come as no
surprise, because the Examen consists of lectures that Rutherford delivered to his
students at the University of St. Andrews for the express purpose of training them in
theology. It contains discussion of every major theological locus and provides the most
comprehensive presentation of Rutherford's theology that is available in any one
treatise,14 albeit with a decidedly polemical slant. In another sense, however, it may
come as a surprise to those who are acquainted with Rutherford's writings and the
prolix style and nit-picking nature of his argumentation, influenced as it is by
Aristotelian categories of logic. One need not spend long in certain of Rutherford's
works to appreciate Tertullian's (160-220) anti-Aristotelian sentiments: "Unhappy
Aristotle! who invented for these men dialectics, the art of building up and pulling
down; an art so evasive in its propositions, so far-fetched in its conjectures, so harsh, in
its arguments, so productive of contentions—embarrassing even to itself, retracting
everything, and really treating of nothing!"15 The value of such writings in actually
teaching theology is rightly to be questioned. But, in point of fact, this is another reason
why the Examen stands head and shoulders above others of Rutherford's theological
works. It represents his thinking at its best and clearest. James Walker claims that it is
"much more interesting than either the Exercitationes [1636] or the De Providentia [1649],"
even though all three are devoted to countering the perceived evils of Arminianism.
And William Campbell adds that the Examen "shows no weakness in his power of
dialectic and is more lucid and orderly than much of his other polemic."16 Although it
13 Theology and Theologians ofScotland., 10.
14 Rutherford's two other Latin treatises, Exercitationes apologeticae pro divina gratia (1636) and Disputatio
scholastica de divina providentia (1649), seek to answer the question of how it is that absolute divine decrees
can coexist with real human freedom. They concentrate on the divine will and on metaphysical issues,
whereas the Examen presents a discussion of every locus in systematic theology. The twenty chapters that
comprise it are as follows: "Of the Holy Scriptures" (p. 1), "Of God" (p. 138), "Of Election" (p. 238),
"Of Reprobation" (p. 276), "Of the State of the First Man [hominis]" (p. 297), "Of Original Sin" (p. 310),
"Of the State of Fallen Humankind \hominis\" (p. 324), "Of the State of Grace" (p. 351), "Of Universal
Redemption" (p. 372), "Of the Covenant of Grace" (p. 426), "Of the Manner of Conversion" (p. 453),
"Of the Justification of the Sinner" (p. 498), "Of the Perseverance of the Saints" (p. 549), "Of the
Certainty of Salvation" (p. 625), "Of the Church and its Notes" (p. 642), "Of Ministers of the Word" (p.
681), "Of Synods" (p. 692), "Of the Sacraments and Ecclesiastical Discipline" (p. 716), "Of the
Magistrate" (p. 728), "Of the Soul and the Resurrection of the Body" (p. 753).
15 Tertullian, The Prescription against Heretics, section VII, cited in Colin Gunton, Stephen Holmes, and
Murray Rae, eds., The Practice ofTheology:A Reader (London: SCM Press, 2001), 157.
16 Walker, Theology and Theologians ofScotland, 10; Campbell, Triumph ofPresbjterianism, 85.
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does employ logical syllogisms and highly contentious argumentation, it contains less of
the negative features of Rutherford's other works and, at the same time, is more
comprehensive in the topics that it covers. For these very reasons, Thomas Murray has
appropriately concluded that the Examen is Rutherford's "best production."17 It is his
magnum opus or his summa theologiae.
In spite of its importance, the Examen has never been translated out of the
original Latin and, more significantly, has been completely overlooked in the secondary
literature. The works of Bell, Torrance, and Kim do not even mention it at all. Those
of Coffey, Walker, and Macleod mention the Examen, but do not interact with its
contents.18 The current study seeks to fill both the aforementioned gaps by making
Rutherford's theology in the Examen available to a wider audience. To accomplish this,
citations from it have been made in English rather than in the original Latin, as may be
more typical in academic circles, while citations from other Latin treatises—even from
those penned by Rutherford—will, as a rule, remain untranslated. Before proceeding to
look at Rutherford's theology in the Examen, however, we must first introduce the
context in which it was developed and articulated. This chapter will, therefore, seek to
provide an examination of the socio-political, ecclesial, theological, polemical, and
formal contexts of the Examen and, then, conclude with a note regarding methodology.
1.2: Establishing the Context
1.2.1: The Socio-Political and Ecclesial Context
In his work on the cultural background to the Scottish Reformation, John Durkan
states: "In any age there is nothing more difficult to pin down than a climate of thought,
and nothing more necessary to reckon with than this particular intangible."19 Durkan's
statement expresses something that is commonly accepted today among historians of
ideas: we are all, to a greater or lesser degree, products of the periods in which we live.
That this is the case for Rutherford will become patently obvious throughout the course
17 The Life of Rev. Samuel Rutherford (Edinburgh: Oliphant, 1828), 333-4. Apart from John Coffey's
definitive introduction to Rutherford, Thomas Murray's biography offers the best and most well-
researched contribution to the field.
18 Coffey begins his treatment of Rutherford's theology with a note that the "detailed arguments of
Rutherford's Latin works against Arminianism, in particular, require a more extended treatment." Polities,
Religion and the British Revolutions, 114.
19 John Durkan, "The Cultural Background in Sixteenth-Century Scotland," in Essays on the Scottish
Reformation 1513-1625, ed. David McRoberts (Glasgow: Burns, 1962), 292-3.
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of this thesis. Rutherford is a man of his time, or, as Robert Gilmour quips, "the most
distinctively representative Scotsman in the first half of the seventeenth century."20
What this means is that, by studying Rutherford, we become better acquainted with the
time in which he lived and, by studying the time in which he lived, we become better
acquainted with him. Therefore, much of what could be said in this section about the
cultural context of the seventeenth century will be revealed only as this thesis unfolds,
chapter by chapter. But because the final chapter of the dissertation contains an
examination of the grounds for Rutherford's opposition to Arminianism, it, more than
any other part of the study, will contribute to a deeper understanding of seventeenth-
century thought and Rutherford's relationship to it. For now, however, our goal is
simply to introduce—and, then, only in the broadest and most basic of terms—some of
the relevant cultural factors that would have influenced Rutherford and the
development or expression of his theology.
By all accounts, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries mark a time of
tremendous religious and societal upheaval. Beginning in the early 1500s, the European
community as a whole witnessed a large-scale, heretofore unprecedented Reformation
within the Roman Catholic Church. This Reformation was essentially a reaction against
the elements of corruption and excess that were present within the church at the time.21
But whereas prior reform movements had allied themselves to papal authority in order
to implement their desired changes, the Reformation of the sixteenth century allied itself
to the civil authorities instead.22 And as the work of the Reformation progressed over
the course of the century, this link between church and state became further solidified.
In Scotland, the official break with the Roman Church came as a result of an act
of Parliament—the so-called "Reformation Parliament"—in 1560, which was itself a
product of the Protestant revolution against France and Rome and against the French
regime of Mary of Guise (1554-1560). In response to Mary's actions against early
outbreaks of support for the Reformation, many in Scotland appealed to the Protestant
Queen Elizabeth I of England (1558-1603) for help. The financial and military
20 Samuel Rutherford, ix.
21 Alister E. McGrath, Reformation Thought:An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 31999), 2-5. McGrath righdy
notes that the Reformation sought more than just doctrinal reforms. It sought to overhaul the church's
legal system, bureaucracy, morality, and piety, in addition to its theology.
22 McGrath explains that the authority of the pope had diminished due in part to the Spanish Inquisition
and the Concordat of Bologna. Reformation Thought, 4.
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assistance they received from her eventually enabled the calling of the aforementioned
Reformation Parliament and, thus, ensured the establishment of a Protestant Scotland."3
After being officially established in this way by a close connection between the ecclesial
and political spheres, Scottish Protestantism continued to develop by an even closer
connection between church and state, although it was oftentimes more antagonistic than
not.
Following the accession of James VI (1567-1625) to the throne in Scotland, the
royal policy towards the church—at least initially anyway—"seems to have been to hold
a balance between protestant and catholic."24 But James' inability actually to pull off this
balancing act enabled stronger souls, like Andrew Melville (1545-1622), to have their
way. Melvillian Presbyterianism, which had been established in the 1570s during James'
minority reign, forced James into a position of weakness and, on at least one occasion,
outright capitulation.23 With the uniting of the kingdoms of Scotland and England in
1603, however, James set about a new work of assimilating the two national churches
with a new-found strength. In response to Melvillian Presbyterianism—and its doctrine
of the two kingdoms—which was then in control of the Scottish kirk,26 James claimed
jus divinum regum and began imposing episcopacy upon the church in Scotland, arguing
that Presbyterianism "as well agreeth with a monarchy as God and the Devil."27
Resistance to the king's wishes for the kirk was regarded as treason and punished
accordingly. Rutherford's boyhood minister, the staunch advocate of Calvinist and
Presbyterian doctrine, David Calderwood (1575-1650),28 was one casualty of James'
policy towards the church, a casualty that would have been indelibly imprinted upon the
mind ofRutherford from the earliest of ages.
23 See James Kirk, "Reformation Parliament," and "Reformation, Scottish," in DSCH&T, 693-8; and J.H.
Burns, "The Political Background of the Reformation, 1513-1625," in Essays on the Scottish Reformation
1513-1625, ed. David McRoberts (Glasgow: Burns, 1962), 1-38.
24 Burns, "Background of the Reformation," 31.
25 J.H. Burns recounts a time in 1592 when James was "[s]o weak...that he had to make a concession, if
not a surrender, to the presbyterian party" by giving their "hierarchy of courts...parliamentary authority"
to act in a high profile murder case. Burns, "Background of the Reformation," 31.
26 J.H.S. Burleigh points to an instance of open conflict between Andrew Melville and James in 1596 in
which Melville called James "'God's sillie vassal', and forcefully reminded him that 'there are two kings
and two kingdoms in Scotland. There is Christ Jesus the King and His kingdom the Kirk, whose subject
King James the Sixth is, and of whose kingdom not a king, nor a lord, nor a head, but a member.'" A
Church History ofScotland (Edinburgh: Hope Trust, 1988), 204-5.
27 King James at Hampton Court Conference, 1604, cited in Burleigh, Church History, 205.
28 Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions, 31.
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What started under James was continued under his son, Charles I (1600-1649).
But whereas James sought to introduce episcopacy into Scotland progressively, Charles
had no such pretence.29 Again claimingykr divinum regum, he insisted that he knew what
was best for Scotland and purposed to bring it about immediately. With the help of
William Laud (1573-1645)—later Archbishop of Canterbury—Charles set out to
conform the church in Scodand to an Anglo-Catholic model. Acts of nonconformity
were again met with disciplinary acdon under Charles, as they were under his father.
Rutherford himself was subjected to the discipline of the Caroline church by being
exiled to Aberdeen in 1636 for his nonconformity and for his attack on the
Arminianism espoused by Laud and the "Canterburian" party.30 The autocratic
methods of Charles in dealing with the church and with the nobles in Scotland led to
revolt and culminated in the signing of the National Covenant in 1638. By signing this
document, men pledged themselves "to maintain the freedom of the Church from civil
control, to defend the true Reformed religion, and to decline the recent innovations in
worship decreed by the King until the General Assembly had ruled on them." Even
though the National Covenant did not explicitly condemn episcopacy, it did directly
contradict James' and Charles' policy of jus divinum regum by asserting instead the
freedom of the kirk from all state control and the sole headship of Christ over all
ecclesial affairs.31
One year after the signing of the Covenant, at the Glasgow General Assembly
of 1639, the church "adopted a thoroughly Presbyterian programme."32 Together with
the jus divinum Presbyterianism of the "Covenanting" kirk, the "impertinent and
damnable demands" of the National Covenant—as Charles referred to them—helped to
initiate a period of intense conflict between the crown and the church in Scotland. This
period, known generally as the period of the Covenanters, was a time marked by
extreme intolerance on both sides, which would steadily increase until reaching a climax
after the Restoration of 1660.33
29 Burleigh indicates that James knew '"the stomach' of his people, [and] he walked warily, step by step,
and achieved considerable success" (Church History, 215). Michael Lynch highlights Charles' impatience by
calling him "a king in a hurry" {Scotland:A New History, 247).
30 Letters, 141-3. Laud's relationship to Arminianism will be discussed in more detail in section 1.2.3
below and again in chapter five.
31 J.D. Douglas, "National Covenant," in DSCH&T, 620.
32 K.M. Brown, "Covenanters," in DSCH&T, 218.
33 Brown, "Covenanters," 218; and David Stevenson, "Restoration," in DSCH&T, 710-11.
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Having thus sketched out the socio-political and ecclesial context of
Rutherford's day, it should be patent that he was in fact a man of his times. His
association with David Calderwood ensured that he would be exposed to the
controversy between the crown and the church from the earliest of ages, which
exposure would then set the course for the remainder of his lifetime. The publication
of Lex, Rex in 1644 not only confirmed Calderwood's influence upon Rutherford, but
also sealed his fate with the Stewart dynasty. As if it was not bad enough to publish a
treatise defending biblically the Covenanters' open resistance to Charles I, Rutherford
took his diatribe one step further. He repeatedly and uncharitably, in Lex, Rex,
compared the king and his queen to the wicked Ahab and Jezebel of the Bible.34 The
combination of the treatise and its acerbic tone delivered a knockout punch and would
most likely have resulted in Rutherford's martyrdom, were it not for his ill health. In
addition to his work in the political realm, Rutherford also staunchly defended jus
divinum Presbyterianism in his polemical works against Independency and Erastianism.35
And he did it all with an intolerance that was characteristic of his age. He even devoted
a treatise to defending the concept of intolerance itself.36 In all these ways, Rutherford
shows himself to be the quintessential Scotsman of the early Covenanting period. His
life epitomized the struggle of the church against the tyranny of the Stewart dynasty.
His intolerance reflected the best and the worst of the intolerance of his day. Not only
does it correspond well to his theology but it also partially explains the reason for his
effectiveness.
1.2.2: The Theological Context
Of the two basic types of theological writing characteristic of the post-Reformation
period, the Lxamen falls into the "polemical" or "scholastic" category. Whereas works
of "didactic" or "positive" theology tend to "meditate" upon the detailed exegesis of
Scripture and to present only basic statements of doctrine—e.g., the compendia or
medullae—those of the "polemical" or "scholastic" variety typically contain "more
elaborate systems" of doctrine that are directed "toward their correct conclusions over
34 Campbell, Triumph ofPresbyterianism, 79.
35 E.g., A Peaceable and Temperate Plea for Pauls Presbyterie in Scotland (London, 1642); The Due Right of
Presbyteries (London, 1644); The Divine Rdght of Church Government and FLxcommunication (London, 1646); and
A Survey ofthe Survey ofthat Summe ofChurch-Discipline Penned by Mr. Thomas Hooker (London, 1658).
36 A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience (London, 1649). Rutherford's intolerance will be
taken up again in chapter five.
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against the erroneous conclusions of adversaries in debate."37 Works of polemical
theology are not less scriptural than didactic works. Both types are based wholly upon
biblical exegesis. But polemical treatises tend to begin with the basic statements of
doctrine provided by didactic works and then to develop them in greater detail within
the context of theological dispute. This is precisely what we see in the Examen, whose
twenty chapters run the gamut of systematic theology and oppose Arminian teaching at
each point along the way with tediously intricate detail.
Entering the theological world of the Examen is, according to John Coffey,
something like "entering] the world evoked so vividly in Umberto Eco's novel, The
Name of the Rose." In short, he says, it is a world of scholastic distinctions and
theological argumentation over questions that can be as obscure as the medieval query
about "whether an angel could pass from star to star without traversing the intermediate
space."38 While Coffey's claim should remind us that Rutherford stands within a
theological tradition that extends back through the Reformation to the Middle Ages, this
should not immediately be taken as conclusive proof that his theology is wholly, or even
substantially, the same as his medieval scholastic forebears and, thus, discontinuous with
the Reformation, as some have assumed. There is, in fact, profound disagreement
among modern scholars over the relationship between medieval scholasticism, the
Reformation, and the post-Reformation period. On one side of the divide, scholars like
Brian Armstrong argue that Rutherford and his post-Reformation peers drifted away
from the theology of John Calvin (1509-1564) by rejecting Calvin's more "balanced,"
biblical, and humanistic approach to theology in favor of a scholastic worldview
exhibiting the following four basic characteristics:
(1) Primarily it will have reference to that theological approach that
asserts religious truth on the basis of deductive ratiocination from given
assumptions or principles, thus providing a logically coherent and
defensible system or belief. Generally this takes the form of syllogistic
reasoning. It is an orientation, it seems, invariably based upon an
Aristotelian philosophic commitment and so relates to medieval
scholasticism. (2) The term will refer to the employment of reason in
religious matters, so that reason assumes at least equal standing with faith
in theology, thus jettisoning some of the authority of revelation. (3) It
will comprehend the sentiment that the scriptural record contains a
unified, rationally comprehensible account and thus may be used as a
37 PKRD, 1:202. See, e.g., Edward Leigh, A Systeme or Body ofDivinity (London, 1654), a2.
38 Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions, 117.
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measuring stick to determine one's orthodoxy. (4) It will comprehend a
pronounced interest in metaphysical matters, in abstract speculative
thought, particularly with reference to the doctrine of God. The
distinctive Protestant position is made to rest on a speculative
formulation of the will of God.39
By adopting these elements of medieval scholasticism—elements which are perceived to
have been definitively eschewed by Calvin and the reformers in general—theologians of
the post-Reformation period allegedly developed a theology that was no longer faithful
to the actual thinking of the Genevan reformer.
T.F. Torrance and Charles Bell, whether or not they actually follow Armstrong's
definition of scholasticism, have, nevertheless, followed in the same vein of thinking and
suggested that there is substantial theological discontinuity specifically between
Rutherford and Calvin. Torrance has even gone so far as to brand Rutherford an
"extreme hyper-Calvinist" for his reliance upon "strict syllogistic form[s]" and his views
on limited atonement and predestination.40 While agreeing with Torrance's evaluation
in the main, Bell adds covenant theology, preparation, and assurance of salvation to his
list of Rutherford's "hyper-Calvinist" doctrines.41
On the opposite side of this divide, however, Richard Muller, Heiko Oberman,
and David Steinmetz, among others, have more recently initiated a reappraisal of the
link between Calvin and the so-called Calvinists and have argued against the existence of
substantial theological discontinuity.42 They have pointed out problems with
39 Brian G. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism and Humanism in Seventeenth
Century Prance (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1969), 32, and 31n84, 42. Armstrong's viewpoints
are held by others with varying degrees of similitude: e.g., Ernst Bizer, Priihorthodoxie und Rationalismus
(Zurich: EVZ Verlag, 1963); Charles S. McCoy, "Johannes Cocceius: Federal Theologian," SJT 16 (1963),
352-70; Otto Griindler, Die Gotteslehre Girolami Zanchis und ihre Bedeutungfur seine Lehre von der Pradestination
(Neukirchen: Neukirchner Verlag, 1965); Basil Hall, "Calvin Against the Calvinists," in John Calvin, ed. G.
E. Duffield (Appleford, Berkshire: Sutton Courtenay, 1966), 19-37; Walter Kickel, Vernunft und Offenbarung
bei Theodor Be%a (Neukirchen: Neukirchner Verlag, 1967); R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649
(Oxford: Oxford University, 1979); idem, "The Puritan Modification of Calvin's Theology," in John Calvin,
ed. W. Stanford Reid (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982), 199-214; Philip C. Holtrop, The Bolsec
Controversy on Predestination, Prom 1551 to 1555, 2 vols. (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1993-).
40 Scottish Theology, 109-110. Although Torrance does not define what he means by the slipper)' term
"hyper-Calvinist," it is likely that he is using it to suggest, in a general sense, that Rutherford's theology
hardened Calvin's own understanding to such a degree that it no longer remained faithful to the thinking
of the Genevan reformer.
41 Calvinism and Scottish Theology, 70-84, especially 83-4.
42 E.g., Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to
Perkins (Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1986); idem, "Calvin and the 'Calvinists': Assessing the
Continuities and Discontinuities between the Reformation and Orthodoxy," CTJ 30 (1995), 345-75, and
31 (1996), 125-60; idem, "The Problem of Protestant Scholasticism—A Review and Definition," in
Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, eds. Willem J. Van Asselt and Eef Dekker (Grand
11
Armstrong's definition of scholasticism, claiming that it overlooks what Roman Catholic
scholars have long understood, viz., "that to describe a theology as scholastic is to make
a statement about its method not its content."43 This movement towards reappraisal
thus suggests that "scholasticism" is best understood as a term referring to a method of
approaching or arranging the content of theology rather than of developing or
determining the theology itself. Armstrong's definition, they say, overlooks three things
in particular: the presence of scholasticism in the Reformation; the presence of
humanism in the post-Reformation period; and the existence of vast theological
differences between individuals who can, nevertheless, still be classified as scholastic—
most notably, between medieval scholastics like Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274),
Durandus of Saint-Pourcain (1270-1334), John Duns Scotus (c. 1270-1308), William of
Ockham (c.1280-c.1349), and Gabriel Biel (d. 1495), and also, between seventeenth- ,
century Arminians and Calvinists.44
Because a significant percentage of the published work discussing Rutherford's
theology approaches it from the perspective of the discontinuity thesis, and because of
the prominence both of the authors of those published works and of the Calvin-
Calvinist debate itself, it is impossible for the current study to present Rutherford's
theology adequately without talcing up this issue. In the course of this thesis, then, we
will seek to determine which side in this debate is most correct, at least as far as it
involves Rutherford. Does Armstrong's definition apply to Rutherford? Is his theology
at odds with the teaching of Calvin? Can he, as Torrance believes, legitimately be called
Rapids, MI: Baker, 2001), 45-64; idem, PRRD, 4 vols.; Heiko A. Obcrman, The Harvest ofMedieval Theology:
Gabriel Biel and Tate Medieval Nominalism (1963; Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 31983); idem, Forerunners of
the Reformation (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966); idem, "The Shape of Late Medieval
Thought: The Birthpangs of the Modern Era," in The Pursuit of Holiness in Tate Medieval and Renaissance
Religion, eds., Charles E. Trinkaus and Oberman (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 3-25; idem, Masters of the
Reformation: Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe, trans. Dennis Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge
University, 1981); David C. Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes von Staupit£ in Its Tate
Medieval Setting (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968); idem, "Calvin and the Absolute Power of God," Journal ofMedieval
and Renaissance Studies 18:1 (Spring 1988), 65-79; idem, "The Scholastic Calvin," in Protestant Scholasticism:
Essays in Reappraisal.eds. Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster, 1999), 16-
30; Willem J. Van Asselt and Eef Dekker, Reformation and Scholasticism, 11-43; and Carl R. Trueman and R.
Scott Clark, Protestant Scholasticism, xi-xix.
43 Trueman and Clark, Protestant Scholasticism, xiv. Cf. James A. Weisheipl, "Scholastic Method," in The
New Catholic Engclopedia (New York: Catholic University of America, 1967), 12:1145-6.
44 Trueman and Clark, Protestant Scholasticism, xiv-xv; Van Asselt and Dekker, Reformation arid Scholasticism,
24; and Muller, "The Problem of Protestant Scholasticism," 45-64. See also idem, "Calvin and the
'Calvinists'," CTJ 30 (1995), 358-75, and 31 (1996), 126-60, where Muller presents no less titan ten
modifications or qualifications to Armstrong's definition of scholasticism.
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a hyper-Calvinist?45 Or, is the reappraisal school more correct to see substantial
continuity between post-Reformation theologians like Rutherford, on the one hand, and
Calvin and his Reformation contemporaries, on the other?
Whichever side is most correct, one thing is certain at this point: Rutherford's
theology in the Examen clearly exhibits characteristics of scholasticism, however it is to
be defined. Even the reappraisal school acknowledges this fact. According to Richard
Muller, the primary technique that distinguishes the scholastic method in every age is
the technique of the quaestio, involving the following four components:
1. The presentation of a thesis or quaestio, a thematic question;
2. The indication of the subjects that stand to be discussed in the quaestio,
the so-called status quaestionis-,
3. The treatment of a series of arguments or objections against the
adopted positions, the so-called objectiones-,
4. The formulation of an answer (responsio), in which account is taken of
all available sources of information, and all rules of rational discourse are
upheld, followed by an answer to the objections, which is as
comprehensive as possible.46
This same basic pattern can be found in the Examen, each chapter ofwhich is organized
around a series of quaestiones, readily identifiable from the recurring introductory Latin
verb Quaeritur., "It is asked."47 The status quaestionis then frequendy further refines the
quaestio by offering clarification as to what actually is the point of contention between
Rutherford and the Arminians.48 After this, the adopted positions of each party in the
controversy are presented and relevant objectiones are offered and rebutted by appropriate
responsiones from Rutherford.49 As Muller warns, however, these responsiones can be quite
comprehensive. At one point, Rutherford offers no less than twenty responses to
Arminian claims, and, quite frequently, he amasses sixteen or more.50 Only rarely is the
number of responses from Rutherford less than four. This shows that the Examen is
45 This study will offer a definition for hyper-Calvinism in chapter five when it brings this issue to a close.
46 Richard A. Muller, "Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the Reformed Tradition: An Attempt at
Definition" (Inaugural Address, Grand Rapids, MI, 1995), 4-5.
47 See, e.g., Examen, "Index Capitum & Quaestionum," which begins immediately after the main body of
the text, for a complete listing of every quaestio in each chapter.
48 See, e.g., Examen, 453, 463, 464, 498, 520, 551.
49 See, e.g., Examen, 28-9, 56, 100-103, 108-21.
50 Examen, 171-4 (shows 16 responses), 185-91 (16), 206-10 (18), 241-4 (16), 249-52 (16), 458-65 (19),
553-63 (20).
13
unambiguously a work of scholastic theology. Its methodology stands in continuity
with medieval scholasticism. What remains to be seen is whether or not it stands in
continuity with the Reformation and how, if at all, this affects Rutherford's theology.
Considering the nature of the education he received at Edinburgh's "Town
College,"51 Rutherford's patent scholasticism should not surprise us. G.D. Henderson
has described the curriculum in Edinburgh as one of "pure scholasticism."52 And
although Henderson's claim is overstated—insofar as it minimizes the humanistic
influence of Andrew Melville and Robert Rollock (c.l 555-1599) and their joint emphasis
on studying the classics and the Bible in the original languages and on Ramist logic—it
is a fair general caricature insofar as almost half the number of texts within the
curriculum consisted ofworks belonging to Aristotle (d. 322 BC).53
What is more, Rutherford's scholasticism should not surprise us in light of the
intellectual climate in which he lived. His thinking is not unusual, nor even distinctively
British, for seventeenth-century theology. Though there are, as we will see, distinctive
emphases in Rutherford that result, in many cases, from particular doctrinal
controversies, his theology and his methodology remain essentially generic to
continental Reformed orthodoxy—which is explicitly scholastic in nature. Rutherford's
work in Scotland and England in the seventeenth century cannot be isolated from the
rest of the European intellectual community. All of Europe, but especially Britain and
the Netherlands, were united in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is partly
due to the fact that there was a common academic language in Europe at that time, and
partiy to the continental migration of those who faced religious persecution at home.
The Netherlands, more than anywhere else, became the safe "hiding place" for British
exiles, particularly those with Reformed convictions, largely because it was the economic
super-power of the day—with Britain a mere "junior partner"—and also because it was
both accessible and religiously compatible.54
51 According to Alexander Grant, the medieval term universitas was not applied to Edinburgh until the end
of the seventeenth century. For the first one hundred years or so it was known simply as the "Town
College." See Grant, The Story oj the University ofEdinburgh During its First Three Hundred Years (London:
Longmans, Green, 1884), 1:130.
52 Religious Life in Seventeenth-Century Scotland (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1937), 122.
53 For more on the curriculum in Edinburgh during the early seventeenth e'entury, see Thomas Crauford,
History of the University of Edinburgh, from 1580 to 1646 (Edinburgh: A. Neill, 1808), 57-62; and Grant,
University ofEdinburgh, 1:148-50. Cf. Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions, 63-4.
54 Keith L. Sprunger, Dutch Puritanism: A History of English and Scottish Churches of the Netherlands in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982), 7, 9.
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According to Keith Sprunger, two key events in the early seventeenth century
served to link the religious identities of Britain and the Netherlands. The first was the
controversy in 1611-1612 over the appointment of Conrad Vorstius (1569-1622) as
successor to James Arminius (1560-1609) in the university at Leiden. So concerned was
James VI (and I of England) that Leiden was appointing a suspected Socinian, that he
"gave [them] no peace until Vorstius, 'this blasphemous monster,' had been banished
from the university."55 The other key event, according to Sprunger, was the Synod of
Dort (1618-1619), to which King James sent a delegation of "sound, orthodox divines,"
in order that they might participate in the synod's proceedings.56 The Canons of Dort
that were produced by the synod were received by many in England and Scotland, but
particularly in the latter, as an expression of the sum of "British divinity." Even to the
end of the seventeenth century in Scotland, these canons were acknowledged to be the
quintessence of "Scripture Divinity, the Divinity of the Ancients, and the Divinity that
right reason doth countenance."57
For Rutherford, the connection with the Dutch church and with Dutch theology
was further strengthened by the fact that his boyhood minister David Calderwood lived
in exile in the Netherlands from 1619-1625. Quite possibly, it was Calderwood's
influence that first brought Rutherford to the attention of the church in the
Netherlands, resulting in the publication of his first treatise, the Exercitationes, in
Amsterdam in 1636. Rutherford's theological proclivities—particularly his strict
Calvinist view of predestination and his advocacy of jus divinum Presbyterian
ecclesiology—endeared him to men the likes of Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676) and
Matthias Nethenus (1618-1686) and eventually resulted in offers to teach in the Dutch
universities of Utrecht and Harderwyck and in the posthumous publication of his
magnum opus, the Examen. It is this connection with the Netherlands that ensures—but,
as we will see, does not fully explain why—Rutherford and his Scottish contemporaries
would devote their whole lives to defending the convictions that they shared with
mainstream Dutch theology against their common enemy, the Arminians.
55 Dutch Puritanism, 355. For more on this controversy and the role played by King James, see Frederick
Shriver, "Orthodoxy and Diplomacy: James I and the Vorstius Affair," English Historical Review 85 (July
1970), 449-74.
56 Sprunger, Dutch Puritanism, 355.
57 Henderson, Religious Life, 86, citing a pamphlet published in 1691 in Scotland, entitled A Vindication of
the Church ofScotland.
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1.2.3: The Polemical Context
Because the Examen Arminianismi, as its title suggests, is a treatise principally devoted to
examining and refuting the central tenets of Arminianism, it behoves us, before entering
upon the intricacies of its arguments, to make preliminary investigation into Arminian
cosmogony. What is Arminianism? Where did it come from? And, what are its roots
in Scotland? These are some of the questions to which we hope to formulate answers,
in order that we might lay the necessary groundwork for what will follow in the
remainder of the study.
The system of thought known as Arminianism derives its name from the Dutch
theologian James Arminius. Its main ideas, however, as Carl Bangs has helpfully
reminded us, do not originate with its namesake in the Netherlands but have a "more
diffuse source." Not only do previous Dutch thinkers, like Dirk Volckertz Coornhert
(1522-1590), Johannes a Lasco (1499-1560), Johannes Utenhove (1510-1565), and
Martin Micronius (1522-1559) aid in the development of Arminian theology,58 but many
of the central themes of Arminianism can be traced back even to the early centuries of
the Christian church. Yet, in spite of this prior influence, it is not until Arminius that
these themes come together to form a comprehensive system and to initiate profound
controversy within the Reformed Church in Holland.59 After the death of Arminius in
1609, this controversy escalated even further when his disciples published their
Remonstrance of 1610, containing five articles directed against what they perceived to
be the most noxious of high-Calvinist doctrines: absolute predestinarianism, limited
atonement, and the perseverance of the saints. These five articles taught that, (1) God
elects unto salvation those fallen men and women who believe in him and persevere in
their faith and rejects those who do not; (2) Christ universally obtains the pardon for the
sins of all people, the benefit of which only the faithful will enjoy; (3) men and women
cannot save themselves but must look instead to grace to accomplish this feat; (4) co¬
operating grace is necessary for men and women to begin and to persevere in faith; and
(5) true believers can ultimately fall away from grace and lose their faith completely and
58 Carl Bangs, "Arminius as a Reformed Theologian," in The Heritage ofJohn Calvin, ed. J.H. Bratt (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1973), 212-14. On Arminius and Arminianism, see Bangs, Anninius: A Study in the
Dutch Reformation (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1971); A.W. Harrison, Arminianism (London:
Duckworth, 1937); and idem, The beginnings of Arminianism to the Synod of Dort (London: University of
London, 1926).
59 It is worth noting that Arminianism, like Protestantism, arose within die church not as a parasitic
alternative to it. See Alan P.F. Sell, The Great Debate: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Salvation (Grand Rapids,
MI: Baker Books, 1983), 5.
16
utterly.60 These articles triggered, among other things, the convening of the Synod of
Dort in 1618, which attempted to squelch the rapidly increasing Remonstrant
movement and to set forth its own set of assertions—or canons—summarizing its own
doctrines, each the obverse of the Arminian articles. Rather than squelching the
insurgence, however, Dort and the contra-Remonstrants appear to have had the
opposite effect. By the close of this synod, Arminianism had apparendy become so
commonplace in the Netherlands that "not onely the Schooles of the Low-countries
[were] filled with the noise" of it "but also the Streetes, Barbers shops, and Tavernes."61
The phenomenon of Arminianism was not confined simply to the "Low-
countries," however. England, too, had its share of controversy involving the Arminian
doctrines of conditional predestination and human free will. In fact, many of the views
that would later be censured at Dort were first disputed within the church in England in
the mid-1590s, some twenty-three years before Dort ever convened. In 1595, William
Barrett preached a sermon in Cambridge in which he challenged a list of six principles
belligerently introduced by William Whitaker (1548-1595) as "bastions against the
spread of Pelagian heresy."62 Barrett, following the lead of his teacher Peter Baro (1534-
1599)—the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge—openly rejected the
absolute predestination of Calvin, Theodore Beza (1519-1605), Jerome Zanchi (1516-
1590), and Franciscus Junius (1545-1602) and advocated, instead, a semi-Pelagian view,
in which predestination was conditional upon human free choice.63 The Calvinist party,
led by William Whitaker and William Perkins (1558-1602), responded and, with the help
of John Whitgift (c. 1530-1604), Archbishop of Canterbury, formulated the Lambeth
Articles and succeeded in imposing them upon all at Cambridge. The eventual result
was that both Baro and Barrett were removed from the university—Baro in 1596;
Barrett a year later in 1597. The threat to Calvinist hegemony in England was stamped
out once and for all after only a relatively minor controversy, or so they thought.64
60 Harrison, Arminianism, 49-50. The fifth article originally indicated an uncertainty as to whether or not
true believers could actually fall away from grace. This was later modified to reflect the above reading.
61 Pieue Du Moulin, The Anatomy ofArminianismc (London, 1620), 136.
62 Peter G. Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982),
203-4.
63 Cf. Lake, Moderate Puritans, 201-2; with "Peter Baro's Summary of Three Opinions Concerning
Predestination," in W]A, 1:92-100.
64 See H.C. Porter's account of this controversy in Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 1958), 344-90; and Nicholas Tyacke's in Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English
Arminianism c. 1590-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 29ff; and Lake's in Moderate Puritans, 201-42.
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From what we have seen, then, it would appear that the first official early-
modern controversy involving Arminian doctrines took place in England rather than in
the Netherlands. But this does not mean that what would later be called Arminianism
had an English rather than a Dutch provenance. The origin of these proto-Armintan
views in England, is quite probably—because of the close relationship between England
and the Netherlands, which Keith Sprunger dates to the beginning of Elizabeth's reign
in 1558—due to the influence ofmany of the earliest sixteenth-century Dutch advocates
of Arminian theology, men like Coornhert for instance.65 But even if it is not true that
proto-Arminianism entered England from the Netherlands, we do know that there was
a close association between the pre-Arminians in both countries in the same decade in
which the controversy broke out in Cambridge. Richard "Dutch" Thomson (d. c.1612),
Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge, knew Arminius personally in the 1590s and
continued to keep tabs on him and on events in the Netherlands until his death.66 This
in itself would seem to suggest that the development of early forms of Arminianism in
both countries was at least integrally related with one another. Nicholas Tyacke's
research confirms this close association by pointing to the fact that, in 1613, Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645) came before the English Court, "propagandising in person on
behalf of the Dutch Arminian or Remonstrant party."67 Obviously, there would be no
reason for such a visit unless there was some expectation that he would be favorably
received. Notwithstanding the controversy of the 1590s, the seeds of pre-Arminian
thinking apparently remained in England, kept alive, no doubt, by colleagues in the
Netherlands. And these seeds simply needed encouragement to reach full bloom.
According to Keith Sprunger, the requisite encouragement came as a result of English
involvement in the Synod of Dort. Though the external manifestation of Arminianism
had been dealt with decisively in Cambridge in 1595, the seeds of free will-ism had
remained alive in British theology and began growing rapidly in post-Dort England.68
Unlike the situations in England and the Netherlands, however, it is difficult to
ascertain exactly when Arminianism first appeared in Scotland. G.D. Henderson argues
that it was present in Scotland at least a year "before the Synod of Dort, as we know
65 Sprungcr, Dutch Puritanism, 3.
66 Nicholas Tyacke, "Armimanism and English Culture," in Britain and the Netherlands, vol. 7, Church and
State since the Reformation, eds. A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 95.
67 "Arminianism and English Culture," 95.
68 Sprunger, Dutch Puritanism, 356.
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from the Dupljes of the Aberdeen Doctors."69 But the Doctors' statement is vague at
best, and the extent of the Arminianism that they allude to would seem to be fairly
limited. Shortly after Dort, more accusations of Arminianism appear in Scotland.
David Calderwood, for instance, complains of the presence of Arminian sympathies
within the Scottish kirk in 1619 and, just one year later, indicates that Auminianism had
already made inroads into many Scottish universities.70 And in 1624 the Scottish Privy
Council passed a statute decreeing that Arminians are "enemyis to religioun, authoritie
and peace."71 But these claims are equally as vague as those noted by the Aberdeen
Doctors. Arminianism may well have existed in Scotland prior to or just after the Synod
of Dort, but it is not until many years after Dort that demonstrable accusations become
commonplace.
In a letter most likely dated to 1631, Rutherford laments the "deep furrows" of
Arminianism in Scotland, and prior to the signing of the National Covenant in 1638,
George Gillespie (1613-1648) bemoans that Arminianism is rampant in all the
universities. But, perhaps most significantly, Arminianism becomes a common subject
of Scottish theological and polemical writing only in the mid-1630s.72 Scotland has no
equivalent to the controversies that occurred in England during the 1590s. Instead, as
Robert Baillie (1599-1662) notes, ecclesial issues had been at the forefront of every
dispute in Scotland since the beginning of the Reformation in 1560. For these reasons,
Baillie, whose work provides the closest thing we have to a contemporary history of
69 Henderson, "Arminianism in Scotland," London Quarterly and Holborn Review (October 1932), 493. The
Aberdeen Doctors were a group of professors and ministers in Aberdeen steeped in piety and scholarship
who opposed the signing of the National Covenant and held to a mild form of episcopacy. Henderson is
here referring to their assertions that the Covenanters "complained of Arminian corruptions, even before
Pearth Assembly [in 1618]; branding some of the most learned of our Church, with that Aspersion" (see
The General! Demands, oj the Reverend Doctors ofDivinitie, and Ministers of the Gospell in Aherdeene, Concerning the
Late Covenant, in Scotland. Together with the Answers, Replyes, and Dupljes thatfollowed thereupon, in the Year, 1638
[Aberdeen, 1663], 102). On the Aberdeen Doctors, see Donald MacMillan, The Aberdeen Doctors (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1909); and G.D. Henderson, The Burning Bush: Studies in Scottish Church History
(Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1957), chapter 5; and B. McLennan, "Presbyterianism challenged: A study
of Catholicism and Episcopacy in the North-East of Scotland, 1560-1650" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Aberdeen, 1977), chapter 5.
70 David Calderwood, A .Solution of Dr. Resolutus (Amsterdam, 1619), 49; idem, The Speach of the Kirk of
Scot/and to her Beloved Children (Amsterdam, 1620), 47-8.
71 Henderson, Religious Life, 88.
72 Letters, 64; Gillespie, A Dispute against the English-Popish Ceremonies (Leiden?, 1637), A3v. For treatises
specifically aimed against the Arminians, see, e.g., Rutherford, Exercitationes apologeticae pro divina gratia
(Amsterdam, 1636); idem, Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himselfe (London, 1647); idem, Disputatio
scholastica de divinaprovidentia (Edinburgh, 1649); idem, A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty ofConscience
(London, 1649); idem, Examen Arminianismi (Utrecht, 1668); Robert Baillie, Ladensium autokatakrisis, the
Canterburians SelfConviction (London, 1641); and idem, An Antidote against Arminianism (London, 1641).
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Arminianism in Scotland, argues that the movement existed only in seed form amongst
the Scots until the early 1630s. It was then that William Laud and the "Canterburians"
in England "began to blow upon these unhappie seeds of Arminiuf by lending
protection and even favoritism to those who embraced Arminian tenets and by
persecuting those who openly rejected them. Once these "south-winds" entered
Scotland, Baillie says, Arminianism "began to spring amaine" in all the universities.73
Thus, according to Robert Baillie and, more recently, G.D. Henderson,74
Arminianism entered Scotland via their southern neighbor England rather than by way
of the Netherlands. And it did not come alone; it came riding on the backs of Laud and
his Canterburian party, yoked together with an ecclesial agenda. Just how pervasive this
southern migration was in seventeenth-century Scotland is an issue that will be taken up
in chapter five, where we will argue that the English ecclesial influence is the
distinguishing feature of the Scottish context and that which helps to establish not only
the grounds for but also the intensity of Rutherford's opposition to Arminianism.
1.2.4: The Formal Context
The Examen is comprised of lectures drawn up and composed (conscriptum et dictatum) by
Rutherford for his divinity students at St. Andrews. They were posthumously edited for
publication by the Dutch theologian Matthias Nethenus under the direction of
Rutherford's closest friend and most intimate disciple (intimae admissionis discipulus)
Robert MacWard (d. 1681), with the assistance of Robert Traill (1642-1716).75 The
lectures themselves were most likely originally written and delivered by Rutherford
sometime between his appointment as professor of divinity in 1639 and his departure
for the Westminster Assembly in 1643. This range of dates is suggested by the
following two facts: (1) none of the works cited by Rutherford in the Examen has a
publication date later than 1639;76 and (2) Rutherford makes a passing comment in the
73 Baillie, Ladensium autokatakrisis, 11-12, 21; idem, Antidote againstArminianism, 17-18.
74 "Arminianism in Scodand," 493. Henderson's work is largely founded upon the prior seventeenth-
century work of Robert Baillie.
75 See Examen, title page; "Epistola Dedicatoria," *2a; and MacWard's Foreward. Robert MacWard is
quite probably Rutherford's most intimate friend and disciple. He studied under Rutherford at St.
Andrews in the early years of Rutherford's teaching career, accompanied him to London as his
amanuensis during the time of the Westminster Assembly, edited the first edition of his Letters (1664), and
authored his first biography.
76 Among the works cited with the latest publication dates are: Thomas Goodwin's De aggravation peccati
(1637); "Laud's Liturgy" (1637); and William Laud'sA Relation ofThe Conference betweene William Laud,...and
Mr. Fisher the Jesuite (1639). See, e.g., Examen, 50-51, 136, 744.
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Examen about "Arminians in England' seeking to "gratify the Anglican Bishops, who are
now in possession of things" in the church—which would appear to suggest that, at the time
of Rutherford's writing, William Laud's control of the church was a contemporaneous
event.77
In spite of their relatively early development, however, the lectures almost
certainly would have remained in use throughout Rutherford's career in St. Andrews.
Even though it is true that this period marks a hotbed of activity against Arminianism in
Scotland, Rutherford is still writing treatises against the Arminians as late as 1649,78 and
his opponents—who would surely have provoked some kind of response from
Rutherford—are active in print well into the 1650s.79 Others of Rutherford's
contemporaries, moreover, continue to speak out against Arminian theology into the
late 1640s and, some do so even into the mid-1680s, almost seventy years after the
Synod of Dort.80 The point of all this is simply that Rutherford's lectures, although
most likely written during Lis early years in St. Andrews, would have continued to be
used by him within the classroom for as long as he was still lecturing, because
Axminianism remained a threat in Scotland until well after he died in 1661. That this is
so will become even more apparent when we see the grounds for Rutherford's
opposition to Arminianism in chapter five.
Fragments from lectures given by Rutherford in 1648 and 1654 and transcribed
by at least two of his students still remain in manuscript form today.81 Both fragments
deal with the topic of the doctrine of Scripture and were obviously part of Rutherford's
lectures on "the Common Places of Divinity," which was, ever since Andrew Melville's
day, the responsibility of the Principal of St. Mary's College.82 Since neither manuscript
77 Examen, 97, emphasis added.
78 E.g., A Free Disputation against Pretended Eiberty of Conscience tending to Pesohe Doubts moved by Mr. John
Goodwin, John Baptist, Dr. Jer. Taylor, the Be/gick Arminians, Sociniatis, and other Authors contending for lawlesse
Eiberty, or licentious Toleration ofSects and Heresies (London, 1649); and Disputatio scholastica de divina providentia.
Variispraelectionibus.. .adversusJesuitas, Arminianos, Socinianos... (Edinburgh, 1649).
79 E.g., Jeremy Taylor, Unum necessarium: or, The Doctrine and Practice ofRepentance (London, 1655).
80 John Goodwin (1593-1665), one of the antagonists of Rutherford's Pretended Liberty of Conscience, is
publicly branded as an Arminian by Thomas Edwards (1599-1647) in 1646 and, again, in 1647 (Sell, The
Great Debate, 29). For later treatments of Arminianism, see David Dickson, Therapeutica sacra (London,
1656); and idem, Truth's Victory over Error (Edinburgh, 1684).
81 Unpublished manuscripts, National Library of Scodand, Edinburgh, MSS 16475; and St. Andrews
University Library, BS 540.R8.
82 J.K. Cameron, "Andrew Melville in St. Andrews," in In Divers Manners: A St. Mary's Miscellany, ed.
D.W.D. Shaw (St. Andrews: St. Mary's College, 1990), 64, 69.
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bears much resemblance to the Examen and since Rutherford was not named Principal
of St. Mary's until 1648—after he returned from the Westminster Assembly—this
would seem to confirm a date for the Examen in the early 1640s. It is possible, given the
fact that disputations were a normal part of the classroom experience in the 1630s and
40s and the systematic treatment of theology in the Examen, that its lectures were also
part of Rutherford's series on "the Common Places of Divinity."83 This would help to
explain how Rutherford could have continued using the material in the Examen in the
classroom even into the early 1660s. But it also raises the question of why he would
have failed to update the manuscript of the Examen with more recently published
material in order to bolster his argument. One possible explanation is that he was
prevented from doing so because of time constraints. As Principal of St. Mary's
College, Rutherford undoubtedly kept a busy schedule. But ifwe remember that he also
shared at least the preaching responsibilities—if not also the pastoral responsibilities—
with Robert Blair in the Town Kirk; that he was at the height of his influence after the
Westminster Assembly and, thus, would have been in demand in various
denominational matters; that he continued to correspond by letter with friends, fellow-
pastors, and many of his former parishioners; and that he published five weighty
theological treatises during this time, along with a popular testimonial concerning the
death of his patron in Anwoth—we can understand how he might have been prevented
from updating what was just one part of his lecture notes.84
1.3: A Note on Methodology
Because this thesis presents a study in historical theology rather than in systematic
theology, it will tend to be more descriptive than prescriptive of Rutherford's theology
and his examination of Arminianism. While opportunity is taken from time to time to
offer critique of Rutherford's theology, especially where it is most warranted, the goal of
this thesis is not so much to determine whether Rutherford is correct in believing as he
does so much as to determine what he actually does believe and to engage with modern
scholars who have misunderstood him. At some points, we have offered critiques of
modern evaluations of individual doctrines held by Rutherford in order to help develop
83 Ronald G. Cant, The University of St. Andrews: A Short History (Edinburgh and London: Scottish
Academic Press, 1970), 70-71.
84 The five treatises and one testimonial are: Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience (1649);
Disputatio scbolastica de divina providentia (1649); The Covenant ofFife Opened (1655); A Survey ofthe Survey of that
Summe of Church-Discipline Penned by Mr. Thomas Hooker (1658); and Influences of the Life of Grace (1659); and
The Fast and Heavenly Speeches and Glorious Departure ofJohn Viscount Kenmuir (1649).
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the fullness of his thinking on a given topic. Because of this and because of the
polemical nature of the Examen, the current study may come across in some places as
not being cridcal enough of Rutherford's views. In these cases, it must be remembered
that our primary intention is to explain and to clarify his thinking rather than to argue
that it is right or wrong. The hope is that, by setting forth Rutherford's theology, this
study will advance, albeit ever so slighdy, the church's knowledge of Rutherford himself
and the times in which he lived and ministered, in order that we might learn from him
and be better equipped to address the times in which we live.
What follows, then, is an examinadon of Rutherford's doctrines of prolegomena
(chapter two), God (chapter three), and soteriology (chapter four), all set within the
context of his dispute with the Arminians. After looking at these things, we will turn
our attendon to considering the grounds for Rutherford's systemadc opposition to
Arminianism and draw our study to a close (chapter five). It would easily have been
possible to extend the area of concentration further in this thesis to include any number
of relevant topics in Rutherford's thinking ad infinitum. We have confined ourselves to
an analysis of those areas that comprise the main loci of any systematic theology and that
reflect the central issues within the Arminian controversy. As has already been
mentioned, we give special attention to Rutherford's Examen Arminianismi in this
process. But we will augment it at times by referring to other works in his corpus, both
published treatises and unpublished manuscripts, in order to provide as complete and
fully orbed a picture of his theology as is possible. And, yet, it needs to be said that the
goal of this thesis is not simply to present Rutherford's theology in toto but to tell a story,
a seventeenth-century story involving Rutherford and the condition of Calvinist
theology in early modern Scotland. Many Rutherford enthusiasts have considered his
lifetime to be the apex of Calvinism's golden age. And. in some ways, it may well be.
But this thesis will consider Rutherford's lifetime from a seventeenth-century
perspective and tell a different story, one that uncovers the nature of the threat posed to
Scottish Calvinism by Arminian theology. Rather than portraying Scottish Calvinism as
flourishing in its vitality, we will show it to be wallowing in the mire of self-preservation.
Early modern Calvinism is not the vibrant Calvinism that many might think—or wish—
it to be. It is a Calvinism backed into a corner, seemingly at the precipice of defeat.
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Chapter 2: Prolegomena to Theology
The question of where one should begin in the study of theology—its ontological
principium, God, or its epistemological principium, revelation—poses a dilemma that is
anything but new within the church. Without God himself, there could be no revelation
of any kind. But without divine self-revelation, no one could know God or anything
about him. The question is not an easy one to answer.1 The tendency among the post-
Reformation orthodox is to answer it by beginning with the epistemological principium;
and so we will launch our study of one such post-Reformation theologian at precisely
this point. In this chapter, we will examine Rutherford's understanding of God's self-
revelation before moving on to explore the ontological principium, God himself, in the
next chapter. Under the heading of prolegomena to theology, we will evaluate
Rutherford's thinking in regard to revelation, natural theology, the role of reason, the
necessity of Scripture, and the nature and interpretation of Scripture, all within the
context of his dispute with the Arminians.3
The importance of beginning with this discussion should be obvious. In the
first place, since all theology is built upon certain principles or presuppositions,
uncovering them in Rutherford and in the Arminians is necessary in order to measure
accurately the character and integrity of their theological systems. In the second place,
accusations of rationalism and of a wholesale acceptance of the speculative
philosophical ideals of the medieval scholastics and of Aristotle are, according to Brian
Armstrong, part and parcel of the Protestant scholastic tradition to which Rutherford
belongs. In order to substantiate or refute Armstrong's claims, and to evaluate the
continuity of Rutherford's theology with Reformation thought, his presuppositions
must be clarified and examined. In the third place, of all the differences between
1 Kevin J. Vanhoozer has recently published a book in which he revisits this question from a modern
perspective and concludes that rather than claiming either Scripture (revelation) or God as our first
theology, we should choose a "both-and approach: we interpret Scripture as divine communicative action
in order to know God; [and] we let our knowledge of God affect our approach to Scripture" (First
Theology: God, Scripture <& Hermeneutics [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2002], 38). This "both-and
approach" is very similar to the way both Rutherford and Arminius handle the principia of God and
Scripture, as we will see in the course of this thesis.
2PRRD, 2:151-223.
3 Although the Reformation's emphasis on sola Scriptura resulted in a separate locus for the doctrine of
Scripture that was distinct from general theological prolegomena, it also resulted in a doctrine of Scripture
that was logically prior to theology (Scripture was the principium cognoscendi tbeologiae). In this way, the
doctrine of Scripture was a formal prolegomenon to theology, and, for this reason, the current study will
subsume it under this larger heading. See PRRD, 2:151-5.
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Rutherford and the Arminians, one of the most basic is their disagreement over
questions relating to theological prolegomena, and, in particular, to the natural
epistemological capacities of individuals.4 For all these reasons, the current study of
Rutherford will seek to begin with a discussion of prolegomenal issues. Much of what
we do here will lay the foundadon for what will follow in the remainder of the study.
2.1: Revelation
2.1.1: Theologia archetypa et ectypa
In continuity with medieval scholastic and Reformation thought, Rutherford believes
that divine self-revelation is necessary for all human knowledge of God. To adopt the
language of Martin Luther (1483-1546), Rutherford's God is Deus absconditus, and the
only way he can be known by his creatures is for him to become Deus revelatus,5
According to Rutherford, this is exactly what God has done. But in so revealing himself
to his creatures, God has not, for that reason, ceased to be Deus absconditus. The creator-
creature distinction necessitates that, while God knows himself perfectly and
comprehensively, his creatures—who are ontologically derivative—know him only
imperfectly and incompletely. Ultimately, God remains incomprehensible for them.
At the heart of this understanding of revelation is the scholastic distinction
between theologia archetypa and ectypa—a distinction which, according to Willem Van
Asselt, can be traced to a similar distinction between theologia in se and theologia nostra in
John Duns Scotus (c.l270-1308).6 The former term, in each case, denotes the infinite
knowledge that God has of himself. As its prior name suggests, it is archetypal
knowledge and, thus, forms the pattern for ectypal knowledge—the theology which is
available to the finite capacities of human creatures through divine revelation.7 The
object of the distinction between archetype and ectype is to convey the idea that our
4 John E. Piatt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology,
1575-1650 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982), 179-201. Piatt suggests that the epistemological differences between
Calvinists and Arminians form the foundation for other areas of their dispute. While it is no doubt true
that prolegomenal issues are fundamental to the Calvinist-Arminian debate, the doctrine of God, as we
will see in the next chapter, is even more fundamental.
5 Bernhard Lohse, Martin Eulher. An Introduction to his Life and Work, trans. Robert Schultz (Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1986), 171.
6 Willem J. Van Asselt, "The Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in
Seventeenth-Century Reformed Thought," WTJ 64:2 (Fall 2002), 322.
7 Richard A. Muller, Dictionary ofEatin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic
Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1985), 299-301.
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knowledge of God is limited by and subject to divine self-revelation. The discipline of
theology can never portray God as he is really and in himself—Deus absconditus or
tbeologia archetypa. It is limited to Deus revelatus or theologia ectypa. But, more than this, the
distinction between theologia archetypa et ectypa also expresses the fact that, in revealing
himself to his creatures, God has accommodated himself to their capacities. Because
finite creatures are incapable of comprehending the infinite God as he is in himself,
God must lisp to his creatures, much as a parent would to his or her child.
Rutherford's reliance upon this scholastic distinction can be seen implicitly in his
embrace of the medieval nominalist distinction between potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata—
which will be discussed in detail in chapter three—and in the clear emphasis he gives to
the difference between creator and creature throughout his theology, which again will be
seen graphically in the next chapter. As Willem Van Asselt has written, "discussion of
this topic can be found in almost all the important dogmatic systems" of the late
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both Lutheran and Reformed, both British and
continental.8 Among Rutherford's contemporaries, one who embraces this distinction
more patently than he does himself is Francis Turretin (1623-1687). In Turretin we can
see how this idea is used to convey revelation by way of divine accommodation.9
When God understands anything he understands it for himself, and as he
is infinite [Deus absconditus], he understands according to infinity [theologia
archetypa\, but when he speaks [Deus revelatus] he is not speaking to
himself, but to us, that is, in a manner accommodated to our capacity,
which is finite [theologia ectypa].10
Martin Klauber has recendy argued that Turretin's use of the distinction
between theologia archetypa et ectypa is instrumental in linking his view of accommodation
with that of Calvin. Rather than seeing accommodation—or, actually, the lack of it in
the writings of the post-Reformation period—as evidence of discontinuity between
Reformation and post-Reformation thought, as Brian Armstrong and others have,11
8 "Archetypal and Ectypal Theology," 323-4.
9 On Turretin's views, see Francis Turretin, Institutes ofElenctic Theology, trans. George M. Giger, ed. James
T. Dennison Jr., 3 vols. (Philipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992-7), 1.1.9, 1:3; 2.19.8, 1:151; and Timothy Phillips,
"Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology and its Bearing upon his Doctrine of Scripture" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1986), especially 123-39.
1(1 Francis Turretin, The Doctrine of Sciipture: Locus 2 of lnstitutio theologiae elencticae, ed. and trans. John W.
Beardslee III (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1981), 202-3.
11 Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Herey, 173. Cf. Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The
Authority and Interpretation ofthe Bible:An HistoricalApproach (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 177.
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Klauber has argued that this distinction plays an important role in demonstrating
substandal theological continuity between them.12 Rutherford's implicit embrace of this
distinction confirms that he, like Turretin, stands in substantial continuity with Calvin as
well. But it also, as we will see in the next chapter, confirms that he stands in
fundamental opposition to the Arminians, who apply this distinction in a wholly
different manner than do Rutherford and the Reformed.
John Webster has, perhaps most recently, issued a significant warning that
would seem prima facie to be aimed against the view of divine revelation advocated by
the distinction between theologia archetypa et ectypa. Webster advises that "[rjevelation is
not to be thought of as the communication of arcane information or hidden truths, as if
in revelation God were lifting the veil on something other than his own self and
indicating it to us."13 Rather, as Colin Gunton has expressed, "the doctrine of revelation
should be understood as a function of the doctrine of salvation."14 But, having said this,
it is not evident, upon deeper reflection, that Rutherford's conception of revelation
differs all that much from the aforementioned statements ofWebster and Gunton. In
the first place, Rutherford in no way denies the express Johannine teaching that Jesus
Christ is the Word of God and, as such, divine revelation. In a way typical of the post-
Reformation orthodox and also of Calvin, he acknowledges that Christ is the "essential
Word" of God, while Scripture is the written Word. The two are related, for
Rutherford, albeit not in the sense that the latter is simply a derivative of and, thus, only
a witness to, the former. They are related in that the former, Jesus Christ, is the
principal author of all prophecy. Jesus teaches us "the quhole [whole] will of God, both
by himself in the dayes of his flesh, and by sending propheits and apostles for that
effect."15 Not only is Jesus himself revelation from God in his incarnate state, but he is
also chiefly responsible for the same, before, during, and after his incarnation.
But more than this, as Willem Van Asselt has argued, the post-Reformation
understanding of the concept theologia ectypa is cast within clear Christological and
soteriological frameworks. Relying upon Franciscus Junius—who is perhaps the first
12 Martin I. Klauber, "Francis Turretin on Biblical Accommodation: Loyal Calvinist Or Reformed
Scholastic?," WTJ 55:1 (Spring 1993), 73-86, especially 78-80.
13 John Webster, Holy Scripture:A Dogmatic Sketch (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2003), 14.
14 Colin Gunton, A Brief Theology ofRevelation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 111.
15 Catachisme, 179, 182. Cf. Institutes I.xiii.7-9, 129-34. For more on this in the post-Reformation era, see
the discussion in Richard A. Muller, "Christ—the Revelation or the Revealer? Brunner and Reformed
Orthodoxy on the Doctrine of the Word of God," JETS 26:3 (September 1983), 312-15.
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Protestant to use the distinction between theologia archetypa et ectypa—as his prototype,
Van Asselt demonstrates that post-Reformation theology characteristically distinguished
between three forms of theologia ectypa-. the theology of union in the person of Christ, the
theology of vision coram Deo, and the theology of revelation to pilgrims in via. Because
Christ is the God-man, who possesses both archetypal and ectypal knowledge and who,
for the salvation of humankind, endured humiliation in via followed by exaltation coram
Deo, he is, therefore, the principium or source of both forms of human theology, the
theology of vision and the theology of revelation.16 The person of Christ and his salvific
work thus form the context and the basis for revelation.,
In the second place, Rutherford, in continuity with the Augustinian tradition,
understands theology to be a theoretico-practical discipline but with the ultimate
emphasis on the practical. Following English Ramists—like William Ames (1576-1633)
and William Perkins—and Dutch Second Reformation theologians—most notably,
Gisbertus Voetius, Johannes Maccovius (1588-1644), and Johannes Hoornbeeck (1617-
1666)—and continental theologians—like Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf (1561-
1610)—Rutherford divides theology into theoria or "faith" and praxis or "obedience,"
and places the accent on the latter.17 The goal of theology, for Rutherford, is
fundamentally practical—a la Peter Ramus' (1515-1572) definition of theology as "the
doctrine of living well" before God.18 It is, in the words of the Westminster Shorter
Catechism, "to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever."19 Like the Puritans in general,
Rutherford emphasizes the importance of theoria in this, but not as an end in itself, only
as a means to the practical end of joyful obedience. This ensures that Rutherford will
say that revelation is, in Gunton's words, "a function of the doctrine of salvation," or,
16 Van Asselt, "Archetypal and Ectypal Theology," 330-31.
17 See, e.g., William Ames, Medulla ss. theologiae (London, 1630), 1; William Perkins, A Golden Chaine,
chapter 1, in The Workes of that Famous and Worthy Minister ofChrist in the Universitie ofCambridge, Mr. William
Perkins, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1616-18), 1:11; Gisbertus Voetius, Ta asketika sive Exercitia pietatis in usum
juventutis academicae nunc edita. Addita est, ob materiam affinitatem, Oratio de pietate cum scientia conjungenda habita
anno 1634 (Gorinchem, 1664); Johannes Hoornbeeck, Theologiapractica, 2 vols (Utrecht, 1663-6); Johannes
Maccovius, Eoci communes theologici (Amsterdam, 1658), I; Amandus Polanus, Partitiones theologicae (London,
1591), title page, 1. Cf. with Rutherford's twofold division of theology into faith and obedience in
Catachisme, 161, 225. The beginning—as well as the overall structure—of Polanus' Partitiones is very
similar to Rutherford's catechism.
18 Peter Ramus, De religione Christiana (Frankfurt, 1576), 6. On the link between Ramus and Puritan
theology, sec Keith L. Sprunger, "Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology," Harvard Theological
Review 59:2 (April 1966), 133-51, especially 145-51.
is WCF, 287. This emphasis is again reflected in Polanus, Syntagma theologiae Christianae (Geneva, 1617),
Synopsis Libri I.
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perhaps more accurately, that it is unto salvation. Revelation is not merely the
communication of information in Rutherford's thinking. It is that, to be sure. But it is
more than that. If theologia ectypa is truly patterned after theologia arcbetypa, then reveladon
cannot merely be factual information about God. It is God communicadng himself
purposively. Though Rutherford would not, as Webster does, define reveladon as
reconciliadon, he would most certainly agree that the "knowledge of God in his
revelation is no mere cognitive affair: it is to know God and therefore to love and fear
the God who appoints us to fellowship with himself, and not merely to entertain God as
a mental object, however exalted."20
2.1.2: Natural and Supernatural Revelation
God's revelation of himself to his creatures—or, theologia ectypa in via—takes two basic
forms in Rutherford's thinking: general or "natural revelation," which is rooted in the
created order and is naturally available to all people; and supernatural revelation, which
transcends the simple created order itself.21 Natural revelation is laid open to all people
in "foure bookes:" (1) the "booke of [the] creation of the Heavens and [God's] workes,
Psalme 19.1;" (2) the "booke of ordinary providence," which Rutherford calls a
"Chronicle or Diurnall [Journal] of a God-head and a Testimony that there is a God,
Acts 14.17. Acts 17.27;" (3) the "booke of the extraordinary workes of God, and some
report of the true God, upon occasion carried to Nations without the borders of the
visible church.. .Josh. 2.10;" and (4) the "booke of mans conscience, Rom. 2.14-15."22
Supernatural revelation, on the other hand, is presented to the creature both scripturally
and extra-scripturally. Scripturally speaking, supernatural revelation has objective and
subjective components. Objectively, it is God's act of giving Scripture. God actively
discloses "his will and Gospell," which was previously hidden, "to Prophets and Apostles"
as "the writers of Canonnick scripture." But it is also the literary product of this divine
act—i.e., Scripture itself. Understood in this way, the Bible is merely a passive or
"literal" and "Grammatical' revelation.23 Before it can move beyond a revelation in letter
20 Webster, Holy Scripture, 16.
21 Examen, 83-4, 629. Both forms of revelation are supernatural in the sense that they are from God, but
the latter is particularly so, in that it is a form of revelation "above the natural order." Cf. Muller,
Dictionary, 265-6.
22 HOC, 10-11. Jack Rogers and Donald McKim have claimed that Rutherford actually denies nature to
be a source of revelation {Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, 203). From the above, however, it should
be obvious that their contention is incorrect.
23 Examen, 328; SA, 39.
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alone, there must be a subjective work of the Holy Spirit, or, what Rutherford and many
of his post-Reformadon peers—using the so-called "more 'dynamic' or 'existential'
language of the Reformers"—refer to as subjective supernatural revelation.24 This
entails "a spiritual opening and declaration of the literal sense" of Scripture to the
individual by the Holy Spirit.25
Extra-scripturally speaking, supernatural revelation can refer to Jesus Christ, the
"essential Word" of God. But it can also apply to the "Testimony of the [Holy] Spirif and
to the dreams and predictions of godly men. Since we have already discussed the first
of these, we will confine our discussion here to the last two. According to Rutherford,
there is a "special internal revelation," in which the Spirit testifies to the spirit of the
elect individual that he or she is indeed a child of God. No person's name is written in
Scripture. The Bible does not anywhere say whether "John" or "Anne" will be saved.
The Holy Spirit alone, by special internal revelation, reveals this to the individual.26 But,
in addition to this, Rutherford—perhaps rather surprisingly to some—acknowledges
that the dreams and predictions of godly men that come true are also to be considered
supernatural revelation. Here he has in mind such things as this:
John Husse, Wickeliefe, Luther, have foretold things to come, and they
certainely fell out, and in our nation of Scotland, M. George Wishart
foretold that Cardinall Beaton should not come out alive at the Gates of
the Castle of St. Andrewes, but that he should dye a shamefull death, and
he was hanged over the window that he did look out at, when he saw the
man ofGod burnt.
Now, Rutherford is quick to qualify this. These men did not suggest that their
predictions were equally as binding as Scripture; nor did they believe them to be
infallibly accurate; nor did they necessarily advocate the ways in which they were
brought to fruition (especially so in the case ofWishart and Beaton). Their predictions
were by and large in accord with the "generall rule" of Scripture, which teaches that
"Evill shall hunt the wickedmanT They were uttered by those who were mature Christians,
"sound in the faith," zealous for the cause of Christ.27 Thus, although Rutherford calls
them revelation, he does not place them on an equal plane with the inspired Scriptures.
Before the writing of Scripture, however, godly men like "Seth, Enoch, Noah, and
24 PRRD, 2:99.
25 Examen, 83-4, 328.
1(' SA, 39-41; Examen, 22.
27 SA, 42-4.
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Abraham...had revelations instead of the Word."28 These pre-scriptural revelations,
unlike the dreams and predictions of godly men living after the close of the canon, are
on an equal plane with the inspired Scriptures.
All this being said, our discussion of revelation is not so much interested in the
ways in which God has revealed himself as whether and how his creatures can receive
his revelation. In other words, what we are chiefly concerned with is this: can the
creature come to know God by way of his divine self-reveladon? And if so, how? Is it
possible for an individual to know God or to know things about him by way of natural
revelation? Or, is supernatural revelation necessary for all theology? It is to answering
these questions that we now turn, in order that we might uncover and evaluate some of
the basic epistemological differences that form the backdrop to Rutherford's conflict
with the Arminians.
2.2: Natural Theology
All one has to do is think about natural theology in contemporary theological dialogue
and Karl Barth's rejection of it immediately springs to mind. His resounding "Nein!" to
Emil Brunner's more positive reception is reminiscent of Luther's repeated invective
against Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531) at Marburg, "Hoc est corpus meum!" Barth states
that "we must learn again to understand revelation as grace and grace as revelation and
therefore turn away all 'true' or 'false' theologia naturalis by ever making new decisions and
being ever controverted anew." He then goes on to say that "if one occupies oneself
with real theology one can pass by so-called natural theology only as one would pass by
an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one does not want to fall."29
If we are to use the Barth-Brunner debate as a grid through which to read
Rutherford's own understanding of natural theology, we will find that Rutherford sides
with Brunner in viewing natural theology much more positively than did Barth. For
Rutherford, natural theology not only exists, but it serves at least two important
funcdons as well, as we will see—it renders all people without excuse before the divine
tribunal; and it acts as an instrument in apologetics. Such a posidve view of theologia
28 Examen, 115.
29 Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising 'Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. EmilBn/t/ner
and the Reply 'No!" by Dr. Karl Barth, trans. Peter Fraenkel (1946; Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002), 71, 75.
Barth's rejection of natural theology is, as he himself says, a "hermeneutical rule" that is forced upon him
by, among other things, his understanding of the transcendence of God and his definition of revelation as
something more akin to reconciliation. Ibid., 76. See also Barth, CD, 1/1, 134.
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naturalis is not peculiar to Rutherford, however. It is the predominant understanding
from at least John Calvin through the time of the Westminster Assembly. In fact, it is
Calvin's notion of the duplex cognitio Del—the twofold knowledge of God as creator and
redeemer—that can be said, without great exaggeration, to set the paradigm for the
thinking of not only his Reformation contemporaries but also his post-Reformation
successors on natural theology.30
2.2.1: The duplex cognitio Dei
Rutherford, like Calvin, distinguishes between the knowledge of God as creator and
judge and the knowledge of God as redeemer. The former he defines as a natural
knowledge of God by which every person "knoweth ther is a God, and that sinne is
forbiddin."31 One way this natural knowledge is received by the creature is through the
works of creation and providence. The first three "bookes" of general revelation are
"laid open...to all nations," such that all people without exception know God.32 But
there is also, according to Rutherford, another way in which natural knowledge is
received by the creature, and this way is more explicit in his writings—the imago Del. By
virtue of creating men and women in his own image, God has placed a knowledge of
himselfwithin their minds and consciences. In regard to the former faculty, Rutherford
states plainly that "knowledge in the mind is part of the image of God."33 This means
that no person is born into the world with a mind as a tabula rasa—which is, as we will
soon see, a position contrary to that taken up by the Socinians and many later
Arminians. Instead, according to Rutherford, speaking in true Calvinian fashion, all
people have an internal awareness of God, a sensus deitatis or habitus deitatis, which
manifests itself necessarily in worship of one form or another. All people "worship
some divine power \numen\ and have some religion, which is a sign that they
acknowledge God."34 "[TJhere is no people so barbarous," Archbishop James Ussher
3,1 The current author has attempted to demonstrate this by tracing the duplex cognitio Dei through the
Reformation and post-Reformation periods and into the Westminster Confession of Faith (J.V. Fesko
and Guy M. Richard, "Natural Theology and the Westminster Confession," vol. 3, The Westminster
Confession into the 21" Century, ed. J. Ligon Duncan III (Fearn, Ross-shire: Mentor, forthcoming 2006). On
the duplex cognitio Dei in Calvin and in the post-Reformation period, see Institutes I.ii.l, 40; and Richard A.
Muller, "'Duplex cognitio del in the Theology of Early Reformed Orthodoxy," SCJ 10:2 (1979), 51-61.
31 Catachisme, 174.
32 HOC, 10-11.
33 Examen, 139, 452.
34 Examen, 326-7. Calvin speaks of a universal semen religionis, sensus divinitatis, or sensus deitatis, which
consists of a divine knowledge placed by God within the mind, and is attested by the universal human
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(1581-1656) adds, "but they will have some forme of Religion," and will acknowledge
some form of deity, which is proof that they know God.35
In regard to the latter faculty, the conscience, Rutherford says that it is an
"Ambassador and deputy Judge from God" to convict individuals of sin and continually
to testify to them "that there is a God."36 Within the conscience specifically God has
written the same "naturall Theology, that we had in our first creation:"
in the Cabinet [i.e., the conscience], the naturall habit of Morall
principles lodgeth, the Register of the common notions left in us by
nature, the Ancient Records and Chronicles which were in Adams time,
the Law of Nature of two volumes, one of the first Table, that there is a
God, that he createth and governeth all things, that there is but one God,
infinitely good, most just rewarding the Evill and the good; and of the
second Table, as to love of our Parents, obey Superiours, to hurt no
man, the acts of humanity; All these are written in the soule, in deep
letters, yet the Inke is dimme and old, and therefore this light is like the
Moone swimming through watery clouds, often under a shadow, and yet
still in the firmament.37
Thus, for Rutherford, the law of nature, which is comprised of both the first and second
tables of the Decalogue, was written on Adam's conscience before he fell into sin. And
although Adam's fall into sin, as recorded in Genesis 3, affected Adam himself and all
who had him as their federal representative (i.e., all people) to such a degree that all by
nature became "dead in sins and inept to a right and good understanding, discerning,
probing, believing, and doing in every spiritual thing" apart from the regenerating work
of the Holy Spirit, this does not mean that the image of God was wholly effaced. The
law of nature remains in the consciences of all people after the fall.38 Even though "the
tendency toward idol worship. Institutes I.iii.l, 43-4; I.iii.3, 45-7; and I.iv.l, 47-8; and idem, Romans and
Thessalonians, trans. Ross Mackenzie, Calvin's New Testament Commentaries, eds. David W. Torrance and T.F.
Torrance (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1960), 32.
35 James Ussher, A Body of Divinitie, or the Summe and Substance of Christian Religion (London, 1645), 3.
Archbishop Ussher is one of the most important figures in the development of Westminster theology.
He was summoned to be a member of the Assembly but never participated in its proceedings. As
Alexander Mitchell has indicated, however, the Assembly "gave unmistakable proof of its high regard for
him" hy relying heavily upon the Irish Articles—which are believed to have been prepared by him—and
upon his Body ofDivinitie, in its formulation of the Confession and catechisms (Alexander F. Mitchell, The
Westminster Assembly: Its Histo/y and Standards (London: James Nisbet, 1883), xvi, 98, 117, 372-3, 422-3).
Both Ussher and his Body ofDivinitie are, therefore, quite important in understanding Rutherford.
36 Examen, 131, 326.
37 Divine Right, 66; PLC, 7.
38 Examen, 86. Rutherford highlights the federal relationship we have with Adam by speaking of us as
"legally in Adams loins" as well as "naturally." He sees three aspects to the corruption passed to us from
Adam: "a partaking" of Adam's first sin, a tarnishing of the image of God, and a "bent-nesse" of our
33
Inke is dimme and old" and is "like the Moone swimming through watery clouds, often
under a shadow," it is, nevertheless, written "in deep letters" and is "still in the
firmament."
In this way, all people know God naturally both as creator and as judge. They
know that "there is a God, that he createth and governeth all things," and "that there is
but one God, infinitely good, most just rewarding the Evill and the good."39 The effects
of Adam's sin, however, have corrupted not only their consciences but their minds,
wills, and emotions as well. Consistent with the post-lapsarian voluntarism of Calvin
and the Reformation,40 Rutherford believes that the natural truth contained in the minds
of all people by virtue of their being created in the image of God is suppressed by the
rebellion inherent in their wills and affections after the fall. All people are thus utterly
powerless in and of themselves "to perform that which pleases God." Their natural
knowledge of God, although it is real, is "weak and insufficient" for salvation. In and of
themselves, people can never come to a saving knowledge of God; they are "blind" and
"dull" in sin.41 A natural knowledge of God is not enough. Salvation requires a
supernatural knowledge, a knowledge of God as redeemer, which can only be secured
by the Holy Spirit working in and through Scripture.42
Rutherford is not alone in his understanding of the duplex cognitio Dei. Not only
is this idea found in Calvin, but it is also found in Calvin's contemporaries Wolfgang
Musculus (1497-1563) and Peter Martyr Vermigli (c.1500-1562), albeit with slight
nuances. Musculus, for instance, actually advocates a threefold knowledge of God in
which he adds the testimony of the Holy Spirit to Calvin's duplex cognitio,43 Vermigli
plainly embraces the twofold knowledge of God but reserves natural knowledge for the
learned alone. "Scripture," he says citing Romans 1.19, "distinguishes wise men and
philosophers from the crude and ignorant masses." Only the former are capable, in his
estimation, of attaining to a natural knowledge of God.44 Despite these nuances in their
nature toward sin (COL, II, 234). But, while the divine image has been tarnished, it has not been
completely eclipsed. Examen, 227.
39 PLC, 7.
40 This idea will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.2.1 below.
41 Examen, 324-5; HOC, 11, 16. Cf. Examen, 139; COL, 21.
42 Catachisme, 161, 174; SA, 310.
43 Wolfgang Musculus, Common Places ofChristian Religion, trans. John Man (London, 1578), 3.
44 Peter Martyr Vermigli, In Epistolam S. Pauli Apostoli ad Pwmanos (Basel, 1558), 30, and 30-33; idem,
Philosophical Works, ed. and trans. Joseph C. McLelland, The Peter Martyr Eibraty, vol. 4 (Kirksville, MO:
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thinking, both Musculus and Vermigli are in agreement with Calvin and Rutherford that
there is a natural knowledge, which is insufficient for salvation. A supernatural
knowledge alone can secure this for the individual. After the Reformation, Calvin's
duplex cognitio Del continues to be used in succeeding generations of Reformed orthodox
discussions of natural theology. Many of Rutherford's predecessors—e.g., William
Perkins, Amandus Polanus, Pierre Du Moulin (1568-1658), and James Ussher—and
many his contemporaries at the Westminster Assembly—e.g., William Twisse (1578-
1646), Anthony Tuckney (1599-1670), and Thomas Goodwin (1600-1680)—explicitly
rely on this distinction in their writings.45
While Rutherford's Reformation forebears and his post-Reformation peers
embrace this understanding of the duplex cognitio Dei, the same cannot be said for
Arminius and his later disciples. The knowledge distinction, as it is described above,
marks a clear point of contention between Rutherford and the Arminians. According to
Rutherford, Arminianism collapses the natural knowledge of God into the supernatural
by its doctrine of prevenient or universal grace. Because this grace is bestowed by God
in creation and sustained by him in providence, even after the fall,46 it eliminates the
possibility of the natural knowledge of God. All knowledge of the divine is
supernatural, because it is made possible by the universal grace of God. It is for this
reason that Rutherford can say that "Arminius calls supernatural grace a remnant of the
image of God present in us after the fall;" that Simon Episcopius (1583-1643) "ascribes"
the basic knowledge that God exists "to grace, not to natureand that other Remonstrants
"teach that the law of nature, a good upbringing [educatio\, an excellent character, and the
remnant of the image of God in people, aregrace."41
Sixteenth Century Journal, 1996), 19, and 18-27. See also, idem, The Common "Places of the most famous and
renowned Divine Doctor PeterMartyr, ed. and trans. Anthony Marten (London, 1583), I.ii, 10-17.
45 Perkins, Workes, 1:144, 154, 159, 517; 2:280, 282, 459; Polanus, Syntagma, 1.10, 12; 9.7, 594; Pierre Du
Moulin, De cognitione Dei tractatus (Hagae-Comitis, 1631), 25-6, 36-7, 126, 128, 161-7; Ussher, Body of
Divinitie, 5-6, 136, 143-4; William Twisse, A Treatise of Mr. Cottons, Clearing certain Doubts Concerning
Predestination. Together ivith an Examination Thereof (London, 1646); 213; idem, A Discovery of D. Jacksons
Vanitie (n.p., 1631), 654; Anthony Tuckney, Eight Letters ofDr. Anthony Tuckney, and Dr. Benjamin Whichcote,
in Moral and "Religious Aphorisms, Collectedfrom the Manuscript Papers of the Reverend and Learned Doctor Whichcote,
ed. Samuel Salter (London: Pater-Noster-Row, 1753), 20, 69; Thomas Goodwin, The Works of Thomas
Goodwin, D.D., 12 vols (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1861-1866), 1:388; 6:375; 10:144.
46 WJA, 2:362-4, 366-8; 3:109-19. See also, Richard A. Muller, God, Creation and Providence in the Thought of
Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions ofScholastic Protestantism in the Era ofEarly Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker, 1991), 244-6. Prevenient grace will resurface again in this and in the next two chapters, where it
will be discussed in more detail.
47 Examen, 325, 358.
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As a result of their collapsing the knowledge distinction through their
understanding of universal grace, the Arminians—in Rutherford's view—grant men and
women too much power in coming to a knowledge of God apart from the special work
of the Holy Spirit and, thus, open themselves up to the charge of Pelagianism. In the
Examen, Rutherford even goes so far as to offer no less than eleven points at which
Arminian theology reflects the perceived errors of Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians.48
While the accuracy of Rutherford's claims will be examined in more detail in chapter
four, especially in connection with our discussion of grace and free will, the important
thing to note here is not so much whether Rutherford's claims are warranted as the fact
that they are made in the first place. Rutherford perceives profound differences
between himself and the Arminians—differences that are at least similar to those
between Augustine and Pelagius in the early church—and he reacts against them with
vitriol, piling up eleven arguments to sustain his diatribe.
2.2.2: The Role of Reason and the Necessity of Supernatural Knowledge
As previously mentioned, Brian Armstrong has argued that the Protestant scholasticism
ofwhich Rutherford is a part placed great emphasis on the role of reason in developing
its theology. In general, he says, this emphasis took the form of an increased reliance on
logical deduction and syllogistic reasoning. But, more significantly, he claims that
reason assumed an "equal standing with faith in theology, thus jettisoning some of the
authority of revelation."49 Armstrong's contentions fall within a steady stream of similar
sentiment expressed by scholars since at least F.A.G. Tholuck's two works, l/orgeschichte
des Kationalismus (1861) and Geschichte des Rationalismus (1865). This sentiment has placed
an important share of the burden for Enlightenment rationalism squarely on the
shoulders of post-Reformation protestant scholasticism.''0 In order to evaluate these
assertions as they apply specifically to Rutherford, and in order to help us in
determining Rutherford's relationship to his Reformation predecessors, we need to
examine the role of reason in his thinking. When we do so, particularly in the context
of Rutherford's fight against Arminianism, we will see that Armstrong's allegations are
more appropriate in describing the Arminians than Rutherford.
48 Examen, 357-62.
49 Calvinism and the Amjraut Heresy, 32.
50 See, e.g., Paul Althaus, Die Prinsfpien der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter er aristotelischen Scholastik
(Leipzig: Deichert, 1914); Bizer, Friihortbodoxie und Rationalismur, and Barth, CD, 11/1. Cf. Otto Weber,
Foundations ofDogmatics, trans. Darrell L. Guder, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1981), 1:118.
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The differences between Rutherford and the Arminians over the role of reason
in theology develop roughly along the lines of the crisis in Utrecht between Christian
Aristotelians Gisbertus Voetius and Martin Schoock (1614-1669) and Rene Descartes
(1596-1650).51 Following in the Christian-Aristotelian and anti-Cartesian tradition
exemplified in Voetius and Schoock, Rutherford believes both in the usefulness of
reason and in its limitation. The natural person, as we saw earlier in our discussion of
natural theology, is capable of right reason and, thus, of knowing God naturally by
virtue of being created in the divine image. But this natural use of reason, like the
natural knowledge of God, is limited. It is "dimme and old" and "often under a
shadow,"52 such that it never leads to salvation but merely serves to render individuals
inexcusable ([inexcusatiores) before the divine tribunal for failing to worship God as they
ought.53 The post-lapsarian human will suppresses both the natural use of reason and
the natural knowledge of God, with the result that the individual is "by nature dead in
sins.. .and incapable [ne quidem sufficientes\ of knowing any good thing."54 He or she, thus,
has a sic et non relationship, so to speak, with reason and divine knowledge, as William
Perkins classically explains: "the same man, that by the light of nature thinketh there is a
God, may by that corruption and darknes of mind that came by Adams fall, thinke there
is no God."53 The individual may perceive the divine naturally or by the use of reason,
but he or she will never embrace God savingly, nor will he or she want to. Using
traditional Augustinian language, as Rutherford himself does, this means that each
person is non posse nonpeccare and must look beyond the natural to know God savingly.56
The insufficiency of reason and the natural knowledge of God in spiritual things
signifies that Scripture is necessary. Contrary to the grandfather of English deism, Lord
Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648), the doctrine of innate ideas does not lead to a denial
of the necessity of supernatural revelation, not for Rutherford and the Reformed
51 On the crisis in Utrecht, see ha querelle d'Utrecht, textes etablis, traduits et annotes par Theo Verbeek
(Paris: Les impressions nouvelles, 1988); and Theo Verbeek, "Descartes and the Problem of Atheism: The
Utrecht Crisis," NAvKl\-.2 (1991), 211-23.
52 PLC, 7. In Examen, <105, Rutherford states that the "dictates of natural reason are not clear and plain."
53 Examen, 480-81. Cf. HOC, 11; SA, 310.
54 Examen, 332.
55 Workes, 2:459.
56 Examen, 349. By non posse non peccare Rutherford does not mean that no one can do or know any good
thing from a human point of view. What he means is that the natural person is unable to do or to know
any spiritual good and that, from God's point of view, every human good deed—erf body or mind—falls
short of giving him glory and thus is sinful by defect. See Examen, 345; and section 4.2.1.1 below.
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anyway. "Had conscience been a faithful register," Rutherford says, "there should have
been no need of a written Bible." But now the "Lord [has] lippened [trusted] more to a
dead paper than to a living man's soul," because the conscience has not been "a good
Bible."57
More than signifying that Scripture is necessary, however, the insufficiency of
reason also signifies that a special work of the Holy Spirit is necessary, because post-
lapsarian natural reason is incapable of understanding Scripture on its own. Salvation—
or, the knowledge of God as redeemer—requires not only Scripture but also the Holy
Spirit giving us a "spiritual clarity" (evidentia), infusing (superinfusus) our understandings
with a "newpower" and anointing us with the "eye salve of Christ."58 To borrow Calvin's
words, the individual must be given "spectacles" to enable him or her to see and
understand true theology in Scripture and to obtain salvation.59 Although the natural
person can know right and true things about God from Scripture (and from general
revelation as well), he or she can never know God rightly and truly—i.e., in a saving
relationship—apart from the work of the Holy Spirit. Natural reason or natural ability
can only furnish a vague and "literal" knowledge of God. It can never lead to an
accurate, deep, and true knowledge of God in relationship.60 As Rutherford himself
says: "Wee teach no such thing, as that Reasonings, Syllogismes, or the Scriptures,
without the Spirit can produce Faith."61 Scripture is soteriologically necessary, for
Rutherford. But it is soteriologically insufficient, because of the post-lapsarian limits on
natural reason. A special and subjective work of the Holy Spirit is, therefore, also
necessary.
This special work of the Spirit is not a creation ex nihilo within the individual, nor
is it in opposition to his or her own natural faculties. In traditional Thomistic language,
Rutherford explains that grace restores and perfects the divine imago, which has been
tarnished as a result of the fall.62 The metaphor of the eye-salve or, in Calvin's case, the
57 Communion, 232.
58 Examen, 85, 328.
59 Institutes I.vi.l, 70. John McNeill comments that the metaphor of the spectacles "is probably Calvin's
decisive utterance on the role of Scripture as related to the revelation of the Creator in creation" (note 1).
Here Rutherford, in a similar way as Calvin, speaks of the Holy Spirit working in and through Scripture as
an "eye salve" to enable one to see.
60 Examen, 82-7.
61 Christ Dying, 278-9.
62 Examen, 299. Rutherford's use of Thomistic language in arguing that grace does not destroy, but rather
perfects, nature occurs specifically in, e.g., Lex, Rex, 122, 324, 327; and Christ Dying, 62.
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spectacles, proves that restoration and perfection is what grace provides. New eyes are
not needed, only the correction of the vision problem. Thus, there is no contradiction
in Rutherford's thinking—or in Calvin's either, for that matter—between faith and
reason, only between faith and natural reason. Whereas, on the one hand, a sinner can
never become a Christian by logic or by natural reason, the believer, on the other hand,
is "the most reasonable man in the world;" and the one "who doth all by faith, doth all
by the light of sound reason."63 The Spirit restores and perfects the created reason of
men and women and enables them, in a distinctively Ramist fashion, to apply the rules
of logic rightly and discern the truth. Scripture itself demonstrates that "[w]hen the
rules of logic [are] followed, the truth [comes] immediately to view, even though it may
have been obscure before."64 In Matthew 21.31-2, for example, Jesus, the perfect God-
man, argues "from an Antecedent to a consequent by naturall logick" and reproves the
Sadducees for "their unbeliefe and dulnesse" in not doing the same and, thus, for their
not seeing the doctrine of resurrection in the Old Testament.65
In referring to the importance of "naturall logick," here, Rutherford is not
talking about the use of logic by the natural person—i.e., one without the Holy Spirit—
but about the use of human logic, insofar as it, like all other arts and sciences, is
common to humans created in the image of God. He is not advocating natural logic
and reason per se but the spiritual, or perhaps better, Spiritual, use of them. His
justification for doing so is rooted in the imago Dei and in Jesus' own example in
passages like Matthew 21. Rutherford's statements about the importance of human
reason also should not be taken to indicate that he emphasizes rationality to the
exclusion of other faculties within the human psychology. As we will see in chapter
lour, Rutherford, in typical Puritan fashion, places great weight on the role of the
affections in knowing God. They are "like the needle, the rest of the soul like the
thread; and as the needle makes way and draws the thread, so holy affections pull [the
soul] forward and draw all to Jesus."66 Humans are reasonable creatures by virtue of
their creation imagine Dei. But they are also affective and volitional creatures by virtue of
this same fact as well. Rutherford, like the Puritans as a whole—reflecting the emphasis
on praxis in theology—never advocates an exclusively rational religion but a whole-soul
"HOC, 22. C£, RD, 9-10.
64 Sprunger, "Ames, Ramus, and Puritan Theology," 142.
65 SA, 49-50.
66 Communion, 316. See section 4.3.2 below.
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relationship with Jesus Christ. This is not to suggest, as John Coffey unfortunately does,
that Rutherford believes this relationship is fostered more by "special and private
raptures" with Christ than by the Holy Spirit's work in and through Scripture.67
Although the Spirit is not tied to Scripture and is free to work or not-work through it or
apart from it—a feature of Rutherford's doctrine of God that will become much more
apparent in the next two chapters—he, nevertheless, ordinarily uses it as his "offiana' or
"workhouse." The Spirit goes along "with the word [and] makes it effectual." His work
is "to enlighten, to teach, to rebuke, to convince, [and] to persuade."68
It is precisely the Spirit's work in and through Scripture and human
argumentation—rather than an exalted view of the natural epistemological capabilities
of fallen creatures—that allows Rutherford to ascribe positive uses to natural theology
in the work of apologetics. Even though the fall has affected every faculty within the
human psychology, "some remanents of the Image of God" do remain in all of us after
the fall.69 Natural theology is, thus, not always or altogether idolatrous. In continuity
with Calvin and Reformation and post-Re formation thinking in general, Rutherford
believes that it is possible to speak rightly and truthfully about God apart from
Scripture, and even to know right and true things about him, although it is never
possible to know him savingly or in the way he means for us to know him.70 Instead of
utterly rejecting natural theology and working de novo in apologetics, Rutherford clearly
sees a use for it. It serves as a common point of contact between the Christian and the
non-Christian world, which must be corrected where it is deviant by the teaching of
Scripture.71 In this process, reason and rhetoric are not to be relegated to the back seat.
67 Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions, 94. The current author has examined Coffey's claim in greater
detail in a forthcoming essay enrided, "'And the Two shall become One Flesh': An 'Affectionate'
Theology of Union with Christ in the Song of Songs," which is scheduled to appear in a collection of
essays on Rutherford edited by Matthew Vogan and published by Rutherford House in Edinburgh.
68 Influences, 60, 172.
69 COL, 14.
70 Rutherford, thus, affirms Edward A. Dowey's understanding of Calvin's doctrine of the knowledge of
God over T.H.L. Parker's. Cf. Dowey, The Knowledge oj God in Calvin's Theology (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1994); with Parker, Calvin's Doctrine ofthe Knowledge ofGod (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1969).
71 Examen, 38-40. Brian Gerrish, in commenting on the Institutes (I.vi.l), says: "[I]t seems clear that the
saving knowledge, when it comes, attaches itself to a remnant of the natural knowledge; otherwise,
Calvin's famous comparison of the Word to a pair of spectacles, which bring to clear focus a confusa
alioqui Dei notitia, would make no sense." Brian A. Gerrish, "From Calvin to Schleiermacher: The
Theme and the Shape of Christian Dogmatics," in Schleiermacher-Archiv, International Schleiermacher-
Kongress, 1984, 2 vols., eds., Herman Fischer, Hans-Joachim Birkner, Gerhard Ebeling, Heinz Kimmerle,
and Kurt-Victor Selge (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), 2:1043n40.
40
Even though these human enterprises can never "convert soules, and lead high thoughts
captive, to the obedience of Chrisf in and of themselves, we should, nevertheless, use
them and look for them to be "sanctified" and "fitly made use of, by the Spirit" unto
salvation.72 As his colleague at the Westminster Assembly, William Twisse, once said:
not to use reason and rhetoric in this way is to "derogate from the wisdom and
sufficiency of God," who gave us such things as "means and helps of seeking after the
Lord, and finding mercy from him."73
The Arminians, on the other hand, reflect a Cartesian approach to reason by
removing the limitations to its usefulness in matters of faith. Their notion of universal
grace effectively does away with the sanctions imposed on created human reason by the
fall and ensures that Arminius and his later successors will assign greater significance to
the post-lapsarian use of reason. Although it is true that Arminius' understanding of the
effects of the fall would appease even staunch Calvinists like Rutherford,74 it is also true
that his understanding of prevenient grace, which is established in creation and then re¬
established and sustained in providence, renders this view of the fall virtually
meaningless—a point that is not overlooked by Arminius' opponents in the seventeenth
century.75 What is more, Arminius' later disciples seem not to have shared his views in
regard to the fall. Some of these disciples explicitly embrace the more Aristotelian, and
Socinian, view that sees every newborn human mind as a tabula rasaJb In the place of a
universal, irresistible, and internal natural knowledge of God endorsed by Calvinists like
Rutherford—and in contrast with Arminius' own convictions as well—these disciples
substitute the idea that all people, if they simply apply themselves to the right use of
72 SA, 55.
73 A Treatise ofMr. Cottons, 207-8.
74 Arminius plainly states that all people are dead in sins and trespasses after the fall in W]A, 2:192-4.
75 E.g., Du Moulin states: "There meete us in the writings of these innovators [i.e., the Arminians], some
places, in which they say, that man in his corrupted state was altogether dead, and that of himselfe, he can
neither thinke, nor will, nor doe, any thing that is good. But these things are said but for a colour, and
that they might deceive the unwary reader: For they say, that a man is able to doe no good without grace;
but by this grace, they understand universal! grace, which is common to all men, and sufficient grace,
which is given, even to them to whom Christ was made knowne, and which doth extend it selfe as farre as
nature." Anatomy ofArminianisme, 298.
76 Conrad Vorstius, Tractatus tbeologicus de Deo (Steinfurt, 1606), 128; Simon Episcopius, Opera theologica
(Hagae-Comitis, 21678), 6; Philip Van Limborch, Theologia Christiana ad praxin pietatis ac promotionem pads
Christiana unice directa (Amsterdam, 1735; originally published as Institutions theologiae Christianae, 1686),
1.2.16. On this, see John E. Piatt, "The Denial of the Innate Idea of God in Dutch Remonstrant
Theology: From Episcopius to Van Limborch," in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, eds. Carl R.
Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster, 1999), 216-20; and idem, Reformed Thought,
202-38.
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human reason with the help of prevenient grace, can discover principles in nature and,
thereby, come to know God "naturally."77
Leaving aside for now the quesdon of prevenient grace, there are at least three
factors that ensure the Arminians will place greater emphasis on human reasoning and
rationality than will Rutherford and the Calvinists. First, one would expect to find a
greater openness to rationalism in a theological system whose focus is more
anthropocentric. And from what we have seen thus far, it would appear that
Axminianism is at least more inclined to anthropocentrism than is Rutherford's
Calvinism—a fact that will be demonstrated conclusively in the next two chapters.
Second, Arminius redefines the scholastic distinction between theologia archetypa et ectypa
and his later disciples reject it outright, thereby revealing a different understanding of
the epistemological relationship between creator and creature in their theology than
what we have seen in post-Reformation theologians like Rutherford.78 Though this will
be explored in more depth in chapter three after the introduction ofpotentia Dei absoluta
et ordinata, for now suffice it to say that the effect of redefining or rejecting this
distinction is that the Arminians collapse Deus abconditus into Deus revelatus, thus
removing much of the element of divine incomprehensibility from their theology.79
After we see how the Arminians regard the medieval nominalist power distinction, this
feature of their theology will become much more apparent.
The third, and most conclusive, factor ensuring that the Arminians will place
greater stress on human reason is their embrace of Thomistic anthropological
intellectualism. It is in this philosophy, with its emphasis on the priority of the intellect
over the other faculties of the human psychology, that Arminius finds a resolution to
the epistemological problem existing between the creature and his or her creator.
Against the more voluntaristic tendency, which is found in Rutherford and in the
Reformed in general, Arminius argues that the intellect possesses the ability to know
good and spiritual things and to direct the will accordingly, even after the fall. It is the
77 "Quare alia responsione opus est: videlicet cognitionem Dei, non esse sic naturalem, ut necessario
omnino homini insit, eique non possit non inesse, tanquam ex naturae principiis fluens, sed sic tantum
naturalem, ut si homo velit ratione tantum uti, principia quaedam reperire possit in nature, auxilio radonis
istius rectae, per quae deveniat in Dei cognitionem." Episcopius, Opera theologica (1678), 16.
78 For Arminius' use of the distinction, see Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, 60-62. For its rejection in
later Remonstrant thought, see Episcopius, Opera theologica (1678), 12-13; and Van Limborch, Theologia
Christiana, 1.1.1.
79 See section 3.2.1.2 below.
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"understanding [which] extends itself to acts of volition," and in "this act of the
mind... the salvation of man and his perfect happiness consist."80 Arminius' receptivity
to rationalism and his divergence from the general trend among the Reformed come
into sharper focus when we discover, as Richard Muller has shown, that Arminius weds
this intellectualism, rather surprisingly, to a Scotistic and Ramistic orientation towards
praxis in theology instead of the Thomistic orientation toward contemplation Of this
union, Muller states:
[It] points, in turn, to the profound soteriological disagreement between
Auminius and the Reformed and, consequently, toward the greater
receptivity of the Arminian system to philosophical rationalism:
Arminius, in contrast to his Reformed contemporaries and, indeed, in
contrast to Aquinas, assumes that a practical theology can also be
intellectualistic because, even in the problem of salvation, the intellect
leads the will. Reason, therefore, can play a greater role in the
construction of theological system than it could on the assumption of a
soteriological priority of will [as is found in Rutherford].82
In keeping with this intellectualist approach, Axminius' later disciples elevate human
reason and, correspondingly, minimize the effects of sin upon the understanding to
such a degree that they deny the necessity of both Scripture and special grace in
salvation. Van Limborch explicitly states that sin, while influencing other human
faculties, leaves the reason wholly unaffected. Thus, when the Bible speaks of the
"Carnal Mind," he says, "we are not to understand that Reason with which God has
endow'd Man."83 Episcopius acknowledges that Scripture is not necessary but only
"useful" (utilis) as an aid and argues that all people are capable of knowing God without
it, "si ullo modo ratione recta duci velint." Others of the Remonstrants, like Vorstius,
even go so far as to deny the need for a special work of grace in salvation.84
Thus it would seem that while Brian Armstrong is correct in seeing an increased
emphasis in the post-Reformation period on the use of reason and logic when
compared with the reformers—a fact that even the reappraisal school acknowledges—
811 W]A, 1:363; 2:189-94. Arminius' intellectualism and the implications of it are discussed more fully in
sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2.1, and 4.3.1 below.
81 For more on the object and goal of theology in Arminius' thinking, see WJA, 1:321-73; and 2:335-7.
For the same in Arminius' later disciples, see, e.g., Van Limborch, Theologia Christiana, 1.1.5.
82 Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, 79.
83 Theologia Christiana, 5.1.4-5; ACS, 1:43.
84 Episcopius, Opera theologica (1678), 6; Du Moulin, Anatomy ofArminianisme, 299-300.
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he is incorrect in claiming that reason and logic assumed an "equal standing with faith in
theology" and, thus, diminished the authority of revelation. Rutherford, true to his
Ramist roots—which can themselves be traced back through the Reformation to such
late medieval humanists as Rudolf Agricola (c.1443-1485)—does plainly assign a
significant role to reason in theology, but not to natural reason.83 Rather than assigning
reason a place of "equal standing with faith," Rutherford unambiguously subordinates
the former to the latter. Reason and logic are wholly impotent in spiritual matters until
they are restored and perfected in faith. Reason never achieves principial status in
Rutherford's thinking, not even after conversion. Scripture and God remain the only
two principia of his theology. Rutherford emphasizes the usefulness of reason to the
degree that he does because he believes that Scripture teaches it to be part of the imago
Dei and, most especially, because Jesus himself relied upon reason and the rules of logic
in interpreting the Old Testament Scriptures. But he limits the usefulness of reason by
his use of Calvin's duplex cognitio Dei and his belief in the necessity of both Scripture and
a special subjective work of grace by the Holy Spirit.
The Arminians, on the other hand, attach more significance to the role of reason
in their theology and, as a result, most closely reflect Armstrong's criteria. Even though
Arminius' own theology does contain distinct features that tend towards rationalism—
features that will be explored in greater depth in chapter four, in the sections on faith
and justification—it is primarily in the thinking of his later followers that the
rationalistic trend becomes more readily apparent. By denying the necessity of Scripture
and the need for special grace, these later Arminians do just as Armstrong claims about
Protestant scholastics like Rutherford: they exalt reason to an "equal standing with faith
in theology," and, "thus jettison...some of the authority of revelation." G.J.
Hoenderdaal, while not taking up the issue of Arminius' own tendencies towards
rationalism, identifies the "stronger rationalist bent" of his disciple Episcopius. He also
argues, contra the stream of sentiment engendered by Tholuck, that it was "Episcopius'
successors at the Remonstrant seminary.. .in Amsterdam," rather than post-
Reformation Reformed scholastics like Rutherford, who helped to bring about the
European Enlightenment by their emphasis upon reason in matters of faith.81' Although
85 Walter J. Ong has linked many of Ramus' ideas with those of Rudolf Agricola in his Ramus, Method, and
the Decay ofDiaglogue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1958), 146, 199-200, 214-20, 258-9.
86 G.J. Hoenderdaal, "The Debate about Arminius outside the Netherlands," in Leiden University in the
Seventeenth Centuty: An Exchange of Learning, eds. Th. H. Lunsingh Scheurleer and G.H.M. Posthumus
Meyjes (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 142.
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some later Arminians, as we have seen, denied any concept of innate ideas and, so,
cannot be considered rationalists in a Cartesian sense, there were some, like Stephanus
Curcellaeus (1586-1659), who demonstrated clear affinities for the Cartesian New
Philosophy. According to Hoenderdaal, Curcellaeus so imbibed this Philosophy that he
"translate[d].. .Descartes' Discours de la Metbode from French into Latin."87 Even though
Episcopius and Van Limborch may have believed that the newborn human mind was a
tabula rasa, they, like the latter's close friend John Locke (1632-1704), still regarded
human reason as the "arbiter of revelation."88 While not completely discarding the value
of Scripture, these later Arminians, by their rationalist bent, did, nonetheless, encourage
an "anti-supernaturalism," in which "reason, instead of being regarded as revelation's
handmaid became its master, and in some cases, its replacement."
This same Arminian emphasis on reason in matters of faith—eschewed by
Rutherford as Pelagianism—can also be found in England, quite significantly, in the
writings ofWilliam Laud. The issue of whether Laud himself can actually be considered
an Arminian will be discussed in chapter five. But, for now, it is enough to point out
the similarities in the teachings of Laud and the Arminians. Sounding much like the
later Arminians and John Locke too, Laud declared that "reason by her own light can
discover how firmly the principles of religion are true."90 Because of the Laudian
imposition into Scotland, this feature of Arminian theology would not merely have been
a continental phenomenon, for Rutherford, but an ever-present reality near at hand.
2.2.3: Scripture as principium cognoscendi theologiae
Perhaps the most striking feature of Rutherford's natural theology and his
understanding of the role of reason is that they do not derive from nature or philosophy
but from Scripture. It is not because reason, creation, or any other part of general
revelation tells him there is a natural theology that he believes it, but because Scripture
87 Hoenderdaal, "Debate about Arminius," 142. Descartes' rationalistic approach can be seen in the full
title of this work: E.g., A Discourse of a Methodfor the Well Guiding of Reason, and the Discovery of Truth in the
Sciences (London, 1649).
88 Alan P.F. Sell, "Arminians, Deists, and Reason," Faith and Freedom 33 (Autumn 1979), 19, 24. Not only
did Van Limborch and Locke frequently correspond by letter, but Locke dedicated his A Fetter on
Toleration (1689) to Van Limborch as well, both of which indicate a fairly close association existed between
the two men. See John Locke, Some Familiar Fetters between Mr Focke, and Several of his Friends (London,
1708); Sell, "Arminians, Deists, and Reason," 20, 22; and Hoenderdaal, "Debate about Arminius," 144.
89 Sell, "Arminians, Deists, and Reason," 24.
90A Relation of the Conference behveen William Faud.. .andMr. Fisher the Jesuit (London, -M673), 49.
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teaches it. And it is not because of an inherent rationalism that Rutherford believes in
the usefulness of human reason, but because he sees it on the pages of Scripture. In
order to prove the existence of a theologia naturalis vera, Rutherford appeals to the same
biblical texts as his Reformation predecessors and post-Reformation colleagues—Psalm
19; Acts 14 and 17; Romans 1 and 2.91 And, as we have seen, in order to prove the
usefulness of reason, Rutherford points to Jesus' own use of it in Matthew 21.31-2.
What is true of his natural theology and his understanding of the role of reason,
however, is also true for all his theology: Scripture functions as his principium cognoscendi
theologiae verae,92 This means, in the words ofJames Ussher, that every true doctrine will
not only be "consonant unto [the Scriptures]" but will find "the ground thereof in
them," such that "unto them onely is the Church directed for the saving knowledge of
God."93 To label Scripture the cognitive foundation of theology is not to deny that
natural revelation, philosophy, or tradition have a place in theological discourse. It is to
suggest that natural revelation, philosophy, and tradition—along with every other
human enterprise—must be held up to and examined by the light of Scripture.94
Even primafacie, the Examen substantiates the idea that Scripture is the principium
cognoscendi theologiae in Rutherford's thinking. Each of its twenty chapters is organized
around the exposition of key Bible passages that relate to the topic under examination.
The first chapter on Scripture, for example, is structured around seven main biblical
texts: John 5.39; 1 Corinthians 2.14; 2 Corinthians 4.3; Colossians 2.6-7; Hebrews 13.9;
2 Timothy 3.16; and Romans 14.14. And the same architectonic principle can be seen
throughout the Examen.95 Each chapter is not only organized around scriptural
91 Examen, 325-6; HOC, 10-11, 16. Cf. Calvin, Romans and Thessalonians, 32; idem, Acts 14-28, trans. John
W. Fraser, Calvin's New Testament Commentaries, eds. David W. Torrance and T.F. Torrance (Grand Rapids,
MI: Ecrdmans, 1960), 112; Musculus, Common Places, 2-5; Vermigli, Ad Romanos, 30ff; Du Moulin, De
cognitione Dei, passim; Ussher, Body ofDivinitie, 5; WCF, § 1.1, 19-20; § 1.6, 22-3.
92 On Scripture as principium cognoscendi theologiae, sec PRRD, 2:151 ff.
93 Body ofDivinitie, 18.
94 This is what sola Scriptura means, as A.N.S. Lane makes clear in his article, "Sola Scriptural Making Sense
of a Post-Reformation Slogan," in A Pathway into the Holy Scripture, eds. Philip E. Satterthwaite and David
F. Wright (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 297-327.
95 If we group the twenty chapters of the Examen according to the seven major loci of systematic theology,
then Theology proper, which begins with chapter two, is structured around twenty-four texts of Scripture:
Colossians 1.10; 1 Corinthians 8.6; Acts 13.48; 15.18; 17.27; Romans 8.32; 9.5; 9.11; 9.18; 9.19; 11.23;
Philippians 2.6; Hebrews 1.6; 4.13; Matthew 6.10; 28.19; fames 1.17; Ephesians 1.3; 1.4; 1.11; Luke 21.18;
1 Thessalonians 2.16; 4.3; 2 Thessalonians 2.11; Anthropology, beginning at chapter five, around four
texts: Ephesians 4.24; Romans 5.12; 8.7; and 1 Timothy 2.3, 4; Christology, in chapter nine, around nine
texts: John 10.11; Ephesians 1.7; John 3.19; 15.13; Romans 5.10; 8.34; 2 Corinthians 5.19; 1 Peter 2.24;
and 1 Corinthians 1.4; Soteriology, beginning in chapter ten, around twenty-four: Hebrews 6.4; 8.8;
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headings, however, it is also replete with scriptural proof-texts. Rutherford repeatedly
develops and defends his doctrinal positions by way of appeal to the Bible.96 While he
certainly draws on theological and philosophical arguments and methodological
disdncdons gleaned from the medieval scholasdcs (and others) in order to disprove the
Arminians, his primary concern throughout the Examen is to show that Scripture
contradicts their theology.97 Quite often Rutherford simply makes a bare appeal to a
certain text of Scripture in order to do this. From the beginning of the Reformation
through the end of the sixteenth century, this was all that was required in order for
theologians to validate their positions and to protect themselves from the naturalistic
claims of rationalism. The dawn of the seventeenth century, however, brought an end
to that, as heterodox groups—such as the Arminians and Socinians—claimed to adhere
to the same Protestant Scripture principle as the Reformed orthodox and, yet, embraced
a theology that was, in some cases, radically different.98 This new seventeenth-century
challenge did at times lead post-Reformation theologians to draw out the "philosophical
absurdities or ancient heresies implicit in the[ir] opponent's teaching," as J.P. Donnelly
asserts.99 But more frequently and more importantly, it led Rutherford and others like
him to place greater stress on the nature of Scripture and, in particular, on the
interpretation of Scripture and the significance of the church in the hermeneutical
process. For this reason, the remainder of the chapter will focus on the nature and
interpretation of Scripture in the theology of both Rutherford and the Arminians.
2.3: The Nature of Scripture
What is Scripture like? What attributes rightly characterize it? Why is it, rather than
something else, the cognitive foundation of Rutherford's theology? Before we can
Romans 3.28; 4.3; 7.14; 7.17; 7.18; 8.35; 9.8; Matthew 3.10; 10.5; 13.20; 16.18; Ephesians 1.18, 19; 1 John
l."7, 8; Galatians 5.17; Acts 2.21; 13.43; 1 Timothy 1.15; 1.19; John 10.28; 2 Peter 2.20; and Philippians
2.21; Ecclesiology, which begins in chapter fifteen, around seven: Matthew 18.17; 28.19; 1 Timothy 5.22;
John 10.28; Romans 10.15; 13.4; and Acts 15.6; and Eschatology, in the final chapter, around two: Acts
7.59; and Matthew 25.41.
96 Nowhere is this more apparent than chapters three (election) and tour (reprobation): Examen, 238-96.
97 E.g., Examen, 161, 167, 178, 189.
98 Carl R. Trueman, "Faith Seeking Understanding: Some Neglected Aspects of John Owen's
Understanding of Scriptural Interpretation," in Interpreting the Bible: Historical and Theological Studies in Honour
ofDavid F. Wright, ed. A.N.S. Lane (Leicester: Apollos, 1997), 150-51; J.P. Donnelly, "Italian Influences on
the Development of Calvinist Scholasticism," SCJ 7:1 (1976), 85. On Arminian and Socinian views of
Scripture, see W]A, 2:80-92; and The Racovian Catechisme (Amsterdam, 1652), 1-8.
99 "Italian Influences on the Development of Calvinist Scholasticism," 85.
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answer such questions, we need to examine the underlying issue of the divinity of
Scripture in Rutherford's thinking. The reason being, the divinity of Scripture
fundamentally addresses the problem of the origin or cause of Scripture. Before we can
look at what Scripture is like, we need to establish where it comes from. The post-
Reformation era, of which Rutherford is a part, tends to deal with the problem of the
origin of Scripture by adopting language from the medieval scholastics and from
Aristotle to describe God as the primary author of Scripture and the prophets and
apostles as secondary authors and instruments. In order to further systematize this
position, post-Reformation theologians appeal to four Aristotelian causal categories, all
of which can be explicitly found in the writings of Rutherford and in the Examen,m and
all of which foreshadow doctrines that will be presented more fully in the following two
sections of the current chapter.
The efficient cause of Scripture, for Rutherford, is God himself—Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit. The Father is said to be the author of Scripture, insofar as he immediately
writes "the Ten Commandments.. .on Tables of stone," and mediately leads the "hand
[of the apostles and prophets] at the pen."101 The Son, too, is the author of Scripture,
insofar as he is the essential and living Word of God and the principal author of all
prophecy. But, in a way that is typical of the Reformed orthodox in general, and of
Calvin as well, Rutherford places the greatest emphasis on the work of the Holy Spirit in
the causality of Scripture. Following the lead of Calvin's Institutes, Rutherford
specifically refers to the Spirit as the "Author" and "efficient cause" of Scripture.102
Two things are worth noting at this point in connection with efficient causality.
First, the divine authorship of Scripture, more than any other single factor, forms the
basis for Rutherford's view of the Bible as theprincipium cognoscendi theologiae. Second, it is
important that we call attention to the explicitly trinitanan nature of Rutherford's
understanding of efficient causality. Authoring Scripture, in Rutherford's estimation, is
not a segregated act of one divine person set over against the others. It is an integrated
act involving the triune God as a unified whole. As a consequence, it cannot be argued
that Scripture contains merely the will of the Father—or of any one of the divine
persons, for that matter—as opposed to the united will of the triune God. This will be
100 Cf., e.g., Examen, 521; with PRRD, 2:224-8.
11)1 SA, II, 211; Divine Right, 66.
102 Influences, 172; Christ Dying, 536; Examen, 3, 9, 60; SA, 316; II, 164, 211. Cf. Institutes I.ix.1-2, 93-5; and
John T. McNeill, "The Significance of the Word of God for Calvin," CH 28 (1959), 134, 139.
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especially significant when considered in light of the remaining three causes, but most
particularly, the purpose of Scripture.
Scripture's formal cause, according to Rutherford, is divine truth, and for that
reason, there are certain requisite divine characteristics that can be seen in it. There is,
Rutherford says, "some character, some sound of Heaven...and a stampe of Divine
Majesty" in the Bible that is not found in any human literary work, such that "the style,
liveliness, majesty and divinity that may be seen in the letter of the Scripture are
eminendy above the like in other Writers."103 As Calvin writes, the Bible does not
contain a "dead and killing letter," because God "has stamped upon the Scriptures" his
"own image."104 For Rutherford, formal causality means that Scripture must be received
on its own, at face value, according to its literal sense. This may or may not coincide
with the way the church "expoundeth it."105 What is more, the formal cause of
Scripture—as it is theologia ectypa—also means that a wedge is not to be driven between
God and his words. God's words must reflect who he is (theologia archetypa), and who he
is must be revealed in the words that he speaks. Again, to cite the words of Calvin:
(The Spirit] is the Author of the Scriptures: he cannot vary and differ
from himself. Hence he must ever remain just as he once revealed
himself there. This is no affront to him, unless perchance we consider it
honorable for him to decline or degenerate from himself.106
The final cause of Scripture, in Rutherford's thinking, is to "teach us quhat [what]
God is in himself, and his holie nature, and quhat he is in his worlds towards us."107
Considering Rutherford's primary emphasis on praxis in theology, this means that
Scripture is not merely intellectual information about God but purposive divine self-
reveladon. Scripture is given to us unto salvadon. Indeed, as we have seen, salvadon is
ordinarily impossible without it. Thus, Rutherford can speak of the Bible as the "formal
means of Faith" and, in characterisdc Ramist language, as that which contains
everything necessary both for faith—because "Scripture is a precise rule.. .of Religion
towards God" and the only fountain of "all things to mak us wise to salvation"—and
for obedience—because "Scripture is [also] a precise rule...of Justice and Mercy
103 Ttyal, 98; Influences, 172. Cf. WCF, § 1.5, 21-2.
1(14 Institutes I.ix.1-2, 93-4.
105 Christ Dying, 536.
106 Institutes I.ix.2, 94-5.
107 Catachisme, 162.
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towards one's neighbor."108 Since all three persons of the Godhead—but particularly
the Spirit—wrote the Bible and intended it for salvation, it is, therefore, in Rutherford's
thinking, a primary means that God uses to convey his grace to people. Ordinarily,
there will be no salvation apart from the Spirit working in and through Scripture.
But if the purpose of Scripture is to teach us who God is and what he is towards
us, then obviously its material cause, or subject matter, will be such as will enable that
purpose to be fulfilled. Therefore, according to Rutherford, it is God himself who is
presented to us in the text of Scripture, not so much as he is in his essence but as he is
in his attributes—which is, as we will see in the next chapter, a key distinction in
Rutherford's theology especially over against Arminian teaching—not comprehensively
but sufficiently for faith and obedience, and then always accommodated to the
capacities of human creatures. Because the material cause of Scripture is God himself
"lisping" to us, and because its efficient cause is also God, Rutherford is willing to
ascribe to Scripture a corresponding "materiaP power, "even as contradistinguished
from the [Holy S]pirit acting with it." In this way, the Bible functions like "a Sword or
an Axe of steel," which from "the matter and artificer that made them hath actu primo
sharpness and aptness to cut."109
Significantly and, perhaps, rather surprisingly, Arminius also adopts these
Aristotelian causal categories in order to explain the divinity of Scripture.110 The mere
fact that he does so demonstrates the influences of medieval scholasticism upon his
thinking, which, in itself, has " implications for our evaluation of Brian Armstrong's
definition. But, it also demonstrates the need for an urgent and decisive response on
the part of Rutherford to the threat posed by the Arminians. By adopting the same
language and the same basic approach to Scripture—notwithstanding the
presuppositional differences between Arminius and his later followers, who are,
nonetheless, still classified as Arminians—and, yet, holding to radically different
theological positions, the Arminians posed a threat to Calvinist orthodoxy unlike that
posed by the Roman Church in the sixteenth century, which developed its theology
from fundamentally different presuppositions. If, following Heiko Oberman, we say
108 Examen, 112, 114; Catacbisme, 161. Calvin refers to the teleological nature of Scripture by citing 2
Timothy 3.16 and by arguing that Scripture "leads the children of God even to thefir] final goal." Institutes
I.ix.l, 93.
109 Influences, 172. This too seems to be in continuity with Calvin's doctrine of accommodation. See
McNeill's treatment in "The Significance of the Word of God for Calvin," 137-8.
110 IVJA, 2:80-109.
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that the Reformation was, in the main, a clash between two different approaches to
theology—on the one hand, "Tradition I," or "the single-source or exegetical tradition,"
which derived its theology sola Scriptura, and, on the other, "Tradition II," or "the two-
sources theory," which allowed "for an extra-biblical oral tradition" in developing its
doctrine—then the Arminian-Calvinist struggle clearly falls within the bounds of
"Tradition I."111 Arminianism claimed the same presuppositional starting point for their
theology as did Calvinists like Rutherford and, yet, reached sometimes far different
conclusions. As we will see in the next chapter, this is because of a different
understanding of the doctrine of God. But, regardless, Arminianism represented, in the
eyes of Rutherford, a system of thought whose basic presuppositions jeopardized
theological certainty, and, for that reason, it could not be tolerated.
2.3.1: The Perfection of Scripture
In the Examen, Rutherford gives almost no explanation of his doctrine of the perfection
of Scripture. But this is not unusual. None of his published writings contains an
organized—much less a comprehensive—discussion of the perfection of Scripture.
This doctrine is almost universally accepted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Even the Arminians, as Rutherford himself admits, embrace this doctrine
wholeheartedly."2 In spite of the fact that there is little here to distinguish Rutherford
from the Arminians, we will offer an examination of Rutherford's views of inspiration
and infallibility because they form an important backdrop to understanding the rest of
his theology. What is more, Rutherford's views and their relationship to the views of
Calvin have often been misrepresented in the secondary literature. In order to present
as full a picture of Rutherford's theology as possible and to get as accurate an account of
the condition of seventeenth-century Calvinism as we can, we will examine Rutherford's
doctrine of the perfection of Scripture. In doing so, we will rely mainly upon sources
outside of the Examen—chief among which will be the lectures that he gave on the locus
of Scripture in his series on the "Common Places of Divinity."113 Though Rutherford
did not publish a treatise on the doctrine of Scripture, he did lecture on it to his students
at St. Andrews.
1.1 Oberman, Harvest of'Medieval Theology, 371.
1.2 Examen, 5. For Arminian doctrines of Scripture, see WJA, 2:80-92, 322-31; and Confession, 59-77.
1.3 Unpublished manuscripts, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MSS 16475, 2, 3-6; and St.
Andrews University Library, BS 540.R8, 17-41.
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Following in the tradition of the Reformation, Rutherford holds to a strict view
of the inspiration of Scripture. His doctrine is in fact closer to a dictation theory of
inspiration than not:
in writing every jot, tittle, or word of Scripture, they [the human authors]
were immediately inspired, as touching the matter, words, phrases,
expression, order, method, majesty, stile and all: So I think they were but
Organs, the mouth, pen and Amanuenses', God as it were, immediately
dyting, and leading their hand at the pen.114
And commenting on 2 Peter 1.20-21, Rutherford says:
So the Prophets were inspired ^epopEVOS carried, rolled, moved, acted
immediately by the Holy Ghost, for God used not reason, or humane
discoursing as an intervening organ or acting instrument to the devising
and inventing of spirituall or Gospell truths... but yet this immediately
inspiring Spirit spake written Scripture.115
In light of these two citations, one might be tempted to argue that Rutherford favors the
divinity of Scripture even to the exclusion of its humanity. But such a distinction
between the two cannot be made. Unlike many modern theologians operating under
the influence of men like Barth and Berkouwer, Rutherford sees no contradiction
between a high view of inspiration and the humanity of Scripture.116 This is because of
the close relationship that exists between inspiration and providence in his thinking.
The writing of Scripture, like every other event in the created order, falls under the
umbrella of God's providential dealings with his creatures, albeit to an extraordinary
degree. Both divine sovereignty and human agency are preserved together by seeing
God as the first and efficient cause and his free creatures as contingent second causes.
The end product is thus both divine and human. And the two are not to be separated
but taken together. The very words written by the human authors are, themselves, the
very words of the Holy Spirit, and everything that the "Prophets spake, God spake."117
Thus, Rutherford would criticize the above-mentioned modern theologians in much the
same way that he criticizes the Antinomians and Familists in his own day, viz., for their
drawing too sharp a divide between the divinity and humanity of Scripture and, as a
result, coming up with two words: one that is human and, thus, subject to all the
114 Divine Right, 66.
115 SA, 314.
116 Cf. Karl Barth, CD, II/2, 532ff; and G.C. Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, trans. Jack B. Rogers (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 18ff.
117 SA, 39ff; II, 164,211.
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shortcomings of other human productions; and another that is divine or spiritual and,
thus, free from those very shortcomings.118
Yet even though the relationship between the divine and the human in Scripture
is analogous to the relationship between the divine and the human in every day events, it
is not identical. Rutherford believes that the authors of Scripture are kept from error in
a way that humans are not in the course of ordinary providence. The result is an
infallible Bible.119 Scripture is infallible because God, who is incapable of error, inspired
its human authors in such a way that they were preserved from all error: "The
immediately inspiring Spirit, rendred the Prophets and Apostles in that they spake and
wrot by such inspiration, the immediate organs of the Holy Ghost, and such as could not
erre."120 For this reason, to ascribe error to any of the human author's words is to
ascribe error to God's words, and thus to God himself. God's perfect nature stands
behind the words of the Bible. This applies not simply to the original Greek and
Hebrew manuscripts. It also applies to copies and, in some way, to English translations
as well. Although "the meanes of conveying" Scripture, such as "writing, printing,
translating, speaking, are all fallible meanes of conveying the truth of old and new
Testament to us," nevertheless, "the Word of God in that which is delivered to us is
infallible." Here again there is a link between the perfection of Scripture and divine
providence. The God who inspired Scripture infallibly has also preserved it down
through the ages by "an unerring and undeclinable providence." This does not mean,
however, that there is no possibility of error in any one copy or in translations of the
original manuscripts. Rutherford, in fact, admits that there are "errours of number,
genealogies, &c." in the copies of Scripture as we have it.121 But it does mean that God
has kept pure the original—among all the copies—and the translations—insofar as they
are faithful to the original. And this is true to such a degree that "in the body of articles
us This is not in any way to suggest that theologians operating under the influence of Barth and
Berkouwer are simply modern-day Antinomians or Familists, but only that Rutherford would level the
same cridque against them as he does against the Antinomians and Familists. (The Familists were
members of the sect "Family of Love," which was founded in the sixteenth century by the German
Roman Catholic Henry Nicholas. For more, see Christopher Marsh, The Family ofLove in Lnghsh Society,
1550-1630 [Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1994].)
119 Rutherford exemplifies the tendency among Reformation and post-Reformation theologians to speak
of the infallibility of Scripture instead of its inerrancy. Scripture does not err, because it is infallible. No
attempt appears to have been made at this time to "construct a noun out of the verb errare" and apply it to
Scripture as an attribute. See PRRD, 2:300n26.
12(1 SA, II, 211.
121 PLC, 362-3, 366.
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of faith, and necessary truths, we are certaine with the certainty of faith, [that] it is that
same very word of God" that was originally given to the prophets and apostles.12"
Scripture, therefore, is perfect, because it is divinely given through human instruments,
and remains perfect, because it is divinely preserved.
2.3.2: Objections to the Perfection of Scripture
jack Rogers and Donald McKim have claimed that Rutherford, like the Puritans in
general, did not hold to a strict view of scriptural perfection. They insist that such an
understanding did not even develop within the church historically until the nineteenth
century, when Princeton theologians B.B. Warfield and A.A. Hodge fostered a more
stringent theory of inspiration and inerrancy that was then "read back into" history.
Rogers and McKim do admit that "Rutherford was, on occasion, driven to a theory of
dictation," but they allege that he took up this position merely in polemic against
Richard Hooker's (1554-1600) views on worship and that he was "much more
circumspect" in his other writings. Thus, they say that while Rutherford may have "on
occasion" been pushed to a strict view of inspiration and inerrancy, his overarching
concern was to extend the perfection of Scripture only to matters of salvation. Rogers
and McKim argue that Rutherford understood the Bible to speak perfectly in moral
actions and in the fundamentals of the faith but not in other matters. Scripture was not
to be used as an infallible "encyclopedia" on such subjects as the arts and sciences; its
purpose was to "mediate salvation" not to provide "interesting information."123
In responding to the claims of Rogers and McKim in regard to Rutherford's
doctrine of Scripture, at least two things can be said. First, although they are correct to
point out that Rutherford's dictation comments are made in polemical contexts, they
trivialize his comments by calling them "occasional" and by alleging that he was
"driven" to embrace them only because the demands of those polemical situations
forced him into an extreme position that he ordinarily would not have endorsed. This,
however, ignores the fact that Rutherford makes these comments on at least three
different occasions and overlooks the fact that the specific polemical question he is
seeking to answer in at least two out of the three concerns the manner in which the
122 PLC, 366. Cf. WCF, § 1.8, 23-4.
123 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, xvii-xxiii, 205-7, 250n23. John D.
Woodbridge has offered a devastating critique of the Rogers and McKim thesis generally (.Biblical
Authority: A Critique of the Rogers/McKim Proposal [Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982]). We will offer a
critique of their thesis only as it applies direcdy to Rutherford and his theology.
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Apostles and Prophets were "inspired" in the writing of Scripture. In response to the
allegation of the "Papists and Formalists" who would argue that the reason we can add
traditions to the written Word of God is because the Prophets and Apostles made
canonical additions to the writings of Moses, Rutherford says that the Apostles and
Prophets were inspired by the Holy Spirit in a different way than we are today. They
were inspired in such a way that their "every syllable and word" was God's syllable and
word. God did not give them the "power to devise a Gospel" and then write it. Nor
did he merely give them his "rude thoughts," as "Princes and Nobles do" to "their
Secretary" in writing to a "Forraign Prince," and then "go to bed and sleep," leaving the
rest of the letter to the "wit and eloquence of the Secretary." Rather, God gave his
"AmanuenseF the "matter, words, phrases, expression, order, method, majesty, stile and
all."124 Likewise, in response to the Antinomians, Rutherford says that the Apostles and
Prophets were immediately inspired "above the reach" of their "free will, humane
doubtings, discourses, [and] ratiocinations" in such a way that they "could not erre."
This "priviledge" is not given even to the "most sanctified" believer today.125 Thus, it
would seem that although these comments are made in polemical contexts, Rutherford
is responding to specific questions in regard to inspiration with specific answers. There
is no reason to disregard them simply because he is engaging in debate.
Second, and more significantly, Rogers and McKim overlook the explicit,
systematic, and non-polemical statements that Rutherford makes in his lectures on the
doctrine of Scripture. In lecture notes from the year 1654, for example, Rutherford
clearly states his strict view of inspiration: "God himself, without any secondary
counselors, organs, or authors, either among angels or men, devised [cxcogitavit] the word
as its common [valgus] and primary author; and the matters [res], words [verba], and series
of words [iverborum series] are immediately by the Holy Spirit [a spiritu sancto\."nb And in
lecture notes from 1648, Rutherford just as clearly says that the whole of Scripture is
"divinely inspired" to the extent that the Holy Spirit did not merely "assist and approve
of' what the human authors wrote, but "dictated" (dictaverii) the "individual words
[singula verba], the order [ordo], and the series of words [series verborum]" in Scripture. The
human authors are, in this way, "amanuenses" who wrote the very words of the Holy
124 Divine Right, 65-6.
125 SA, 11,211.
126 Unpublished manuscript, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MSS 16475, 2.
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Spirit as he spoke them.127 Furthermore, in the lecture notes from both years,
Rutherford mentions the Greek word Oeottveuotos, from 2 Timothy 3.16, and then
cites texts like Matthew 22.32, 2 Samuel 23.1-3, and Luke 1.70, among others, as proof
that "inspiration" extends to the very words of the text.128
When we couple these explicit statements with Rutherford's doctrine of the
divinity of Scripture, and specifically, with his view of God as its efficient cause, we can
at least say that the assertions made by Rogers and McKim are a bit premature.
Rutherford's dictation comments are not "occasional," nor are they merely confined to
polemical contexts. They are patent and recurring, even though many of them are
found in Rutherford's most obscure writings.
But not only are Rutherford's dictation comments not "occasional," they are
also not atypical among the Puritans of the post-Reformation period. So, William
Ames, using many of the same words as Rutherford, says: "In all those things which
were made known by supernatural! inspiration, (whether they were matters of right, or
fact) he did inspire not onely the things themselves, but did dictate \dictavii\ and suggest
all the words [.singula verba] in which they should be written."129 James Ussher similarly
writes that the "tongue, phrase, matter, and all other circumstances" of Scripture are the
products of divine authorship.130 And William Whitaker—whose doctrine of Scripture,
according to one scholar, is the formative influence behind the first chapter of the
Westminster Confession131—explains that the human authors of Scripture "were
induced and moved to write by the special authority of Christ and the Holy Spirit: for
the scripture is called 0EOTTVEUaTOg, that is, delivered by the impulse and suggestion of
the Holy Ghost....The men were merely the instruments; it was the Holy Ghost who
dictated to them." Lest we be unsure as to the extent of the Spirit's dictation, Whitaker,
citing Augustine's (354-430) analogy of Christ as the head and the apostles as his hands,
127 Unpublished manuscript, St. Andrews University Library, BS 540.R8, 32-4.
128 Unpublished manuscripts, St. Andrews, BS 540.R8, 34-5; and National Library, MSS 16475, 2.
129 The Marrow ofSacred Divinity (London, 1612), 168, compared with Medulla, 179.
130 Bodj ofDivinitie, 8.
131 Wayne R. Spear has written a series of articles in which he seeks to demonstrate this point: "William
Whitaker and the Westminster Doctrine of Scripture," Reformed TheologicalJournal! (November 1991), 38-
48; "The Westminster Confession of Faith and Holy Scripture," in To Glorify and Enjoy God: A
Commemoration of the 350'' Anniversary of the Westminster Assembly, eds. John L. Carson and David W. Hall
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1994), 85-100; and "Word and Spirit in the Westminster Confession," in
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further explains what he means: "Christ wrote all those things which the apostles and
evangelists wrote; because the apostles were only the hands, but Christ the head. Now
the hands write nothing but as the head thinks and dictates."132
A second objection—this time from the opposite perspective—has been raised
by Wilhelm Niesel, John McNeill, and J.K.S. Reid, among others, who have argued that
such an emphasis on verbal inspiration is not found in the teachings of Calvin and thus
represents a warping of his theology.133 According to this point of view, Calvin does not
regard the individual words themselves as being divinely dictated but only the doctrines,
and he subordinates even this concern to the importance of the Holy Spirit in illumining
the individual to understand those doctrines. While these claims do helpfully remind us
of valuable emphases in the writings of Calvin, it is not clear that they accurately reflect
his view of Scripture. What is more, it is not clear that they accurately appraise the
relationship between Calvin and his successors. Although it would take us well beyond
the scope of this thesis to enter into a comprehensive examination of this complex
debate, we will seek to discern whether the above-mentioned assertions are fair, at least
insofar as Rutherford is concerned. There are at least five links between Calvin's and
Rutherford's understandings of Scripture that have been underdeveloped in assertions
similar to those mentioned above. These links show that a closer relationship exists
between Calvin and Rutherford than some have previously assumed.
First, Calvin's use of language to describe the perfection of Scripture is strikingly
similar to Rutherford's own. He calls Scripture the Word of God "set down and sealed
in writing.. .under the Holy Spirit's dictation" and refers to the human authors in this
process as "amanuenses of the Holy Spirit." Even the historical narratives of the Bible
were so "composed {compositaef by divine dictation,134 It is true, as McNeill rightly
points out, that this dictation applies to the doctrines of Scripture. But it also applies,
"in a certain way" at least, to the very words themselves. Thus, Calvin writes: "Verba
quodammodo dictante Christi Spiritu."us While we need to be careful not to read too much
into the dictation theory of Calvin—-as his qualifier, quodammodo, would indicate—it,
132 William Whitaker, A Disputation on Holy Scripture, trans, and ed. William Fitzgerald (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 1849), 526-7.
133 Wilhelm Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, trans. Harold Knight (London: Lutterworth, 1956), 26-30, 35-7;
McNeill, "The Significance of the Word of God for Calvin," 140-45; J.K.S. Reid, The Authority ofScripture:
A Study ofReformation and Post-Reformation Understanding ofthe Bible (London: Methuen, 1962), 36-45.
134 Institutes IV.viii.6, 1153-4; IV.viii.9, 1157.
135 Institutes IV.viii.8, 1155 and note 7.
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nonetheless, remains true that Calvin did believe, according to his own words, in some
form of verbal inspiration. When we add to these statements other comments taken
from his commentary on 2 Timothy 3.16, the potential for substantial discontinuity
between Calvin and his successors is lessened even further. Expressing himself in
language which is reflective of Rutherford, Ames, Ussher, and Whitaker, Calvin says:
"the prophets did not speak at their own suggestion, but...being organs of the Holy
Spirit, they only uttered what they had been commissioned from heaven to declare."
And, shortly thereafter, he boldly asserts that "it [Scripture] has proceeded from him
[God] alone, and has nothing belonging to man mixed with it."136 Although these
statements may not be definitive in and of themselves, they do make it highly unlikely
that there would be substantial theological discontinuity between Calvin and Rutherford.
Second, Rutherford's dictation comments should not be interpreted as negating
the importance of the human author. He, like Calvin, "habitually keeps in view the
human writer of each book, his purpose and intent in each passage; he often features
what experts in our time have called the Sit% im "Leben; and he manifestly feels that such
matters are important if the full meaning and message of Scripture are to be
conveyed."137 This link will become more evident in Rutherford once we have
examined his understanding of the interpretation of Scripture. Others of his post-
Reformation peers, however, demonstrate their continuity with Calvin more explicitly.
William Ames, for instance, writes:
But Divine inspiration was present with [the human] writers with some
variety, for some things to be written were before altogether unknowne
to the writer, as doth sufficiently appeare in the History of the Creation
past, and in foretellings of things to come: but some things were before
knowne unto the writer, as appeares in the History of Christ, written by
the Apostles: and some of these they knew by a naturall knowledge, and
some by a supernaturall: In those things that were hidden and
unknowne, Divine inspiration did performe all by it selfe: in those things
which were knowen, or the knowledge where of might be obtained by
ordinary meanes, there was also added a religious study (God so assisting
them) that in writing they might not erre.
In all those things which were made known by supernaturall inspiration,
(whether they were matters of right, or fact) he did inspire not onely the
things themselves, but did dictate and suggest all the words in which they
136 Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, trans. William Pringle (Edinburgh:
CTS, 1856), 248-9.
137 McNeill, "The Significance of the Word of God for Calvin," 139.
58
should be written: which notwithstanding was done with that sweete
attempering, that every writer, might use those manners of speaking
which did most agree to his person and condition.
Third, Rutherford and his post-Reformation contemporaries also believe, like
Calvin, that the doctrines of Scripture are divinely dictated. This is the basis upon which
they regard Scripture to be the principium cognoscenti theologiae. Amandus Polanus even
uses the same words as Calvin to describe this idea, saying: "Verbum Dei, est doctrina
dictante Spiritu Sancto per Prophetas & Apostolos conscripta, perfecte tradens rationem
consequendi vitam aeternam."139 William Whitaker adds that though there were
"various men who wrote" the Scriptures, there was "one Spirit under whose direction
and dictation they wrote," with the result being, "one continuous body of doctrine."140
Fourth, Rutherford and Calvin express their dictation comments in virtually
identical contexts and come to virtually identical conclusions. Both men are attempting
to distinguish between the apostles and prophets and their "successors" and to answer
the question as to the difference between the two. And both men reply by stating that
the former group was inspired by the Holy Spirit in a different way than we are today.
The apostles and prophets were, in Calvin's words-—which Rutherford would echo—
"certi et authentici Spiritus sancti amanuenses."w This means, for Rutherford and for Calvin,
that the apostles and prophets did not "devise a Gospel" and then write it down. They
wrote "only" what they received from the Holy Spirit, so much so that Calvin and
Rutherford both adopt absolutist language in ascribing Scripture to God "alone" with
"nothing belonging to man mixed with it."142
Fifth, as we have seen above, Rutherford attaches the same significance to the
work of the Holy Spirit in enabling the individual to understand Scripture as Calvin
does. The Holy Spirit illumines and persuades each person not only in regard to what
Scripture says but in regard to Scripture's own divinity as well. The Spirit gives us eyes
to see the Word of God and then testifies to us that what we see is, in fact, the Word of
God. In a way that is typical for post-Reformation theologians, William Perkins,
following Calvin, cites this testimony of the Holy Spirit as "the argument of all
138 Ames, Marrow, 167-8.
139 Partitiones, 1.
140 Disputation, 661.
141 Institutes IV.viii.9, 1157.
142 Cf. Divine Right, 65-6; with Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, 248-9.
59
arguments, to settle and resolve the Conscience, and to seale up the certaintie of the
word of God."143
For these reasons, there does not appear to be substantial theological
discontinuity between Rutherford and Calvin in regard to the perfection of Scripture.
Though there may be some difference in the extent of the inspiration of Scripture in
their thinking—in light of Calvin's quodammodo qualifier—there is, nonetheless,
significant continuity between both men. Rutherford, in this way, confirms the
conclusions reached by Geoffrey Bromiley regarding the elements of continuity and
discontinuity between the Reformation and post-Reformation periods:
In these writers the doctrine of scripture is no doubt entering on a new
phase. Tendencies may be discerned in the presentation which give
evidence of some movement away from the Reformation emphases.
The movement, however, has not yet proceeded very far. The
tendencies are only tendencies. What change there has been is more in
style, or, materially, in elaboration. The substance of the Reformation
doctrine of scripture has not yet been altered, let alone abandoned.144
A third objection—one that also carries a well-founded warning—has been
raised recently to the language of dictation that occurs in Rutherford, in others of the
post-Reformation period, and in Calvin as well. According to John Webster, "[wjhat is
problematic about the language of dictation, or of the biblical writers as amanuenses of
the Spirit, is not only that such notions make the text unrecognisable as a human
historical product, but that they trade upon a confusion of God's omnicausality with
God's sole causality."145 Webster has helpfully put his finger on a linguistic problem
common to Reformation and post-Reformation theologians alike. Rutherford's
propensity to emphasize the divinity of Scripture by speaking of it as being dictated to
amanuenses in the same manner that "Princes and Nobles" would to "their Secretary,"
does tend to minimize the humanity of Scripture and, potentially, to encourage wrong
ideas about the way God works to bring actions and events to pass in the world. To be
fair to Rutherford, however, we must point out that there was no controversy over the
doctrines of inspiration and infallibility either prior to or during his own lifetime. These
doctrines were accepted largely without question. We should not fault him for a less
than clear expression of them. Furthermore, he did explicitly warn against seeing the
143 Workes, 2:56.
144 Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Historical Theology:An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), 328.
145 Holy Saipture, 39.
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text of Scripture as anything other than a document in which the human and the divine
come together inextricably; and he also spoke out in favor of human free will and the
necessity of second causes in bringing actions and events to pass, as we will see in the
next two chapters. And if B.B. Warfield's claim in regard to Calvin is correct—viz., that
dictation corresponds not so much to the mode of inspiration as to its result—then this
would indicate that, though Rutherford's (and Calvin's) language may need to be
refined, he does not understand the divinity of Scripture in a way that excludes its
humanity.146 Nonetheless, Webster's warning is important, and it must be said that
many of the abuses of Scripture in seventeenth-century Scotland may have been avoided
had a warning like his been given at that time and heeded. G.D. Henderson cites two
such abuses of Scripture that appear to stem from an overemphasis on its divinity. The
first involves the practice of "making lottery of the Holy Scriptures" or "of opening the
Bible at random and seeking guidance in the first words observed;" and the second
involves the use of the Bible to disclose the idendty of a thief in a room full of people.147
Rutherford himself warned against this tendency toward bibliolatry in his own day:
We professe we hate with our soules that Chrisdans should adore and
fall downe before an inke-Divinity, and mere paper-godlinesse, as if the
Spirit were frozen into inke, and dead figures, writings, letters, or as if
naked languages of Hebrew, Greeke, and Ladne, could save us. The
Kingdome of God is not in letters, nor in externals, but in life and
power.148
The weakness of the Rogers and McKim thesis is further seen when we broach
the subject of the authority of Scripture in Rutherford's thinking. Biblical authority is
intimately connected with the perfection of Scripture. In the Examen, the perfection of
the Bible—itself grounded on the divinity of Scripture—provides the foundation for its
authority.149 When Rutherford cites 2 Timothy 3.16, for example, rather than explaining
the doctrine of inspiration from it, he draws the following conclusion: "Hence it is
evident that the Scriptures are complete \plenas] and perfect to the point that not only
the traditions of the Papists, but also all human ceremonies, and whatever is devised by
the Anti-Christ or by False-Prophets for the positive observance in divine worship,
146 See B.B. Warfield, Calvin and Calvinism (New York: Oxford University, 1931), 62-4.
147 Religious Life, 12-13.
148 SA, 304. See also page 236, where Rutherford states: "If any idolize the preached or written Word, it
is not our doctrine."
149 This is not, however, to deny the testimony of the Holy Spirit, as we will see.
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would fight against the completeness \plenitudine\ of the Scriptures."150 This conclusion
confirms that Rutherford embraces biblical authority at least to some degree. In order
to answer Rogers and McKim, however, we need to see the extent to which he does so.
Does he view Scripture as authoritative only in matters of faith and morality, as they
assert, or in every subject to which it speaks?
2.3.3: The Authority of Scripture
Rutherford devotes a great deal of space in the opening chapter of the Examen to
discussing the issue of the authority of Scripture. Whereas the perfection of Scripture is
not a matter of contention between him and the Arminians, its authority clearly is.151
According to Rutherford, the Arminians in England "sin shamefully," because they
subvert the authority of Scripture in order to "gratify the Anglican Bishops, who are
now in possession of things" in the church. In currying the favor of these bishops,
Rutherford believes the Arminians are "deliberately" contradicting themselves. On the
one hand, they state that they embrace the perfection and authority of Scripture, and
yet, on the other hand, they undermine both by teaching—among other things—that
both the Presbyterian and Episcopal forms of church government are acceptable.152
This is unthinkable for Rutherford, because, as he alleges, the Bible plainly commands
the Presbyterian form of church government. To advocate any other form besides what
is commanded is to subvert the authority of Scripture. Contrary to Arminius' claim that
some things in the Bible are more authoritative than others,153 Rutherford regards
everything in Scripture as equally authoritative. Christians are obligated to receive
"Occasional, Chronological, and Historical things"—like the fact that "Paul left his
cloak, books, and parchments in Troas" and the fact that "Abraham begot Isaat?'—
"Astronomical things about Orion and the Pleiades, Arcturus and the Northern signs," and
numerical things—like the fact that "eight people were in Noah's Ark"—as no less true




151 Rutherford deals with the Arminians on issues relating to biblical authority throughout the first
chapter, but he concentrates his diatribe in a thirty-one page section near the end of it {Examen, 97-127).
152 Examen, 97-8. Cf. Simon Episcopius, Opera theologica (Rotterdam, 1665), II, 223-7.
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While Rutherford does distinguish between things that are fundamental to the
faith and things that are not, he adopts a fairly intricate hierarchy in order to
differentiate between the two categories, the end result of which is to make the former
category unusually comprehensive. "The Fundamentals," he says, "are those things that
pertain to the vital parts, to the soul and the life of faith." Following Theodore Beza,
Rutherford defines them as the doctrines that are found "either expressly or by
consequence in the Apostles' Creedf'155 Historically, they have been received "by the
consent of all," according to Calvin, as containing the foundation of the Christian faith.
All who subvert this foundation are not a part of the "true Church" but prove, instead,
that they are members of a "false Synagogue." Following after the fundamentals, and
built upon them, are the Supra-Fundamentalia. These things proceed "from the
foundations by plain and necessary consequence" and are, thus, "Fundamentals
secondarily and materially." All who "deny such supra-Fundamentalia, subvert the
Foundation, just as the one who denies a clear and plain consequence, denies its
antecedents." Next in line are the Circa-Fundamentalia. In this category, Rutherford
places everything mentioned in Scripture, even the "Occasional, Chronological, and
Historical things," the "Astronomical things," and the numerical things we mentioned
above. These are necessary by necessity of precept but not by necessity of means. In
other words, they are not so fundamental to salvation that a person cannot be saved
without adhering to them, but they are, nonetheless, fundamental to salvation insofar as
no one who is genuinely saved will deny them.156 The one who denies anything that
"God clearly and plainly reveals in his Word" is guilty of a "Fundamental" sin.
Although Rutherford does allow for "Fraeter-Fundamentalid' or "adiophord'—indifferent
things—he limits this category to what is specifically "neither forbidden nor
commanded" in Scripture. Everything in the Bible is fundamental, for Rutherford,
"because to resist the light of the Word clearly displayed, even in matters of the greatest
indifference, is to deny the Authority of God in the Word."137
The confusing part in all this is that although he defines the fundamentals as the
sum of the doctrines contained in the Apostles' Creed, he adds to this an undefined
number of supra-fundamentals and circa-fundamentals, some ofwhich—borrowing the
155 Examen, 11, 32.
15(1 This is, as we will see, Rutherford's and the reformers' basic argument in regard to the necessity of
works. They are necessary by necessity of precept but not by necessity ofmeans. See section 4.3.1 below.
157 Examen, 4, 11-13.
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language of 1 Corinthians 3.12—are "gold" and thus "necessary to be believed," while
others are "hay and stubble" and "such as exdnguish not saving faith." Because the
supra-fundamentalia and circa-fundamentalia are largely undefined, one is left wondering how
far the category "fundamental" extends in actual practice. On at least one occasion,
when speaking of the Roman Catholic Church, Rutherford takes a broader stance with
regard to the fundamentals both explicidy—by including several doctrines that are not
mendoned in the Aposde's Creed—and impliedly—by blurring the lines of disdncdon
between the fundamentals, on the one hand, and the supra-fundamentaiia and circa-
fundamentalia, on the other:
[T]he Church of Rome erres in the fundamentals, in the doctrine of our
Saviour and his offices, in the doctrine of merit, humane satisfactions,
indulgences, the Scriptures, the Church [T]hey [also] erre about
bapdsme, the Lords supper, confirmation, unction, pennance, though of
themselves thefse doctrines] happily deprive not of life eternall, yet
because the subject about which the matter is versed is most necessary,
they are pernicious errors.... [Then also, they err] touching creation,
providence, mortification, though of themselves thefse beliefs] might be
called errours, simple ignorance, yet for the dangerous consequences,
they are pernicious heresies.158
By referring to the circa-fundamentals and the supra-fundamentals as "most necessary"
and as "dangerous consequences" that flow from fundamental errors, Rutherford
reveals the comprehensive and intricate nature of his view of the fundamentals of the
faith. And Rutherford's statements with regard to the circafundamentalia elsewhere
would appear to support this assertion. Even historical and numerical things are
necessary to the Christian life, by necessity of means. To deny such things is a
fundamental sin. To deny them publicly and obstinately, however, is a "pernicious
heresy." Either way, all errors in circafundamentalia are not to be tolerated by the church
or by the civil magistrate.159 The genuine and practicing Christian will embrace
everything in God's Word, outwardly at least, because everything carries the stamp of
divine authority.
Thus, when Rogers and McKim insist that Rutherford does not view the Bible
as an authoritative "rule" in areas beyond faith and morality, they show that they are
misinformed. Just the opposite is true, in fact; Rutherford views the Bible as an




that Scripture addresses every conceivable issue. It does not teach us how to plow a
field (arandi), or how to sing (canendi), or how to speak in Latin (Latine loquendi). These
things are learned from the principles of agriculture, music, and Latin grammar. The
Bible does not address them in the same way it does matters of faith, because the final
cause of Scripture is not to convey factual information about everything in life but to
reveal the triune God purposively. But when the Bible does speak to the arts and
sciences, it speaks authoritatively and perfecdy, as we saw in regard to historical and
astronomical things in Scripture. Even when it does not directly address a certain
area—like "plowing" or "speaking in Latin"—it still has something to say. It addresses
these areas as they are "moralized" or "Theologized." It may not teach us how to plow,
speak in Latin, or even make "mathematical demonstrations." But it does teach us that
we are to glorify God through the arts and sciences and that we are not to lie while
speaking Latin or defend false conclusions while completing a mathematical problem.160
Rogers and McKim are correct to see a difference between matters of faith and
morality and other areas of life in Rutherford's thinking. But the difference is not that
he believes the Bible to be perfect and authoritative only in the first case. The
difference is that the Bible is sufficient in matters of faith but is not so in other areas of
life. The divine causality of Scripture guarantees that the Bible must be sufficient to
fulfill the divine purposes. Matters pertaining to the arts and sciences fall outside these
parameters. But this does not mean that Scripture should be regarded as less perfect or
authoritative in dealing with those issues. As John Woodbridge has demonstrated, the
authority and infallibility of the Bible in speaking to the arts and sciences is widely
assumed at this juncture in history. Even Galileo (1564-1642) and other fellow-
Copernicans of his day contend that their revolutionary discoveries are in accord with a
strict view of the Bible. Many in the church at this time, like Blaise Pascal (1623-1662)
and Archbishop Ussher among others, go to great lengths in attempting to reconcile the
teachings of the Bible with the findings of science. The idea that the Bible is anything
short of completely infallible and authoritative does not really appear on the radar
screen of the church until biblical critics like Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), Richard
Simon (1638-1712), and Isaac La Peyrere (1596-1676), writing near the end of
Rutherford's lifetime, begin to challenge this prevailing notion.161 Rogers and McKim
160 RLxamen, 108, 109-10, 114. Cf. Divine Right, 108.
161 See Woodbridge, BiblicalAuthority, chapter 5.
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unfortunately overlook this and reveal instead a tendency to read Rutherford's doctrine
of Scripture through Enlightenment goggles.
Rutherford's view of the equal infallibility and authority of every part of
Scripture is even more blatant when it is seen in contrast to his perception of Arminian
theology. According to Rutherford, by acknowledging that some things in the Bible are
more authoritative than others and by ignoring the clear teaching of Scripture—clear,
that is, to Rutherford—concerning the requisite form of church government, the
Arminians minimize the authority of Scripture and open the door to the possibility of a
second authoritative source. To Rutherford this is tantamount to a rejection of
"Tradition I"—to borrow Heiko Oberman's categories once again—and a move
towards Roman Catholicism and "Tradition II." That such a move is endemic to
Arminian theology is confirmed, to Rutherford's way of thinking, by their refusal to
ascribe ultimate authority in controversies to Scripture. Using forensic language
analogously, the Arminians assert that "the Scriptures cannot be the Judge when the debate is over
the sense of the haw, because haw andJudge are separate and distinct?'162 But, then, instead of
going the full distance and assigning ultimate authority to the church, as in Roman
Catholicism, the Arminians locate it in the interpreting individual. Each person, without
coercion—but with direction perhaps—from the civil magistrate, the church, or even
the Bible itself, is to "search the Scriptures" and "try the Spirits," and then to examine
"Controversies of Faith" by what they have gleaned.163
David Mullan has recently pointed to this feature of Arminian theology and
concluded that the Arminians "empowered the individual as a theologically significant
centre of interpretation and criticism," with the result being that they "recognized [the
individual's judgment] as an essential locus of theological authority."1 4 Because each
person is led to a private apprehension of Scripture by "his or her very own spirit of
prophesying," the Arminian empowerment of the individual, in Rutherford's opinion,
had the effect of rejecting the Bible as the ultimate authority and the church as a
secondary authority. And, as a result, it undercut the Reformation principle sola
Scriptura. Although the Arminians still assigned Scripture a modicum quid of positive
162 Examen, 1-3. Cf. Episcopius, Opera theologica (1665), II, 124; Confession, 68-9; ACS, l:32ff.
163 Confession, 69.
164 David G. Mullan, "Masked Popery and Pyrrhonian Uncertainty: The Early Scottish Covenanters on
Arminianism," The journal ofReligious Histoiy 21:2 (June 1997), 174-5.
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authority, they did so only subjectively, insofar as the individual understood it by "his or
her dreaming spirit."165
It is important to point out here that Rutherford is not being entirely fair with
the Arminian doctrine of the "liberty of prophesying." Auminians, like Van Limborch,
embrace the liberty of prophesying in order to preserve the unity of the church and to
prevent the consciences of individuals from being bound by anything but Scripture, not
in order to encourage hermeneutical licentiousness. Furthermore, it is not a "dreaming
spirit" that leads an individual to comprehend Scripture, according to Van Limborch,
but his or her use of "Right Reason." Even keeping this in mind, however, it remains
true that because Van limborch and the Arminians relegate the interpretive decisions of
the church to a "Discretionary.. .not Authoritadve" status, and because they refuse to
allow anything or anyone other than God himself to have any form of coercive power
over the individual's conscience,166 they subjectivize and individualize the interpretation
of the Bible and, in so doing, pave the way for "millions of faiths with millions of senses
[of Scripture], and so no faith at all."167 For Rutherford and the covenanters in general,
such ideas helped to introduce a Pyrrhonian crisis within the church, the immediate
threat of which was to endanger theological certainty.
Rutherford's theological response to this latitudinarian threat is to defend the
Reformation understanding of sola Scriptura, in continuity with the medieval
understanding of "Tradition I." This means, in the first place, that Scripture is the
ultimate authority in all controversies. Of the seven reasons Rutherford gives as to why
this is so, three are of particular interest. First, the Bible itself teaches that it is a binding
arbiter. Therefore, to deny that the Bible functions as the ultimate authority in
controversies is to reject what it says about itself. Second, in response to the forensic
analog)' of the Arminians, he says that Scripture is not "pure law, and nothing else." If
it were, "Judge and Law by necessity would be separate. But because Scripture is the
standard of that which is to be judged, and at the same time has the Holj Spirit joined to
it...it is not necessary that this Law and Judge be separated as a human law and earthly
judge are separated." Third, he states that if the Arminians are correct and Scripture
merely directs and does not compel the individual "to receive the true sense, intended
163 Examen, 89, 91-2.
m ACS, 1:39; 2:1015.
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by the Holy Spirit," and if there is no objective meaning to Scripture, then no one
"would sin by perverting the Scriptures." But this "is said to be done by many, 2 Pet.
3.16."168
This understanding of Scripture as the ultimate authority in controversies raises
the question of whether biblical authority is objective or subjective for Rutherford and,
thus, of whether Rutherford faithfully reflects Reformation teaching on this matter.
Whereas other post-Reformation theologians—like William Perkins and James Ussher,
for example-—devote considerable time and effort to developing objective proofs for
the authority of Scripture, Rutherford does not do so.169 Instead, he more modestly
suggests one objective and one subjective proof:
[H]ow [do] we know Scripture to be the Word of God; there is two
things here considerable; one within, and another without. How
knoweth the Lambe its mother amongst a thousand of the Flock?
Naturall instinct teacheth it. From what Teacher or Art is it, that the
Swallow buildeth its clay house and Nest, and every Bee knoweth its
owne cell and waxen House; so the instinct of Grace knoweth the voyce
of the Beloved amongst many voyces...and this discerning power is in
the Subject [i.e., it is discerned by the individual according to the
testimony of the Holy Spirit], There is another power in the Object, of
many thousand Millions of men, since the Creation, not one, in figure
and shape, is altogether like another, some visible difference there is;
amongst many voyces, no voyce like mans tongue; amongst Millions of
divers Tongues of men, every voyce hath an audable difference printed
on it, by which its discerned from all other. To the new Creature, there
is in Christs Word some character, some sound of Heaven, that is in no
voyce in the world, but in his only, in Christ represented to a beleevers
eye of Faith; there is a shape, and a stampe of Divine Majesty, no man
knoweth it, but the beleever; and in Heaven and Earth, Christ hath not a
Marrow like himselfe.170
Quite significantly, these comments reveal that the Holy Spirit is the connective link
between the objective and subjective proofs of biblical authority in Rutherford's
thinking. Though the divine causality of Scripture does provide grounds for its
objective authority, this objective authority cannot be perceived apart from the work of
the Spirit granting the eyes and the mind of faith. Not only does the Spirit enable us to
168 Examen, 2-4.
169 E.g., Perkins, Workes, 2:54-6; Ussher, Body ofDivinitie, 8-11.
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see the objective authority of Scripture, but it also subjectively and definitively testifies
to us of this divine authority.171
It is this same emphasis on the work of the Spirit as providing the link between
the objective and subjective proofs for biblical authority that can be seen in Calvin.
Thus, while putting great stress upon the subjective testimony of the Holy Spirit in the
Institutes, Calvin also offers objective proofs that stem from the divinity of Scripture.172
When commenting on the Apostle Paul's words in 2 Timothy 3.16, Calvin remarks: "In
order to uphold the authority of the Scripture, he [Paul] declares that it is divinely inspired,
for, if it be so, it is beyond all controversy that men ought to receive it with reverence."
But, lest we be tempted to understand this in isolation from the Spirit's work, he adds:
"If it be objected, 'How can this be known?' I answer, both to disciples and to teachers, God
is made known to be the author of it [Scripture] by the revelation of the same Spirit
[that dictated it]."173 Then, in order to put the matter beyond all dispute by explicitly
combining both the objective and subjective in the Spirit's work, he writes:
"Accordingly, we need not wonder if there are many who doubt as to the Author of the
Scripture; for, although the majesty of God is displayed in it, yet none but those who
have been enlightened by the Holy Spirit have eyes to perceive what ought, indeed, to
have been visible to all, and yet is visible to the elect alone."174
Wilhelm Niesel has incorrectly concluded that these objective proofs "are not of
great value" for Calvin, whereas, for his later successors, they became of primary
importance.175 Such comments not only overlook Rutherford's position, which is
virtually identical to Calvin's, but they also ignore the statements in others, like Perkins,
that assert the testimony of the Holy Spirit to be the "argument of all arguments, to
settle and resolve the Conscience, and to seale up the certaintie of the word of God."176
Thus, Reinhold Seeburg would seem to be justified when he states that "Calvin
establishes the authority of the Scriptures partly upon their divine dictation, and partly
upon the testimony of the Holy Spirit working through them," so long as we remember
that the Spirit is as necessary in the first as in the second. Seeburg's conclusion would
171 Examen, 21-3.
172 Institutes I.vii-viii, 74-92.
173 Commentaries on the Epistles to Timothj, Titus, and Philemon, 248-9, emphasis added in latter citation.
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then also seem to be justified: "Historically considered, [Calvin] thereby combines the
later medieval conception of inspiration with the theory of Luther.. ..[and] is therefore
the author of the so-called inspiration theory of the older dogmaticians" of the post-
Reformation era.177 Rutherford's understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit in
establishing the authority of Scripture helps to demonstrate substantial continuity
between Calvin and the post-Reformation period. He, like Calvin, rightly deserves John
Hesselink's ascription, "The theologian of the Holy Spirit."178 That this is so will be
more evident after our discussion of the role of the Spirit in interpreting Scripture in the
next section and in effecting salvation in chapter four.
In the second place, sola Scriptura, according to Rutherford, means that the
church has binding authority. The church is the "minister" (ministra) of Scripture, and,
as such, it fulfills an interpreting role and "determines" iproponil) what Scripture says. Its
decisions are not merely beneficial to individuals but are binding upon them, albeit only
insofar as they are in accordance with the plain teaching of the Bible. The church's
authority is thus "instrumental" only. Contra Roman Catholicism, it is secondary to and
derivative from the authority of the Bible itself.179 What this means is that scriptural
interpretation is not merely a matter of an encounter between the individual and the
Spirit, because the church, rather than the individual, is the "minister" of Scripture.
Although it is true that the Holy Spirit opens the eyes of individuals so that they can see
the meaning and authority of Scripture, it is also true that the individual's ensuing
interpretation is subject, first of all, to the overall teaching of the Bible and, second of
all, to that of the church. The idea is that the collective wisdom and knowledge of the
church is ordinarily greater than that of any one individual, as our examination of the
church's role in interpreting Scripture in the next section will show.
In an issue closely related to the authority of the church, viz., the legitimacy and
role of a confession of faith, the Arminians once again frame their opinions in order to
ensure maximal latitude in their approach to Scripture. Arminius states that
confessions, and all other public interpretations of Scripture, ought to be confined to
the express words of the Bible and ought not, "as far as [the church] is capable," to
177 Reinhold Seeburg, Text-book of the History ofDoctrines, trans. Charles E. Hay, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker, 1977), 2:395-6.
178 I. John Hesselink, "The Charismatic Movement and the Reformed Tradition," Reformed Review 28
(1975), 149-51, cited in Sell, The Great Debate, 3, 103nl0.
179 Examen, 3, 16; PLC, 23ff.
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utilize "foreign words or phrases."180 Van Limborch adds that "no Man" should ever be
"ded up" or forced to embrace "such Words and Expressions as are not contain'd in the
Holy Scripture, but are only of Human Invention."181 While this position may have
much to commend it-—especially when it is viewed in comparison with Rutherford's
position of extreme intolerance—nonetheless, from Rutherford's perspective, it
overlooks the God-given responsibility that the church has in the propagation of the
tmth. The church, as the "minister" of Scripture, is entrusted with—to again use the
words of Heiko Oberman—the "fides or Veritas contained in Holy Scripture."182 The
church is responsible to teach the people what it perceives to be the right interpretation
of the Bible and to protect the people from what it perceives to be harmful and false
interpretations. Ever since the fourth century and the Arian controversy, the church
had seen the need for confessions and creeds "to preserve its commitment to the New
Testament proclamation" by distinguishing the accepted interpretation of Scripture
from heretical alternatives.183 Such an emphasis on the use of confessions, however,
should not suggest that they would carry an equal status with the Word of God.
Rutherford regards them as only secondary standards, subordinate to the teaching of
Scripture. Individuals are not to subscribe to a confession, "formally and to the extent
that it was written by the Church, but materially, to the extent that it is the word of
God." Scripture alone is "the object of our faith," says Rutherford, not the "set of
words" of a confession. Subscription, therefore, is not "absolute" but "conditional"
upon a confession's faithfulness to the teaching of Scripture.184
The latitudinarian emphasis in Arminian theology provokes more than just a
theological response from Rutherford. It provokes a move to censure the Arminians
for their subversion of the authority of Scripture. As a result of extending a liberty of
prophesying to all persons, the Arminians effectively eliminate the objective line of
demarcation between fundamental and non-fundamental articles. This leads them to
offer religious toleration to a wide variety of sects and to expand the bounds of the
church to include even heretical groups like "Socinians, Anabaptists, Anti-trinitarians,
180 WJA, 2:422.
181 ACS, 1:22.
182 Harvest ofMedieval Theology, 372.
183 Alister E. McGrath, The Genesis ofDoctrine:A Study in the Foundations ofDoctrinal Criticism (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1990), 7.
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Avians, Tritheists, Sabellians, and Papists."!85 For Rutherford, the toleration of such groups
is itself a sinful disregard of the Bible's authority to speak clearly to matters pertaining to
faith. Tolerance can never be extended to groups who err in the fundamentals.
But more problematic than this, for Rutherford, is the fact that the Arminians
place themselves in league with the above heretical groups not merely by tolerating
those views but by publicly holding and obstinately defending their own views as well.
There is a difference, in Rutherford's opinion, between privately held beliefs and those
that are publicly promulgated and stubbornly defended. Individuals who hold Arminian
convictions may still "retain the Foundation" and, if private in their profession, are
worthy of true toleration. But those who publicly inculcate Arminian ideals are not due
this same indulgence.186 Even though they err in non-fundamentals—which fact is not
certain according to Rutherford's comprehensive conception of the fundamentals—they
promulgate and defend these non-fundamental errors vigorously. And, because the
authority of God "is as great in non-fundamentals, and our obligation to beleeve no
lesse, then in the most necessary [of] fundamentals," as we saw before, true toleration is
not to be shown to public and hardened Arminians either.187 Instead, the church and
the civil magistrate are to use all the power at their disposal to ensure that every external
manifestation of their error is eliminated. Rutherford does not shrink from extending
the magistrate's power in this process to include even "the sword," in order that it might
"restrain the external! act[s]" of religion and ensure that all people outwardly adhere to
the fundamentals of the faith and the Word of God.188 As we will see in chapter five,
there is more at stake in Rutherford's censure of the Arminians than the mere fact that
they hold to non-fundamental errors publicly and obstinately and embrace the liberty of
prophesying. These things form part of a bigger picture that will help us to see why
Rutherford reacts with such intolerance towards Arminian theology.
More than anything else, Rutherford's understanding of the authority of
Scripture and his view of the fundamentals of the Christian faith beg the question of the
interpretation of Scripture. This question was one that had not previously required
much in the way of an answer before the middle of the sixteenth century. But now,
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with the emergence of Arminianism and Socinianism in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries—both of which professed to hold high views of Scripture and,
yet, developed theologies that were at odds with Reformed orthodoxy—Rome's
accusation that the Reformation's emphasis on sola Scriptura had empowered
hermeneutical abuses of Scripture without any ultimate means of differentiating between
varying interpretations was beginning to appear prophedc.189 The changing context of
the period in which Rutherford lived required a shift in polemical methodology. The
issues of the perspicuity and interpretation of Scripture now came to the fore.190 The
demand for this shift was further exacerbated by the sharp increase in the number of
religious sects in England during the early decades of the seventeenth century that
tended to treat the Bible as a "nose of wax" to be formed and fashioned according to
fancy.191 Rome's solution to this issue was to locate ultimate authority in the church.
Although they too interpreted Scripture subjectively, "with equall propension to
contradictory senses,"192 the ballast of church authority kept them from sinking into the
depths of utter subjectivity. Rutherford's hermeneutics, to which we now turn, are
developed in such a way as to avoid the Scylla of Rome's accusations of subjectivity and
of Arminian uncertainty, while, at the same time, steering clear of the Charybdis of
Rome's ecclesiology.
2.4: The Interpretation of Scripture
In his attempt to defend a via media between the extremes of subjectivity and
uncertainty, on the one hand, and of ascribing final authority to the church, on the
other, Rutherford articulates his belief that Scripture is perspicuous (perspicua). God, he
says, sounding very much like William Ames, has not revealed the "deep and high
Mysteries, [which are] necessary for salvation" in "dark and enigmaticall prophecies, but
plainly."193 Although "the things themselves are for the most part hard to be conceived,
yet the manner of delivering and explaining them, especially in those things which are
189 Christopher Hill, The F.nglish Bible and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution (London: Penguin, 1993), 428.
190 Trueman, "Faith Seeking Understanding," 157n28.
191 Christ Dying, 536. See also H.C. Porter, "The Nose of Wax: Scripture and the Spirit from Erasmus to
Milton," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 14 (1964), 155-74; and other post-Reformation
theologians: e.g., Ussher, Body of Divinitie, 21. In PLC, 254, Rutherford says that "above twenty sundry
Religions in England came to the streets" during the 1640s.
192 Christ Dying, 536.
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73
necessary, is cleere \clarus\ and perspicuous |perspicuus\."m In continuity with the
Reformadon understanding of sola Scriptura, Rutherford and his post-Reformadon peers
believe that the Bible, at least in the fundamental articles of the faith, is clear and can be
understood by all people, even the most unlearned.
As may be anticipated, vast differences arise between Rutherford and the
Arminians with respect to the ways in which they perceive the perspicuity of Scripture.
These differences foreshadow many of the issues that will be discussed in the following
chapters and demonstrate the immense significance that Rutherford, like Calvin,
attaches to the role of the Holy Spirit in his theology. Adopting similar language to the
Reformed orthodox, albeit with a strongly rationalist bent, the Arminians state that
Scripture is perspicuous, "especially in Meanings necessary to be understood unto
salvation, [so] that all that read them, not only the Learned, but the Ignorant also (that
are endued but with common Sense and Judgment) may, as far as it is sufficient, attain to the
understanding of them."195 Van Limborch and Episcopius, in their own writings, make
this link between perspicuity and the "right use of Reason" more explicit. Episcopius
even claims that "the light of the Holy Spirit is not required to understand the sense ofScripture."1%
Although they attribute this use of reason in comprehending Scripture to the realm of
grace, the effect of their emphasis on reason is to teach that all people are able to
interpret Scripture rightly if only they apply themselves and their natural capacities.
Rutherford, however, argues instead that the "Gospel is hidden [tectum] to the blind and
to those who are perishing."197
But how can he assert that Scripture is both perspicuous (perspicud) and hidden
(tectum) at the same time? In order to answer this question and to differentiate his
position from Arminianism and Roman Catholicism, Rutherford—very much in line
with other post-Reformation theologians like John Owen—speaks of a duplex evidentia
Scripturae, and, correspondingly, of a duplex cognitio Scripturaef8 On the one hand, there is
a "literal and grammatical clearness" to Scripture, by which all people can "grasp" the
"literal and grammatical sense" of the Bible by their natural understandings and thus
194 Ames, Marrow, 170; idem, Medtdla, 181-2.
195 Confession, 72, emphasis added.
196 ACS, 1:18; Examen, 83; Episcopius, Opera theologica (1665), II, 126-7.
197 Examen, 87.
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come to a "literal [and grammatical] knowledge" of it. This literal knowledge is
insufficient for Christian salvation. Even "Devils, Heretics, and those.. .whom Satan, the
god of this age, has blinded' can achieve that. Salvation, as we have seen, requires a
supernatural knowledge of God, which is gained by a "spiritual [or, better, a Spiritual]
opening and declaration of the literal sense" of the Bible. Thus, there is, on the other
hand, a "supernatural clearness" to Scripture, which is productive of this supernatural
knowledge. It is "obscured [obscuras] to Devils and to the blind reprobate in the same
way that the sun is obscured to the [physically] blind, though in itself it is exceedingly
clear \clarus\ and visible." So it is that, although Scripture itself is perspicuous [perspicua),
the effects of sin have rendered all people incapable of grasping anything other than the
literal and grammatical meaning of it. The "Gospel" or the spiritual meaning of the
Bible is "hidden and obscured" (tectum et obscurum) and can only be seen when the Holy
Spirit removes our spiritual blindness, giving us eyes to see and illumining our minds to
understand.199 Apart from this work of the Spirit, the "word of God by itself is [simply]
a dead letter."200
This is not to say, as the Arminians "falsely" accuse, that there are two senses to
Scripture, a "literal and grammatical sense," which is understood by all people, and a
"supernatural sense added over and above it," which is only seen by those who are
supernaturally enlightened. For Rutherford, this is "most false." Just because "the
nearly blind" and the "sharp-sighted see the same sun in different ways," does not mean
that there are "two Suns." And, so, just because Scripture is understood differently by
two opposing groups of people, does not mean that it has two senses. Instead, there is
only one sense to Scripture and that is the literal sense. But there are "two ways of
seeing" this literal sense: one, literally or naturally and, the other, spiritually or
supernaturally. For the believer, the Word of God is perspicuous (perspicuum) "in each
way, in both its natural and its supernatural clearness" ievidentia). But for the unbeliever, it is
perspicuous "in its natural clearness"—contra Roman Catholicism—and is "hidden and
obscured in its supernatural clearness—contra Arminianism. Both read the same literal
sense, but while the unbeliever has eyes to see only the literal and grammatical meaning
of that sense, the believer has eyes to see its spiritual meaning. It is the Holy Spirit, or
the lack thereof, that is the chief difference between the two.201




The literal sense of Scripture is, therefore, the key to its interpretation in
Rutherford's theology. Anyone who has eyes to see and who applies himself or herself
to the "literal! exposition" of the Bible, can clearly understand at least those things that
are necessary for salvation. But what is this literal sense? And what does literal
exposition look like? For Rutherford, the literal sense is the "native sense that the
words offer, without violence or straining." It is not the same thing as the "radical
Scripture principal of the Socinians" and later Arminians,202 i.e., some sort of literalistic
interpretation that reads the Bible only "according to the letter." Scripture is full of
metaphorical, as well as "figurative and typicall," language that must be taken into
account. Jesus' words in Matthew 18.8-9, for example, cannot be interpreted to mean
that we are actually to pluck out our eyes or to cut off our hands and feet. Figurative
passages like this should rather be understood as if "they were turned into modified and
simple expressions." These modifications of "figurative speeches" into "simple
expressions" are to be done in a way that is faithful to the text itself and the "analogie of
faith.""03 The literal sense of Scripture is, therefore, something more akin to its literary
sense. It is the sense that the human author intended to convey to his original audience
through a particular literary genre.
Thus, if we were to borrow John McNeill's comparison, Rutherford would side
with Calvin, rather than with Gregory the Great, in his high regard for the human
authors of Scripture. Though Rutherford can consciously call these authors
amanuenses—as Calvin does as well—they are "far more than a pen" to him.204 This is
because the literal or literary sense that was intended by the human author is the "very
meaning and kindly sense of the Holy Ghost."205 Rutherford follows the humanistic
historical-grammatical method of exegesis typical of the reformers and arrives at the
divine meaning of a given text by discerning what the human author originally meant to
say in writing it. What is more, this identification of the divine intent with the human
intent in Scripture also ensures that there will be no contradiction in Rutherford's
thinking between a reliance upon the Holy Spirit in interpreting Scripture and the need
for real human effort in discerning the author's original meaning.
202 Carl R. Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen's Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster,
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One obvious consequence of this emphasis on the historical-grammatical
method of exegesis is the necessity of knowing the original languages. William Ames
expresses this need succinctly: "|B]ecause the Scriptures...were written in those tongues,
which were most commonly vulgar in the Church at that time when they were written
[i.e., Hebrew and Greek]... .there is some knowledge at least of these tongues [that is]
necessary to the exact understanding of the Scriptures." Another obvious consequence
of this method is that "the Scriptures are to be understood by the same meanes that
other humane writings are." It is precisely because the human authors are of central
importance in grasping the message of the divine author that post-Reformation
theologians, like Rutherford, attach such significance to "Logzck, Rethorick, Grammar,"
and history in the hermeneutical process, not because they have some sort of an
overriding rationalistic bent.206
In keeping with the Reformation's method of exegesis, Rutherford not only
draws upon his knowledge of the original languages but also refers to the original
context and the analogy of faith in order to establish the best interpretation of a passage
of Scripture, when its plain sense is not immediately explicit. His overarching
hermeneutical principle is that Scripture is always the "rule of exporting scripture."207
Because of this, he refers to clearer passages of the Bible for help in interpreting those
that are less clear.208 For particularly challenging texts, Rutherford also turns to a whole
host of biblical commentators and, in many such cases, shows a profound erudition and
breadth of knowledge. For example, in both the Examen and A. Peaceable Pleafor Paul's
Presbyterie, Rutherford argues that when Scripture says "Tell the Church" in Matthew 18,
it actually means the elders or the "Ministeriall Church" rather than all the members of
the church, by offering, in each treatise, over thirteen pages of textual evidence from
both Old and New Testaments to prove his contention. In Paul's Presbyterie, three of the
pages are devoted to disproving those who would argue against him from Scripture
based upon the use of the word "church." On these occasions, Rutherford reveals a
thoroughgoing familiarity with the original Greek and Hebrew, the Septuagint, and
206 Ames, Marrow, 171.
207 SA, 67.
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Jewish culture, as well as with a myriad of theologians, among whom he cites such
"Fathers" as Augustine, Ambrose (c.340-397), Cyprian (d. 258), Jerome (c.340-420), and
Chrysostom (347-407); such "Scholastics" as Aquinas, Ockham, Nicholas of Lyra (1270-
1340), Dominico Banez (1528-1604), Franciscus Suarez (1548-1617), Gabriel Vasquez
(1549-1604), and Gregory de Valentia (c.1550-1603); and such reformers and post-
reformers as Musculus, Calvin, Beza, Polanus, David Pareus (1548-1622), and Robert
Parker (d. c.1650).209 On other occasions in the Examen, Rutherford enters into detailed
word studies in order to discern the meaning of the human author and, in doing so,
even shows an awareness of different biblical codices and their renderings of particular
words and phrases.210
Interpretive situations like these, in which the plain meaning of the text is
difficult to ascertain, serve to establish further the necessity of the church in the
hermeneutical process. But even in these situations, Rutherford sees the church as
necessary ad bene esse not ad esse. Many people can be and are saved, who never have the
help of the church to "cleare their faith." This is because those things that are necessary
for salvation are plain for all who have eyes to see. Other things in Scripture, however,
are not so plain. But this is not because of any defect in Scripture. The Bible is clear
and leaves nothing "in it selfe controversall." Some of the things it teaches, though, are
"controverted" by us, because of our "dulnesse and sinfull blindnesse." In these cases,
it is the domain of the church to "determine from the light of the word" the best
interpretations.211 Their determinations are by no means always infallible, although they
can be. Rutherford certainly believes that it is possible for the fallible church to speak
infallibly, but this is so only insofar as what they say is according to Scripture.212 The
church pronouncing on controverted doctrines is likened, by Rutherford, to ministers
preaching the word. In both cases what they say is the word of God and, thus,
infallible, but only secondarily so, to the extent that it is in accord with Scripture.
Quite obviously, this stance with regard to the church necessitates a trained
ministry. And so Rutherford decries as "intruders" to the ministry those "sectaries"
who "goe from weaving, sowing, Carpentaria, Shoo-making to the pulpit to the
209 Examen, 650-63; PP, 85-98.
210 Examen, 545-6, 571-4, 575.
211 PLC, 24, 33.
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representing of God, and being his mouth to his people, being voyd of all learning,
tongues, logick, arts, sciences, and the literall knowledge of the scripture."213 Ministers
must be schooled in "human arts and tongues," because these things are tools to help
interpret the Bible righdy. The example of Christ and the Apostles in making use of
languages and logic in interpreting the Old Testament—by translating Hebrew passages
into Greek and drawing logical conclusions from scriptural texts—confirms that such
"human learning is lawfull for, and necessary to the opening and understanding of the
Scripture" for us as well.214 This takes on added significance in light of Rutherford's
belief that "[w]hat is in Scripture by consequence is Scripture."215 Ministers, whose
work it is to interpret and expound the Bible, ought, therefore, above all others, to be
trained in languages, logic, and rhetoric, as well as other arts and sciences, in order that
they might rightly understand and apply Scripture for the benefit of the church.
It is important that Rutherford's convictions regarding the necessity of the
church in interpreting Scripture not be understood in contradiction to the work of the
Holy Spirit. His definition of the church as "Godis people chosen to lif everlasting, and
called by his Word and Spirit from sinne to grace and glorie," helps to demonstrate this
fact.216 As Rutherford sees it, the church is the community of the Holy Spirit. It is
organized by the Spirit's calling and comprised of individuals who have been given
Spiritual eyes to see the "supernatural sense" of Scripture. Furthermore, its ministers
have been trained in the original languages and in the use of other such arts and sciences
as would aid in the interpretation of Scripture. And because, as we saw previously, the
use of certain human skills in employing the historical-grammatical method of exegesis
is perfectly compatible with the Holy Spirit's work in interpretation—which is itself a
product of the identification of the intent of the human authors with the intent of the
divine author—the church and, most particularly, church synods, are most qualified to
interpret biblical teaching. It makes sense, therefore, that Rutherford would refer to the
church as the minister or steward of Scripture.
What all this shows is that in attempting to walk a hermeneutical via media
between the Arminians and the Roman Church, Rutherford emphasizes three basic
213 SA, 49.




interpretive categories-—the spiritual, the historical-grammatical, and the ecclesial—each
of which is inextricably tied to the work of the Holy Spirit.217 The Arminians, like the
Papists, deny this threefold approach to biblical interpretation. By doing so, they reduce
the work of the Holy Spirit in the hermeneutical process to, at best, an individual event.
While their motivation for this move towards individualization is a laudable desire to
preserve the unity of the church by allowing for theological latitude in non-
fundamentals, they elicit Rutherford's censure for it in at least three important ways.
First, in denying the Reformation's threefold approach to biblical interpretation, the
Arminians, to Rutherford's way of thinking, identify themselves principally with the
Roman Catholic Church. Second, by allowing for theological latitude in non-
fundamentals, the Arminians function as a living apology for the work of the counter-
Reformation. The Arminian latitude, according to Rutherford, effectively opens the
door for theological subjectivity and thus embodies the Papists' accusation that the
Reformation doctrine of sola Scriptura was productive of such subjectivity. The
objectivity that Rome provided by their belief in the ultimate authority of the church,
Rutherford and the Reformation attempted to provide through the above mentioned
threefold approach to biblical interpretation. The Arminians represented a threat to the
work of the Reformation—a point we will argue more vigorously in chapter five—by
their rejection of sola Scriptura and their openness to theological subjectivity. Third, by
undermining theological certainty, the Arminians endangered not only the work of the
Reformation but the Christian faith itself. Because, as we will see in chapter four,
Rutherford believes assurance to be of the essence of saving faith, the Arminian
Pryhonnian crisis threatened to undermine the foundations of Christianity itself. And,
for all these reasons, it could not be tolerated.
217 Rutherford's understanding at this point is virtually identical to John Owen's, as can be seen in
Trueman, Claims ofTruth, 85.
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Chapter 3: The Doctrine of God
The most important aspect of Rutherford's theology is his doctrine of God. No other
doctrine is more fundamental. It controls and affects Rutherford's whole approach to
theology and influences his understanding of revelation, creation, election, Christology,
and soteriology. In the Examen, it stands at the heart of his dispute with the Arminians,
because the Arminian doctrine of God is equally as fundamental in determining their
theology as it is in Rutherford. This is not to suggest that every doctrine is simply a
derivative of the doctrine of God. In Rutherford and the Arminians, as in other
Reformed writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is, as Richard Muller
has stated, "significant interrelation, even interplay, between the doctrine of God and
the other topics of...theology." By identifying God as the "printipium essendi of
theology," Reformation and post-Reformation theologians—including both Rutherford
and the Arminians—"actually produced a theological system in consistent dialogue with
the doctrine of God."1 In Rutherford's quarrel with the Arminians, it is the specific
interrelation or dialogue between the doctrine of God and soteriology that takes center
stage. The current chapter will demonstrate this by presenting Rutherford's doctrine of
God and the main areas of contention between him and the Arminians. We will follow
the same basic outline that is offered in the Examen, concentrating first on the nature of
God, then on the will of God, and finally on two particular applications of the divine
will to salvation, predestination and the atonement of Christ.
3.1: The "natura Dei"
There is nothing particularly novel about Rutherford's view of the nature of God. His
thinking is not only characteristic of the seventeenth century, but can be traced back
through the Reformation to medieval scholastics like Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and
Anselm (d. 1109) and, before that, to the Patristic tradition of the Latin West.2
Nevertheless, before considering the more controversial doctrine of the divine will in
Rutherford's thinking, we will briefly survey his view of the nature of God and highlight
several areas in which it can be distinguished from the Arminians. We will look at the
essence and attributes of God—specifically, divine perfection, simplicity, and
1 PRRD, 3:33. For post-Reformation use of this phrase, see, e.g., Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 121.
2 For cogent surveys of the nature of God from the medieval era through to the post-Reformation period,
see PRRD, vols. 3 and 4; and RD, 47-190.
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omnipresence—and then at the Trinity, before concluding with a treatment of
Rutherford's view of divine knowledge and what he regards to be a pernicious error
amongst the Arminians, namely, scientia media.
3.1.1: The Essence and Attributes of God
Rutherford begins his examination of the doctrine of God in the Examen not by
answering the questions an sit Dens? or quid sit Deus? as do other post-Reformation
treatments of the doctrine of God,3 but, like Calvin, by answering the question qualis sit
Deus?4 In other words, Rutherford, like Calvin, is most concerned with what God is like
towards his creatures rather than with proving the divine existence or with examining
what God is essentially, in and of himself. Rutherford and his contemporaries do
discuss the divine essence {quid sit Deus)—some more than others—but only insofar as
Deus revelatus and theologia ectypa enables them. Contrary to Brian Armstrong, they have
no "pronounced interest in metaphysical matters, [or] in abstract speculative thought" in
their understanding of God.5 Instead, in keeping with their emphasis on praxis in
theology, Rutherford and the Reformed orthodox are chiefly concerned with what God
is like in relation to his creatures. Even the attempts they make to answer quid sit Deus
are made only as a means to this end. And although it is true that Calvin questions the
helpfulness of asking quid sit,6 this does not prevent him from devoting a chapter of his
Institutes to answering it. As with Rutherford and his peers, however, Calvin insists that
this knowledge of the divine essence is not speculative but practical, because "it invites
us first to fear God, then to trust in him."7 All of the questions asked by reformers and
post-reformers alike are designed not to answer quid sit, at least not insofar as it invites
3 Rutherford actually begins this part of the Examen with a two-page discussion of our knowledge of God.
But unlike other post-Reformation treatments of the doctrine of God, this short discussion only seeks to
answer one question, namely, whether or not "a true and right knowledge of God" can be commanded of
all people without exception. He does not enter at all into speculative questions about whether God's
existence can be proved (Examen, 138-41). Other post-Reformation theologians place more emphasis on
the proofs for God's existence before proceeding to an examination of the divine essence and attributes.
See, e.g., Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 122-35; and, to a lesser extent, Perkins, Workes, 1:11; and Ussher, Body of
Divinitie, 28-9.
4 On these questions and their priority in the Reformation and post-Reformation eras, sec PRRD, 3:153-9.
5 Calvinism and the Amjraut Heresy, 32.
6 Calvin says: "What is God {quid sitf Men who pose this question are merely toying with idle
speculations. It is more important for us to know of what sort he is [qualis sit] and what is consistent with
his nature." Institutes I.ii.2, 41.
7 See Institutes I.x.1-3, 96-9, and especially, I.x.2, 97-8.
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speculation, but quis sit or qualis sit instead.8 As T.F. Torrance has remarked in regard to
Calvin—which would apply equally to Rutherford as well—these latter questions are
not ones "in which the essence and the existence of God are held apart from one
another, but [those] in which God is allowed to disclose who he is in actual relation
toward us."9
That being said, how does Rutherford answer the question, quid sit.Deus? or,
perhaps better, qualis sit Deus? In a way reflective of the influence of Duns Scorns, in
particular, and before that, of Anselm, Rutherford believes that God is, by definition,
"absolutely perfect." He is the being than which nothing greater can be conceived.10
Although Rutherford does not attempt to prove this from Scripture, the Westminster
Confession, which he helped to write, does.11 Even so, it should be noted that there
was little, if any, reason for him to prove this assumption. Divine perfection was not
questioned at this juncture in the church. Nor was it necessarily linked with the
influence of Greek philosophy. Were Rutherford challenged on this idea, he would no
doubt have made reference to biblical passages similar to the ones cited in the
Confession. Be that as it may, divine perfection is only mentioned in the Exarnn as a
means to an end. Following in the tradition of Anselm, Rutherford develops several key
divine attributes by way of deduction from God's essential perfection. But, at the same
time, he consciously borrows from Peter Lombard's (c.l 100-1160) tendency to present
and defend these attributes with biblical and ecclesiastical justification.
First among these deductions, for Rutherford, is divine simplicity. Although
simplicity is one attribute that was normatively acknowledged within the church from
the time of the early fathers through the end of Rutherford's lifetime, it received
renewed attention during high and late medieval scholasticism in the face of Islamic and
Jewish philosophical attacks on the doctrine of the Trinity. The question these medieval
8 Thus, William Ames could use the phrases quid sit, quis sit, and quails sit virtually interchangeably. Marrow,
13-15; Medulla, 13-15.
9 T.F. Torrance, "The Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition," Reformed Review 54:1 (Autumn
2000), 6.
10 Examen, 141. For Duns Scotus, God is a "maximally excellent" being, which means, in the first place,
that God is "maximally perfectThis in turn seems to be the foundation from which Duns Scotus
constructs his doctrine of God, inferring a whole host of divine attributes (Richard Cross, Duns Scotus
[New York: Oxford University, 1999], 23-4, 31). For Anselm, God is "aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari
posit." See the helpful discussion of this phrase in Karl Barth, Anselm: FidesQiiaerens Intellectum, Anselm's
Proofof the Existence ofGod in the Context ofhis Theological Scheme (London: SCM, 1960), 73ff.
11 The Confession cites Job 11.7-9 and 26.14 as proof-texts of divine perfection in WCF, § 2.1, 24-5.
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scholastics faced was this: how could there be distinctions made between persons in
God and, yet, still be only one God? In order to answer such questions, theologians
wrangled over what was meant by the term distinction and what they perceived to be
the relationship of the persons and attributes of God to the divine essence. The way
one responded in this debate was largely a matter of what one believed about universals
and their relationship to God. Rutherford, true to Reformed theology in general, was
faithful to one of the Nominalist schools—the anti-Pelagian schola A.ugustiniana moderna,
of which more will be said later—and embraced a Thomistic conception of divine
simplicity.12 According to this way of thinking, "Attributes, Relations, and Modes of
Subsisting" are not different parts or aspects of God. That would make God a
composition and deny his simplicity. Neither are they merely divine qualities, actions, or
ways of speaking about him, as we say that "white is in milk'' and "justice in humankind.
But they are God himself, considered and presented to our Understanding in different
ways."13
Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff have recently claimed that this
Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity actually eliminates the reality of
distinctions within the Godhead, even those among the persons of the Trinity.14 If
every distinction in the Godhead is God himself, then, as Plantinga explains, God
becomes "identical with his nature and [with] each of his properties." Such a notion, he
says, is subject to at least "two difficulties:"
In the first place if God is identical with each of his properties, then each
of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that God has
but one property. This seems flatly incompatible with the obvious fact
that God has several properties; he has both power and mercifulness,
say, neither of which is identical with the other. In the second place, if
12 On Aquinas' understanding of divine simplicity, see Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 44-57. On the different schools within Nominalism, see Heiko A. Oberman,
"Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism: With Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance,"
Harvard Theological Review 53 (1960), 47-76. Here Oberman differentiates between four such "schools" or
"threads of tradition" within Nominalism, the third of which includes men like Gregory of Rimini
(d. 1358) and Thomas Bradwardine (c.1290-1349) and drew upon an Augustinian view of the compatibility
of human free will and divine sovereignty. Cf. Alister E. McGrath, "John Calvin and Late Mediaeval
Thought: A Study in Late Mediaeval Influences upon Calvin's Theological Development," Archiv fur
Reformationsgeschicbte 11 (1986), 64-6, 70-73, where McGrath links the schola Augustiniana moderna specifically
to Gregory ofRimini and Hugolino of Orvieto and outlines its features from their writings.
13 Examen, 142. Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia.3.1-8.
14 Alvin Plantinga, Does God have a Nature? (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University, 1980), 46-7; Nicholas
Wolterstorff, "Divine Simplicity," in Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion, ed. James
Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1991), 531-52.
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God is identical with each of his properties, then, since each of his
properties is a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property.
Accordingly God has just one property: himself. This view is subject to
a difficulty both obvious and overwhelming. No property could have
created the world; no property could be omniscient, or, indeed, know
anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn't a person but a mere
abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. So
taken, the simplicity doctrine seems an utter mistake.15
But claims such as these made by Plantinga and Wolterstorff fail to take into account
the variety of ways in which terms like identitas and distinctio have been used within
scholasticism historically.16 Identitas cannot, in this case, mean identical in every way,
because few, if any, scholastic theologians who embrace the traditional doctrine of
divine simplicity would deny that there are also distinctions within the Godhead.
Simplicity is designed not to mean that there are no distinctions whatsoever in God but
to protect the unity of the divine essence by providing an environment in which
discussions of those distinctions can rightly take place. The distinction between the
justice of God and the mercy of God, for example, or between the persons of the
Trinity, cannot refer to different parts or components, because the divine essence is one
numerically. But this does not mean that there is no distinction at all between divine
justice and mercy, on the one hand, or between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,
on the other. Finding a solution to the problem presented by Plantinga and
Wolterstorff does not necessitate a denial of divine simplicity. The scholastic solution—
a perfectly legitimate one—is simply to qualify what is meant by the term "distinction."
Following the pattern established by Henry of Ghent (c.1217-1293) and Aquinas,
Rutherford explains that the distinctions between the attributes of God, or the persons
of the Godhead, are not real distinctions—i.e., they do not refer to different things {res)
in God; nor are they formal distinctions, as Duns Scotus believes; but they are
"distinction[s] of Reason" and of the way in which God is considered {ratiocinatae) not
only by us but also by the divine essence itself.17 In reference to the persons of the
15 Plantinga, Does God have a Nature?, 46-7. Plantinga's conclusions are repeated in Wolterstorff, "Divine
Simplicity," 535-6.
16 See Geoffrey Bridges, Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan
Institute, 1959), 31-42; and Roy Deferrari, M. Inviolata Barry, and Ignatius McGuiness, eds., A Lexicon of
St. Thomas Aquinas based on 'The Summa Theologica" and selected passages of his other works (Washington:
Catholic University of America, 1948), 326-7 and 497. Cf. PRRD, 3:40n63.
17 Examen, 142; PRRD, 3:40-44; 4:191; and Cross, Duns Scotus, 29, 39, 43-5, and, especially, 149. Duns
Scotus' idea of formal distinctions is, as Cross explains, basically a via media between real distinctions and
Aquinas' rational distinctions. In order for something to be formally distinct it has to be both really
identical and really inseparable. But, for Duns Scotus, the merely rational distinctions of Aquinas do not
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Trinity, as we will see, Rutherford also allows for a relational distinction between the
Father as unbegotten, the Son as begotten, and the Spirit as proceeding.
A second deducdon from divine perfection is that God is not perfectible. He is,
by definition as the most perfect being, incapable of becoming more perfect. Such an
idea is significant because it lies at the center of a dispute between Rutherford and the
Arminians, which, although relatively minor, reveals at least one important lesson for
our discussion here. Rutherford and the Arminians both assert divine omnipresence.
But, for Rutherford, perfection requires that the omnipresence of God is an
omnipresence of his essence not simply of his "Power., and Providence, and Knowledge," as
some Arminians admit.18 Episcopius and others of the Remonstrants argue that
Scripture does not teach "Deum secundum essentiam suam ubique esse, nedum Deum
secundum essentiam suam esse extra caelum & terram in spatiis omnibus, etiam
imaginariis."19 Perhaps demonstrating his reliance upon Anselm's deductive approach
to the divine attributes, Rutherford responds to the Remonstrants by arguing that their
claim makes the divine essence perfectible, because the "essence which is [present] in all
things and everywhere is more perfect than the essence which is merely here, such that it
cannot be elsewhere."20
This relatively minor disagreement between Rutherford and the Arminians
reveals his profound attitude of intolerance and his overriding concern for the glory of
God. The Arminians explicitly acknowledge that God is omnipresent, but they assert
that Scripture is ambiguous as to the manner of that omnipresence. Rutherford
responds by bringing no less than ten arguments to bear upon the Arminian position.
Quite possibly, he perceives an implicit rejection of divine simplicity by their locating
omnipresence in the attributes rather than in the essence of God. Such a view would
only have been exacerbated by the Arminian doctrine of the Trinity, which will be
examined in the next section. In any case, it does not appear as though there is anything
of any consequence that would justify Rutherford's response other than his
go far enough. As a result of his belief that God is formally distinct from his attributes and that each
attribute is formally distinct from every other attribute, Duns Scorns rejects Aquinas' (and Rutherford's
and Augustine's) view that God is "identical with his attributes, and...that his attributes are identical with
each other." Cross, Duns Scotus, 29.
18 ACS, 1:59. Van Limborch is actually agnostic on the question of whether omnipresence refers to the
divine essence or to certain divine attributes only.
19 Episcopius, Opera theologica (1665), II, 130.
20 Examen, 145.
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overwhelming intolerance for Arminian theology and its tendency to stress the glory of
human free will over the glory and freedom of God. Other seventeenth-century
polemical treatises aimed specifically against Arminianism do not make an issue of
omnipresence.21 There appears to be no reason for Rutherford's tirade except his
intolerance and his zeal for divine glory.
Besides being perfect, simple, and omnipresent, however, God is also, according
to Rutherford, first (i.e., prior to everything else), absolute, and independent. These
attributes should not be understood primarily as inferences from Greek philosophy in
general or from Aristode in particular but from Moses. Like the medieval scholastics,
Rutherford believed that the Tetragrammaton, the name of God given to Moses in
Exodus 3.14-15, functions as the primary source for discussions about the essence and
existence of God.22 In this passage of Scripture, he perceives God's proper name to be
linked with the "to be" verb, iTTT. And this link, together with the testimony of other
texts of Scripture—like Amos 9.6, Genesis 15.7, Isaiah 42.8, and Acts 17.28—yields at
least two metaphysical deductions: God is the one who has "being from himself' and
the "one who is Jehovah in his essence."23 In other words, Rutherford understands
Exodus 3—not in and of itself but when it is read in light of the analogy of faith—to
teach that God is the source and sustainer of all creaturely being, while he himself has
no such source or sustainer. God is independent of his creation and absolute over it.
He wills and acts according to his own good pleasure and is not in any way dependent
upon anything outside of himself.2.
Today there is a great deal of uncertainty among contemporary theologians as to
the correct interpretation of Exodus 3 and the divine name. Karl Barth argues that
Exodus 3 does not reveal the divine name at all. It is, he says, "in content, a refusal of
any name—'I am that I am' can scarcely mean anything else than just, I am He whose
name proper no one can repeat."25 Wolfhart Pannenberg states that Exodus 3
demonstrates merely that God "will show himself in his historical acts." The only
"clearcut sayingjs] about God's essential nature," Pannenberg says, come from 1 John
21 E.g., Du Moulin, Anatomy ofArminianisme.
22 Etienne Gilson, The Spirit ofMedieval Philosophy, trans. A.H.C. Downes (New York: Scribner, 1936), 51.
23 Txamen, 141-2.
24 Tixamen, 183-4.
25 CD, 1/1, 365. Emil Brunner expresses a similar sentiment in The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. Olive
Wyon (London: Lutterworth, 1949), 120, 128-9.
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4.8, 16, and John 4.24.26 Other scholars believe that Exodus 3 does present the name of
God and that it conveys the idea of "divine faithfulness to self," an interpretation that
implies a metaphysical truth about God as the basis for his actions with Israel.27 In spite
of this uncertainty today, however, two things bear mentioning here. First, Rutherford's
understanding of Exodus 3 is the consensus view among medieval, Reformation, and
post-Reformation theologians. Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), could thus say:
God taught Moses...how to establish amongst them [the Israelites] the
belief in the existence of Himself, namely, by saying Ehyeh asher Ehyeh, a
name derived from the verb hayah in the sense of "existing," for the verb
bayah denotes "to be," and in Hebrew no difference is made between the
verbs "to be" and "to exist." The principle point in this phrase is that
the same word which denotes "existence," is repeated as an
attribute This is, therefore, the expression of the idea that God exists,
but not in the ordinary sense of the term; or, in other words, He is "the
existing Being which is the existing Being," that is to say, the Being
whose existence is absolute.28
Reformers like Calvin, Zwingli, Bullinger (1504-1575), and Vermigli could all point to
Exodus 3 and draw a similar conclusion from it, namely, that God is, in the words of
Calvin, "self-existent and therefore eternal; and thus [he] gives being and existence to
every creature. Nor does he predicate of himself anything common, or shared by
others; but he claims for himself eternity as peculiar to God alone."29 Among men of
the post-Reformation era, Perkins, Ames, Ussher, and Leigh could all state that the
"Essence of God" is, to cite Ames, "declared in his Name, Jebova," and several
conclusions flow from this: "First, that God is one, and only one;" "Secondly, that God
is of himselfe, that is, neither from another, nor of another, nor by another, nor for
another;" and "Thirdly,.. .that he is voyd of that power which is called passive, hence he
is unchangeable."30
26 Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 1:205, 395-6.
27 Terence Fretheim, "Yahweh," in The New International Dictionary ofOld Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed.
Willem VanGemeren (Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster, 1996), 4:1295-6.
28 Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. Michael Friedlander (London: George Routledge & Sons,
21919), 94-5.
29 Calvin, Commentaries on the Tour East Books ofMoses, trans. Charles William Bingham, 4 vols. (Edinburgh:
CTS, 1852-5), 1:73; Institutes I.x.2, 97; Bullinger, The Decades ofHemy Bullinger, ed. Thomas Harding, vol. 4
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1849-52), sermon 3; Ulrich Zwingli, Commentary on True and False
Religion, eds. Samuel Macauley Jackson and Clarence Nevin Heller (1929; Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press,
1981), 62-4; and Vermigli, Common Places, I.xii, 100.
30 Ames, Marrow, 11. Cf. Perkins, Workes, 1:11; Ussher, Body ofDivinitie, 29; Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 132-3.
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Second, Rutherford's essentialist understanding of God, which is derived from
Exodus 3, should not be relegated to the realm of metaphysical speculation. It should
rather be seen as a doctrine that is laden with soteriological import and especially so in
the context of Rutherford's debate with the Arminians. Since no one but God can
make the claims of Exodus 3, this text lies at the foundation of the creator-creature
distinction. God is not a mere creature; he is absolute and independent, while his
creatures are derived and dependent upon him for everything in their lives.31 What is
more, Exodus 3 also teaches that God alone is absolutely trustworthy. Vermigli
highlights both the creature's dependence and the trustworthiness of God when he says,
"there is no creature that may saie; I will be. For if God drawe backe his power, all
things do straitwaie perish. God doubtlesse may trulie saie so, bicause he cannot faile
nor forsake himselfe."32 Exodus 3, the centrality of the creator-creature distinction, and
the importance of divine trustworthiness are interpreted differently by Rutherford and
the Arminians and will result in profound soteriological differences in their respective
systems, as we will see both later in this chapter and in the next.
3.1.2: The Trinity
Following a pattern characteristic of Reformed confessions from the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, including the Westminster Confession, the Examen moves from a
statement of the unity of the essence and attributes of God to an account of the
doctrine of the Trinity.33 And it is in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity that we begin
to see greater areas of disagreement emerge between Rutherford and the Arminians.
These areas of disagreement, as we will see, extend beyond the limits of the doctrine of
God into the realm of soteriology. But before we can show this, we must first survey
the doctrine of the Trinity in both Rutherford and the Arminians.
In typical polemical fashion, Rutherford and the Arminians accuse one other of
tritheism and Sabellianism or Arianism for the ways in which they see the relationship
between the persons and the essence of God. Arminius, aligning himself more with the
Greek East—at least insofar as that tradition is reflected in Basil (c.330-379) and
Gregory of Nyssa (c.335-c.395),34 but, as we will see, without the protective measures
11 Examen, 141-2.
32 Vermigli, Common Places, I.xii, 100.
33 PRRD, 3:93; cf. Examen, 141-6 with 147-62; and WCE, §§ 2.1-3, 24-7.
34 T.F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives: Toward DoctrinalAgreement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 29-30.
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that they employ—than with the Latin West, argues that the Father is "the source
\principium\ of the whole Deity." The Son and the Holy Spirit receive not just their
persons but also their "essencefs] by being born of the Father" and by proceeding from
the Father, respectively.35 Because of this, the Father alone is said to have "Deity from
no one," while the Son and the Spirit have their "origin" and "Deity from the Father."36
The Father alone is autotheos, in the sense that he is "Godfrom himself." The Son and the
Spirit are autotheos in a subordinate way, only insofar as it refers to "one who is truly and in
himselfGod."37 To speak of the three persons of the Godhead as each being autotheos in
the former sense, is, according to Arminius, to suggest either "that there are three Gods,
who have together and collaterally the Divine Essence" or that the Son and Spirit
"differ from the Father in nothing but.. .name,—which was the opinion of Sabellius."38
Rutherford, on the other hand, claims that it is Arminius' understanding of the
Trinity that is inherently tritheistic. Because Arminiug states that "the Son, both as the Son
and as God, has his Deityfrom the Father," Rutherford accuses him of ascribing to the Son a
derived essence and, thus, of having "another distinct Essence and Deity" from the
Father. And since the "same thing can be said of the Holy Spirit," this means that there
are in fact three essences and three Gods in Arminian theology. Such an idea, for
Rutherford, is contrary to the plain sense of Scripture. Passages like Deuteronomy 6.4,
32.39, and 1 Corinthians 8.6, teach that the three persons of the Godhead have one
essence numerically.39 In Rutherford's view-—also reflected in his Reformed
contemporaries—it is not enough to posit only a generic identity among the three
persons, as the Greek fathers and some later Arminians do.40 God is not one in the
35 WJA, 2:693, 696. Arminius is actually agnostic on whether the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone or
from the Father and the Son. Such an issue, he says, "far surpasses [his] capacity" to determine (WJA,
2:691). Later Remonstrants, however, do favor a double procession (Confession, 94).
3<i WJA, 2:693, 696. Cf. Confession, 30.
3" WJA, 2:30-31. Cf. Examen, 149-50.
38 WJA, 1:692; 2:137-44, 690-96.
39 Examen, 147-9.
4U See the discussion of generic identity in the Cappadocian fathers in J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines
(London: A&C Black, 51977), 267-9; and in John D. Zizioulas, "The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The
Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution," in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being andAct,
ed. Christoph Schwobel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 45-9. For an Arminian view of generic identity,
see Conrad Vorstius, Apologetica responsio ad ea omnia (n.p., 1618), 1-17. It is not certain whether other
Arminians held to generic identity or to numerical identity. In their Confession, these Arminians state that
God is "one" but do not explain how he is one. Because they move from this statement of God's
oneness immediately to a discussion of the attributes of God shared by each person, they lead the reader
to believe that they support generic identity. But this is not apparent. Confession, 81 ff.
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same way that three human beings are one.41 Even though "three humans are sharers in
the class \genus] of living being in the same way that the "three Persons [of the Godhead] are
sharers in the divine nature," nevertheless, they are "not one and the same living being in
number."42 Whereas, as Edward Leigh states, "men" or "Angels.. .may be without the
other," God cannot exist without Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.43 To remove one person
from the Trinity is not merely to remove part of God—as it would be in removing one
human being from a group of three; it is to remove God in his entirety. Therefore,
rather than saying "the Son, both as the Son and as Godhas "his Deity from the Fatherf
Rutherford differentiates between the Son qua Son and the Son qua God. He, like
Calvin and Augustine before him, is quite willing to allow that the Father is the cause or
principium of the persons (hypostases) of the Son and the Spirit but not of their essences
(ousias). In regard to their essences, the Son and the Spirit are, as Calvin says, "absque
principio," and, thus, each has aseitas and is autotheos in the same way as the Father.44
This is not tritheism, however, because, as Calvin again says, "the whole divine nature is
understood" to be "in each hypostasis" or person. It is not Sabellianism, because each
of the three persons has "his own peculiar [relational] quality."45 The Father "is
begetting;" the Son "is begotten;" and the Spirit proceeds. But this is true only "in
reference to Personality" not essence.46
Rutherford, furthermore, has a problem with the inherent subordinationism in
Axminius' view of the Trinity. He believes that to say "the Son, both as the Son and as God,
has his Deity from the Fatherf is to say not only that the Son's essence is distinct
numerically but also that it is unequal with the Father. When this is coupled with
Arminius' ascription of autotheos to the Father alone, the result, for Rutherford, is
disastrous: "There will be one supreme God and two litde Gods, the Son and the Holy
SpiritS'17 It is this perceived element of subordinationism in the Arminian doctrine that
41 Rutherford is not criticizing the Greek fathers' views on generic identity so much as the less careful
views of the Arminians, as we will see.
42 Examen, 147-8.
43 Body ofDivinity, 205.
44 This language of Calvin is also found in Beza and became typical of post-Reformation orthodoxy. See
Expositio impietatis Valen. Gentilis (1561), loannis Calvini opera, eds., G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss
(Brunswick: Schwetschke, 1863-1900), IX, 368; Institutes I.xiii. 17-20, 141-5; and Theodore Beza,
Quaestionum et responsionum Cbristianarum libellus (Geneva, 1570).
45 Institutes I.xiii. 19, 143.
46 Examen, 147-8, 160-62.
47 Examen, 150.
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leads Rutherford to accuse them of Arianism. Though, he admits, there are some
among the Arminians who profess with their words that the Son is homoousios and
consubstantial with the Father, they deny "the thing itself' by their practice of
establishing different levels of worship for the Son and the Father. Because "they
establish that [the Son] is an inferior God to the Father...[and] is to be adored with an
inferior adoration," Rutherford says he has "really suspected them ofArianism,"48
Having thus traced the arguments of Rutherford and the Arminians in regard to
the Trinity, it must be said that each side is exaggerating in their appraisal of the others'
views. Each side stands squarely within the Niceno-Constantinopolitan tradition. The
accusations they level at each other are excessive. Rutherford clearly avoids
Sabellianism by delineating relational and personal distinctions within the Godhead.
And the Arminians steer clear of Arianism by plainly stating that the Son is just as much
God as is the Father; though he is not "Godfrom himself," he is "truly and in himselfGod.''49
What is more, Rutherford appears to have misread the distinctions that the Arminians
make with respect to worship. His claim that the Arminians ascribe "inferior adoration"
to the Son is too simplistic, because it presents only half the story. Arminians like Van
Limborch, for example, explicitly state that the Son "as he is the Son of God" and
"Partaker of the same Nature with God" is to be worshiped with "the same Worship
which is paid to God himself."50
But, having said this, it must also be said that the Arminian position is the least
careful of the two linguistically in its presentation of the doctrine of the Trinity. This
can be seen in the following two ways. First, although the Arminians seem to favor
Eastern causal language in order to keep themselves from tritheism, they are not as
careful in protecting themselves from subordinationism as are the Greek fathers. The
Cappadocians expressly locate the source (apxh) or cause (ama) of deity in the Father
but avoid subordinationism by consistently arguing that deity (0£OTr]s) cannot be




51 Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, 1.33, in Patrologia Graeca Cursus Completus, ed. J.P. Migne, 161 vols.
(Paris: Vives, 1857-66), 45:393-6; Basil of Caesarea, Epistolae, 8.3, in Patrologia Graeca, 36:1073-6; Gregory
of Nazianzus, Orationes, 30.18-20, Orationes theologica, IV, in Patrologia Graeca, 36:125-32. Cf. T.F. Torrance,
The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995),
239-41,317-18.
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however, do not employ such protecdve measures. In point of fact, they run in the
opposite direcdon and openly adopt the language of derivation. Arminius himself says
that the Son "is from the Father with respect to his essence." Van Limborch states that
the Father has "the Divine Nature from himself, whilst the Son and the Holy Ghost
derive it from the Father." And Episcopius, going a step further and sounding more like
the Socinians than the Greek fathers, claims that although all three persons of the
Trinity are "divine in nature," there is some "difference in being" between them.52
Secondly, when pushed by charges of tritheism in polemical situations, the
Greek fathers exercise great care in differentiating between human existence, in which
human "nature precedes the [individual] person," and the divine existence, in which the
persons perfectly "coincide with" the divine nature.53 Sometimes, the Cappadocians
even go so far as to speak of the identity of the Godhead in terms that are perhaps more
characteristic of the West. Gregory of Nyssa, "[i]n his anxiety to evade the tritheistic
implications of likening the Triad to three men sharing the same ousia of manhood...is
forced to conclude that.. .we should not speak of a multiplicity of men but of one man."
Gregory of Nazianzus (c.325-c.389), likewise, "emphasizes that the unity of the divine
Persons is real as opposed to the purely 'notional' (povov ETTivoia 08Copir|TOl') unity of
several men."54 The Arminians, on the other hand, are again less careful in their use of
language. Arminius opts to rely on the causal language of the Eastern tradition without
any of their protective measures. And some later Arminians refuse to qualify their
teaching to insure it against the charge of tritheism and even plunge headfirst towards it
by speaking of the three persons as "tres divinas essentias."55
52 W]A, 2:696; ACS, 1:110, emphasis added; Episcopius, Opera theologica (1665), I, 69; Hoenderdaal, "The
Debate about Arminius," 149-50. Episcopius' later position, as he expresses it in the 1665 Opera, appears
to be at odds with his earlier view in the Confession, in which he and his peers do adopt some of the
protective measures of the Greek fathers and speak more prudendy of the Son and the Spirit as being
"truly partakers of the same Deity, or Divine Essence and Nature absolutely and in common considered with
the Father" (Confession, 94, emphasis added)—which position, if genuinely believed, would clearly be
different than what the Socinians are willing to say (see, e.g., Racovian Catechisme, 18-19, 33, 59). Either
Episcopius later changed his mind on this issue, or the earlier expression of his thinking in the Confession is
vague and imprecise or, perhaps, even intentionally deceptive.
53 Zizioulas, "The Cappadocian Contribution," 48. This, incidentally, shows how it is that Rutherford's
criticisms regarding generic identity apply not to the Greek fathers' so much as to the Arminians. The
Cappadocians, in particular, went to great lengths to protect themselves from such criticisms, as Zizioulas
has shown.
54 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 267-8. Gregory of Nazianzus continues by stating that "the analogy
between the Trinity and Adam, Eve (made out of his rib) and Seth (the product of both) breaks down
because the divine essence is indivisible."
55 Vorstius, Apologetica responsio, 1.
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Rutherford's critique of the Arminian view of the Trinity, however, should be
seen as more than just a petty reaction to this lack of linguistic caution. It should be
seen as a reaction to the Christological and soteriological errors that he and his
Reformed contemporaries perceive to be reflected in Arminius' subordinationist
tendencies. Because this feature of Rutherford's dispute with the Arminians involves
their respective views of the divine decrees and of the covenantal relationships between
the persons of the Trinity, we will reserve our discussion of it until these issues have
been introduced later in this chapter and in the next.56
3.1.3: The scientia Dei
After developing and refuting those things that he perceives to be erroneous in the
Arminian understanding of the Trinity, Rutherford broaches the subject of the
knowledge of God in the Examen. In accord with traditional scholastic approaches to
divine knowledge, Rutherford believes that the objects of God's knowledge are himself
and all things outside himself.57 The former he calls a "reflex Knowledge," which is
"plainly natural" to God. The latter he subdivides into two categories: a "knowledge of
Simple Intelligence" and a "Visionary, or intuitive, or definite" knowledge.58 Whereas the
scholastic tendency is to discuss God's knowledge of himself under the category of
simple intelligence,59 Rutherford does not do so in the Examen. He dedicates the
abovementioned two categories to describing the divine knowledge of all things outside
of God, without respect to God's knowledge of himself. Simple intelligence, then, for
Rutherford, is the "natural,, indefinite, [and] abstract' knowledge of God, by which he
"knows all possibilities." It is necessary in God insofar as he is God and omniscient. It
is "natural^ because he possesses it by nature; it is "indefinite" and "abstract," because it
only pertains to "possibilities," not to actualities. Visionary knowledge, the scientia Dei
visionis, is that "by which God knows all the things outside of himself that [actually] are,
have been, or will be, or are not." This knowledge is free in God, because it is a product
of his free will or decree. As such, it is "definite" or determined and refers to all
actualities.60 To put it more simply, the scientia visionis is comprised of those things, and
56 See sections 3.3.1.5, in this chapter, and 4.1.2 and 4.2.2.2, in the next.
57 E.g., Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 160.
58 Examen, 163. This is characteristically scholastic language. See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa theologiae, la.14.9.
59 See RD, 73-4; Muller, Dictionary, 274-6. Cf. Turretin, Institutes, 3.12-13, 1:206-18.
60 Examen, 163.
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only those things, that the divine will has chosen to bring into actuality from among the
possibilities contained in the scientia simplicis intelligentiae. What this means for Rutherford
is that God knows every future actuality not because he sees it in the future as having
existence of its own, but because he wills that it, rather than something else, should
come to pass.61
In addition to these two categories of divine knowledge, the Arminians,
introduce a third, scientia media, which falls in between the two just previously outlined.
The idea of a "middle" knowledge, however, did not originate with Arminius.
According to Gisbertus Voetius, it was first developed in 1566 by Pedro de Fonseca
(1528-1599).62 Fonseca's better-known disciple, Luis de Molina (1535-1600), then
perfected and popularized it in his Concordia liberi arbitrii cumgratiae donis, divinapraescientia,
providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione, which was originally published in 1588. Although
there does not appear to be an explicit connection between Arminius and the Jesuit
Molina, the latter's influence, according to Richard Muller, "is quite apparent in several
places in Arminius' system," chief among them being in regard to divine scientia medial
Following Molina, Arminius defines scientia media as that knowledge by which God
foresees what free creatures will do given a certain, or infinite, set of possibilities. In the
words of Arminius himself, it is "that by which [God] knows, that 'if this thing happens,
that will take place.'"64 Not only does God know all possibilities (scientia simplicis
intelligentiae), but he also knows all things that will come to pass by the acts of free
creatures. The divine will draws from one or the other of these two "knowledges" in
choosing what events to bring to pass. Middle knowledge only "intervenefs] in things
61 Cf. IVCF, § 3.1, 28.
62 Voetius states that Fonseca "gloriatur se primum hujus scientiae authorem & inventorem fuisse, cujus
cogitatio sibi primum inciderit an. 1566." Voetius, Selectarum disputationum parsprima (Utrecht, 1648), 265.
Cf. Robert Merrihew Adams, The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York:
Oxford University, 1987), 91n2; with E. Vansteenberghe, "Molinisme," Dictionnaire de theologie catholique,
eds. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and E. Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1928), 10:2096.
63 God, Creation, and Providence, 43 and 154-66. Other recent studies also link scientia media in Arminius with
the teaching of Molina. See especially, Eef Dekker, "Was Arminius a Molinist?," SC] 27:2 (1996), 337-52;
and idem, Pdjker dan Midas: Vrijheid, Genade en predestinatie in de theologie van Jacobus Arminius (1559-1609)
(Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1993).
64 1PJA, 2:123. Molina defines scientia media as that knowledge "qua ex altissima et inscrutabili
comprehensionc cuiusque liberi arbitrii in sua essentia intuitus est, quid pro sua innata libertate, si in hoc
vel illo vel etiam infinitis rerum ordinibus collocaretur, acturum esset" (Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae
donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione [Antwerp, 1595], 4.52.9). For a lucid account
of Molina's theory of divine knowledge, see William Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and
Future Contingentsfrom Aristotle to Suare^ (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 167-206.
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which depend on the liberty of created [arbitriz] choice or pleasure." Those things that
do not depend on human free will are brought to pass directly by God from his
knowledge of simple intelligence. But when human free will is involved, God is either
"moved by those deeds of [his] creatures" or he "at least.. .receive[s]" them by way of
his scientia media and then decrees or permits them accordingly or does not.63
The central issue in this seventeenth-century debate between Rutherford and the
Arminians is much the same as it was in the sixteenth-century contest between the
Jesuits Luis de Molina and Franciscus Suarez and the Dominicans Franciscus Zumel
(1540-1607) and Dominico Banez, namely, God's knowledge of future contingents.
How should God's foreknowledge of future contingents be reconciled with human free
will?66 Rutherford and the Reformed in general were concerned to defend a Thomistic
harmonization of human free will with divine sovereignty. The Boethian conception of
time as an eternal present for God enabled Aquinas and the Reformed in general to
assert that God's knowledge of contingent things is necessary, because God is their
"first cause," while the things themselves remain contingent upon the "proximate
causes," which occur in time.67 Even though Arminius fully embraced the idea that
God's knowledge of contingent things was necessary—as a corollary of divine infinity—
he denied the Thomistic assumption that this knowledge involved causality in God. He
pointed instead to human causality—foreseen by God's scientia media and then actively
willed or not willed or passively permitted—in bringing all things to pass.68
Rutherford reacts harshly to this way of thinking, labelling it "blasphemous" for
compromising God's sovereignty and making the divine decree contingent upon either
65 WJA, 2:342; 3:65-6. The Arminians and Jesuits were by no means alone in breaking from the
traditional twofold view of the scientia Dei and replacing it with a threefold understanding. Richard
Baxter—under the influence of Tommaso Campanella's threefold metaphysical distinction between
omnipotence, knowledge, and will—also embraced a threefold view of divine knowledge, which included,
first, a knowledge of all possibilities; second, a knowledge of all appropriate or fitting things; and third, a
knowledge of all things actually willed. See Richard Baxter, Catholick Theologie (London, 1675), 1.4.45-52;
and Carl R. Trueman, "A Small Step Towards Rationalism: The Impact of the Metaphysics of Tommaso
Campanella on the Theology of Richard Baxter," in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, eds.
Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster, 1999), 189-92.
66 See Alfred Freddoso's introduction to Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, trans. A.J. Freddoso
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1988).
67 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia.14.13. Boethius (c.480-c.524) said: "But if it is appropriate to compare die
divine present with the human, then just as you men see certain things in this temporal present of yours,
so God sees all things in his eternal present. Hence this divine foreknowledge does not change the nature
and character of things; God sees them as present before his eyes as they will emerge at some time in the
future." The Consolation ofPhilosophj, trans. P.G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 112.
7,8 Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, 158.
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the free wills of creatures, who do not yet exist, or upon the whims of chance {fortune?).
The problem that Rutherford has with scientia media is that it makes either the will of the
creature or fate the first cause of all things and the divine will the second cause, because
God looks out of himself to see what free creatures will do before making his decree.
Thus, the creature, or fate, is put in the place of God and God in the place of the
creature, because the creature's will takes precedence over the divine will in determining
those things that come to pass.69 But Rutherford also believes that scientia media is itself
based upon wrong notions of divine foreknowledge, especially as it is held by the
Arminians. It wrongly attributes to God a kind of paranormal ability or clairvoyance, by
which he can see every future contingent before it exists. But future contingents have
no existence outside of the will or decree of God and, thus, cannot be known apart
from it.70 Because God knows the future only by declaring it to be, divine
foreknowledge is, therefore, limited to those things that God actually brings to pass.
Foreknowledge, for Rutherford, is not a bare foresight, as it is for the Arminians, but is
inextricably tied to the divine will.
Since the Arminians deny that God knows the future by way of his decree and
substitute instead the "fictitious" idea of middle knowledge, Rutherford accuses them of
the Socinian error of denying God's knowledge of future contingents.71 But this is
somewhat disingenuous on Rutherford's part. The very reason that Arminius employs
the concept of sceintia media is in order to explain how it is that God knows future
contingents. And Arminius' later disciples explicitly retain this same view.72 Rutherford,
furthermore, misquotes from the Apologia of Episcopius and applies words meant for
"Censorem hunc, aliosque" to Episcopius himself.73 By doing so, he makes it appear as
though the Remonstrants are overtly rejecting God's knowledge of future contingents,
which is not at all what Episcopius intends. The point the Remonstrant leader is trying
to make is that the Reformed orthodox, and, specifically, the authors of Censura in
69 Examen, 163-4, 191-3.
70 Examen, 163-9.
71 See Examen, 166-7.
72 Vorstius, Tractatus tbeologicus, 42-7; Episcopius, Opera theologica (1665), I, 394; idem, Opera theologica (1678),
299-304.
73 Cf. Episcopius, Opera theologica (1665), II, 130; with Examen, 166-7. The "Censores" were those Contra-
Remonstrant professors in Leiden—including among them Johannes Polyander, Andreas Rivetus,
Antonius Walaeus, and Antonius Thysius—who together wrote Censura in confessionem sive declarationem
sententiae eorum qui in foederato Belgio Kemonstrantes vocantur (Leiden, 1626), in order to censure Arminian
doctrines.
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confessionem sive declarationem sententiae eorum qui in foederato Belgio Remonstrantes vocantur
(1626), are themselves denying God's knowledge of future contingents by claiming that
they have no existence apart from the divine decree. But things that are caused by the
decree of God cease to be contingent and become, instead, quite necessary. So, in the
opinion of Episcopius, it is actually the Contra-Remonstrants who are guilty of the
Socinian error. They not only renounce God's knowledge of future contingents; they
reject the existence of them as well.
It must also be said in defense of the Arminian, and Jesuit, notion of scieniia
media, that Rutherford's vehemence against it is somewhat misplaced. It is, to be sure, a
new idea, but, as William Lane Craig remarks, it is a new idea that attempts to "resolve a
number of the most profound theological conundrums" and does so in a way that is
"almost breathtaking."74 Furthermore, it is an idea that is developed and defended from
the pages of Scripture. Both Molina and Arminius are keen to show biblical justification
for their theory of divine scientia media. They point to passages like 1 Samuel 23.10-12
and Matthew 11.21, to show that God has a foreknowledge ofwhat people will do given
certain circumstances that are different from the current situation or from that which
could soon come to pass.75 It must also be admitted that Rutherford's response to these
scriptural texts is rather unsatisfactory: he simply emphasizes the fact that these foreseen
things must have been a part of the decree of God, otherwise, "God would know
certainly that which is not knowable."76 But this does not restrain his invective in the
least. While we, in the twenty-first century, may be able to appreciate the philosophical
value of and biblical rationale for divine scientia media, Rutherford is clearly in no position
to do so. For him, this theory represents a "blasphemous fabrication" that essentially
74 The Problem ofDivine Foreknowledge, 206.
75 W]A, 3:65; Craig, The Problem ofDivine Foreknowledge, 183.
16 Examen, 166. Other attempts by the Reformed orthodox to explain these biblical passages are more
convincing. See J.A. Van Ruler, "New Philosophy to Old Standards: Voerius' Vindication of Divine
Concurrence and Secondary Causality," NAvK 71:1 (1991), 73-6, where he states: "Catholic [i.e.,
Dominicans] and Calvinist adversaries of Molinism...said that in the first example fl Samuel 23], God
does not contemplate a future conditional, but something already present, viz. the actual mental
disposition of Saul and of the Kehilite citizens. In other words, their decision was already made. As for
the second example [Matthew 11], Christ there only makes an exaggerated comparison, in order to point
out the haughtiness of the Galileans." Van Ruler further notes that Voetius' preferred explanation of 1
Samuel 23 is found in William Ames, who distinguishes between formal decrees and implicit decrees in
God: "The latter have a bearing on those future conditionals which will never actually pertain. For
instance, God from all eternity decided, or 'formally decreed', to liberate David from the hands of the
Kahileans. From this, it is legitimate to infer the following implicit condition: 'if David would not flee, he
would be handed over'." Van Ruler, "New Philosophy to Old Standards," 74, 75n52.
98
removes God from his sovereign's throne and places human beings there in his place.
Consequendy, it is not to be tolerated.
But there is something more behind Rutherford's intolerant reaction to scientia
media than simply narrow-mindedness. Karl Barth explains that "[i]t was the express
intention of the Jesuits" in developing the doctrine of scientia media "to aid a new semi-
Pelagianism to gain its necessary place and right...in opposition to the Augustinian-
Thomist teaching of the Dominicans, which they accused of being dangerously near to
Luther and Calvin."77 If Barth is right, then, by embracing the Jesuit doctrine of scientia
media, the Arminians would have been consciously adopting a position that was itself
intended from its inception to be in opposition to the thinking of the Reformation.
And by reacting against scientia media, Rutherford would have been consciously
defending the Reformation viewpoint from such opposition. As we will see in chapter
five, this, more than anything else explains the fervor of Rutherford's response to
Arminian teaching.
The debate over the scientia Dei is closely linked with the issue of the divine will.
Many of the ideas we have presented here will resurface and be further developed in
connection with the will of God. For this reason, we will bring our discussion of divine
knowledge to a close at this point and revisit it and the related issues of divine
omnipotence and immutability as we work through the voluntas Dei. After doing so, we
will be able to evaluate such soteriological applications of the will as predestination and
the atonement of Christ.
3.2: The "voluntas Dei"
In keeping with a large part of the scholastic tradition, the most distinctive and perhaps
most complex feature of Rutherford's theology is his understanding of the voluntas Dei.
It has a profound affect upon his thinking in many other areas, as we will see, especially
his views in regard to the decrees and salvation, the preaching of the gospel, and the
atonement of Christ. That being said, it is worth noting that Rutherford does not regard
this doctrine in isolation from the doctrine of God or a discussion of his attributes. The
divine will, for Rutherford and for scholastic thinkers in general, is itself an attribute of
God.78 And as we have already mentioned, divine simplicity means that each of God's
77 CD, \l/\, 569.
78 Ussher, Body ojDwinitie, 39; Muller, Dictionary, 331.
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attributes, including his will, is identical with God himself.79 Even though Rutherford
operates from a voluntarist understanding of God, emphasizing the primacy of the
divine will over the intellect,80 we should be wary of drawing too sharp a contrast
between the intellect, which is also a divine attribute, and the will. For Rutherford, as
for Duns Scotus, the will does not function in isolation from the intellect, nor does it
function in an unwise, irrational, or contradictory manner, because "a will destitute of
knowledge \cognitio\ is a brute appetite, blind, reckless, and inferior in sensitivity."81 The
divine intellect precedes the will and exercises some restraint upon it. The intellect
limits the set of possibilities that can be brought into actuality by the will, since God can
only will what is contained within his scientia simplicis intelligentiae. But the intellect does
not direct or compel the divine will in its choosing. The will is free and "does not need
direction as though it could err or choose something unsuitable, and in this sense the
divine will is its own rule," a point which post-Reformation theologians the likes of
Rutherford and Theodore Beza were wont to make.82 It is the will—the potentia Dei
appetitiva—that freely moves everything from the "state of possibility to the state of
future actuality" and from scientia simplicis intelligentiae to scientia visionis,83 As we will see,
however, there are influencing factors that incline the will of God to certain courses of
action over others and to bringing certain things to pass instead of others.
Explaining Rutherford's understanding of the divine will is not a simple task. It
requires presenting and exploring a series of scholastic distinctions, distinctions which
men like Rutherford were driven to embrace by their desire to be faithful to the teaching
of Scripture. As Peter Lombard had previously pointed out in his massively important
79 Examen, 169-70. Rutherford discusses the divine will not as a separate chapter in the Examen but as
part of his study of the essence and attributes of God in chapter two.
80 On voluntarism vs. intellectualism in medieval scholastic thought, see Frederick Copleston, A History of
Philosophy, 9 vols. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1946-75), 2:382-3, 538-41.
81 Examen, 173. On Duns Scotus and voluntarism, see Bernardine M. Bonansea, "Duns Scotus'
Voluntarism," John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965, eds. Bonansea and John Ryan (Washington: Catholic
University of America, 1965), 83-121; and Cross, Duns Scotus, 91-5. Recendy, Alexander Broadie has
argued that Duns Scotus is "no Scotist," or, in other words, that he is not the extreme voluntarist that
many scholars have thought him to be. Broadie highlights a phrase in Duns Scotus, "pondus et
inclinatio," to show that he believes that the intellect provides not only the raw material from which the
will selects but that it actually "carjries] weight with will and incline[s] it." Dun Scotus' position, he
asserts, is, therefore, something of a via media between intellectualism and voluntarism. Broadie, The
Shadow ofScotus: Philosophy and Faith in Pre-Reformation Scotland (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), lecture 3.
82 Copleston, History of Philosophy, 2:531; Theodore Beza et al., An Evident Display of Popish Practices
(London, 1578), 256.
83 Examen, 163. See the discussion on "voluntas" and "voluntas Dei" in Muller, Dictionary, 330-31.
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Sententiae, the Bible's picture of God's will is complex and multifaceted and, this, more
than anything else, demands some kind of a series of distinctions in order to come to
terms with it.84 Contrary to Brian Armstrong's assertions, Rutherford and scholasticism
in general—whether of the Protestant or medieval variety—are not so concerned with
"speculative formuladon[s] of the will of God," much less with building their theology
upon such a foundation.85 As we will see, both in this chapter and in the next,
Protestant scholastics like Rutherford are driven to embrace these distinctions by their
understanding of the biblical portrait of the divine will, and they build their theology,
not upon formulations of the divine will per se, but—once again in keeping with their
emphasis on praxis in theology—upon formulations of divine covenantal relationships.
3.2.1: Voluntas ad intra et ad extra
The first distinction that must be made in regard to the divine will is that between the
voluntas Dei ad intra et ad extra. This distinction is designed to express the difference
between the divine will as it is within God himself and as it is directed towards us and
known by us. It allows Rutherford to explain the relationship between the nature and
will of God. But it should not be understood as introducing a sharp divide between the
divine will and nature, and then engendering speculative metaphysical questions as to
whether or not will precedes nature in God. As our discussion of divine simplicity
indicates, Rutherford—true to the Nominalist thinking of William of Ockham and
Gabriel Biel—believes that "God's intellect and will coincide with His essence in such a
way that His decisions cannot be separated from His being."86
The distinction between ad intra and ad extra serves a more practical end in
Rutherford's theology. It allows him to establish the ultimate incomprehensibility of
God and to preserve absolute divine freedom by differentiating between those things
that are necessary for God to will and those that are not. The will of God, as it is within
God himself—i.e., ad intra—is bound by his nature. God must will his own existence by
necessity of nature. He must also love himself and beget and love the Son by necessity
of nature.87 Other things, outside of himself—i.e., ad extra—God wills freely and
84 Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libros distinctae, 2 vols. (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas,
1971-81), I.xlv.5, 1:309.
85 Calvinism and the A.myraut Heresy, 32.
86 Oberman, "Notes on Nominalism," 61.
87 COL, 29-31. Rutherford reflects his view of the Trinity in saying that the Son, because he is self-
existent in his essence, also cannot will his non-existence. COL, 29.
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without any compulsion whatsoever, even from his own nature. Therefore, although
God is good, merciful, and just in and of himself, and must will accordingly with respect
to himself {ad intra), he is under no obligation to be good, merciful, and just towards his
creatures {ad extra). As Rutherford says: "God is good in creating the world, in giving
faith to Peter, and in communicating being and goodness with his creatures,...[but] he
could have been not-good, in this way, if he would not have created the world and not
have given Faith to Peter, and if he would have annihilated the creatures."88
3.2.1.1: Potentia absoluta ei ordinata
Lurking behind this idea of the voluntas Dei ad intra et ad extra is the dominant medieval
Nominalist distinction between the potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata. Both Heiko Oberman
and Francis Oakley see this "power distinction" as the defining characteristic of
Nominalist thought.89 While it obviously reflects the traditional Aristotelian approach to
being (comprised of potency and act), it appears not to have been used explicitly until
Aquinas used it to differentiate between God's hypothetical power per se and the power
by which he works out his decrees.90 It is then further developed and given prominence
in the voluntaristic systems of Duns Scotus and Ockham.91 William Twisse, whose
thinking is very similar to Rutherford's on this and other fronts, provides us with a good
post-Reformation definition of these two terms:
For Gods absolute power is one thing, his ordinate power is another
thing, for this includs his will. God coulde have refused to make the
88 Examen, 146. Cf. Examen, 405-6; COL, 27-34; Disputatio, 342, 345.
89 Oberman, Harvest ofMedieval Theology, 37ff; and Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order. An
Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abelard to Leibni^ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1984), 77-84. The
centrality of this distinction within Nominalism has also received support from Paul Oskar Kristeller.
See, e.g., Kristeller's article, "The Validity of the Term: 'Nominalism'," in The Pursuit of Holiness in Late
Medieval and Renaissance Religion, eds. Charles E. Trinkaus and Heiko A. Oberman (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974),
66.
90 Mary Anne Pernoud, "The Theory of the Potentia Dei According to Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham,"
Antonianum 47 (1972), 73-80. Though the terminology first appears in Aquinas, the basic ideas, according
to Lawrence Moonan, originated with the theology faculty of the University of Paris in the thirteenth
century (Divine Poiven The Medieval Power Distinction up to its Adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas
[Oxford: Clarendon, 1994], 6). Oberman traces the basic ideas behind the power distinction to the
twelfth century and Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141) in "Notes on Nominalism," 56.
91 Pernoud notes that the so-called "power distinction" is just one of the ways in which similarities
between Aquinas and Duns Scotus can be seen. Many "historians of philosophy and theology first
mention the use of God's omnipotence as a matter of importance and as an indication of the new
direction scholastic thought took, in their studies of the Subtle Doctor [Duns Scotus]." But this is
actually not so, because the "basic tenets" which come to the foreground in Duns Scotus and Ockham
were first found in Aquinas. "The Theory of the Potentia Dei," 80, 83.
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world, when he did make it, & he made it freely; but supposing Gods
decree to make it, & to make it at that time it was impossible it should be
otherwise, as it is impossible that Gods will shoulde be changed.92
Although Rutherford uses the terminology of this distinction only sparingly, his
affinities for Nominalist thought—again as reflected in the schola Augustiniana moderna—
and his strong voluntarism clearly evidence its influence. One of the ways in which this
influence manifests itself in Rutherford is in the differentiation he makes between
omnipotency and sovereignty. Whereas omnipotency is "what the Lord can doe"
sovereignty is more than that; it includes the divine will: "Soveraignty is not only his
holy Nature what he can doe and so supposeth his Omnipotency, but also what he doth
freely, or doth not freely, and doth by no natural necessity, and so it includes his holy
supreme Liberty."93 According to Heiko Oberman, the difference between
omnipotency and sovereignty parallels exactly the Nominalist power distinction.
Omnipotency, or, "what God is able to do," corresponds to potentia absoluta, whereas
sovereignty, or, "what God actually decides to do," includes the will and, thus,
corresponds to potentia ordinata,94 God is not only able to do as he pleases
(omnipotency), though that is certainly true, but God actually does as he pleases
(sovereignty), and, in doing so, his "holy Will [is] essentially wise and just, [and] is a Law
and Rule to himself."95
In Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himselfe, Rutherford speaks more explicitly
and with greater detail of the divine potentia absoluta et ordinata. He refers to God's
"absolute power without respect to his free decree," and, by doing so, establishes the
parameters of divine potential The power of God, in and of itself, without respect to
his free decree ad extra, is an absolute power—an omnipotency—in a classical or
Thomistic sense, whereby God can do whatsoever he pleases. But his decree, even
though it is made freely by his own will, necessarily limits his consequent power.
Although God, by his poteniia absoluta, can freely choose to create or not-create and then
to be good or not-good, merciful or not-merciful, and just or not-just to his creatures,
92 D. Jacksons Canitie, 5.
93 Influences, 33-5.
94 Oberman, "Notes on Nominalism," 58. This is the same way that Rutherford's contemporaries—even
such New England Puritans like Samuel Willard—speak of this distinction. See Willard, A Compleat Body
ofDivinity (Boston, 1726), 70.
95 Influences, 33-5.
96 Christ Dying, 7-8, emphasis added.
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once he decides to act in a given way ad extra, his subsequent power is bound by his free
decree.97 He cannot act against his ad extra decree. For him to do so would require
mutability, which, according to Rutherford, is impossible for God: "Scripture argues
from the Immutability of God to the immutability of the willed thing: And for this
reason if he [God] would will that and afterwards will not for that; then there would be
a final [terminating change in him."98 Therefore, while the omnipotency of God refers to
his absolute and unbounded power (potentia absoluta), the sovereignty of God refers to
his power as it has been constrained by his own free decree {potentia ordinata).
Significandy, this relationship between the potentia ordinata and the potentia absoluta
suggests that the nature of God does in fact restrain the will of God ad extra in
Rutherford's thinking. This presents a twofold problem, however. If, on the one hand,
it is only immutability that restrains the divine potentia absoluta (given God's free decree),
then why should we not go the whole way and deny that any attribute can control the
divine will ad extra? Why keep immutability as the only limiting factor? The logical law
of non-contradiction does not require this, if, according to Rutherford and his fellow
Nominalists, the divine will is indeed a rule or a law unto itself. Why not say that God's
potentia and freedom transcend his decree, such that he is free to change his mind as he
so pleases and to go against his decree if he so wishes? It would seem correct to suggest
that Rutherford's answer to these questions is to point to the teaching of Scripture.
Immutability restrains God's potentia, because Scripture teaches that it does. But this
raises a second difficulty. If immutability limits the sovereignty of God ad extra, then
why would other attributes of the divine nature not also? This appears to be a
capitulation, at least in theory, to the intellectualist position.
But this is not the only inconsistency that one finds in regard to Rutherford's
voluntarism. Rutherford's own interpretation of Exodus 3.14-15, as discussed above,
would also appear to contradict his understanding of the priority of the divine will. In
Exodus 3, God gives Israel his own name, which, according to Rutherford, is
descriptive of who he is in his very being. If we understand this passage to present a
metaphysical fact about God, as Rutherford does, then the context of the passage would
seem to suggest that God's actions on behalf of Israel will be tied to the metaphysical
truth just presented. God is giving his name to Israel not as an end in itself but in order
97 Examen, 146, 284. Cf. COL, 27-34; Communion, 28.
98 Examen, 177.
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to comfort the Israelites and to assure them of his trustworthiness in the future. In
other words, by giving them his name, a name which is grounded in his nature, God is
telling them that they can rest assured, because he will act in the future in accord with
who he is in his very being. Such a reading of Exodus 3, however, runs contrary to
Rutherford's voluntaristic system, which is keen to sever ties between God's being ad
intra and his actions towards his creatures.
In connection with the potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata and the voluntas Dei ad extra,
a fundamental difference between Rutherford and the Arminians emerges. Whereas
Rutherford believes that God has potentia absoluta in and of himself and, so, is not bound
to act in any way ad extra by anything other than his decree, Arminius rejects the concept
of the potentia absoluta and seeks to redefine God's power strictly in terms of the potentia
ordinata. The rationale behind this move in Arminian theology is the doctrine of
creation, a doctrine which Richard Muller suggests "occupies a pivotal and virtually
principial position in [Arminius'] thought." Because Arminius understands creation in a
Thomistic sense, as "an emanation of the divine potency for being and of the existence
of the created order by participation in the goodness of divine being," God's power and
will are necessarily bound ad extra by his act of creation." But this act stems more from
the nature of God than from his will: the "impelling cause" (causa impellens) of creation,
says Arminius, "is the Goodness of God, according to which he is [affectus] inclined to
communicate his good." God is the highest good (summum bonum) and creation is a
communication of that good, and, because of this, all things have their "existence" {quod
sint) and "goodness" (quod bona sinl) by their "participation" in divine goodness.100
Such a conception of creation necessitates that the purpose of God towards
those he creates will be "the good of the creatures themselves, and especially of man."101
Otherwise, as Muller states, the very nature of the act of creation is violated:
God freely wills to create the world, but—granting that the world is the
result of God's goodness and exists by participation in that goodness—
once the world as such belongs to his willing, [he] is bound by his own
goodness and by its reflection in the world to exercise his dominion in a
99 Richard A. Muller, "God, Predestination, and the Integrity of the Created Order: A Note on Patterns in
Arminius' Theology," in loiter Calvinism: International Perspectives, ed. W. Fred Graham (Kirksville, MO:
Sixteenth Century Journal, 1994), 440, 445. The extent to which Arminius is faithful to Thomist thinking
is not clear. Brian Davies argues, for instance, that Thomas believed human free will after creation to be
limited by divine providence. Thought ofThomasAquinas, 177-8, 248-9.
1011 W]A, 2:339, 355. Cf. Muller, "Patterns in Arminius' Theology," 440.
11,1 WJA, 2:356.
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manner "proportioned to the powers of the creature on whom it is
imposed." "Any other mode" of divine intervention, whether to assist
or to hinder human activity, "will be directly contrary to the good of the
universe, inasmuch as the good of the universe consists just in this, that
any creature be endowed with a free will, and that the use of its own
proper free judgment or choice be allowed to it without any divine
interference."102
Although Arminius does apparently allow for something like the potentia absoluta in God
before the decree to create, he, nonetheless, assigns so central a place to creation that it
transcends God's decrees and forms the basis from which they flow.103 All of God's
decrees ad extra fall within the category of potentia ordinata, because they are limited by
God's overarching act of creation, and, therefore, cannot contradict the nature of
creation as a communication of and participation in divine goodness. This means that
even God, as the later Remonstrants say, has no right to "require, that a Man should
wholly devest himself of the exercise of his Liberty, which he received by Creation."104
In short, then, we see a basic difference in the theological systems of Rutherford
and the Arminians. While Rutherford is driven by an overriding concern to protect
divine freedom and the good, or glory, ofGod in the development of his doctrine of the
divine will, Arminius consciously develops a system in which human freedom and the
creature's good take center stage. It is important to note, however, that, despite this
difference, both believe zealously in the sovereignty of God. But, whereas Arminius has
constructed a world order wholly under the rubric of potentia ordinata, in which God's
every act is limited by his decree of creation, Rutherford has instituted one in which
potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata co-exist. The result is that God is both omnipotent
and sovereign in the current world order, even over the free wills of creatures. In
addition to this, by advocating a world order in which potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata
exist together, Rutherford is allowing room for the immediacy of God. God is free to
work above, beyond, and apart from given means. But, in Arminius' world order,
because God has subjected his sovereignty to the free wills of creatures by creating them
with liberty, he now works only mediately, adopting a hands-off approach, so to speak,
to providence. This difference between Rutherford and Arminius has profound
soteriological implications, as we will see later in this chapter and in the next, and will
102 Muller, "Patterns in Arminius' Theology," 441, citing from WJA, 3:284-5.
103 Muller, "Patterns in Arminius' Theology," 434-5; W]A, 1:653-4.
104 Confession, 103.
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result in theological systems that are diametrically opposed to one another in their
entireties.
3.2.1.2: Theologia archetypa et ectypa
Because the potentia Dei ordinata represents the sphere in which God has revealed himself
to his creatures through his decrees, while the potentia Dei absoluta represents a larger
sphere, transcending our comprehension, the scholastic emphasis on the power
distinction points towards another distinction that is important for our discussion of
Rutherford and the Arminians, viz., that between theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa,
which was introduced in chapter two.105 By bringing the whole world order under the
sphere of God's potentia ordinata, Arminius emphasizes theologia ectypa over theologia
archetypa, and, thereby, justifies and accentuates the rationality of religion.106 By
removing the sphere of the potentia absoluta from consideration in the present world
order, he is removing the element of God's incomprehensibility from his theology,
while Rutherford, who maintains a world in which God has both potentia absoluta and
potentia ordinata, retains a balance between God's comprehensibility and his ultimate
incomprehensibility. What is more, the dynamic relationship that exists between the
potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata and between theologia ectypa and theologia archetypa
helps to explain the element ofmystery that exists in Rutherford's theology. Things like
the sovereignty of God and human free will can both be subscribed to by Rutherford at
the same time without any necessity of resolving the relationship between them
philosophically. But the same cannot be said of Arminius' theology. Since everything is
confined to the sphere of the potentia ordinata, no such mystery is justified.107 Arminius
must, to be consistent, attempt to resolve the relationship between such things as God's
sovereignty and human free will. More significant than this, however, is the fact that by
denying God's ability after creation to work immediately, the Arminians make theologia
ectypa knowable by all people without exception, whereas, for Rutherford, the noetic
effects of sin cloud the minds of all people after the fall and prevent them from
105 See section 2.1.1 above.
106 Although Arminius embraces the scholastic distinction between theologia archetypa et ectypa, later
Arminians, like Episcopius and Van Limborch, reject it outright. By doing so, they reveal this penchant
for relegating all theology to theologia ectypa. See Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, 60-62; Episcopius,
Opera theologica (1678), 12-13; Van Limborch, Theologia Christiana, 1.1.1.
107 Sec Oberman's helpful discussion of the effects of the potentia ahsoluta et ordinata on medieval
Nominalism in "Notes on Nominalism," 57ff.
107
knowing theologia ectypa savingly apart from the immediate work of God upon their
minds and wills.108
This feature of Rutherford's theology further confirms Brian Armstrong's error
in asserdng that reason assumed an "equal standing with faith" in post-Reformation
thinking and further demonstrates how his claims apply best to Arminian theology
instead. But it also reveals how the doctrine of God lies at the foundation of the
theological differences that exist between Rutherford and the Arminians. No matter
how central prolegomenal differences are, the doctrine of God—and the potentia Dei
absoluta et ordinata, in particular—is more fundamental. Whereas Rutherford's God
reigns on high within the current world order, the Arminians' God has willingly
subjected himself to his free creatures. Most, if not all, of the key differences between
their respective theologies can be explained in light of these ad intra/ad extra distinctions.
3.2.2: Voluntas beneplaciti et signi
The second and most common distinction that Rutherford makes in regard to the divine
will is one that involves the relationship between the will ad intra and ad extra, namely,
the voluntas Dei beneplaciti et signi. Even though Rutherford remarks that the "Scholastics
unanimously acknowledge this," he is quick to point out that they differ amongst
themselves and is equally as quick to explain the way in which he is using the terms
himself.109 Rutherford defines the voluntas beneplaciti as "the decree of God," by which he
determines all things, both good and bad, that will come to pass "in his own time." It is
the hidden or decretive (decretiva) will ofGod, that which God "cannot not satisfy."110 It
differs from the voluntas signi, which is the "revealed" (revelata), "approving" (approbans),
1(18 By "immediate," we do not intend to suggest that Rutherford understands God to work apart from his
appointed means (e.g., Scripture) but to work specially upon one individual at a time, opening his or her
eyes to see the truth in Scripture and enabling him or her to believe, rather than generally instituting a
sphere of grace in which all people are able to be saved.
109 Exercitationes, 213. Heinrich Heppe has claimed that post-Reformation theologians in general
"disapproved of the distinction between voluntas signi et beneplacitD (RD, 87-8). But this claim does not
bear up against the evidence both in regard to Rutherford and the Arminians, as we will see, and, as
Richard Muller has shown, in regard to many others of the post-Reformation period as well, including
Wendelin, Poole, Leigh, Maccovius, Cocceius, Twisse, and Baxter (PRRD, 3:457-9). Interestingly, Heppe
himself points to several others who employ this distinction favorably and in the same way that
Rutherford does: e.g., Polanus, Walaeus, Hottinger, Braun, Airing, and Heidan (RD, 85-7). There were
different opinions about this distinction among scholastics (see, e.g., Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 165) but rather
than wholly disregard and disapprove of it, men like Rutherford, Arminius, and many of the later
Remonstrants, embrace it and define what they mean by it.
110 Examen, 181-2, 285.
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or "commanding" (praecipiens) will of God, whereby he makes known to his creatures all
that he approves of, as being "morally lawful and noble, even if the future actuality
of...[those] good thing[s] may never be decreed by God.""1 In this way, God desires,
approves, and commands many things to be done, which he decrees not to be done in
actuality, and he forbids many things from being done, which he decrees to be done in
actuality. Although it may sound like it, these two wills are not contradictory. God does
not decree by his voluntas beneplaciti or command by his voluntas signi that something be
both done and not done.112 But he does approve of certain things being done by his
voluntas signi that he does not actually decree to be done by his voluntas beneplaciti. And
the reverse is true as well: God decrees (permits) certain things to be done by his voluntas
beneplaciti that he does not approve of nor command to be done by his voluntas signi. For
example, Rutherford says that God "desires the obedience of Judas and Herod and
Pilate," by his approving, commanding, and revealed will, and "yet he decreed [by his
hidden or decretive will] that they should crucify the Lord ofgloryP And he approves and
commands "by his Voluntas Signi the perfect obedience of his own Law: But he decreed
by his Voluntas Beneplaciti from eternity that there would be no one besides Christ, who
would perfectly satisfy the Law."113
In Rutherford's opinion, the Arminians virtually equate these two wills, the only
difference being that the voluntas beneplaciti is hidden while the voluntas signi is revealed.114
By making this charge, however, he is again exploiting the Arminian position and
ignoring the explicit statements that they make in order to distinguish between them.
Both Arminius and his later disciples identify the voluntas beneplaciti as that "by which
[God] wills to do or to prevent something" by using "his absolute and irresistible
Omnipotency" to dispose "of all outward actions, and events of all things according to his
alone pleasure." They differentiate it from the voluntas signi., "by which [God] wills
something to be done, or to be omitted, by creatures endued with understanding."115
But, having acknowledged this, it must be said that Rutherford is putting his finger on
an inherent contradiction in Arminian thinking. Following this almost-Calvinistic
definition of the voluntas beneplaciti, the Remonstrants make the following remark:




1,5 WJA, 2:128; Confession, 113, emphasis added.
109
yet the natural contingency of things, and the innate liberty ofMans will,
once long since given it in Creation, [God] doth never take away thereby:
but leaveth ordinarily the natures of things safe and entire: and in such
sort concurreth with the will of Man in acting, that he suffers it also to
act according to its own nature, and freely perform its part: and therefore
doth not at any time lay upon it a necessity ofdoing well, much less ofdoing illf6
Rutherford recogntiies that the Arminians are speaking of God's decree in absolute
terms—he disposes all things "according to his alone pleasure"—and then qualifying it
out of existence by adding that God does not "at any time" place any kind of necessity
upon the free wills of his creatures. By making this qualification, they do appear to
empty the contents of the voluntas beneplaciti and to transubstantiate it into the voluntas
signi. God no longer wills according to his good pleasure alone but merely approves of
what his creatures will according to their own good pleasure.
That such a transubstantiation ofwills occurs is more apparent when sin is taken
into account. The Arminians say that God does not will sin in any way whatsoever but
only permits it by "suffering] our Actions to proceed," according to our own freedom
of choice. God's permission is not an active willing on his part but a mere "Remission"
of his will. Were he actively to will sin or even sinful events, he would "overthrow the
order [of creation] once setled by himself, and destroy and void that liberty, which he
gave his Creature."117 As a result, the Arminians collapse the voluntas beneplaciti into the
voluntas signi. God can only forbid sin to happen by legislating against it in his external
commands; he has no real power to prevent its actuality once establishing the order of
things in creation. Positively, this way of thinking seems to clear God of the charge that
he is the author of sin by laying it at the feet of the creature instead. Negatively, it
renders God powerless—albeit by divine choice—-in preventing or overturning sinful
actions or evil people. And, as we will see, it does not completely clear God of the
charge of being the author of sin. Before we can explore how this is so, however, we
need to look at yet another distinction within the divine will.
3.2.3: Voluntas efficiens et permittens
The third distinction that Rutherford makes in regard to the divine will is the ad extra
distinction between the voluntas efficiens et permittens. Both terms fall under the umbrella
of the voluntas beneplaciti and help to explain how it is that the will of God determines all
116 Confession, 114, emphasis added.
117 Confession, 84-5; W]A, 2:128.
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future things and functions in concurrence with the free wills of creatures. In continuity
with much of Thomistic philosophy, Rutherford operates in strict premotionist terms,118
attributing to God—the first cause of all things—not only a simultaneous concurrence
with every secondary cause but also a physical or material predetermination of it.119 The
voluntas ejfiriens is the "first and highest cause of allpositive existents." It is the will by which
God direcdy accomplishes all tilings, either by himself or by his divine predetermination
of and concurrence with secondary agents. In regard to morally good things, the voluntas
efficiens determines not only the physical acts themselves but the morality of those acts as
well.120 Evil or sinful acts, however, fall under the voluntas permittens, God's permitting
will, whereby he allows evil to be done by his creatures but does not directly accomplish
it. This will, for Rutherford as well as for Calvin, is not a "bare" permission, as the
Arminians say. It is not a "bare denial of the will" or a "non-willing" on the part of
God but a "positive act of the voluntas Beneplaciti," in which the predetermination and
concurrence of God together with the secondary agent produces the physical act of the
sin. But the morality of the sinful act is only and completely caused by the secondary
agent. Thus, although the voluntaspemittens affirms a positive act of God's will, it denies
two important things: "1. It denies moral efficiency, for God is not the cause of those
things, which he permits. 2. It denies voluntas approbans [or, signi]. For that which God
permits, he does not approve or prescribe for the creature to do."121
118 Whether or not Aquinas is a premotionist is a subject of debate. William Lane Craig has recendy
argued that "Aquinas interpreted the notion of divine concurrence to mean that God not only supplies
and conserves the power of operation in every secondary cause, but that He acts on the secondary causes
to produce their actual operations, a view that came to be known as the doctrine of premotion" (The
Problem ofDivine Foreknowledge, 201). For those who take an opposite view to Craig, see Van Ruler, "New
Philosophy to Old Standards," 67n27. For our purposes here it does not really matter where Aquinas
comes down on this question, because, as Van Ruler points out, "later Thomistic thinkers...were
generally held to be premotionists" (Van Ruler, "New Philosophy to Old Standards," 65).
119 "Premotionism" derives its name from the predetermination, or pre-moving, of God in bringing
secondary causes into motion in the first place (see Van Ruler, "New Philosophy to Old Standards," 64ff).
Van Ruler gives the following helpful diagram in order to explain this theory:
Prime Cause
a / \ c
Secondary Cause — Effect
b
where, a = God's "physical predetermination of the secondary cause;" b = the "natural operation of the
secondary cause," i.e., human beings acting according to their own free wills; and c = the "simultaneous
concurrence of the Prime Cause" with the free operation of the second cause.
120 Fxamen, 184-5, 223-4, 226-7.
121 Fxamen, 185, 205. Cf. Institutes I.xviii.l, 228-31.
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The Arminians, following later scholastics and, in particular, the thinking of
Molina, reject this theory of premouonism in favor of a cooperadonism, whereby God
simply works together with secondary causes to bring about certain effects, but he does
not predetermine or "pre-move" those secondary causes into action.122 Were God to do
so, he would violate the free wills of his creatures, something he cannot do after creating
them. From the Arminian point of view, the premotionist position, as developed by
Rutherford, is subject to at least two significant criticisms. First, if God is the
predetermining cause of sin, or even of the sinful act, such that his predetermination is
the sufficient condition for its existence, then God is necessarily the author of sin.
Rutherford denies the accusation by arguing that God cannot be considered the author
of sin if he is not the direct or efficient cause of it. He distinguishes between the
physical and moral natures of sinful acts and asserts that the one who is responsible for
the moral character of a sinful act is the rightful author of sin. Even Arminius, he says,
"admits that eating is in itself a natural act, having no disorder in itself" But the "prohibition
of the Legislator" against wrongful eating—i.e., overeating—does not remove the
distinction between the physical and the moral natures of the act, nor does it equate the
physical act with the sinful use of that act. It is not the act of eating that is sinful but the
act of overeating (i.e., eating sinfully). In the same way, according to Rutherford, even
though God is the material first cause of the sinful act, he cannot rightly be considered
the author of the sin itself.123 Only the one who acts sinfully can be so considered.
While this distinction between the physical and moral natures of an act does
show that it is inappropriate to allege that Rutherford makes God the author of sin, it
still leaves a nagging problem unresolved. How can God be the first and sufficient
122 Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge, 200-202. See also Van Ruler, "New Philosophy to Old
Standards," 64-7. Once again, Van Ruler gives the following helpful diagram in order to illustrate how the
cooperationist view differs from the premotionist. As should be obvious from the diagram, "a," God's
"physical predetermination of the secondary cause," is absent from the cooperationist scheme. But, "b"
is still the "natural operation of the secondary cause," as before, and "c" is the "simultaneous concurrence
of the Prime Cause" with the second cause.
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See Van Ruler, "New Philosophy to Old Standards," 64n21.
123 Examen, 220, 224, 230.
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cause of a sinful act, such that a given sin would not occur without him, and, yet, not
have some amount of moral culpability? Whether or not God is actually the author of
sin in Rutherford's theology, then, is really beside the point, because God still appears to
be culpable, as an accomplice at least, for his role in predetermining the physical act.
Secondly, the Arminians criticize Rutherford by suggesting that if God is the
predetermining cause of everything, even of evil and affliction, then there is nothing
separating his understanding of God from the fate of the Stoics or the Manichees.124
But rather than deny this accusation, Rutherford acknowledges it, saying that "iffate is
the will of God, we do not hesitate to assert that all things happen by fatef In order to
clarify this and to avoid at least two problems that would result from such a potentially
controversial statement, he offers the following two points of dissimilarity between his
version of "fate" and Stoicism: first, "Divine Fate" is not the cause of wickedness,
whereas the "Fate of the Heathens" is; and, second, divine fate "works sweetly in
harmony with" the free acts of creatures—or, as the Westminster Confession says, God
determines "whatsoever comes to pass" but in such a way that "the liberty or
contingency of second causes is [not] taken way, but rather established"—whereas this
emphasis is missing from the fate of the Stoics.125 Since we have already dealt with the
former point, we will now explore the latter in more detail.
Rather than precluding human freedom, as one might be tempted to guess,
divine fate, in Rutherford's thinking, actually assumes it. Divine sovereignty and human
freedom are completely compatible, as he sees it. Scripture, the principium cognoscendi
theologiae, teaches both that God is sovereign and that humans are free. Commenting
upon Nehemiah 1.10—a text which attributes the redemption of the people of Israel
primarily to God—Rutherford says: "But this power manifested itself by free acts in
Pharaoh, who freely sent out the people; by Moses and Aaron, who freely proclaimed and
performed miracles; [and] by the people, whofreely went out."126
Rutherford believes that the relationship between the sovereignty of God and
human freedom in Scripture extends even to sinful acts. He offers fours ways in which
this can be seen. First, Scripture teaches that God decrees sin and is the predetermining
cause of its existence: in Genesis 45.7, God, and not Joseph's brothers, is said to be the
124 Examen, 227; Confession, 115.
125 Examen, 228-9; WCE, § 3.1, 28.
126 Examen, 198.
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one who sends Joseph into Egypt; in Acts 2.23, 4.27, and 13.29, we are informed that
"those who crucified Christ did nothing other than what God decreed to be donef in 2 Samuel 24.1,
we are directed that "God incited David to number the people ofGod," which was a sinful act;
and in 1 Chronicles 5.26, we read that the "God ofIsrael stirred up the spirit ofVul <&c. so that
he would take the people captive."™ Second, Scripture teaches that "God uses Devils and
individuals in the act of sinning, as his own instruments," in order to accomplish his
purposes: so, in Isaiah 10.5, "Assyria is [said to be] the rod of [God's] wrathf in Isaiah 7.20,
the king of Assyria is called a "hired rayorf and in Jeremiah 51.7, "Babylon is a gold chalice
in the hand ofGod."™ Third, Scripture establishes the fact that God works together with
sinful actions by permitting them materially but not morally: thus, in Job 1.12, 15, and
21, we are told that in one and the same act "the Sabeans took away good things from
Job, and God, through the Sabeans, took away those same good things;" and in 2 Samuel
12.11 and 16.21-2, we see that in one and the same "material action," "God castigates
David by Absalom polluting his...bed." In each of these cases, Rutherford says, the
action of the "instruments is morally unjust and vitiated."129 Fourth, Scripture
demonstrates that God decrees some things (by his voluntas beneplaciti) that he has
expressly forbidden (by his voluntas signi). So, in 1 Kings 22.20, 23, God sent a "lying
spirit in the mouth of the Prophets" to allure Ahab to a battle that had been forbidden
by God, "in order that he might be killed there." And, in 2 Samuel 12.11, God
"appointed Absalom to pollute wickedly his own Father's bed," in order to discipline
David for his sin with Bathsheba.130
Whether or not such ideas are in fact true to the biblical text is an issue that will
not be entered into here. Biblical interpretation is an enterprise that, even in
Rutherford's day, could be highly subjective. As we saw in the previous chapter, many
of the Christian sects which surfaced in England and Scotland in the 1640s treated
Scripture as a nose of wax to be molded and shaped according to their every whim. In
setting this question aside, however, it should be noted that Rutherford's ideas are at
least philosophically unsatisfying. The Arminians argue, as many others have over the
last almost four hundred years, that such an emphasis on God's sovereign
127 Examen, 206. Rutherford lists other biblical passages: 2 Chronicles 21.16-17; Isaiah 45.7; Job 1.21;
Ezekiel 14.9; 1 Corinthians 1.19-20; 2 Thessalonians 2.11; and 1 Peter 3.17.
128 Examen, 207. Rutherford adds Jeremiah 25.9; 27.6; 50.23; and Revelation 17.17.
129 Examen, 230-31. Rutherford adds Isaiah 10.12.
13,1 Examen, 206.
114
predetermination of every event precludes any possibility of true or "significant" human
freedom.131 Although Rutherford denies this accusation, his compatibilism leaves us
with an unresolved tension that the Arminian position seems to address: How can God
be sovereign and humans still retain any semblance of true freedom? While the tension
between God's sovereignty and human free will is anticipated in Rutherford's
understanding of the potentia absoluta et ordinata, it is still somewhat unsatisfying
philosophically for him to leave the issue unresolved. The Arminians do attempt to
resolve it, an attempt which is also anticipated in their reaction to the medieval power
distinction, by stating that God foresees human free actions and then decrees to work
together with them in divine concurrence.
It should be noted that Rutherford's emphasis on the sovereignty of God in
predetermining everything that comes to pass, is at times so stark that it leaves one
wondering if there actually is anything that separates his understanding from fatalism. A
good example of this extreme emphasis on divine sovereignty is Rutherford's defense of
the practice of casting lots.132 Historian Robert Wodrow records an incident in
Rutherford's lifetime in which he took up the casting of lots in order to determine
God's choice for a vacant regency at St. Andrews. Even though he insisted it be done
twice—because the first time the prayer that had been offered was "not right gone
about" and so the "determination" was "not to be sisted in"—he did, nonetheless,
finally acknowledge and submit to God's decision in the outcome, but only after he
himself had prayed and the result had turned out the same.133
Despite the difficulties inherent in Rutherford's system, however, it must be said
that the Arminian alternative is subject to several problems that are at least as troubling.
131 .Most recendy Open Theists like John Sanders and Gregory Boyd have taken this stance. Sanders says
that libertarian freedom, which is genuine or "significant" freedom, is "necessary for a truly personal
relationship of love to develop" between God and ourselves (The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence
[Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998], 214, 251). Boyd echoes Sanders' sentiments and adds that
"agents arc genuinely free only if the agents themselves are the ultimate explanations of their own free
activity" (Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy [Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity, 2001], 19) For a response to these claims of Open Theists and Arminians and a cogent
comparison of libertarian and compatibilist freedom written from a compatibilist perspective, see Mark R.
Talbot, "True Freedom: The Liberty that Scripture Portrays as Worth Having," in Beyond the Bounds: Open
Theism and the Undermining of Biblical Christianity, eds., John Piper, Justin Taylor, and Paul Kjoss Helseth
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2003), 77-109; and Helseth, "The Trustworthiness of God and the Foundation
of Hope," also in Beyond the Bounds, 275-307.
132 Examen, 194-5.
133 Robert Wodrow, Analecta: or, Materials for a Histoty of Remarkable Providences; Mostly Relating to Scotch
Ministers and Christians, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: Maidand Club, 1842-3), 1:140-1.
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First, Arminian theology does not fully clear God of moral culpability either. As
William Wainwright argues:
A person is responsible or accountable for events of which she is not the
author if she was able to prevent their occurrence and knew that they
would occur if she did not interfere. It follows that since God knew that
Judas would betray Christ if he and Jesus were created, and created them,
He is responsible or accountable for Judas's betrayal even if he [sic] isn't
the author of that betrayal. That God isn't the author of sin doesn't
absolve Him of moral responsibility for it.134
But Wainwright proves more than this. Sin, he claims, for both the Calvinist and the
Arminian, is ordained by God as a means to the end of achieving divine purposes.
Even Arminians would agree that "God's ultimate aim includes the redemption of the
world through Christ's atonement." But if this is so, then "sin is a means to that end,
and not just an unfortunate by-product of something else God aims at." And if this is
the case, then "in creating free agents whom He knows will freely sin if they are created,
God knowingly 'initiates a harmful causal sequence'" in order to fulfill his ultimate aims.
Wainwright's conclusion: "The Arminian isn't much better off than the Calvinist with
respect to God's alleged authorship of human sin."135 Both systems are unable wholly
to clear God of moral culpability and both teach that God ordains sin as a means to
accomplishing his purposes.
Secondly, Arminians face similar difficulties as do Calvinists in regard to the
inherent determinism of their respective theological systems. For the Arminians, the
difficulties stem from their reliance upon scientia media, a notion that had been
traditionally challenged by Thomistic theologians on the basis that it leads ineluctably to
a "determinism of circumstances."136 By bringing one particular world into actuality
instead of another—say, a world in which "fane" will be surrounded by good influences
and so freely choose to believe and to persevere in her faith, whereas "John" will be
134 William J. Wainwright, "Theological determinism and the problem of evil: Are Arminians any better
off?," InternationalJournalfor Philosophy ofReligion 50 (2001), 87.
135 "Theological determinism," 90.
136 See, e.g., Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "Premotion Physique," in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique (Paris:
Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1936), 13:68: "Enfin, les thomistes retorquent I'objection [that premotionism is
incompatible with human freedom] en disant: c'est la theorie de la science moyenne qui detruit la liberte,
car elle suppose que Dieu, anterieurement a tout decret divin, voit infailliblement ce que choisirait le libre
arbitre de tel homme, s'il etait place en telles circonstances. Comment, en effet, eviter alors le
determinisme des circonstances? Ou Dieu peut-il voir infailliblement la determination a laquelle le libre
arbitre cree s'arrcterait, sinon dans l'examen des circonstances, qui deviennent des lors infailliblement
determinantes?"
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surrounded by bad influences and so freely choose not to believe or not to persevere in
faith; or, a world in which Judas will freely betray Jesus so that Jesus might die to
redeem humankind—God has effectively determined the fate of not only Jane and
John, or Judas and Jesus, but of all individuals in that particular world. God could have
chosen not to create John and Judas. But by choosing to create them, knowing that
they would not believe, he has predetermined a certain course of events. Why create
John or Judas in the first place? Would that not be more "good" for them than creating
them unto destruction? Regardless of how much the Arminians protest against the
determinism of Calvinists like Rutherford, their alternative does not wholly free them
from its blight.
In Rutherford's opinion, however, there is a greater problem with the
determinism of the Arminians; it is grounded ultimately not in the will ofGod but in the
will of the creature or in some sort of fate. The Arminians reject the absolute decree of
God and opt instead for a conditional one that "envelops God in fate, and forces his
Omnipotency," which by definition should work "freely ad extra" to cooperate "in
contributing to acts which have future actuality prior to his every decree."137 In other
words, Rutherford says, by denying that the divine will determines everything absolutely,
and teaching instead that God decrees, in light of his scientia media, what he foresees will
necessarily happen in and of itself, apart from his divine will, the Arminians place a far
greater emphasis on the fate of the Stoics than he could ever be accused of doing. Their
fatalism is not a "divine fate" but one that removes God from the throne of the
universe and places humans there in his place as those who are ultimately responsible
for determining all things.
Thirdly, the Arminians open the door to certain pastoral issues that are, again, at
least as troubling as those raised by Calvinism. The most noteworthy of these is the
issue of prayer within the church. There can be no doubt that Rutherford's perception
of God and the voluntas beneplaciti leaves many of the problems with respect to prayer
unresolved. The question arises for Rutherford: if God is sovereign, why is prayer
necessary? And although this is not a question that he answers, it is clear that, as far as
he is concerned, the problem raised by Arminianism is much more serious pastorally:
why pray, if God is unable to answer that prayer? The God of the Arminians "could
only respond [to our prayers] like this: I am unable to help, it is not my will that the wicked
137 Examen, 192-3; cf. Examen, 164-5, 185, 190.
117
should have a hatred foryou"™ For God to intervene in the world order in answer to
prayer would mean he would have to overturn the free wills of at least some of his
creatures, which is impossible for him to do after creating them. The pastoral
implications of this are grave, according to Rutherford, not only in regard to prayer, but
also in regard to "our faith,.. .hope, gratitude, fear, desire," and patient endurance in
suffering. All these things would not "rest and repose in God" but would be a source
of great anxiety for the church were God not the one who has decreed all things "from
eternity."139
In short, after examining Rutherford's understanding of the distinction between
the voluntas efficiens and the voluntaspcrmittens and comparing it with similar notions in the
Arminians, it can be said that neither Rutherford nor the Arminians resolve all the
problems regarding the relationship between divine sovereignty and human free will.
Each side in the debate presents a theology with some elements that commend it and
others that would seem to undermine it. What should be evident, however, is that both
sides are diametrically opposed to one another. Rutherford exalts God's sovereignty
and free will by establishing a world order in which God can reign and rule from on
high, while the Arminians place their emphasis on human autonomy instead.
3.2.4: Voluntas antecedens et consequens
The final distinction that Rutherford makes in regard to the divine will is the distinction
between the voluntas antecedens et consequens. Although Rutherford believes that the
Arminians wrongly employ this distinction, he feels that the terms themselves could be
useful to differentiate between the end and the means to the end or between the voluntas
■ signi et beneplaciti.uo In his Exercitationes, Rutherford also adds a third way in which these
terms could rightly be utilized. This third option is similar to the relation between the
voluntas signi and beneplaciti and is found in such medieval scholastics as Duns Scotus and
Durandus. According to it, "Deum id velle antecedenter.. .quod vult in antecedente
causa, ex qua.. .effectus sequitur, quamvis non necessario; ut Deus antecedenter vult
omnes salvari, quatenus dedit omnibus naturam salutis capacem, & media sufficients
138 Examen, 202, 207.
139 Examen, 207, 228-9.
14(1 Examen, 170-71. Rutherford is not alone in his belief that these terms could be righdy used when
properly defined. Maccovius, Cocceius, Heidanus, Owen, Turretin, and Rijssen—among post-
Reformation theologians—and Vermigli and Musculus—among the reformers—all voiced similar
opinions. See PRRD, 3:442-3, 465; RD, 90-92.
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non negavit, & Deus id vult consequenter quod non in causa sua, sed in se vult, ut
credentes salvari."141 Here we have Rutherford's explanation of how it is that God can
will the salvation of the whole world and yet not have the whole world be saved. God
wills antecedently that all natural barriers to salvation be removed, even though spiritual
barriers may remain. While this does provide a universal warrant for faith,142 it does not
guarantee that faith will inevitably follow. The consequent will of God removes the
spiritual barriers and guarantees that faith will follow in the elect.
But this is not how the Arminians employ this distinction. Picking up on and
perhaps modifying the examples of Chrysostom and John of Damascus (c.675-c.749),
the Arminians speak of God antecedently willing the salvation of all people but
consequently punishing some of them and withholding salvation from them for their
sins.143 This way of thinking renders the voluntas antecedens wholly inefficacious and the
voluntas consequens conditional upon the performance or non-performance of the
creature.144 Rutherford's problem with the Arminians, however, is not so much that the
voluntas antecedens is inefficacious, because in the second and third ways that he himself
gives for properly using this scholastic distinction, it is equally so. His problem is that
there is no place in the Arminian system for an efficacious and absolute divine will. By
not affording a place for an efficacious and absolute will, the Arminians are once
again—in Rutherford's opinion—exalting human autonomy over divine free will and, in
the process, undermining the sovereignty and glory of God.
3.2.5: Continuity or Discontinuity with the Reformation?
Before moving on to look at two key soteriological applications of the divine will in
Rutherford's thinking, we need briefly to address the question of whether or not the
preceding view of the voluntas Del is continuous with Reformation theology. Doing so
will enable us to demonstrate further the tenuous nature ofArmstrong's claims in regard
to the characteristic Protestant scholastic understanding of the divine will. Rather than
being a source of discontinuity between the Reformation and post-Reformation periods,
141 Exercitationes, 323.
142 The soteriological concern over the warrant of faith is a problem that was later to plague men like
James Fraser of Brea (see his Memoirs of the Life of the 1Very Rev. Mr. J.F. ofBrea [Edinburgh, 1738]). It is
possible that had Fraser understood Rutherford properly at this point, he might have been spared some
of the spiritual agony he endured for the better part of his life.
143 Muller, "Patterns in Arminius's Theology," 434.
144 Examen, 171; Exercitationes, 323. Cf. PRRD, 3:465.
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as Armstrong would have us to believe, the intricate doctrine of the voluntas Dei
represents substantial continuity instead. This can be seen in at least the following three
ways. First, although many of the reformers consistently express their disregard for
doctrinal speculation, they, nonetheless, recognize the methodological necessity of
adopting a series of distinctions to describe the divine will. Thus, Calvin and Musculus
agree with Vermigli in saying that "the will of God is of one sort, but.. .the objects [are]
diverse."145 And because the objects of the divine will are diverse, "our perception [of]
God's will is manifold."146 Some sort of system of distinctions is, therefore, necessary in
order to explain the divine will as it is perceived by us.
Secondly, in order to meet this need of explaining the will of God as it is
understood by human beings, Calvin, Musculus, and Vermigli all adopt scholastic
distinctions. Thus, Calvin differentiates between God's "hidden will" (voluntas arcana)
and his "revealed will" (voluntas revelata) and uses these terms in the same way that
Rutherford uses voluntas beneplaciti et signi, viz., to distinguish between God's hidden
decree, on the one hand, and the commands that meet divine approval as revealed in
Scripture, on the other.147 Vermigli and Musculus not only embrace the medieval
distinction between voluntas beneplaciti et signi, but, as we have previously indicated, they
also accept the terms voluntas antecedens and voluntas consequens, although they use these
latter terms interchangeably with the former pair. According to Vermigli, the "will
signified is that, which sheweth what we ought to do, or what we ought to avoid; for
thereby we gather the judgment and ordinance of God, and that consisteth in the lawe,
in the commandements, promises, thretnings and counsels." The "other will of God,"
the voluntas beneplaciti, "is that, which is called mightie, effectuall, and according to his
good pleasure, which by no power can be vanquished and overcome."148 Calvin, like
Rutherford, also distinguishes between the "effecting" will of God and the "permitting"
will of God by referring favorably to medieval scholastics like Peter Lombard. For
Calvin, as for Rutherford, God's permissive will is that by which "he directs the.. .malice
[of Satan and all the wicked] to whatever end seems good to him, and uses their wicked
145 Vermigli, Common Places, I.xvii, 200. Cf. Calvin, Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists, Matthew,
Mark, and Lake, trans. William Pringle (Edinburgh: CTS, 1846), 1:320-21; Institutes I.xviii.3, 232-5;
Musculus, Common Places, 920ff.
146 Institutes III.xxiv.17, 986.
147 Institutes Ill.ii. 14, 560; lll.xx.43, 906; III.xxiii.4, 951; Commentary on a Harmony ofthe Evangelists, 3:109.
148 Vermigli, Common Places, I.xvii, 201. Cf. Musculus, Common Places, 932.
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deeds to carry out his judgments." This is done in such a way that "the figment of bare
permission vanishes" and, yet, not so as to establish God as the author of sin.149
Calvin's use of scholastic distinctions notwithstanding, his rejection of the
particular distinction between the potentia absoluta et ordinata would seem to be at odds
with post-Reformation thought, which, as we have previously seen, adopted the two
powers of God in its "classical" expression.150 As David Steinmetz has argued, Calvin's
unwillingness "to entertain even a hypothetical separation of God's power from his
justice," would seem to be "not only opposed to the abuse" of the power distinction, as
Turretin was later to suppose, but "to the distinction as such."151 In spite of this fact,
however, there is good reason "to acknowledge," with Francis Oakley, that Calvin
embraces the theology laying behind this distinction—as it is understood in its classical
expression—even though he denounces the distinction itself. According to Oakley,
there is an implicit embrace of the two powers of God in Calvin's view of "God's
preordination of things" as "divine action reaching beyond the fixed order of nature and
grace,"152 a view which, in the words of another twentieth-century scholar, is "on a par
with the distinction between providentia ordinaria and extraordinaricT as it is found in such
early English Puritans as Perkins and Ames and, later, in the Westminster Confession.153
Thirdly, although it is true that reformers like Calvin, Musculus, and Vermigli
refuse to pronounce definitively on the ad intra priority of the will or intellect in God,
this does not necessarily mean that Rutherford's explicit voluntarism is, therefore, at
odds with Reformation teaching. There appears to be good reason for seeing
Rutherford's voluntarism as, at the very least, not contradictory to Reformation thought.
For one thing, the theology of Calvin, Musculus, and Vermigli is concerned to protect
the freedom of the divine will from every constraint and to locate the causal basis for all
things in the will of God. But whereas Musculus and Vermigli write that Augustine—
when he says "that there is nothing prior to or greater than the will of God"—is correct
149 Institutes I.xviii.l, 228-31.
150 Francis Oakley, "The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century
Theology," journal ofthe History ofIdeas 59:3 (July 1998), 444-9.
151 David C. Steinmetz, Calvin in Context (New York: Oxford University, 1995), 49-50. Cf. Turretin,
Institutes, 3.21.5, 1:245.
152 Oakley, "Absolute and Ordained Power of God," 458.
153 Gijsbert Van den Brink, Almighty God: A Study of the Doctrine of Divine Omnipotence (Kempen: J. Kok,
1993), 90. Cf. the discussions of providence in Perkins, Workes, 1:159; 3:609, 657; Ames, Marrow, 45-50;
and WCF, §§ 5.1-7, 33-8.
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only insofar as it applies to "those things that are not in God,"154 Calvin is at least more
open to voluntaristic interpretation. Thus, in the Institutes, he says the following about
the divine will without clarifying whether he is speaking ad intra or ad extra-.
[God's] will is, and rightly ought to be, the cause of all things that are.
For if it has any cause, something must precede it, to which it is, as it
were, bound; this is unlawful to imagine. For God's will is so much the
highest rule of righteousness that whatever he wills, by the very fact that
he wills it, must be considered righteous. When therefore, one asks why
God has so done, we must reply: because he has willed it. But if you
proceed further to ask why he so willed, you are seeking something
greater and higher than God's will, which cannot be found.155
Prominent scholars have picked up on statements like this in Calvin and have used them
to argue that Calvin is a voluntarist, influenced more by Duns Scotus than by Aquinas.156
And Hans Emil Weber has described both Calvin and Luther in voluntaristic terms,
referring to them as the heirs of the "medieval tradition of the divine will and its
sovereign freedom."157 There is, moreover, a striking similarity between Rutherford and
Calvin in regard to the soteriological applications of the divine will, as should be evident
after the succeeding discussion. All this is to say that, although we may not be able to
pronounce definitively that Rutherford's voluntarism is identical with Calvin's, there
does appear to be reliable evidence for seeing their theologies as continuous,
nonetheless. The use of scholastic distinctions in speaking of the divine will and the
implicit (at least) reliance upon the power distinction are both areas that represent
significant continuity between Reformation and post-Reformation periods.
3.3: Soteriological Applications of the "voluntas Dei"
The centrality of the divine will in Rutherford's theology can be seen more clearly when
we examine the effect that it has upon his views of the planning and purchasing of
154 Musculus, Common Places, 931. Cf. Vermigli, Common Places, I.xvi, 170.
155 Institutes Ill.xxiii.2, 949.
156 See, e.g., Francois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought, trans. Philip Mairet
(London: Collins, Fontana Library, 1965), 127ff; and T.F. Torrance, The Hermeneutics of John Calvin
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1988). Wendel cites Albrecht Ritschl, Henri Bois, Williston Walker,
and Reinhold Seeberg as linking Calvin's conception of the will of God to Duns Scotus. Although, as we
have indicated previously, Alexander Broadie has argued that Duns Scotus actually took up a position
between the voluntarism of his later followers and the intellectualism of Aquinas, the sixteenth century
viewed Duns Scotus as a voluntarist whose system was opposed to Aquinas' intellectualism. On this, see
Vermigli, Common Places, I.xvi, 170.
157 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 5-6.
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salvation. The most important of these soteriological applications of the divine will, as
far as our discussion in this chapter is concerned, are predestination and the atonement
of Christ. Not only are these two issues counted among the main areas of contention
between him and the Arminians, they are also the primary bases of both contemporary
and modern-day criticisms of his theology.
3.3.1: Predestination158
Perhaps the most notorious aspect of Rutherford's theology is his penchant for a strict
predestinarianism. It is the quintessential hallmark of the rigid Calvinism for which he is
known. As a supralapsarian, he is thought to be in continuity with such high Calvinists
as Theodore Beza, Petrus Plancius (1552-1622), Franciscus Gomarus (1563-1641),
William Perkins, William Twisse, and Gisbertus Voetius—men whose teaching formed
the theological context in which Arminius was to develop his doctrine of predestination
and whose opinions represented the radical extremes against which Arminius and his
later disciples were to react.159 Rutherford's continuity with such men and his taking up
of their mande against Arminius gained him an international reputation and helped to
secure invitations from the divinity departments of two leading Dutch universities,
Utrecht and Harderwyck.
That being said, recent evaluations of Rutherford's doctrine of predestination
have exaggerated its rigidity, labelling it "breathtakingly stark" and "stern and extreme"
because of its supralapsarian scheme.160 But it is not at all certain that such critiques are
fair to Rutherford. He has no dogmatic preoccupation with supralapsarianism or with
the decrees in general. Supralapsarianism is set forth only implicidy in the majority of
his writings and, when it is set forth explicidy, it is surprisingly moderate. Rather than
presenting a harsh supralapsarian scheme, as many like Kingsley Rendell have
assumed,161 Rutherford seems, instead, to frame his supralapsarianism in consistendy
158 A large portion of this section has been reproduced for publication in Guy M. Richard, "Samuel
Rutherford's Supralapsarianism Revealed: A Key to the Lapsarian Position of the Westminster
Confession of Faith?," SJT 59:1 (2006), 27-44.
159 Arminius' reaction against supralapsarian predestinarianism is not unexpected. James Orr has
suggested that such a strict doctrine "is bound to provoke revolt against the whole system with which it is
associated." The Progress ofDogma (London: James Clarke, n.d.), 296.
160 David A.S. Fergusson, "Predestination: A Scottish Perspective," SJT 46 (1993), 465; Bell, Calvin and
Scottish Theology, 83; Rendell, Samuel Rutherford, 82.
161 Rendell says: "Rutherford's doctrine of election may seem stern and extreme to all but ultra Calvinists,
but it appears even sterner when we examine his view of reprobation." Samuel Rutherford, 82.
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infralapsarian terms. In order to demonstrate this, we need to explore further
Rutherford's supralapsarianism, his doctrines of election and reprobation, and the order
of the decrees in his thinking.
3.3.1.1: Supralapsarianism
Supralapsarianism—which derives from supra lapsum, meaning "above or prior to the
fall"—is the designation for the system of thought that understands the decree of God
to elect and reprobate as occurring before his decrees to create and permit the fall. It
sees "electio and reprobatio as positive, coordinate decrees of God by which God chooses
those who will be saved and those who will be damned, in other words, [it is] a fully
double predestination, or praedestinatio gemma." It should be distinguished from
infralapsarianism—a word taken from infra lapsum, meaning "below or subsequent to the
fall"—which speaks of elecdon and reprobation as occurring after the divine decrees to
create and permit the fall. Infralapsarians see election alone as a positive decree of God
and reprobation as "a negative act or passing over of the rest of mankind, leaving them
in their sins to their ultimate damnatiolM1 At the heart of the seventeenth-century
dispute between these two ways of ordering the divine decrees sub specie aeternitatis is the
issue of the objectumpraedestinationis. Karl Barth explains:
The question is put in this way: What do we mean when we say that
from all eternity man was elected by God, or, as we should have to say
with equal emphasis according to the presuppositions of their theology,
rejected by God? Is it that in His eternal election God was thinking
simply of man, man as not yet created but still to be created, man as not
yet fallen but still to fall by divine permission and human action [the
supralapsarian position]? Or is it that He was thinking of man as already
created and already fallen in virtue of this divine permission and human
action [the infralapsarian position]? In other words, is the one elected or
rejected homo creabilis et labilis, or is he homo creatus et lapsus? The whole
difference of opinion [between infralapsarians and supralapsarians]
narrows down ultimately to this formula.163
The resulting order of the decrees for a supralapsarian would be along these lines: (1)
the decree to elect some and reject others; (2) the decree to create both elect and
162 Muller, Dictionary, 155, 234-5, 292.
163 CD, II/2, 127. Barth offers a helpful survey of the seventeenth-century supralapsarian-infralapsarian
debate. For other works with similar treatments, see G.C. Berkouwer, Divine Election, trans. Hugo Bekker
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1960), 254-77; William Cunningham, Reformers and the Theology of the
Reformation (1862; Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1989), 358-71; RD, 148ff, 157-62; and Herman Bavinck,
The Doctrine ofGod, trans. William Hendriksen (Edinburgh: Banner ofTruth, 1977), 382-94.
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reprobate; (3) the decree to permit the fall of both into sin; and (4) the decree to provide
salvation for the elect alone. For an infralapsarian, however, it would look like this
instead: (1) the decree to create human individuals; (2) the decree to permit them to fall
into sin; (3) the decree to elect some and pass by the rest; and (4) the decree to provide
salvation for the elect alone.164
The most explicit statement of Rutherford's supralapsarianism is found in an
unpublished manuscript discourse on Ephesians 1.4, written in his own hand. In this
discourse, Rutherford reveals his belief that election stands logically prior to every
decree: "Some" believe "our election to be both after the decrees of creating us and
permitting us to fall into sin. [But] we prove that God's electing of us cannot be after
the consideration of our creation and fall."165 What is most striking about this
statement, and the whole of the discourse for that matter, is not what it says but what it
leaves unsaid. It clearly mentions that election is prior to every other divine decree, an
explicitly supralapsarian attitude, but it says nothing about reprobation.166
In the Examen, Rutherford again reveals his supralapsarianism by stating that
"the object of predestination is homo creandus <& nondum creatusf But, after doing so, he
goes on to speak of this predestination only in terms of establishing individuals "for
glory." Once again, reprobation is not mentioned at all.167 And while there is a double
decree in Rutherford, whereby the "potter" makes "from the same clay, vessels for
honor and vessels for dishonor [ignominia],"168 this is not necessarily indicative of
supralapsarianism. As John Fesko points out, many infralapsarians also believe in a
praedestinatio gemina,169 When speaking of predestination, moreover, Rutherford
consistendy uses nomenclature which is at least equally as characteristic of
infralapsarianism as it is of supralapsarianism. He refers to praedestinatio ad gratiam, ad
adoptionem, ad obtinendam salutem, and, perhaps most significantly, ad vitam, in addition to
the more distinctive praedestinatio ad gloriam which one would expect from a
164 Barth, CD, II/2, 128-30. Cf. J.V. Fesko, Diversity Within the Reformed Tradition: Supra- and Infralapsarianism
in Calvin, Dort, and Westminster (Greenville, SC: Reformed Academic Press, 2001), xxiii-xxv.
165 Unpublished manuscript, University of Edinburgh Library, La.II.394, 5.
166 Rutherford's manuscript does mention reprobation on a couple of occasions. When it does so,
however, it speaks only in the most vague of terms and with infralapsarian language.
167 Examen, 272.
168 Examen, 257. For more on the double decree in Rutherford, see Examen, chs. 3 and 4; and Catachisme,
163; Christ Dying, 311, 382, 410.
169 Diversity Within the Reformed Tradition, xxv.
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supralapsarian.170 Thus, although Rutherford clearly supports the supralapsarian
position, he states his views only in the most moderate of terms. He places election first
among the divine decrees but ignores the issue of reprobation, and he frequently
employs bipartisan terminology in describing his understanding.
3.3.1.2: Election and Reprobation
When we look at Rutherford's doctrines of election and reprobation, we see this same
tendency toward a moderate supralapsarianism together with a use of terminology that
is characteristically infralapsarian. "Election," for Rutherford, "is a singular, indivisible
act concerning the ordaining of a determined number of people to glory." It is an "act
of divine love" that eternally, absolutely, immutably, and irrevocably "separates" a
certain people unto God to be his own.171 By definition, it is particular or limited in its
scope: "if election is an election of all, it is not election."172 Rather than it being less
loving for God only to choose some, it is actually more loving for him to do so. Even
though the extent of election is limited, its nature is not. Its nature is absolute,
immutable, and irrevocable. This means that those who are elect will never be
otherwise. The doctrine of election, thus, provides one important part of the grounds
for the believer's assurance of salvation, as we will see in the next chapter. Ultimately,
salvation depends not on the will of the creature but on the absolute and unchangeable
decree of God. Such an idea is in direct contrast with the Arminian understanding of
election, which believes that the divine decree is conditional upon the free will of the
creature, foreseen by scicntia media,173
By saying that God's election is absolute, Rutherford does not mean that it does
away with human free will, but that,
the good pleasure \beneplacitum\ of God, ordaining Peter to glory rather
than Judas, is not moved to predestine him, neither causatively moved, nor
occasionally inclined, nor determined by some order of the Justice or
170 See, e.g., Examen, 260, 264-5. John Fesko remarks that "Infralapsarianism is often called praedestinatio
ad vitam" in J.V. Fesko, "The Westminster Confession and Lapsarianism: Calvin and the Divines," in The
Westminster Conjession into the 21'' Century: Essays in Remembrance oj the 350"' Anniversary oj the Westminster
Assembly, vol. 2, ed. J. Ligon Duncan III (Fearn, Ross-shire: Mentor, 2004), 481.
171 Examen, 238-42.
172 Examen, 279.
173 WJA, 2:719. Cf. Exercitationes, 25, where Rutherford claims that the Arminians conceive predestination
in an entirely different manner than he does: "credunt electionem & destinationem ad gloriam esse
temporarium, & ex hominum arbitrio, qui credere vel non credere possunt, adeoque mutabilem esse."
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Veracity of God, nor by some meritorious cause, either a cause proceeding
from congruity, or decency, or some quality, disposition, or condition in Peter.
Because election is not based on anything outside of God but solely on his sovereign
beneplacitum, it must logically take place before all other divine decrees. Placing it after
the decree of the fall, the infralapsarian view, would make "God look out of himself for
determining his will" and thus make election conditional upon a foreseen fall, an error
that would concede far too much to Arminianism and destroy the "all sufficiencie" of
God by making him "go forth of himself, seeking knowledge from things without him,
as we [who are mere creatures] doe."174
When speaking of reprobation, on the other hand, Rutherford delineates a
twofold process by distinguishing reprobadon, obviously taken in a more broad sense,
from praeteritio. He acknowledges that,
it should be distinguished between preterition \praeteritio] or non-election (by
which God is able to deny his favor to an individual who is guilty of
nothing evil, with his own Justice preserved) and reprobation, by which
God has decreed from his own absolute good pleasure [beneplacitum\ to
create some and to deny efficacious grace to them in order to declare the
glory of his Justice.175
In other words, for Rutherford as for William Perkins, reprobation consists in two
acts.176 There is, in the first place, an absolute act, which Rutherford calls preterition or
"non-election." It refers to God's mere "passing by" (praeteril) of some who are "guilty
of nothing evil." It is the necessary antithesis to and coordinate of election, because
election, by definition, cannot be universal: if "God absolutely elects some unto eternal
glory by his own free will, he necessarily (for if election is an election of all, it is not
election) passes by all others and non-elects them unto glory."177 This preterition is just
as much an absolute, definite, immutable, and irrevocable decree as is election.178 But it
is a decree that is at least phrased negatively.
174 Examen, 246-7; Unpublished manuscript, La.II.394, 8.
175 Examen, 278-9. Rutherford is speaking against the Arminians, who collapse these two terms and allow
for no difference between them.
176 Perkins, A Christian and Plaine Treatise of the Manner and Order ofPredestination, and of the Largeness ofGods
Grace (London, 1606), 25. Perkins says that reprobation has "two actes. The first is the purpose to
forsake some men, and to make knowen his justice in them." And the second "is the ordaining of them
to punishment or due destruction" for their sin.
177 Examen, 278-9.
178 Examen, 262-3, 274-5, 277, 287, 291.
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The second act of reprobation that Rutherford alludes to is one that we will call
"pretention,," because it too is a passing by or a withholding. In this case, however,
God withholds "efficacious grace" from a people he has decreed to create, which
implies the need for such grace and, thus, assumes not just the decree of the fall, but
also the decree of God's justice ad extra,179 Here too this act of reprobation is phrased
negatively. God passes by some and leaves them in their sins "in order to declare the
glory of his justice." Together these two acts make up reprobation, in the broadest
sense of the word.
3.3.1.3: The Order of the Decrees
Before going any further, it would be helpful to pause and work through the order of
the decrees in Rutherford's thinking. Doing so will help us to evaluate more accurately
the place he affords to election, pretention, and reprobation, as well as the validity of
the criticisms that have been leveled against his predestinarianism. Following the
tendency of supralapsarians in general, Rutherford does as William Twisse does and
orders the divine decrees according to the "received Rules of Schooles," which
differentiate between ends and means. According to these scholastic rules, "the end
must be acknowledged both first in intention, and last in execution, and contrarily the
means last in intention and first in execution."180 When applied to salvation, this
translates into a supralapsarian scheme, because "the means by which God brings some
[men and women] to salvation" must be decreed after the end or, in other words, after
God decrees the fact of their salvation itself.181 The contrary—decreeing the means to
accomplish salvation before decreeing salvation itself—-would make no sense. With this
in mind, the ordo decretomm will proceed as follows in Rutherford's understanding:
1. Election and Non-Election (or Pretention)}*1 As we have just seen,
Rutherford places election and its corresponding antithesis, non-election,
ahead of all other divine decrees. Election and non-election represent the
179 Examen, 278-9.
180 William Twisse, The Riches of Gods Love unto the Vessells of Mercy, Consistent with his Absolute Hatred or
Reprobation of the Vessells ofWrath (Oxford, 1653), 4.
181 Unpublished manuscript, La.11.394, 5-6.
182 Rutherford presents an ordo decretorum of sorts in his discourse on Ephesians 1.4. But he only mentions
three "decrees," all of which appear to be part of this first decree. God will glorify himself (the first
decree he mentions), Christ (the second decree), and homo creabilis in Christ (the third decree) by electing
some and passing over others. Unpublished manuscript, La.II.394, 9.
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ultimate ends that God has ordained for his creatures and, therefore, must
be decreed prior to the means he will use to accomplish those ends. This is
confirmed by his definition of non-election as a denying of divine favor to
individuals who are "guilty of nothing evil." By defining it in this way,
Rutherford is implying that this passing over occurs before the decree of the
fall. Otherwise, these individuals would be guilty of sin in the mind of God.
2. Creation. Creation, for Rutherford, is the first means by which God works
out the ends of election and non-election.183
3. Fall. God decrees the fall also as a means to the ends of election and non-
election. The divine decree to permit the fall (by his voluntaspermittens) is the
"intrinsic basis for punishing and pardoning."1 4
4. "Ad extra" Decrees. As we mentioned above, Rutherford believes that
God, although just, merciful, and good in and of himself (ad intra), is under
no compulsion to be just, merciful, and good to his creatures. But once he
decrees to act ad extra in this way, he is bound by his decree to do so. This is
just what God has done; he has decreed to be just, merciful, and good (etc.)
to his creatures. This decree presupposes the creation of creatures to whom
God will be just, merciful, and good, and also their fall into sin, because
before God could decree "to illustrate the glory of his punitive Justice and
sparing Mercy, it was necessary, by hypothetical necessity, that sin should
exist."185
5. Salvation and Pretention? It is only at this point that the second act of
reprobation, what we are calling pretention,, comes into play in Rutherford's
thinking. After the fall and the ad extra decrees, God now chooses to show
mercy to the elect, applying to them the benefits of Christ's atonement, and
to pass over the non-elect, leaving them to his ad extra justice.186
Rutherford's catechism further substantiates this interpretation of the decrees






his catechism, he states that there are two decrees of God concerning mankind: "the
decrees of electione and reprobatione." The key, however, is in how he defines election
and reprobation. Election is "the Lordis free appoyntment setting some men apairt for
glorie (Eph. i.5, 6; Joh. xvii.6), and making them his sones in Christ (Ephes. i.5; 2 Thess.
ii.l3), for the praise of his glorie (Eph. i.6)," whereas reprobation is "Godis free
appoyntment qrby [whereby] he decreeth to pass by some and to leave them to the
hardness of their owne heart." In this case, reprobation at least, and, quite possibly,
election as well, should be understood in a broad sense, as encompassing not just the
first decree but the fifth as well. Note that election includes not just "setting some men
apairt for glorie," but also, "making them his sones in Christ," which could presuppose
the fall and the application of salvation in Christ. Regardless of how election is to be
taken, however, reprobation explicitly involves the first and fifth decrees. It includes
both the decree "to pass by some" (non-election) and the decree "to leave them to the
hardness of their owne heart," which obviously presupposes the fall.187
What is unavoidable, both here in his catechism and in the Examen, is
Rutherford's use of infralapsarian language.188 He plainly refers to reprobation as a
"passing by." If Rutherford is a supralapsarian, which he clearly seems to be, and if he
believes in two decrees, which he clearly seems to do, and if he distinguishes between
non-election, or pretention, and reprobation, which he also clearly seems to do, then the
above schema is the only possible one. Reprobation must be a broader category in
Rutherford, as it was in Perkins, involving two steps. But in a way that is different from
Perkins, Rutherford speaks of both steps as "pretentions" or as involving God's passing
over of some: one pretention occurs alongside election and one occurs after the decrees
of creation and the fall. This "passing over" language is certainly uncharacteristic of
supralapsarianism in general. Whereas supralapsarians typically define election and
reprobation as "positive, coordinate decrees of God by which God chooses those who
will be saved and those who will be damned,"189 Rutherford, at least on the surface,
187 Catachisme, 163. William Perkins speaks of election and reprobation as encompassing two distinct acts
each. We have already mentioned the two acts of reprobation. Election's two acts, according to Perkins,
are "foreknowledge, whereby hee doth acknowledge some men for his owne, before the rest," and
"predestination, whereby he hath determined from eternitie to make them like unto Christ." Here, too,
election could be read as encompassing both the first and fifth decrees, although not necessarily, because
God could have chosen to make his elect like Christ without having first to cleanse them from sin. A
Christian and Plaine Treatise, 6-8 and 24-7.
188 Fesko also notes that "Rutherford defines reprobation [in his catechism] in terms of pretention, which
is typical nomenclature for infra- rather than supralapsarians." Diversity Within the Reformed Tradition, 272.
189 Muller, Dictionary, 235.
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appears to express his understanding much more moderately. His supralapsarianism is
defined in terms of election with little or no regard for reprobation; and he consistently
uses infralapsarian language to refer to reprobation as a negative decree in which God
passes over some, rather than positively ordaining them to destruction. John Fesko
offers this description of infralapsarianism:
Infralapsarianism is often called praedestinatio ad vitam, or single-
predestination, because there is only one decree of predestination: the
decree of election. Those who are non-elect are simply passed by in the
decree of election, or are not elect by default, and are left in their sin
unto their ultimate damnation.190
This description of infralapsarianism is consistent with Rutherford's expression of
election and pretention, except for the fact that Rutherford believes in two decrees and
two pretentions. Rutherford is a supralapsarian, to be sure, but one who expresses his
views in infralapsarian language.
3.3.1.4: Summary
After examining Rutherford's supralapsarianism, his doctrines of election and
reprobation, and the ordo decretorum, it should be evident that Rendell's evaluation is
incorrect or, at least, unfair. Rather than making his "stern" view of predestination
"even sterner," reprobation actually moderates it.191 Most of the other critiques of
Rutherford's supralapsarianism also fall at this point along with Rendell's. They
overlook his tendency toward the use of infralapsarian language in regard to reprobation
in particular. While Rutherford speaks about election in strict supralapsarian terms, he
unmistakably speaks about reprobation more in line with an infralapsarian system.
A recent thesis by San-Deog Kim explains Rutherford's use of infralapsarian
language by concluding that it stems from a consideration of the decrees from the
perspective of the creature rather than from God's point of view. The idea, according
to Kim, is that the decrees, when considered from God's perspective, will have a
supralapsarian formulation in Rutherford and an infralapsarian formulation, when
viewed from the creature's perspective.192 While there is truth in Kim's explanation,
insofar as it is true that Rutherford's use of infralapsarian language is partially a product
190 "xhe Westminster Confession and Lapsarianism," 481.
191 Samuel Rutherford., 82.
192 Kim, "Time and Eternity," 176-7.
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of the difficulty inherent in supralapsarian schemes in general, namely, that it makes
God the ultimate cause of his creatures' eternal destruction, it is not true that
Rutherford's supralapsarian language is reserved only for speaking of election and
reprobation from God's perspective or that his infralapsarian language is relegated to
speaking of election and reprobation from the perspective of the creature. Kim ignores
the fact that Rutherford defines reprobation solely in infralapsarian terms. His
supralapsarian terminology is reserved not for speaking of election and reprobation
from God's point of view but for speaking of election without respect to reprobation.
The interpretation of Rutherford's predestinarianism that is offered in the
current study is further supported by Arminius' own seventeenth-century appraisal of
the contemporary theological landscape, which can be found in his Declaration of
Sentiments (1608). According to Arminius, the version of predestinarianism that we later
see in Rutherford should properly be distinguished from the more severe variety held by
Theodore Beza. Whereas Beza espouses "the very highest" form of supralapsarianism
that sees election and reprobation as virtually equal and opposite decrees, Rutherford's
convictions comport best with "a second kind of Predestination," a "modified
supralapsarianism" that Arminius locates mid-way between Beza's supralapsarianism
and infralapsarianism.193 This modified position places greater emphasis on the positive
decree of election and subdivides reprobation into two distinct acts, what he calls
"'pretention" and "predamnationS Arminius describes these two acts as follows:
Two means are fore-ordained for the execution of the act of Pretention:
(1) Dereliction [or abandoning in a state of nature, which by itself is
incapable of every thing supernatural: And (2) Non-communication [or a
negation] of supernatural grace, by which their nature (if in a state of
integrity,) might be strengthened, and (if in a state of corruption,) might
be restored.
Predamnation is antecedent to all things, yet it does by no means exist
without a fore-knowledge of the causes of damnation: It views man as a
sinner, obnoxious to damnation in Adam, and as on this account
perishing through the necessity ofDivine Justice.194
The current interpretation of Rutherford's understanding of predestination also
places it in substantial continuity with Reformation thought. According to Frank James,
193 Cf. W]A, 1:613-15, with 645-7. See also, A. Skevington Wood, "The Declaration of Sentiments: The
Theological Testament of Arminius," The EvangelicalQuarterly 65:2 (1993), 116-20. Wood reminds us that
Arminius knew Beza's doctrine of predestination well, since he was mentored by Beza in Geneva.
194 WJA, 1:646.
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Vermigli's predestinarianism is best interpreted in a way that is strikingly similar to—
and, possibly, even more severe than—Rutherford's view, as we have outlined it here.
Although, as James says, some scholars have interpreted Vermigli's predestinarianism as
"extreme supralapsarian [ism]" because of its overarching emphasis on the propositum
Dei,195 this overlooks his infralapsarian tendencies. There is a "distincdy infralapsarian
cast" to Vermigli's thought, which, more than anything else, is due to the explicit
"christological orientadon" of his theology: "Since Christ is the first effect of
predestination and is exclusively associated with saving sinners, Vermigli's primary
emphasis in predestination tends to infralapsarianism."196 As we will see in the next
section, this Christocentricity parallels Rutherford's understanding of election as well.
One wonders whether such a conception of predestination, couched as it is in
infralapsarian language, could also apply to Calvin's understanding of this doctrine.
Even though scholars have lined up on either side, pronouncing Calvin as either supra-
or infralapsarian,197 their pronouncements tend to trivialize the fact that there are clear
elements of both in his theology. As Richard Muller remarks, "Calvin sometimes speaks
as if the object of predestination is fallen humanity in need of redemption, sometimes as
if the decree is radically prior, given God's predestining of the fall itself."198 Taking
Calvin's own express Christological emphasis into account could help to explain the
infralapsarian language in the Genevan reformer as well. Whether this is so or not,
there remains good reason for seeing Rutherford's view as continuous with Calvin's
own. First of all, according to Alister McGrath's lucid claims, Calvin is part of the same
Augustinian tradition as is Rutherford—the schola Augustiniana moderna—a tradition that,
from its inception, embraced a doctrine of double predestination, especially as that
doctrine is understood in a Calvinian sense.199 Second of all, Calvin uses language when
195 Frank A. James III, PeterMartyr Vermigli and Predestination: The Augustinian Inheritance ofan Italian Reformer
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 88. James cites Reinhold Seeberg and J.P. Donnelly as arguing for a
supralapsarian understanding of Vermigli.
196 James, Vermigli and Predestination, 88-9.
197 Among those who see Calvin as infralapsarian are, Francis Turretin, Institutes, 4.9.30, 1:349-50; Henri
Blocher, "Calvin infralapsaire," Ea Revue RJformee 31 (1980), 273. Among those who see him as
supralapsarian are, Karl Barth, CD, II/2, 127-8; Edward Dowey, Knowledge of God, 186-7; John McNeill,
Institutes II.xii.5, 469n5; G.C. Berkouwer, Divine Election, 257; Paul K. Jewett, Election and Predestination
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985), 89; and, most recendy, John Fesko, Diversity Within the Refonned
Tradition, especially 81-106.
198 PRRD, 1:127.
199 McGrath, "John Calvin and Late Mediaeval Thought," 70-73. McGrath states: "It will be clear that
this school of thought developed opinions which, especially in relation to the doctrine of grace in general,
and predestination in particular, foreshadow those ofJohn Calvin."
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speaking of election that is reminiscent of the language we have found in Rutherford.
In defining election, for instance, Calvin begins by saying that it is not a universal
category but one that necessarily implies reprobation, "since election itself could not
stand except as set over against reprobation."200 When addressing the causa of
reprobation, moreover, Calvin, like Vermigli and Rutherford, "expresses himself from
the vantage point of eternity and the propositum Dei aeternurrP and states that "God's
secret plan is the cause of hardening" all those "whom he pleases" to harden.201
Perhaps the most noticeable difference between Rutherford's treatment of
predestination and Calvin's is the respective locations of their discussions. Whereas
Calvin discusses his view of election and reprobation under soteriology in book three of
the Institutes, Rutherford locates it under Theology proper. While this may reflect an
element of discontinuity between them, we need to be careful not to read too much into
this difference for the following three reasons. First, Rutherford's view should not be
interpreted as being wholly, or even chiefly, speculative just because he locates it in the
doctrine of God; the Christological and soteriological emphasis of his view is patent.
Second, the location of predestination has little, if anything, to do with the way that
Reformation and post-Reformation theologians understand election and reprobation.
Calvin—who is not explicitly infralapsarian—places election and reprobation after the
fall and redemption in Christ, whereas Turretin—who is unambiguously
infralapsarian—places them prior to the fall.202 Third, post-Reformation theologians do
locate their discussions of predestination elsewhere besides the doctrine of God. Thus,
in his Exposition of the Creede, William Perkins places election and reprobation after
ecclesiology and prior to union with Christ.203 What this means is that Rutherford's
supralapsarian predestinarianism, especially as it is couched in infralapsarian language, is
at least in significant continuity with men like Calvin and Vermigli.
3.3.1.5: Objections to Supralapsarianism
In his work on the doctrine of God, Herman Bavinck mentions a common objection to
supralapsarianism, which was also raised by the Arminians in the sixteenth and
200 Institutes III.xxiii.1, 947.
201 James, Vermigli and Predestination, 88; Institutes III.xxiii.1, 948-9. Vermigli expressed his agreement with




seventeenth centuries.204 If the decree to create follows the decree to elect and
reprobate (or pass over), then supralapsarians like Rutherford make a non-entity the
object of the first divine decree. But, as Bavinck says,
how are we to conceive of a decree respecting possible men, whose actual
future existence has as yet not been determined? In the consciousness of
God there is an infinite number of "possible men," who will never live.
Hence, the decree of election and reprobation has for its object "non¬
entities," not definite persons known to God by name.205
Rutherford responds to this criticism in the Examen by denying that it presents a
problem to his position. God is sovereign and, therefore, can will and do as he so
pleases. What is more, he says, everyone who believes in the traditional doctrine of
creation ex nihilo also makes a non-entity the object of the divine decree. The universe,
just like the elect in Rutherford's ordo decretorum, is creandum et nondum creatum when God
first makes his decree.206 But, while Rutherford's comments may adequately respond to
Bavinck and to those who hold to creation ex nihilo—to the extent that it casts the very
same charge back upon those who level it—it is not certain that they fully exonerate his
supralapsarianism from Arminius' critique. As Richard Muller has shown, it is doubtful
that Arminius embraced the traditional doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Even though he
did embrace the traditional language, he identified "the nihil, the nothing, as in some
sense belonging to the material causality of the universe," and, as such, "considered [it]
as first or primary matter."207 If this is true, then the criticism that Arminius brings
against supralapsarian predestinarianism cannot be turned back upon himself. And
Rutherford would fail to respond adequately to the Arminian criticism. Moreover,
Rutherford's comments notwithstanding, it is difficult to understand how God could be
said to "foreknow" those he elects under the supralapsarian scheme—in the way that
passages like Romans 8.29 would seem to require—if they are considered by him no
differently than "an infinite number of possible men'" would be.
Several additional objections to Rutherford's view of predestination were also
raised by the Axminians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. First and perhaps
most significant among them is the claim that Rutherford's supralapsarianism is
204 Cf. Bavinck, Doctrine ofGod, 388; with Episcopius, Opera theologica (1665), II, 138-43; W]A, 3:532, 536-7,
541.
205 Doctrine ofGod, 388.
206 Examen, 271-2.
207 God, Creation, and Providence, 215-16.
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"diametrically opposed to the act of creation." As we have seen, creation, for Arminius,
is "a communication of good" by the "intrinsic property of its nature." But creation,
for a supralapsarian, cannot be a communication of good, because it is a means "by
which the reprobation that had previously been determined may obtain its object."208 In
Arminius' thinking, therefore, it would be impossible for God to create men and
women whom he had already reprobated, because, by creating them, he would not be
communicating good but harm to them. This would seem to require that predestination
must follow creation instead of preceding it.
Two things need to be said at this point in regard to the Arminian view of
creation as a communication of good and their critique of Rutherford. First of all, if the
Arminians are correct about creation, then their critique is also correct. If creation is a
communication of good, then it is impossible for God to create creatures he has passed
by, because in so doing he would be withholding good rather than communicating it.
Second of all, the Arminian understanding of creation affects the nature of
predestination as well as its place in the ordo decretorum. Since creation, as defined by
Arminius, produces human beings "capable of God and of Has life and blessedness,"
predestination must be such that this capability and the creature's good is preserved.209
In short, it must be conditional and subsequent to other more basic decrees.
Predestination cannot be an absolute decree, because then it would override the created
capabilities of humans and prevent the divine communication of good. It must be
conditional upon the creature's own free decision to believe or not to believe. But more
than this, predestination must also follow other decrees that establish a universal
environment of "goodness" in the created world. God is obliged first to decree to make
salvation in Christ possible for all creatures, then to receive those who repent and
believe, and then to grant the means whereby this salvation can be achieved. Only then,
in the Arminian scheme, can God decree to elect those who will exercise faith by way of
their own capabilities and to pass over those who will not.210 Here too, if the Arminians
are correct about creation, they are also correct about the nature of predestination and
about every other decree as well, and, by consequence, not only is Rutherford wrong
but infralapsarians, Amyraldians, and the majority of the church at that time are also.
2,18 IVJA, 1:626. Cf. Muller, "Patterns in Arminius's Theology," 437.
21,9 W]A, 3:579; Muller, "Patterns in Arminius's Theology," 436.
210 For the order of the divine decrees in Arminius, see 1VJA, 1:653-4.
136
The important thing for our discussion, however, is not to determine whether or
not the Arminians are correct about creadon—something that goes beyond the scope of
this thesis—but to demonstrate its principial status in Arminian theology and to
establish the extent of the opposition between Rutherford and the Arminians. The
dispute between Rutherford and the Arminians cannot be limited to a difference of
opinion over a single doctrine. It is a clash between the whole of two competing
systems, at the heart of which is a disagreement over the doctrine of God and his
relationship to his creation. As Arminius himself recognized, the two systems are
indeed "diametrically opposed" to one another.
Secondly, the Arminians criticize Rutherford for not making enough of the
biblical teaching that God, in the words of Ephesians 1.4, predestined "us in Christ
before the foundation of the world" (NRSV, emphasis added). The supralapsarian
position, they say, contradicts this verse by eliminating the need for election to be in
Christ, because sin would not exist in the mind of God when he makes his decree. But,
more than anything else, this criticism calls attention to a profound difference that exists
between the Arminians and Rutherford, a difference that hearkens back to their
disagreement over the doctrine of the Trinity and points ahead to soteriological
variances that will be explored in the next chapter.
Rutherford and many Reformed orthodox theologians of his day understand
Ephesians 1.4 as referring to the "action of election" rather than to the "object about
which it is exercised." The idea is not that "in Christ we are made holy" but that the
"blessing of election [is ours] in Christ." For Rutherford, election is thoroughly
Christocentric, as we will see in more detail in the next chapter.211 Christ—to borrow
the language of Karl Barth—is the "electing and elected" God.212 He elects, because the
"action of election" is "in Christ" just as much as it is in the Father and in the Spirit. All
the "proper operations of God," Ames reminds us, "are attributed not only to the Father,
but also to the Sonne, and the holy spirit."213 Each divine person is consubstantial with
the others and, thus, shares equally in all the divine operations. As a result, the blessing
of election is ours in Christ partially because Christ elects. But, more than this, Christ is
211 Unpublished manuscript, La.II.394, 1. For more on the Christological and soteriological emphasis of
election, see the discussion of the covenant of redemption in section 4.1.2 below.
2,2 CD, II/2, 94ff. Cf. the discussion in Richard A. Muller, "The Christological Problem in die Thought
ofJacobus Arminius," NAvK 68:1 (1988), 158-60.
213 Marrow, 19.
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also elected. He is the chief elect, appointed by the Father and the Spirit, and voluntarily
appointed by himself, on behalf of the elect to be "the first born of the house, and of
the many brethren."214 The blessing of election is, therefore, ours in Christ, because it is
initiated in him and carried out by him.
Arminius' understanding of Ephesians 1.4, however, differs signilicandy from
the typical Reformed orthodox explanadon, as revealed in Rutherford. Redecting his
own view of the Trinity, Arminius sees Christ not as "electing and elected" but, exacdy
the opposite, as "elected and electing." just as the Son is generated by and receives his
deity from the Father, so Christ is elected or appointed by the Father to be the
fundamentum electionis, in the first decree, but he does not elect until the fourth decree.215
The inherent subordinationism in Arminius' doctrine of the Trinity appears to provide
the grounds for the Father's appointment of the Son to his work as mediator, whereas,
as we saw in the Reformed orthodox, the consubstantiality of the persons of the
Godhead translates not just into the Son being appointed to his work but also into the
Son's appointing himself. What is more, the separation of Christ's election in the first
decree from the action of election in Christ in the fourth decree also reflects a different
view of the objects of election in Arminius' thinking. Not only is sin in view within the
individual before election is carried out but faith and final perseverance are as well. This
understanding of the relationship between Christ and election has deep soteriological
significance for the respective theologies of Rutherford and the Arminians, as we will
see in the next chapter in connection with the covenant of redemption.
Thirdly, the Arminians criticize Rutherford's predestinarianism by arguing that it
"fights against" the universal free offer of the gospel. If God has decreed absolutely,
irrevocably, and immutably both who will and who will not be saved, then this seems to
suggest that those and those only will necessarily be saved and not-saved, no matter
what. It appears disingenuous, then, for God to offer the gospel to those whom he
knows will never respond to it. Rutherford's answer to this objection is noteworthy,
because it draws attention to the influence of the potentia absoluta et ordinata on his
thinking and illustrates the difference between him and the Arminians in the use of it.
The underlying reason that Rutherford gives as to why the Arminian criticism is
misplaced is that it ignores the distinction between the "intention of the Evangel," and
214 COL, 303.
215 W]A, 1:653-4. See also Muller, "Christological Problem," 158-60.
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the "intention of him who proposeth the Evangel to men."216 Put more simply, there is
a difference between the purposes of the gospel and the purposes of the one who gave
us that gospel. God's purposes to elect or to reprobate in general belong to the realm of
the potentia ordinata. But his purposes to elect or to reprobate John or Jane or Peter, in
particular, belong to the realm of the potentia absoluta. The gospel, or God's voluntas signi,
reveals his general decrees to us and the provisions for and stipulations of our salvation.
It nowhere reveals who is elect and who is reprobate. That knowledge is reserved for
God's hidden will, his voluntas beneplaciti. Within the realm of the potentia ordinata, we
know that God offers salvation to all people and that he commands those who hear his
offer to turn from their unbelief to faith in Christ. We also know that he uses that offer
as a means to two different ends: it renders some "inexcusable" for their not responding
to it and it brings the elect to faith, because faith comes by hearing the gospel.217 While
God's offer of salvation and his command to believe falls within the sphere of the
potentia ordinata, his application or his withholding of efficacious grace belongs to the
sphere of the potentia absoluta. Some people, known by God's voluntas beneplaciti, are given
efficacious grace, thereby enabling and ensuring that they will respond to the free offer
of the gospel. Others are passed by and denied efficacious grace, thereby guaranteeing
that they will remain in their sins, because of the hardness of their own hearts.218
The Arminians, on the other hand, because they limit the current world order to
the realm of the potentia ordinata, understandably agree with everything that Rutherford
says in connection with that sphere but reject the notion of a hidden will, which is
associated with the potentia absoluta of God. There is no hidden will of God to choose
this or that individual. There is only God's offer and command. God cannot intervene
in this world order either to save or to not-save.
Before turning to look at the atonement of Christ, we need to point out that
Rutherford's strict predestinarianism (although it is perhaps not as strict as some have
assumed) was taken to an extreme in succeeding generations and, as a result, produced
several serious soteriological problems within the church. This extreme position has
been aptly portrayed in James Hogg's Confessions of a Justified Sinner. Hogg's treatise,
which takes place in the early eighteenth century, presents a main character, Robert
216 Tryal, 92-3.
217 Examen, 291.
218 Examen, 139-41, 182, 289.
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Wringhim Colwan, who engages in pronouncing individuals either elect or reprobate
and then uses this pronouncement as justificadon for taking action against the
reprobate, even such radical action as murder. The main character's behavior, though,
does not originate with him but finds precedence in the actions of his adopted father—a
minister within the Calvinist tradition—who immutably and definitively pronounces
Robert to be "elect" but declares others to be "reprobate." As a result of this
pronouncement, the reprobate are immediately and irreparably consigned to the fate of
eternal condemnation and, because they are beyond all hope of salvation, they are to be
cut off from every association with the elect.2iy
Such an extreme position, while it may ultimately have been engendered by
Rutherford's views, would, nonetheless, have been roundly condemned by Rutherford
himself. It is not our place, he says, nor do we have the ability even if it were, to discern
who is and who is not elect. Our place is to offer salvation in Christ to all people
without exception, freely and repeatedly. No person is ever to be written off as
reprobate, and "no one is to consider himself or herself reprobate from eternity, until he
or she finally rejects Christ in this lifetime [in tempore]."220 Moreover, predestination,
according to Rutherford, is not to be the basis for spiritual pride, as it would seem to be
for Hogg's main character. Predestination should, instead, produce a genuine humility
and deep-seated piety within the individual. If it does not, Rutherford says, then he or
she is probably not presently among the elect: "no one knows himself or herself to be
absolutely elect unto glory, who does not approach [God] in fear and pious care."
Rather than leading to arrogance and to a disregard for others and for preaching,
predestination should lead to humility, piety, and reverence before God, and a concern
for all people without exception.221
3.3.2: The Atonement of Christ
As previously indicated in this chapter, Rutherford's doctrine of God and, in particular,
his view of God's will, affects his understanding of the atonement of Christ. This can
be seen primarily in regard to two controversial areas: limited atonement and the
necessity of the atonement. While our intention here is not to discuss these two topics




comprehensively, we will seek to examine the impact of the voluntas Del upon them in
Rutherford's thinking and, then, to assess relevant contemporary and modern-day
criticisms.
3.3.2.1: Limited Atonement
One of the most controversial topics in Rutherford's own day, as well as in all times
since, is the doctrine of limited atonement. It was a main area of contention between
Rutherford and the Arminians in the seventeenth century and has been the focus of
intense criticism among a number of scholars in recent times. These modern scholars
have claimed that supralapsarian predestinarianism and limited atonement, as evidenced
in Rutherford and others of the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, represents, in
the words of Brian Armstrong, "a radical change of emphasis" when compared to the
theology of John Calvin.222 T.F. Torrance and Charles Bell have specifically vilified
Rutherford by referring to him as an "extreme hyper-Calvinist" for his belief in limited
atonement, a doctrine that they say is "derived...logically" from his double
predestinarianism and, for that reason, represents a "further step" away from the
teaching of Calvin.223 Such evaluations, however, are misleading and unfair and, as we
will attempt to demonstrate below, entirely unjustified.
Although it can be—and has been—argued that both Scripture and Calvin are
somewhat unclear as to the extent of the atonement,224 this docs not mean that they
have nothing at all to say about the matter. According to Rutherford, Scripture teaches
that the nature of the atonement is such that Christ does not merely make people
redeemable, as the Arminians suggest, but one in which he actually redeems them: "The
222 Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, xvii. C£, Hall, "Calvin Against the Calvinists," 25-7; Holmes Rolston
III, "Responsible Man in Reformed Theology: Calvin versus the Westminster Confession," SJT 23 (1970),
137; Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 29-30; idem, "The Puritan Modification of Calvin's Theology,"
199-214; Alan C. Clifford, Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology 1640-1790, An Evaluation
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 69-111; J.B. Torrance, "The Incarnation and 'Limited Atonement'," The
Evangelical Quarterly 55 (1983), 82-94; idem, "The Concept of Federal Theology—Was Calvin a Federal
Theologian?," in Calvinus Sacrae Scripturae Professor. Calvin as Confessor ofHoly Scripture, ed. Wilhelm Neuser
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 20; M. Charles Bell, "Calvin and the Extent of the Atonement," The
EvangelicalQuarterly 55 (1983), 115-23.
223 Torrance, Scottish Theology, 109-10; Bell, Calvin and Scottish Theology, 83.
224 For comprehensive examinations of Calvin's view of the extent of the atonement that arrive at
different conclusions, see Roger Nicole, "John Calvin's View of the Extent of the Atonement," WT] 47:2
(Fall 1985), 197-225; and Curt Daniel, "Hyper-Calvinism and John Gill" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Edinburgh, 1983), 777-828. Cf. W. Robert Godfrey, "Tensions Within International
Calvinism: The Debate on the Atonement and the Synod of Dort, 1618-1619" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford University, 1974), especially chapter 2.
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fruits and effects of God's curse, the punishment due to sinners, even that satisfactory,
and penall curse and punishment, which infinite Justice requireth, was laid upon Christ,
while as he died upon the crosse, and suffered the effects of Gods wrath upon his soul
for our sins."225 And the nature of the atonement, being one in which divine justice is
completely satisfied, such that no punishment remains for sin, in turn, has a direct
bearing upon the extent of the atonement in Rutherford's thinking. If the extent is
universal, then all people without exception will necessarily be saved to the utmost,
because Christ has fully paid the price for their sins upon the cross. Rutherford
understands both Scripture and experience to rule this option out. Because universalism
is eliminated as a viable option by the nature of the atonement, the extent of the
atonement, for Rutherford, must be definite or particular. Otherwise people perishing
in hell who had their sins forgiven by Christ's atonement would, in Rutherford's words,
"happilie suffer for their sinne in hell, [and] God shall be unjust in punishing Christ for
their sinnes and in punishing those same sinnes in hell."226 This, in itself, is evidence
that Rutherford does not believe in limited atonement simply because it derives logically
from predestination. He sees Scripture as teaching that the nature of the atonement is
such that the extent must be limited.
It is, nevertheless, true, as Torrance and Bell claim, that limited or particular
atonement does flow logically from double predestination. But, in making such a claim,
it should also be noted that Rutherford's understanding of predestination is grounded in
the eternal intratrinitarian "Covenant of Suretyship or Redemption," which plainly
anchors the decree within the context of soteriology.227 Moreover, just because limited
or definite atonement follows logically from Rutherford's conception of predestination
does not mean that it is fair to accuse him of "hyper-Calvinism," as Torrance and Bell
have done, because, as Karl Barth has remarked, limited atonement "logically followfs]
from Calvin's conception of predestination" as well.228 Rutherford, furthermore, wholly
embraces the traditional scholastic language that we find first in Peter Lombard and
then later in Calvin and other post-Reformation theologians, which says that Christ's
225 Tryal, 187; cf. Catachisme, 179, 188; Christ Dying, 153-4.
226 Catachisme, 188; Examen, 535-6.
227 COL, 290. The covenant and its relation to the divine decrees will be discussed in the next chapter.
228 Barth, CD, IV/1, 57, emphasis added. It should be further noted that the debate over the extent of the
atonement is one that Calvin never faced in his day. It did not really surface until the Synod of Dort
addressed the problem in the Remonstrances in 1618-19.
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atonement is "sufficient for all but efficacious for the elect."229 Christ's death, he says,
can righdy be considered sufficient for all "because of the infinitnesse of the person [of
Christ], before and without [respect to] the decree of God" to apply it only to the
elect.230 Therefore, however much one may disagree or dislike the doctrine of limited
atonement, it does seem unjustified to claim that it represents hyper-Calvinism.
3.3.2.2: The Absolute Necessity of the Atonement
One final critique of Rutherford's doctrine of the divine will remains for us to discuss.
It involves the seventeenth-century debate over the necessity of punitive justice in God
and the resulting soteriological and christological implications of it. John Owen, in his
Dissertation on Divine Justice, published in 1653, attacks both Rutherford and William
Twisse for their views on divine vindicatory justice and their denial of the absolute
necessity of the atonement of Christ.231 Following Twisse, Rutherford argues that,
although justice is a divine attribute ad intra, God is in no way required to exercise that
justice ad extra, towards his creatures.232 Because "God's own free will," Rutherford
continues, "was above, beyond, and before" his "set and decreed law of justice,"233 God
is not required by any necessity of his nature to punish sin. He freely decrees to be just
and to punish sin, but no essential necessity—i.e., no necessity resulting from his
essence—forces the decree upon him.
229 For more on the use of this phrase in medieval, Reformation, and post-Reformation thought up to the
Synod of Dort, see W. Robert Godfrey, "Reformed Thought on the Extent of the Atonement to 1618,"
WTJ 37:2 (Winter 1975), 136-70.
23(1 COL, 239.
231 Works ofJohn Owen, 10:481-624.
232 Oven is a little uncertain as to whether Rutherford sides with Twisse or with the Socinians in his
exposition of divine justice. He says: "Twisse, indeed, maintains that the exercise of that justice is free to
God, but grants that justice itself is a natural attribute of God; the Socinians, that it is only a free act of
the divine will. Which party this learned author [Rutherford] favours appears not from his words. If by
justice he mean the habit, he sides with the Socinians; if the act and exercise, he is of the same opinion
with Twisse, although he expresses his sentiments rather unhappily" (Works ofJohn Owen, 10:608). Owen's
confusion is due to the fact that Rutherford does indeed use poor language. He says things like this: "At
vero justitia punitiva, per haec quae dicta sunt, nullo modo Deo inest ex necessitate naturae, sed libere."
But, as we have already seen, Rutherford clearly means, even with this unhappy language, that punitive
justice is not required ad extra by necessity of nature. He plainly sides with Twisse in this debate. All
Owen had to do was turn back a few pages in Rutherford's treatise and he would have read this: "Quia
enim Deus est Creator infinite bonus, sapientissimus, justissimus, &c. Ideo ei, qua Deus, debita est omnis
subjectio turn naturalis turn moralis, & omnis obediential' And this: "Deus est essentialiter justus &
bonus." Disputatio, 342, 345. Cf. Examen, 174-5; Exercitationes, 348-9, 356; and Trueman, Claims of Truth,
108n21.
233 Communion, 28. Eater in the same sermon, Rutherford further explains this idea: "Justice (as manifested
to us) is a voluntary decree of God to punish sinners." Communion, 30.
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"Mercy," likewise, "floweth not from God essentially, especially the mercy of
Conversion, Remission of sins, [and] Eternal life, but ofmeer Grace; for then God could
not be God, and deny these favours to Reprobats."234 If God was required by necessity
of his own nature to be merciful ad extra, he would be required to act mercifully to all
people, both elect and reprobate, and, thus, to remove the hardness of every heart. But,
Rutherford says, this runs counter to the justice of God, in the first place, because "the
Attribute of Justice is as essential as Mercy, Exod. 34.6-7." One attribute cannot take
precedence over the other. If one is essential, they both must be essential. The
intellectualist position, thus, wrongly places divine justice above divine mercy by
suggesting that God must punish sin by necessity of nature but does not have to show
mercy until and unless he decides to do so. In the second place, necessary mercy or
justice in God runs counter to Scripture, which Rutherford understands as teaching that
God chooses to be merciful and just ad extra. Passages like Romans 9.18, Exodus 34.6-
7, and Ephesians 1.11, are interpreted by Rutherford as proving that God is free to
show justice to those whom he will and to show mercy to those whom he will and that
no necessity of nature forces his hand in either direction.235 But even though there is no
absolute necessity for God to punish sin or to show mercy, there is a relative necessity
for him to do so. Once God decrees to be just and merciful ad extra, he must of
necessity do so; "yet this is but necessity conditional!, and at the second hand."236
Coordinate with Rutherford's denial of the necessity of vindicator}' justice and
saving mercy in God is his denial of the absolute necessity of the atonement of Christ.
Not only can God choose either to be just or not-just and merciful or not-merciful ad
extra, he can also choose to forgive by way of Christ's atonement or some other way:
"God., if wee speake of his absolute power, without respect to his free decree, could have
pardoned sinne without a ransom, and gifted all Mankind and fallen Angels with heaven,
without any satisfaction of either the sinner, or his Surety; for he neither punisheth sin,
nor tenders heaven to Men or Angels by necessity of nature...but freely."237 What is
important to notice here is the distinction Rutherford makes between the "absolute
power" and the "free decree" of God. By making this distinction, he shows that he is
speaking in terms of the potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata. According to his potentia absolnta,
234 Tryat, 17.
233 Examen, 174-5.
236 Christ Dying, 8-9.
237 Christ Dying, 7-8.
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God is free to forgive sin or not to forgive sin and, if the former, to do so by way of the
cross or some other way. There is, therefore, no absolute necessity that Christ should
die upon the cross. Once God decrees to permit the fall and to be just and merciful to
his creatures, however, the cross becomes necessary, "because God did never forgive
debtis for nothing at all."238 God's decree to be just towards his creatures requires that
he punish sin; likewise his decree to be merciful requires that sin be atoned for. The
result: Christ's atonement is necessary, but only consequendy so. It is necessary only
because God has decreed to be just and merciful ad extra to his creatures. As we saw
above, this necessity is not absolute but "conditionall, and at the second hand."239
For Owen, however, as Carl Trueman remarks, it is only "a small step" from
denying the necessity of divine punitive justice and the absolute necessity of the
atonement "to denying the punitive, substitutionary character of Christ's sacrifice," as
the Socinians do.2,10 Far better, according to Owen, is his alternative, which sees divine
justice as essential ad extra. "[T]he justice of God, absolutely considered," says Owen, "is
the universal rectitude andperfection of the divine nature," which is "antecedent to all acts
of his will and suppositions of objects towards which it might operate."241 In other
words, Owen is teaching that divine justice is the totality of the divine perfections, that
these perfections must logically precede every act of the will of God, and that every act
must be wholly consistent with them. Thus, while God is never free to be not-just
towards his creatures in an absolute sense, because this would mean that he would be
acting contrary to who he is, he is free to be not-just specifically towards sin but only
prior to the fall. Once sin is taken into account, God must of necessity "legislate" and
act in accord with his justice.242 This means that the atonement is absolutely necessary
given God's decree to permit the fall and to save sinful men and women. In proving his
238 Catachisme, 187.
239 Although the conditional necessity of the atonement is largely a product of the medieval voluntarist
tradition, even thoroughgoing intellectualists like Aquinas believed that it was hypothetically possible for
God to forgive sin without satisfaction (by way of his potentia absoluta). Summa theologiae IIIa.46.2.
240 "John Owen's Dissertation on Divine Justice: An Exercise in Christocentric Scholasticism," CTJ 33 (1998),
88. Trueman states: "The classic Socinian statement of Christology is Faustus Socinus's 1578 treatise, De
Jesu Christo servatore. This work was a sustained attack on the doctrine of satisfaction and does contain
some indications that emphasis on God's absolute power, an element held in common with men such as
Twisse and Rutherford, was a contributing factor in this rejection of the orthodox position." Trueman,
"John Owen's Dissertation," 88n2. Cf. Alan W. Gomes, "De Jesu Christo Servatore: Faustus Socinus on the
Satisfaction of Christ," WTJ 55:2 (Fall 1993), 209-31.
241 Works ofJohn Owen, 10:498.
242 Works ofJohn Owen, 10:499; Trueman, "John Owen's Dissertation," 92-3.
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claims, Owen raises a damaging critique of Rutherford's denial of the absolute necessity
of Christ's atonement: why would God send his Son into the world to die unless it was
absolutely necessary for him to do so? Rutherford's position seems to make the
atonement of Christ an arbitrary product of the divine will. But, why would God
arbitrarily opt for the cross, instead of some other way, if there was an equally viable
alternative?243
While this critique has real teeth only for those who, like Rutherford, believe in
substitutionary atonement,244 it is not at all apparent that its bite is as damaging as Owen
may have first assumed. A closer look at Rutherford's position with respect to the ad
extra decrees reveals that it may not be as arbitrary as would appear from his dispute
with Owen. As we saw earlier in our discussion of the essence and attributes of God,
divine simplicity requires that God's essential attributes must be the same as the divine
will ad intra. This means that when the will of God acts ad intra, it harmonizes each of
the essential attributes in its action. And the same can be said of God's will ad extra.
When the divine will acts ad extra, it harmonizes the "relative" attributes of God.245 In
other words, the divine will first determines how the essential attributes of God will
operate relative to humankind and then harmonizes those attributes in its actions ad
extra. This is perhaps best seen, according to Rutherford, in the covenant of
redemption, a covenant in which "the harmony of the Attributes of God in the \ad extra]
declaration ofmercy, truth, &c. is sweetly made out."246
For the purposes of our discussion here, the relationships of two particular
attributes to the divine will require separate attention. The first of these attributes is
love. Rutherford's understanding of the relationship between the love of God and the
divine will, while complex, appears to be largely dependent upon the thinking of Duns
Scotus. According to Duns Scotus, "love resides in the will," and so God's ad extra
decrees are, therefore, expressions of his love.247 In a similar way to this, Rutherford
believes that God's love for his people is inextricably linked with his decree to save
243 Works ofJohn Owen, 10:548.
244 Others, like the Socinians, for instance, who do not believe in a substitutionary atonement, sidestep the
barb of Owen's critique by positing that the cross was simply an expression of God's love and an example
of the way that salvation can be gained. See, e.g., Gomes, "De Jesu Christo Servatore," 210ff.
245 COL, 33, 304.
246 COL, 304.
247 Copleston, History ofPhilosophy, 2:540, citing Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, 4.49, quaestio ex latere, no. 21.
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them. Since God's decree to save his people is eternal, immutable, and irrevocable, so is
his love for them. The divine will ad extra is God's love expressed to his creatures freely
in his ad extra works, which is why Rutherford could say that "Love is the Cause of
Christ's death."248 This relationship of the will and love, borrowed largely from Duns
Scorns, may help us to explain why Rutherford chooses to adopt infralapsarian language
in expressing his supralapsarianism. The reprobate, rather than being willed by God
unto damnation, are actually non-willed or simply passed over, because, as Duns Scotus
says, "the will cannot hate.. .nor will misery."249 It also explains how it is that God can
permit sin and suffering in the world. These things are willed, not as ends in
themselves, but as means to conveying the depth of divine love, both ad intra—as an
expression of eternal intratrinitarian love culminating in the covenant of redemption, as
we will see—and ad extra—as a manifestation of God's love for his people culminating
in the covenant of grace.
More important than the relationship of love to the will of God is the
relationship of wisdom to the divine will. Wisdom or sapientia, for Rutherford and for
scholastic theologians in general, is understood in the Aristotelian sense of knowledge
directed towards divine purposes or goals. It differs from the divine knowledge
(scientia), which is a more theoretical knowledge of causes and their effects, even though
both belong to the intellect of God.250 As Herman Bavinck explains, "knowledge
[scientia] is a matter of the mind apart from the will; wisdom [sapientia] is a matter of the
mind made subservient to the will."251 Given the will's determination of the divine
purposes, therefore, it is the wisdom of God that ensures that God knows the best ways
to accomplish those purposes. Even though God could have chosen some other way to
save his people—i.e., he could have opted not to punish sin or to forgive sin by some
other way than the death ofJesus—or, reflecting a typical scholastic emphasis from the
time of Peter Lombard, "he could have made a more perfect world" than the current
one, divine wisdom ensures that God knows and, as a result, chooses the best world to
create and the best way to save his people.252 There are, according to Rutherford,
248 Christ Dying, 409-10.
249 John Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, ed. and trans, with introduction by Allan B.
Wolter (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1986), 194-5.
250 See, e.g., Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, 144.
251 Doctrine ofGod, 195.
252 Influences, 52. Cf. Oakley, "The Absolute and Ordained Power of God," 438.
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certain "connections" between the wisdom of God and his ad extra works, and these
connections "precede every act of the will of God" ad extra,2^ This means that while it
is true that there is no absolute necessity that God punish sin or that he pardon sin by
the atoning sacrifice of Christ, it is also true that these ad extra decrees are not wholly
arbitrary in God. Divine love and divine wisdom work together with the divine will
under the auspices of God's sovereignty to bring about the ad extra decrees and a
harmonization of his relative attributes. In spite of this, however, Owen's critique does
still seem to be warranted in some measure. It is difficult to understand why, in
Rutherford's theological system, God would have sent his Son into the world to die—
wisdom and love notwithstanding—unless it was necessary to accomplish his purposes




Karl Barth has described soteriology as "the very heart and centre of the Christian
message" and, in doing so, has reminded us that there are certain questions that we
cannot. escape once the doctrine of God is presupposed: "How can I lay hold of a
gracious God? and, How can I live in accordance with the fact that I have a gracious
God?"1 The answers that we give to such questions, according to Barth, reveal the
"heart and centre" of our understanding of the Christian gospel. And differences over
the answers to these questions are, therefore, differences over issues that are
fundamental to Christianity.
If Barth is right, then for the present study of Rutherford's opposition to
Arminian theology to ignore the soteriological differences that exist between them
would be for it to neglect "the very heart and centre" of their respective theologies and
to overlook the ways in which the deep truths of their doctrines of God actually work
themselves out in the lives of individuals. For this reason, the current chapter will take
up the issue of soteriology, with the goal that we will be able better to understand how
fundamental the opposition is between Rutherford and the Arminians and how
influential their views of God are in shaping their ideas about salvation. We will once
again follow the same basic outline that Rutherford does in the Examen, concentrating
on the subjects of covenant theology, conversion, living by faith, and assurance.2
4.1: Covenant Theology
It is impossible to describe adequately Rutherford's doctrine of soteriology without
taking up the study of covenant theology, at least to some degree. This is because of the
close association that exists in his thinking between these two concepts. Covenant
theology is the vehicle that transitions between his doctrine of God and his doctrine of
salvation. It answers Barth's aforementioned questions, because, at its most basic level,
covenant theology is the expression of God's relationship with his creatures. And, for
this reason, the covenant idea functions—in the words of Donald Macleod—as "an
architectonic principle for the systematizing of Christian truth,"3 or—to use words more
1 CD, IV/1,108.
2 Exarnn, chapters 10-14.
3 Donald Macleod, "Covenant Theology," in DSCH&T, 214. Recently, San-Deog Kim has argued
against seeing the covenant as an organizing principle in Rutherford's theology and has suggested, instead,
that covenant should be interpreted in a "practical" or "relational way," as expressing "God's relationship
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determinative of Rutherford's own views—"all the worde of God appertaines to some
covenant: for God speaks nothing to man without the covenant."4 Every aspect of
theology having reference to God's relationship with his creatures—which is all
theology, if we remember Rutherford's emphasis on praxis—must necessarily be
organized around the principle of covenant, if covenant is indeed the way of expressing
the divine-human relationship. This necessity is not missed by David Weir, who
acknowledges that, because the "covenant idea is a common inheritance of the Judaeo-
Christian tradition found in the Bible" and is used to refer to God's dealings with
humankind, "[a]lmost all Christian theologians ultimately practice some form of
covenant theology" and, thus, employ a "system in which the covenant forms the basic
framework and acts as the controlling idea."5 In this section, we will seek to
demonstrate how covenant theology is an "architectonic principle" in Rutherford's
theology and how it is not. But before we do so, we must, first, seek to understand
what Rutherford believes in regard to the covenants. What is a covenant? And, how
many are there? After answering these questions, we can turn our attention to
establishing how Rutherford uses the covenant idea.
In his Tryal and Triumph ofFaith, Rutherford defines a covenant as "a joynt and
mutual bargain between two; according to which they promise freely such and such
things each to [the] other."6 In other words, a covenant is by nature a bilateral
agreement between two persons in which promises are made and commitments given.
According to J.B. Torrance, such a definition of covenant is too narrow, because it
overlooks another more important type—the unilateral covenant, which, he says, is not
"open-ended and contingent upon the mutual response of both parties," as is the
with man in history" (Kim, "Time and Eternity," 287). But Kim's evaluation overlooks the fact that
covenant theology is a systematizing principle in Rutherford precisely because it is an expression of God's
relationship with his creatures. There is no reason to deny the one in favor of the other. Rutherford, his
post-Reformation peers, and later generations of federal theologians all held these two ideas together in
tension.
4 Robert Rollock, A Treatise of Gods Effectual Calling (1597; London, 1603), 6. As the first principal of the
University of Edinburgh, Rollock carried great influence with students well into the seventeenth century,
as can be seen from two factors. First, Rollock's successor Henry Charteris was hand-selected because he
was a faithful disciple who could be "trusted to keep things as they were"(Grant, University ofEdinburgh,
2:242). Second, Rollock's curriculum remained in place unchanged until after Rutherford had left for
Anwoth in 1627 (Alexander Morgan, ed., University ofEdinburgh Charters, Statutes, andActs ofthe Town Council
and the Senatus: 1583-1858 [Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1937], 110-25).




bilateral covenant. Torrance offers a helpful example from the Bible of what he means
by a unilateral covenant:
[Such occurs] when in old Israel at the time of his coronation a king
made a covenant for (rather than "with") his people, saying, "This is the
kind of king I am going to be, and this is the land of people you are
going to be!" The classical example again is Rehoboam, where the
people either said, "Amen" to it, or, "To your tents O Israel, we shall not
have this man to reign over us!"7
For Rutherford, this simply begs the question. The ability of the people to respond
either in accepting the terms of the king or in rejecting and rebelling against them
proves that it is defacto a bilateral covenant. Rutherford does not deny the presence of a
unilateral covenant in the Bible. But he does deny that such a covenant is wholly and
exclusively unilateral, because then it would be universalist and would allow no room for
human choice. In continuity with such reformers as Wolfgang Musculus, Rutherford
believes that the unilateral covenant is—as Torrance's example proves—actually both
unilateral and bilateral. It is unilateral in its "origin" or "initiation" by God for
humankind and bilateral in its "fulfillment" or "administration" by God with them.8
By defining covenant as a bilateral agreement, Rutherford is not denying the
presence of a unilateral covenant but is seeking the lowest common denominator in
order to encapsulate every biblical covenant under one heading. Every covenant in the
Bible, no matter who the parties involved, is bilateral to some degree and, so, can fall
within the bounds of his all-encompassing definition. With this definition in place, we
can move on to examine the question of how many covenants there are for Rutherford.
His1 answer: three—the covenant of redemption, the covenant of works, and the
covenant of grace.
4.1.1: The Covenant of Redemption
While Rutherford does not devote any space to discussing the existence of a covenant
of redemption in the Examen, it is clear from others of his works—most particularly The
Covenant of Life Opened (1655)—that he does believe in such. The covenant of
7 J.B. Torrance, "Covenant or Contract? A Study of the Theological Background of Worship in
Seventeenth-Century Scodand," SJT 23 (1970), 54-5.
8 Anthony A. Hoekema, "The Covenant of Grace in Calvin's Teaching," CTJ 2 (1967), 140; Andrew A.
Woolsey, "Unity and Continuity in Covenant Thought: A Study in the Reformed Tradition to the
Westminster Assembly," 2 vols, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Glasgow, 1998), 1:87-8.
Tor Musculus' views on the dual nature of the covenant, see Common Places, 285-6.
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redemption or, as Rutherford also refers to it, the "Covenant of Suretyship," is to be
considered in two ways: "1. As transacted in time between Jehovah and Christ, in his
actuall discharge of his office of King, Priest and Prophet;" and "2. As it is an eternall
transaction and compact between Jehovah and the second Person the Son of God, who
gave personal! consent that he should be the Undertaker [of our salvation], and no
other."9 The second of these is foundational. The first flows from the second and is
necessary only because Christ's relationship with God while he was on earth cannot
rightly be explained by the covenant of grace, as ours can be. Christ, unlike us, is sinless
and, thus, has no need for a gracious covenant to restore a relationship that was broken
by sin. What is more, the second of these—the eternal, pre-temporal, intratrinitarian
covenant of redemption—is also foundational for God's covenant of grace with
humankind: "the Covenant of Suretyship is the cause of the stability and firmnesse of
the Covenant of Grace." The first two persons of the Trinity, who are consubstantial
with one another, freely and willingly enter into an eternal, irrevocable, and immutable
covenant (of redemption) in order to save select ones of their creatures by entering into
a covenant (of grace) with them in time. This relationship ensures Rutherford will say
that although these two covenants must be distinguished, they should never be
separated.10
Rutherford's justification for believing in a pre-temporal covenant of
redemption between God the Father and God the Son is derived exclusively from
Scripture. Passages like Isaiah 49.6-12 are understood by Rutherford, as they are by
others like John Owen,11 to refer directly to such a covenant. Other passages that refer
to the temporal relationship of the incarnate Christ with God are indirectly and rather
intricately woven together to show that they must have their foundation in an eternal
and pre-temporal covenant.12 Still other passages of Scripture, which speak of God's
temporal covenant with humankind, are shown by Rutherford to imply that standing
behind this temporal covenant is an eternal and pre-temporal pact between God and
Christ. Among such passages is Psalm 89, in regard to which Rutherford says that the
reason why "David and his seed stand sure in an everlasting Covenant of Reconciliation
[i.e., of Grace]" is because an eternal pact between God and Christ undergirds it and
9 COL, 302.
10 COL, 290-302, 309.
11 Works ofJohn Owen, 10:170. Cf. COL, 282.
12 COL, 290-302.
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ensures it (w. 28-9, 34).13 In order to add weight to this argument, Rutherford appeals
to Calvin's acknowledgment that the covenant in Psalm 89 ultimately finds its true
eternity (vera aeternitas) only in Christ.14 And while it is true that Calvin never explicidy
speaks of a pre-temporal covenant between the first and second persons of the Trinity
in any of his writings, he does make statements like these in which such an idea is
implicit: "We call predesdnarion God's eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself
what he willed to become of each man;" and, "Now it is useful to know this, for we are
taught that God is ever so consistent with himself, that his covenant, which he has made
ivith Christ and with all his members, never fails;" and, "the covenant ofGod is nothing else
than his secret or counsel."Xi These statements, although clearly not definidve, do seem to
suggest, as Peter Lillback indicates, that "Calvin may have provided the impetus for the
later development of the covenant of redemption."16 Regardless of whether or not this
is the case, it must be acknowledged that the belief in such a covenant can hardly be
taken as a substantial departure from Calvin. In seeing a pre-temporal covenant of
redemption in Scripture, Rutherford positions himself squarely within the neo-
Augustinian tradition, a tradition which undeniably includes such men as Caspar
Olevianus (1536-1587)—who was himself a disciple of Calvin and whose thinking
mirrors Calvin's own at several points17—David Dickson (c. 1583-1663), Johannes
Cocceius (1603-1669), John Owen, and Patrick Gillespie (1617-1675).18
While the existence of such an eternal pre-temporal covenant, which forms the
basis for God's covenant of grace with humankind, does appear neat and tidy on the
13 COL, 309.
14 Cf. Calvin, Commentary on the Book of Psalms, trans. James Anderson, 5 vols. (Edinburgh: CTS, 1845-
1849), 3:437; with COL, 337.
13 Institutes III.xxi.5, 926, emphasis added; Commentaries on the Book ofthe ProphetJeremiah and the Lamentations,
trans. John Owen, 5 vols. (Edinburgh: CTS, 1850-1855), 3:127, emphasis added; and Commentary on Psalms,
1:430, emphasis original. Cf. Peter A. Lillback, The Binding ofGod: Calvin's Role in the Development ofCovenant
Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic; Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster, 2001), 213.
16 The Binding ofGod, 213.
17 Lyle D. Bierma, German Calvinism in the ConfessionalAge: The Covenant Theology of Caspar Olevianus (Grand
Rapids, Ml: Baker, 1996), 107-112, 149-50. Bierma argues—because of the great influence of Calvin
upon Olevianus—that "it is very well possible that a number of themes in Olevianus' covenant theology
can be attributed to Calvin's direct influence" and goes on to describe extensive parallels in their thinking.
18 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra, Shewing Briefly the Method of Healing the Diseases of the Conscience Concerning
Regeneration (1656; Edinburgh, 1664); Dickson and James Durham, The Sum ofSaving Knowledge (Edinburgh,
1650), II.1-3, in WCF, 324; Cocceius, Summa doctrinae de foedere et testamento Dei (1648; Amsterdam, 1683),
chapter 5; Trueman, Claims of Truth, 133-40; and the most extensive of these, Gillespie, The Ark of the
Covenant Opened: or, A Treatise of the Covenant of Redemption between God and Christ, as the Toundation of the
Covenant ofGrace (London, 1677). Cf. RD, 374-9.
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surface, or, as Barth playfully suggests, "sublime and uplifting,"19 its necessity, upon
further reflecdon, seems rather perplexing. If God is one God with one divine will, why
must there be a covenant or contract between the persons of the Godhead? Certainly
there would be no need to ensure agreement or to maintain accountability among the
persons of the Trinity, as there would be among human persons.20 It is hard to escape
the conclusion that Rutherford and his Reformed contemporaries were perhaps more
influenced by the socio-political and economic climates of their day than they were by
the teaching of Scripture in their formulation of this doctrine.21 Even the Arminians,
who were on the fringe of Reformed orthodoxy, still retained in their theology the
notion of an eternal, pre-temporal covenant between God and Christ.22 No doubt, this
is partly because "the people of the 17th century understood the language of bands,
pacts, covenants, [and] contracts," and, so, it made sense to speak accordingly.23 But it
should also be noted that the divine decrees, whether one understands them according
to the Arminian or the Calvinist systems, do assume that decisions are being made
within the Trinity that will then be executed by God within the temporal economy of
salvation. These eternal and pre-temporal decisions are what Rutherford, and the
Arminians, are seeking to identify and to explain in language that is both biblically
founded and culturally sensitive.
The increased emphasis on covenant theology and, in particular, on the
covenant of redemption in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is due to more than
simply the socio-political and economic climates of this period; it is also strongly
influenced by new theological and polemical challenges which arise from within
Reformed orthodoxy during this time. Perry Miller, in his work on New England
Puritanism, has helpfully identified the encroaching threat of Arminianism as a key to
understanding the increased emphasis of the Reformed orthodox on covenant
theology.24 While Miller's claims are over simplified, as George Marsden has
19 CD, IV/1,66.
20 Barth offers a similar criticism to this in CD, IV/1, 65.
21 This is a criticism that has been raised by J.B. Torrance in several of his articles: e.g., "Covenant or
Contract?," 52-4; and, "The Covenant Concept in Scottish Theology and Politics and its Legacy," SJT 34
(1981), 225-8. Cf. S.A. Burrell, "The Covenant Idea as a Revolutionary Symbol: Scotland, 1596-1637,"
CH 27 (1958), 338-50.
22 See WJA, 1:416.
23 Torrance, "The Covenant Concept," 227.
24 Perry Miller, The New EnglandMind (New York: Macmillan, 1939), 366-7.
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demonstrated,25 they are, nonetheless, valid and helpful to some extent. One of the
main reasons why Rutherford and his Reformed orthodox contemporaries emphasize
covenant theology and, in particular, the covenant of redempdon, to the degree that
they do is because they perceive that the soteriological discrepancies between their
system and the Arminian alternative are founded upon key differences in regard to the
eternal, pre-temporal relationship between the Father and the Son and the divine
decrees.
4.1.2: The Covenant of Redemption and the Decrees of God
Though the Arminians speak of a covenant of redemption between God and Christ,
they define it, according to Rutherford, in such a way that "it is a far other thing then
such as we hold."26 For the Arminians, the covenant of redemption is summarized in
the first of the divine decrees: the appointment of Christ as Mediator and High Priest
for the whole world. In this covenant, God "demand[s].. .an action to be performed" by
Christ and "promzse[s\.. .an immense remuneration" in return.27 But it is not certain that
this is a promise that God can rightly make. As we saw in our discussion of the potentia
absoluta et ordinata in the previous chapter, the Arminian God cannot impose his will
upon the free wills of his creatures, given his decree to create them. Thus, there can be
no promised remuneration in this covenant but only a promised potential remuneration.
This is further illustrated by the fact that the Arminians separate the covenant of
redemption from the decree of predestination, which, as we saw in the previous chapter,
is made possible by the subordinationism in their doctrine of the Trinity. Christ is not
the electing and elected God, as he is for the Reformed orthodox, but the elected and
electing God instead; he is appointed by the Father in the first decree—the covenant of
redemption—but does not elect until the fourth decree.28 God cannot rightly promise
Christ an immense remuneration in the covenant of redemption, the first decree, if he
does not elect until the fourth decree. The result of separating the covenant of
redemption from election is that the Arminians propose a pre-temporal covenant in
which Christ takes on the task of salvation for nobody in particular.




28 See WJA, 1:653-4; 2:29-32; and Muller's discussion in "The Christological Problem," 158-60.
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In contrast to the Arminians, Rutherford sees the covenant of redemption as
encapsulating all the divine decrees together. This is clear from his comments that the
covenant of redemption is "a mutuall agreement between Jehovah and the Son...to
have us saved;" it is one in which Christ undertakes to be our Mediator and "our Surety,
Saviour, and Redeemer" as well.29 In speaking of the covenant in this way, Rutherford
demonstrates that it includes the decree to allow the fall, the ad extra decrees, and the
decree to apply salvation in Christ. In other words, for Rutherford, the covenant of
redemption is the intratrinitarian structure within which all the divine decrees are
presented and planned out by God. Not only does it include the appointment or
election of Christ as Mediator, but it also includes the decree of predestination, as well
as the decree to apply the salvadon obtained by Christ to those so elected. There is,
therefore, a unity of Christ's priesdy and mediatorial works within the covenant of
redemption. Christ's role in the covenant is "not simply" to die, as the Arminians
suggest, but to elect, then to offer himself as a sacrifice "for, and in the name of' the
elect, and then to intercede for them and to ensure that what he has offered for them
will be applied to them.30
Because the covenant of redemption includes all the divine decrees, it cannot be
maintained, as David Weir has argued, that the covenant is merely "an explanation of
the working out of the decrees of God."31 Rather, the covenant is the relational context
in which the decrees are given and committed to. But, more than this, because the
covenant of redemption comprises the unity of Christ's priestly and mediatorial works,
and because it forms the pre-temporal basis for Christ's actual work in time and space,
it, and not the decrees themselves, functions as the "causal foundation of the whole
economy of salvation" for Rutherford and for the Reformed orthodox in general.32 The
covenant of redemption, and not the decrees per se, guarantees the salvation of the elect
and provides an absolute and objective "anchor" to support faith with assurance of
salvation.33 Such is not the case for the Arminians, however. By separating the
covenant of redemption from Christ's decree of predestination and from his
29 COL, 293.
30 COL, 360. Cf. WJA, 1:416; with COL, 327-33.
31 Origins ofthe Federal Theology, 157.
32 Trueman, Claims ofTruth, 137.
33 COL, 331, 360. Rutherford says that this covenant should not be the "object of faith," nor will the
believer always derive assurance from it; but the believer's "faith often is, and ought, and may be
supported thereby." See faith and assurance below.
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intercession—moves that are made possible by the fact that the Son is subordinate to
the Father, not only in terms of his office but also in terms of his divinity—the
Arminians reduce the eternal, pre-temporal covenant from being the causal foundation
of all of salvation to being the causal foundation of a universal, common grace after the
fall, which makes salvation possible for all people but does not guarantee it for any.
Not only so, but in separating the covenant of redemption from Christ's predestination
and intercession, the Arminians institute a sharp divide between the wills of the Son and
the Father in the economy of salvation. In order to maintain the harmony of the divine
will in salvation, Arminius appeals to the "authority" of the Father, once again reflecting
a subordinationism in his doctrine of the Trinity and calling the consubstantiality of the
Son into question.34
It should be no surprise, therefore, that Reformed orthodox theologians like
Rutherford choose to place greater emphasis on covenant theology and, in particular, on
the covenant of redemption than previous generations do. They are reacting against
what they perceive to be harmful soteriological implications arising from the Arminian
doctrine of the Trinity and its relationship to the divine decrees. Arminianism is not just
presenting a theological system that is different in one or two points but a system that is
opposed to Reformed orthodoxy from the outset. What is surprising is that Rutherford
makes no mention of this profound difference in the Examen. One would expect in a
treatise devoted wholly to refuting Arminianism that there would be extensive reference
made to such a profound and fundamental difference of opinion. The omission is a
glaring one. It probably reflects an immaturity in Rutherford's thinking on the covenant
in the Examen. Even though he clearly falls within the pale of federal theology at this
early juncture in his career by believing in a covenant of works and a covenant of grace,
Rutherford appears to add this third covenant—the covenant of redemption—only
later, in The Covenant of Life Opened (1655), most likely as a result of the influence of
David Dickson and James Durham (1622-1658).33 In spite of this lacuna in the Examen,
however, Rutherford's later work on federal theology demonstrates that he is aware of
the radical discrepancy that exists between his theology and that of the Arminians.
Although he may not have seen it as early or as clearly as Owen did in his A Display of
34 WJA, 1:416. Arminius does suggest that Christ entered into the covenant of redemption willingly and
with "a voluntary engagement to perform" the required duty. But had Christ not done so, the Father could
have forced his engagement "by a display of his authority."
35 Dickson and Durham published their Sum of Saving Knowledge in 1650, five years before Rutherford's
work. For their statements on the covenant of redemption, see sections II. 1-3 in 1VCF, 324.
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Arminianism (1642),36 he did see it, nonetheless, and he reacted against it by emphasizing
the covenant of redemption and the close, practical relationship that it has with the
divine decrees.
4.1.3: The Covenant of Works
Whereas the covenant of redemption is a pre-temporal pact enacted between God and
Christ, the covenant of works is the first of two temporal covenants that God enters
into with humankind. In the covenant of works, "God promiseth to us lif everlasting,
and wee ar oblished to keep the law by the strength of our nature."37 This statement
should not be taken to imply that Rutherford would disagree with the Westminster
Confession's statement that "life was promised to Adam, and in him to his posterity,
upon condition ofperfect andpersonal obedience. "38 There can be no doubt but that Rutherford
sees obedience to the law as the condition of satisfying this covenant.39 No significance
should be attached to his omission of the word "condition" in his catechism. He is
simply speaking with covenantal (i.e., bi-lateral) language. Rutherford would
wholeheartedly agree with Robert Rollock that God "promised [Adam] eternall life,
under the condition of holy and good works, which should be answerable to the
holinesse and goodnesse of their creation, and conformable to his law."40
But, in saying that God promises life to Adam upon condition of his obedience,
Rutherford does not mean to imply that God intended to save Adam by his law-
keeping: "Adam in his first state was not predestinate to a law glory." God decreed, by
his voluntas permittens, that Adam, as "a publick person representing all his sons" and
daughters, should fall from "the state of Law-life both totally and finally." But, as an
individual, Adam did not fall from "the state of Gospel election to glory." As an
individual, Adam is saved by faith in Christ, just as we are today. The Edenic, pre-
lapsarian dispensation, according to Rutherford, was never intended by God to be an
end in itself but merely a temporary means—"an earthly condition"—to show his love
and grace in Christ:
36 On Owen's use of the covenant against the Arminians, see Trueman, Claims ofTruth, 133-9.
37 Catachisme, 175.
38 WCF, § 7.2, 42, emphasis added. Unfortunately, San-Deog Kim has recently and incorrectly asserted
this in "Time and Eternity," 299.
39 See, e.g., Tryal, 55-6.
40 Treatise ofGods Effectual Calling, 7.
158
For the Lord had in the Law-dispensation a love designe, to set up a
Theatre and stage of free grace; And that the way of works should be a
time dispensation, like a summer-house to be demolished again: As if the
Lord had an aime that works and nature should be a transient, but no
standing Court for righteousnesse: Hence it is now the reliques of an old
standing Court, and the Law, is a day of assyse, for condemning of
malefactors, who will acknowledge no Tribunall of grace, but only of
works: And it is a just Court to terrifie robbers, to awe borderers and
loose men, but to beleevers it is now a Court for a far other end.41
The point that Rutherford is trying to emphasize here is the graciousness of the
covenant of works, a theme that is consistently taken up by such Reformation and post-
Reformation theologians as Musculus, Zanchi, Du Moulin, and Turretin.42 The Lord
had a "love designe" for Adam when he entered into this covenant with him. "Law-
obedience" was never intended to be "the effectual! means leading to" Adam's eternal
glory. This does not imply that life is not promised upon condition of obedience. The
condition remains, but it is not Adam, the "publick person," who fulfills it. Rather,
Christ fulfills the condition on Adam's behalf, insofar as Adam is considered a private
and individual person and not the federal representative of his posterity. But more than
this, the graciousness of the covenant of works is also seen in the fact that it is the
means by which individuals recognize their need of God's mercy and grace in Christ and
receive eternal life. Thus, even though law-breakers and "malefactors" will be
"terrifie [d]" and ultimately condemned by it, believers will be comforted and
encouraged to give praise to God for his "Theatre and stage of free grace."43
Such an understanding of the covenant of works is not uncommon among
seventeenth-century theologians. Although the specific terminology used to describe
the pre-lapsarian relationship between God and Adam is not completely uniform among
the Reformed orthodox,44 the notion that this relationship itself, as well as God's
intention in entering into it, is gracious is generally agreed upon. Thomas Blake (c.1597-
1657) represents the typical post-Reformation attitude to the pre-lapsarian covenant
when he states that,
41 COL, 2-3.
42 Musculus, Loci communes sacrae theologiae (Basel, 31573), 620-21; Zanchi, Opera theologicorum D. Hieronymi
Zatichii, 9 vols. (Geneva, 1617-19), 3:697; Du Moulin, Anatomy ofArminianisme, 42-3; Turretin, Institutes,
1:574-8.
« COL, 2-3, 14, 225.
44 See the examples provided in E.F. Kevan, The Grace ofLaw: A Study in Puritan Theology (London: Carey
Kingsgate, 1964), 111.
159
the fountain, and first rise [of both the covenant of works and the
covenant of grace]...was the free grace, and favour of God. For
howsoever the first covenant was on condition of obedience, and
engaged to the reward ofWorks, yet it was of Grace, that God made any
such promise, of reward to any work of man, when man had done all
(even in that estate) which was commanded, he was still an unprofitable
servant, he had done no more then duty, and no emolument did thence
accrew to his Maker.45
Even those whose theology is at odds with the post-Reformation orthodox-—men like
Arminius, for example—still embrace the idea of a gracious pre-lapsarian covenant
between God and Adam. For Arminius, this covenant is one in which "God requirefs]
obedience, and.. .promise [s] a [gracious] reward... [or, bestows a deserved]
punishment."46 For his later followers, however—men like Episcopius and Van
Limborch—there is no such thing as a pre-lapsarian covenant in which Adam is deemed
the "Representative of his Posterity, so that whatsoever he might do should be imputed
likewise to them."47
Although it is true that the definitive expressions of Episcopius' and Van
Limborch's thoughts in regard to the covenant of works are not published until 1650
and 1686 respectively,48 it is, nonetheless, quite significant that Rutherford nowhere
finds fault with them, or with any others of the Arminians for that matter, for their
refusing to embrace the terminology, "covenant of works," or even for their refusing to
endorse a pre-lapsarian covenant at all. The most likely explanation for this is that the
existence of a pre-lapsarian covenant is not explicitly mentioned in Scripture, and
Rutherford appears to be willing to allow for some leeway in light of this fact. Where he
does find fault with the Arminians is in connection with the theological or, better, the
soteriological, implications that flow from their understanding of the disobedience of
45 Thomas Blake, Vindiciae foederis; or, A Treatise of the Covenant of God Entered with Man-kinde (London,
21658), 9. Cf. also the similar statements in other post-Reformation theologians: e.g., Goodwin, Works of
Thomas Goodwin, 5:82, 7:25; Owen, Works ofJohn Owen, 5:277; John Ball, A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace
(London, 1645), 7, 9; Anthony Burgess, Vindiciae legis (London, 1646), 123, 129; John Graile, A Modest
Vindication of the Doctrine of Conditions in the Covenant of Grace (London, 1655), 26; and Francis Roberts, Of
God's Covenants (London, 1657), 17.
46 W]A, 2:369-73.
47 ACS, 1:197; Episcopius, Opera theologica (1665), II, 149-55. Cf. Johannes Corvinus, Petri Molinaei novi
anatomici mala encheiresis: sen Censura anatomesArminianismi (Francofurri ad Moenum, 1622), 8.7, 9.5; Richard
A. Muller, "The Federal Motif in Seventeenth Century Arminian Theology," NAvK 62:1 (1982), 102-22.
48 Episcopius, Institutiones theologicae, first published in Opera theologica, vol. 1, cd. Etienne de Courcelles
(Amsterdam, 1650); Van Limborch, Theologia Christiana (originally published in 1686 as Institutiones theologiae
Cbristianae).
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Adam—or, as he sees it, from their understanding of Adam's breaking of the covenant
ofworks—and the resulting propagation of his sin.49
While maintaining, on the whole, a fairly traditional view of original sin,50 the
Arminians teach that "the most bountiful God" immediately and universally removes its
stain by providing Christ as a "free Remedy for al against that Evil or Malady, which
was derived unto us from Adam."51 As a result of this universal "Remedy" or
atonement, the Arminians reduce the effects of Adam's disobedience—or, as
Rutherford would see it, the effects of Adam's failure to keep the covenant of works—
upon his progeny to a simple "Misfortune," which not only includes death and the
physical corruption of the world (i.e., disease, pain in childbirth, and labor in producing
food), but also—and more importantly from a soteriological perspective—an
"Inclination to sin." This means that no person is born sinful—i.e., dead in sins and
trespasses, as Rutherford and the Calvinists believe—but with only, at the very most, an
inherited predisposition to sin.52
Although the underlying issue between Rutherford and the Arminians is really
the extent and nature of the covenant of grace and the atonement of Christ, the
differences highlighted thus far are significant because they once again show the
profound and systematic influence of their respective perceptions of God upon their
theologies. The reason why the Remonstrants believe that the effects of Adam's
disobedience cannot apply to his posterity is because that would violate the free wills of
Adam's descendents. God "could not carry out" such a covenant of works, as the
federalists suggest; he cannot hold his free creatures liable for a sin which is not actually
theirs but is so only "by imputation." The problem is especially poignant in regard to
infants. How can God "cast infants in[to] hell" for a sin that is not their own? To do
so is to act against human freedom and, thus, to contradict the decree of creation,
which, as we saw in the last chapter, is wholly a communication of good.53 As far as
Rutherford is concerned, however, this kind of thinking puts God in the dock and
evaluates his ways by human conventions. "God is not unjust and cruel;" who are we to
49 Examen, 449-52.
50 See, e.g., Confession, 117-20.
51 Confession, 120.
52 ACS, 1:191-2; Muller, "Federal Motif," 107-8, 111, 116-17.
53 Examen, 449-50; COL, 56. Cf. ACS, 1:193-4; Corvinus, Molinaei novi anatomici mala encheiresis, 8.7, 9.5.
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suggest that he is? Even if God would never have provided a savior to redeem
humankind and "Adam and all his posterity," including infants as well, "would have
paid the penalty of death, both temporal [;temporaria] and eternal" in themselves, God
would still not be unjust for his actions or the lack thereof. He wills and acts according
to his own standard of justice and always for his own glory.54
The question of whether God holds people accountable for a sin they did not
commit may be a difficult one to answer definitively from Scripture—especially so in
the case of infants. But one thing is not so difficult: both Rutherford and the Arminians
are expressing a theology that is influenced by their respective views of God and his
corresponding relationship with the created order. Rutherford's opinion exalts the
position of God by preserving his sovereignty and freedom but, at the same time,
creates problems for human liberty and responsibility. The Arminian option, on the
other hand, solves the human conundrum but does so with a radically smaller view of
the sovereignty of God. The two systems arrive at different conclusions because they
begin with different premises.
4.1.4: The Covenant of Works—Continuity or Discontinuity?
Since the seventeenth century, the idea of a covenant of works has largely fallen into
disuse. In many cases—especially in the twentieth century—it has been openly
criticized and cited as primary evidence that the post-Reformation orthodox drifted
from the theology of Calvin and the reformers.55 A big part of the problem for those
twentieth-century scholars who are critical of the covenant of works is the fact that a
pre-lapsarian covenant is not explicitly present within Reformed theology until at least
the late sixteenth century, at the close of the Reformation and the onset of the post-
Reformation period. Even though Zacharias Ursinus (1534-1583) first overtly describes
Adam's pre-fall condition by way of a covenant in 1562,56 two years before Calvin's
54 Examen, 450-51.
55 Among scholars who endorse this viewpoint are Michael McGiffert, "Grace and Work: The Rise and
Division of Covenant Divinity in Elizabethan Puritanism," Harvard Theological Review 75:4 (1982), 463-502;
idem, "The Perkinsian Moment of Federal Theology," CTJ 29 (1994), 117-48; J.B. Torrance, "Strengths
and Weaknesses of the Westminster Theology," in The Westminster Confession, ed. Alasdair I.C. Heron
(Edinburgh: St. Andrews, 1982), 40-53; idem, "Calvin and Puritanism in England and Scodand—Some
Basic Concepts in the Development of 'Federal Theology,'" in Calvinns Reformator (Potchefstroom:
Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 1982), 264-77; Holmes Rolston III, John Calvin
versus the Westminster Confession (Richmond, VA: John Knox, 1972); idem, "Responsible Man in Reformed
Theology," 129-56.
56 Robert Letham, "The Foedus Operurn. Some Factors Accounting For Its Development," SCJ 14:4 (1983),
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death, it is not until the 1580s and 90s that this idea becomes more commonplace.57
The phrase foedus operum does not even appear in print until 1585, when the Puritan
Dudley Fenner (c.1558-1587) uses it in his Sacra theologia to help distinguish the pre-
lapsarian and post-lapsarian covenants.38 After Fenner, however, the phrase does gain a
rapid acceptance. Amandus Polanus, William Perkins, Franciscus Junius, and Robert
Rollock—the first in Scodand—all use the phrase foedus operum in the 1590s to describe
Adam's pre-fall situation,39 a trend that continues well into the seventeenth, eighteenth,
and nineteenth centuries.60
Among those twentieth-century scholars who see the covenant of works as a
locus of discontinuity between the Reformation and post-Reformation periods, some,
like Michael McGiffert, have argued for discontinuity not only between the Puritans and
Calvin but also amongst the Puritans themselves. McGiffert specifically sees three
strands within Puritan covenant theology: the first, following men like William Ames,
perceived the covenant of works as "partially embedded in the covenant of grace;" the
second, following Robert Rollock and John Cameron (c.l 579-1625), believed grace to
be the overriding feature of the pre-lapsarian covenant; and the third—representing
"the majority of federalists," who sided more completely with William Perkins—equated
the covenant of works with the moral law, thus opposing law to grace and establishing
the Adamic covenant as merely an "agent of reprobation."61 The implication of
McGiffert's analysis seems to be that, of the three strands, the second comes the closest
to Calvin's position. Interestingly, he sees Arminius' views as being more in line with
this strand than the mainstream of Puritan thought. Other scholars, like Karl Barth,
459; Peter A. Lillback, "Ursinus' Development of the Covenant of Creation: A Debt to Melanchthon or
Calvin?," WT'J 43:2 (Spring, 1981), 247-88.
57 E.g., Caspar Olevianus writes of a "primus foedus" between Adam and God in 1585 (De substantia
foederisgratuiti inter Deum et electos, item de mediis, quibus ea ipsa substantia nobis communicavit [Geneva, 1585], 9).
Johannes Piscator speaks of a "foedus legale" in 1589 (Aphorismi doctrinae Christianae [1589; Oxford, 1630],
50). And Franciscus Gomarus refers to the pre-lapsarian arrangement between God and Adam as a
"foedus naturale" in 1594 (Opera theologica omnia [Amsterdam, 1664], 2).
Dudley Fenner, Sacra theologia, sive ventas quae est secundumpietatem (Geneva, 1585), 88.
59 Polanus, Partitiones, 53; Perkins, Workes, 1:70; Franciscus Junius, Opuscula theologica selecta, ed. Abraham
Kuyper (Amsterdam: Miller and Kruyt, 1882), 184; and Robert Rollock, Quaestiones et responsiones aliquot de
foedere Dei (Edinburgh, 1596), A3-A5c.
60 E.g., Samuel Crooke, The Guide unto Tme Blessedness (London, 1613), 30; Ames, Marrow, 55; Ussher, Body
of Divinitie, 124-5. Herman Witsius' classic work on federal theology, De oeconomia foederum Dei cum
hominibus, was originally published in 1677, and was kept in print well into the nineteenth century.
61 McGiffert, "The Perkinsian Moment," 119, 121, 123, 146-8.
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Paul Althaus, and August Lang, for instance, see the covenant of works as stemming
more from the influence of Melanchthonian views of natural law and the law-gospel
contrast than from the thinking of Calvin.62 Still others, like David Bruggink, have
claimed that a pre-lapsarian covenant of works represents a "perversion of great
seriousness," both theologically and exegedcally, when compared with Calvin's theology
of grace. And others, like David Weir, have similarly argued that the whole "doctrine of
a foedus with Adam" develops as a result of "the seemingly harsh decretal doctrines of
Theodore Beza," in order to soften the extremes of the Bezan form of Calvinism.63
Without minimizing the helpfulness of these twentieth-century studies, three
points bear mentioning in connection with their evaluations of the idea of a pre-
lapsarian covenant and of the question of substantial discontinuity not only within the
Reformed community of the seventeenth-century but also between the post-
Reformation period and that of Calvin and his Reformation peers. First, although the
phrase "the covenant of works" does not appear in Calvin's writings, there is ample
evidence that both Calvin and the Augustinian tradition before him recognized the
existence of a pre-lapsarian covenant with Adam. In the Institutes, Calvin refers to the
tree of life as a sacrament, which "proves" and "seals" God's covenant with Adam. Not
only so, but he also makes repeated reference to the biblical parallel that exists between
Adam and Christ. Because the new covenant is initiated with the latter, it is appropriate
in light of this parallel to conclude that the old covenant must be initiated with the
former.64 Augustine, moreover, whose thinking probably represents the greatest
influence upon Calvin, also specifically points both to a pre-lapsarian covenant between
God and Adam and to the Adam-Christ parallel in the economy of salvation.65
Second, the Melanchthonian influence that is said to result in the covenant of
works in Ursinus and in the post-Reformation orthodox could just as easily be traced to
Calvin as to Melanchthon. For one thing, there is little, if any, difference between the
62 Barth, CD, IV/1, 54ff; Althaus, Die Prinsfpien, 148-52; August Lang, Der Fleidelberger Katecbismus nnd vier
verwandte Katechismen (Leipzig: Deichert, 1907), lxiv-lxvii.
63 David J. Bruggink, "Calvin and Federal Theology," The Reformed Review 13 (1959-60), 15-22, cited in
Lillback, The Binding ofGod, 18; and Weir, Origins ofthe Federal Theology, 63.
64 See Institutes IV.xiv.18, 1294; II.i.6, 248-9; Il.vi.l, 340-42; II.xii.3, 466-7; II.xvii.3, 530-31; IV.xvi.17,
1339-41.
f'5 Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1878), 16.27, 2:142-3.
According to Leonard J. Trinterud, Athanasius follows in this vein as well, making reference to both a
pre-lapsarian covenant and the Adam-Christ parallel. See "The Origins of Puritanism," CH 20 (March
1951), 42, 56nl7.
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way Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) articulates his view of natural law and the way
Calvin writes on the same subject. Melanchthon states, in words that could easily pass
for Rutherford's own, or for those of any other Calvinist as well, for that matter:
Est ergo vera definitio legis naturae, legem naturae esse nodtiam legis
divinae, naturae hominis insitam. Ideo enim dicitur homo ad imaginem
Dei conditus esse, quia in eo lucebat imago, hoc est, notitia Dei et
similitudo quaedam mends divinae, id est, discrimen honestorum et
turpium, et cum his nodtiis congruebant vires hominis.
And Calvin, likewise, says:
The very things contained in the two tablets (of the law) are in a way
dictated to us by that internal law.. .written and stamped on every heart.
The law of God, which we call moral, is nothing other than the
testimony of the natural law and of that conscience which God has
engraved on the minds ofmen.
The gifts which God hath left to us since the fall, if they are
judged by themselves, are indeed worthy of praise; but as the contagion
of wickedness is spread through every part, there will be found in us
nothing that is pure and free from every defilement. That we naturally
possess some knowledge of God, that some distinction between good
and evil is engraven on our conscience, that our faculties are sufficient
for the maintenance of the present life, that—in short—we are in so
many ways superior to the brute beasts, that is excellent in itself so far as
it proceeds from God; but in us all these things are completely polluted.6"
Lest we think that the Calvinian emphasis on the effects of sin upon the usefulness of
natural law is missed by Melanchthon, the great disciple of Luther comments:
Now, one might ask, since an understanding of the Ten Commandments
is implanted in all men at their creation, why then did God proclaim the
Ten Commandments [at Sinai] with so many great miracles before so
many hundreds of thousands of men? Answer: There are many
important reasons for this open magistral proclamation, but two are
especially important. In the wake of sin, the light in human reason was
not as clear and bright as before. Men became ever more shameless and
savage, and incurred more blindness. The heathen invented and invoked
many eternal beings and repugnant gods. They permitted all sorts of
immorality, and did not record it as vice. Against such blindness God
not only proclaimed his law on Mt. Sinai, but has sustained and upheld it
since the time of Adam in his Church.67
66 Lillback, "Ursinus' Covenant of Creation," 260-61; idem, The Binding ofGod., 279-80.
57 Philip Melanchthon, Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, trans, and ed. Clyde L.
Manschreck (New York: Oxford University, 1965), 128-9.
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For another thing, Ursinus' understanding of the distinction between the law
and the gospel—and, thus, the post-Reformation understanding of the same-—may be
more similar to Calvin than to Melanchthon. Peter Lillback has cogendy argued that
"[i]f one reads Ursinus' Summa Theologiae in...light [of the difference between Calvin and
Luther on the law-gospel contrast], it becomes apparent that he was working with
Calvin's letter-spirit distinction rather than Luther's law/gospel distinction."68
Moreover, if, as at least one scholar has claimed, Melanchthon's views later in life
actually became more Calvinistic than Lutheran, then the dissimilarity between these
two reformers would virtually disappear.69 And, as a result, Lillback's conclusions would
seem justified: "if Calvin's conception of the law/gospel distinction prohibited a
development of the covenant of works, then Melanchthon's expression could not have
been contributory either. If Melanchthon's view was a positive stimulus for Ursinus,
then Calvin's presentation could have equally served as a prime mover."70
Third, to contrast federal theology—with its emphasis on the covenant of
works—with Calvin's theology of grace is to overlook Calvin's own view of the law, in
the first place, and, in the second, the fact that post-Reformation theologians followed
Robert Rollock by employing the covenant of works for the express purpose of
emphasizing the grace of God. The covenant of works was, as we have already seen,
intended to highlight the graciousness of God in sending his Son into the world to
redeem his creatures by pointing to their need for this redemption. Contrary to Michael
McGiffert, there is no substantial discontinuity either among the post-Reformation
orthodox or between them and Calvin. Rutherford's own position is enough to
demonstrate this. He, like William Perkins and, before him, Calvin and Melanchthon,
writes that the law of nature is written on people's hearts at creation and is equivalent to
the moral law, which was later revealed at Sinai.71 But Rutherford does not set this
natural law in opposition to grace, nor do other post-Reformation theologians. The
covenant of works is, to be sure, an "agent of reprobation." But it is an agent of
election as well. Thus its end is the revelation of the grace of God unto either salvation
or merited damnation. What is more, as we have already seen in connection with
68 The Binding ofGod, 281. Cf. idem, "Ursinus' Covenant of Creation," 264-7.
f'9 C.E. Maxcey, A Study in the Development of Bona Opera: The Doctrine in Philip Melanchthon (Nieuwkoop: B.
DeGraaf, 1980).
70 "Ursinus' Covenant of Creation," 267.
71 See section 2.2.1 above.
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Rutherford's dispute with the Arminians, neither the terminology "covenant of works"
nor the existence of a pre-lapsarian covenant between God and Adam is of primary
importance to him. Rutherford's main concern is to protect the theology of the fall that
stands behind this covenant. And this theology falls squarely within the tradition of
Calvin.72
Thus, regardless of what one may think of the doctrine of the covenant of
works, three things must be acknowledged in reference to the question of its
discontinuity with Calvin: (1) the theological seedbed of what would later become this
covenant can plainly be seen in Calvin and at least as far back as Augustine; (2) the
association of the pre-lapsarian covenant of works with Melanchthon rather than with
Calvin overlooks the clear theological affinities that exist between Melanchthon and
Calvin; and (3) the Calvinistic emphasis upon a theology of grace remains front and
center throughout the post-Reformation period, occurring alongside their emphasis on
the covenant of works. Far from inaugurating a theological shift away from
Reformation thought, this covenant actually worked to preserve it.
4.1.5; The Covenant of Grace
According to both Rutherford and the Arminians, God enters into a covenant of grace
with his creatures beginning with post-lapsarian Adam. After Adam's fall into sin, God
provides the gracious solution to the problem of humankind—he enters into covenant
in order to bestow grace in Christ. Such an idea does not begin with the seventeenth
century. Rutherford and the Arminians are following closely upon the heels of
sixteenth-century theologians like Bullinger and Calvin, both of whom traced the
beginning of God's covenant to Adam.73 But this is about as far as the similarities
between Rutherford and the Arminians extend. While they agree in regard to when the
covenant of grace is enacted in time and why it is so enacted, they differ over its
purpose, extent, nature, and unity. We will conclude our discussion of covenant
theology by examining each of these areas of disagreement, beginning with the last.
Rutherford understands the covenant of grace to be one covenant that unifies
the Old and New Testaments and binds together the people of God into one people
72 See Institutes II.i.7, 249-50; and the helpful discussion in Lillback, The Binding ofGod, 282-6.
73 Heinrich Bullinger, De testamento sen foedere Dei unico et aeterno (Tiguri, 1534), as translated by and
published in McCoy and Baker, Fountainhead of Federalism, 120; Institutes II.x.7, 434; II.x.20, 446; IV.i. 17,
985; IV.xiv.12, 1287; IV.xiv.18, 1294. See also the discussion in Lillback, The Binding ofGod., 142-6.
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who are saved by their faith in either a coming or an already come Christ. In proving
this, he appeals wholly to Scripture, beginning with Genesis 3.15, which he interprets as
the gospel "proclaimed to Adam."74 His remaining arguments break down into three
categories. First, Jesus and salvation through him are prophesied in the Old Testament,
such that, Old Testament saints would have, and should have, been aware of them
(Isaiah 7.14; 9.6; 53.1-12; and Acts 3.24). Second, Scripture teaches that the saints of the
Old Testament actually did look ahead to Christ by faith for an eternal salvation (Job
19.25-7; Psalm 16.9-11; 17.14-15; 39.6-8; 73.24-6; John 8.56; Acts 15.11; and 1 Cor.
10.1-4). Third, the Bible teaches that the Old Testament covenant is not primarily a
physical covenant but a spiritual one with spiritual blessings (Gen. 17.7; Deut. 30.6;
Isaiah 59.21; Jer. 31.31-5; and Ezek. 36.26).73 Christ is revealed in both the Old and
New Testaments—although he is "vailed" in the former—and grace and forgiveness of
sins in Christ are held forth for all to see—albeit "darkly" and "sparingly" in the
former.76 It is for this reason that Christ is said to be the unifying agent who binds
together not only the covenant of grace but also the whole of the Bible and redemptive
history. Such an idea is not original to Rutherford, however. Others, who preceded
him—most notably, Bullinger, Calvin, Musculus, Ursinus, and Zanchi—explicitly
embrace the same view of the unity of the covenant of grace in the person of Jesus
Christ.77
Having said this, there are at least two things that stand out in connection with
Rutherford's treatment of the unity of the covenant and the Arminian understanding of
it. First, Rutherford relies solely upon Scripture proof-texts in order to justify his
contention that there is only one covenant. Granted, part of the reason for this could
be that the prior work of men like Bullinger eliminates the necessity of his dealing with
this issue in greater detail than he does. Be that as it may, it is surprising that
Rutherford does not go into more detailed exegesis when the very argument raised by
the Arminians is that Rutherford's adversaries are using the same Bible verses that he
74 The Examen reads "Gen. 3.14," but Rutherford's reference to the "blessed seed" and its being
"proclaimed to Adam" proves he is speaking about verse 15 (Examen, 430). Rutherford shows that he
sees in Genesis 3.15 what some scholars have referred to as the "protevangelium, the first utterance of the
gospel after the Fall into sin." See Cornelis Van Dam, in New International Dictionaty of Old
Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem VanGemeren (Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster, 1997), 4:67.
75 Examen, 430-32.
76 COL, 63.
77 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 41, 50, 69, 118; Lillback, The Binding ofGod, chapter 7.
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does in order to disprove his findings. To respond conclusively to the Arminians, one
would expect him to validate his interpretation of Scripture as over against that of his
adversaries. Second, and more important as far as this thesis is concerned, Rutherford's
response to the Arminians reveals his total disregard for their system of beliefs. Instead
of solidifying his exegesis, he rather disingenuously strikes out at the Axminians by
accusing them of believing that "the faith of the people of the Old Testament did not
consider spiritual things at all" but only physical things, when it is not at all evident that
this is actually the case.78 In his Apology, Arminius explicitly states that he is
"not.. .denying that the opinion of the brethren on this matter is true [that Old
Testament believers understood the ceremonies instituted by God to be types pointing
ahead to Christ]." His concern is that there should be a degree of tolerance "to bear
with the weakness of that man who dares not act the part of the dogmatist on this
subject."79 More than anything else, the response that Rutherford makes to Arminrus
substantiates this concern. Rutherford makes no attempt to answer Arminius; he simply
dismisses him, not giving him the time of day and conveying the very intolerance that
Arminius decries.
A second area of disagreement between Rutherford and the Arminians relates to
the extent of the covenant of grace. Is the extent of this covenant universal or
particular? Has God entered into covenant with all of humankind? or, with only the
elect? For Rutherford, the covenant of grace is enacted with the elect alone; but, for the
Arminians, it is enacted with all of humankind without exception. The reasons for this
difference he in their respective views of the nature of the covenant of grace and of the
atonement of Christ, views which are, in turn, affected by the ways in which they see the
relationship between God and the created world order and which reflect their respective
soteriologies. According to Rutherford, the nature of the covenant is such that
"[fjorgivenes of our sinnes, renovatione of our natur, and lif eternall" are actually and,
thus, eternally promised.80 These promises are grounded in the atonement of Christ,
which, as we saw in the previous chapter, provides full and absolute remission of sin for
all to whom it is applied. As Rutherford says in the E:xamen, the "promises of the






were, in fact, universal, then the nature of the atonement would force us to believe in a
universal salvation. The particular nature of the covenant promises, and of the
atonement of Christ standing behind it, requires that the extent of the covenant itself be
particular as well.
The Arminians, on the other hand, regard the nature of the covenant to be such
that the forgiveness of sins and eternal life is made possible for all people without
exception but guaranteed for none. The atonement of Christ does not actually provide
remission of sin for anyone in and of itself in the Arminian system; it simply makes
remission of sin possible for the one who, as we will see, believes and perseveres in faith
to the end.82 In justifying this position scripturally, the Arminians rely on universalist
passages like 1 John 2.2; John 1.19; 6.51; Romans 14.15; and 2 Peter 2. 1, 3; which state
that Christ's death made atonement in some way for the whole world.83 In justifying it
theologically, the Arminians draw attention to the "antecedent love of God," by which
he is inclined to the good, i.e., the freedom, of all his creatures after their creation.
Rutherford rightly perceives that this is the theological "foundation" (fundamentum) of
the Arminian doctrine of universal atonement and, thus, of the universal extent of the
covenant.84 For God to provide actual salvation for his creatures would be to violate
their free wills, something he cannot do after creating them. But, to Rutherford's way
of thinking, there is no such theological prohibition or limitation. God is sovereign. He
reigns on high, even over the free wills of his creatures. Thus, while it is the nature of
the covenant that establishes its extent for both Rutherford and the Arminians, it is the
relationship of God with the created world order that determines their respective views
on the nature of the covenant.
A third area of disagreement between Rutherford and the Arminians involves
the purpose of the covenant of grace. And here, too, we see the pervasive influence of
their doctrines of God. In Rutherford's estimation, the purpose of God's entering into
82 This is only the case according to the original intent of God not in the way that things are executed in
time. In the first of the divine decrees, God establishes the salvation of humankind generally and
universally by way of the sin-destroying death of his Son. But it is not until the fourth decree that he
decides to predestine those who will believe in Christ and persevere in their faith to the end. In time,
however, God predestines those who will believe and, then, Christ dies to obtain their redemption.
According to the temporal outworking of God's decrees, therefore, Arminius could rightly say that Christ
dies to provide redemption for the elect. But such cannot be said in regard to God's original intent. Cf.




the covenant of grace is the glory of God in the redemption of sinful creatures. There is
no necessity for God to make this covenant with his creatures. He enters into it wholly
"of his own free good pleasure \beneplacitum\" and, by doing so, chooses to manifest his
own glory by freely making his grace and mercy known to pitiful sinners.83 But, as
Rutherford perceptively indicates, the same cannot be said for the Arminians. Even
though they "teach with their words that this covenant has been made freely," they
"deny it in truth."86 The Arminians—or at least those earlier Arminians who follow
Arminius in holding to the traditional view of the fall and the imputation of Adam's
sin—end up forcing God into making the covenant of grace with all humankind.87 This
necessity arises in their theology by implication of the relationship between God and his
created order. If God is bound to communicate good to his creatures, such that he
cannot act against their free wills, then he cannot impose upon them the effects of
someone else's, namely Adam's, sin. But if God cannot impose the effects of the fall
upon his creatures without violating their free wills, then he has no choice but to enter
into the covenant of grace with every one of them. This would make the purpose of the
covenant of grace the preservation of the autonomy of the created world order rather
than the glory of God. Such a move is, in Rutherford's opinion, paramount to
dethroning God and placing men and women there in his place. As a result, it cannot
be tolerated.
After surveying Rutherford's thinking in regard to federal theology, it should be
evident that the covenant idea does in fact function as an architectonic principle. It
forms the structure for the biblical story of redemption by providing the context into
which the decrees are given, establishing the parameters for the temporal work of the
triune God in salvation, and expressing the nature of the relationship between God and
his creatures. It should also be evident that while there does seem to be clear
progression in the development of the covenant beyond what is found in the reformers,
there is also clear continuity in the theology the covenant idea was intended to convey.
85 See Examen, 427-8 Rutherford uses the imagery of Ezekiel 16.1-8 to convey the condition of sinful
creatures and God's merciful and sovereign initiation of the covenant.
86 Examen, 427-8.
87 It does not appear that Episcopius in his later life and others, like Van Limborch, embraced the
traditional view of Adam's fall and the federal imputation of his sin to all humankind. Assuming that is
the case, Rutherford's criticism would not necessarily apply to them. On Episcopius' and Van
Limborch's understandings of the fall, see Muller, "Federal Motif," 109-21. For Arminian statements of
the traditional view of Adam's fall, see W]A, 2:156-7, and Confession, 119-20, both of which are cited by
Rutherford in Examen, 428.
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It will soon be obvious, if it is not already, that federal theology is crucial to
understanding the soteriological differences between Rutherford and the Armintans.
The ideas we have sketched out set the stage for the profound variations that will soon
arise in regard to conversion, justification, sanctification, perseverance, and assurance.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to evaluating these variations in more detail.
But, before we turn our attention to this task, two statements need to be made in
connection with Rutherford's covenant theology and our examination of it here. While
there has been some evaluation and interaction with modern day criticisms of covenant
theology in general, and of Rutherford's version of it in particular, throughout the
course of the preceding section, this should not imply that there is nothing else to be
said on the matter. Certain modern day criticisms of federal theology will be revisited in
the course of this chapter, especially those pertaining to conditions in the covenant and
the relationship of the covenant to assurance of salvation. Furthermore, a general
criticism of Rutherford's covenant theology would seem to be in order. In this vein, it
must be acknowledged that any system that claims to be the architectonic principle of all
of Scripture must not be held so stridently that it prevents dialoguing with other
viewpoints. Scripture's teaching on salvation is so multi-faceted, it is hard to see how
one principle can do justice to it all. That in itself should be enough to ensure that we
are more charitable towards the differing views of others, even if it was not so in
Rutherford's own case.
4.2: Conversion
The doctrine of conversion represents a climax in the clash between Rutherford and the
Arminians over soteriological issues. It draws upon everything that we have discussed
thus far in connection with the doctrine of God and his relation to the created world
order and raises several issues that will resurface later when we explore the Arminian
doctrines of justification, perseverance, and assurance. For these reasons, it forms a
central part of the Examen and of our discussion here.
Rutherford follows William Perkins in thinking of conversion more
comprehensively than do others among the Puritans.88 He, like Perkins, believes that
conversion consists in two distinct acts: the divine act of regeneration and the human
88 Edward Leigh, for example, defines conversion narrowly as "our act" in his Body ofDivinity, 491. See
also John Von Rohr, The Covenant ofGrace in Turitan Thought (Adanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), 88-90.
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response of faith and repentance.85 This should not be overlooked, and we will return
to this feature of Rutherford's theology later. But, for now, it is worth noting that
Rutherford, because of his dispute with the Arminians, consistendy emphasizes in the
Examen that the essence of conversion is to be found in the divine act rather than in the
human response. He says:
We establish that conversion [consists], essentially and primarily [actu
primo\, not in the free act of believing [as the Arminians suggest]—
although Conversion is active, and the consummation [actus secundus] of
our Conversion to God, which is commanded to us as our duty, is
essentially [found] in such an act [of believing]—but in the infusion of
new life.90
His contention is that the Arminians, following the Jesuits, place their emphasis in
conversion on human effort not on divine initiative, and, by doing so, they "divide the
glory of Conversion between God and the wretched creature." Such a position is
untenable, for Rutherford, because "the glory [in converting men and women to Christ]
should be wholly and entirely ascribed to God."91 In order to explain further how and
why Rutherford locates the essence of conversion in God's act rather than in our
response and to evaluate his perception of and response to the Arminian view of
conversion, we will treat its component parts in more detail. What follows is a
discussion of regeneration and the role of human ability, grace and free will, calling, and
the nature and object of faith.
4.2.1: God's Work of Regeneration
In his catechism, Rutherford affirms that regeneration is a "work of Godis Spirit,"
involving no human effort.92 In the Examen, he states this more explicitly: "the creature
[homo\ who is dead in sins contributes nothing to his or her own regeneration" (an
assertion he is keen to prove from Scripture: John 3.3, 5.25, and Eph. 2.5).93 Such a
view is not peculiar to Rutherford. Even Arminius and his early disciples
wholeheartedly embrace the fact that regeneration is "the act of God" alone.94 The




93 Examen, 460, emphasis added.
94 See WJA, 2:237. Some later disciples like Vorstius appear to have believed that a special work of
regenerating grace was not necessary for conversion. See Du Moulin, Anatomy ofArminiamsme, 299-300.
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difference between Rutherford and the Arminians on the doctrine of regeneration lies
not in its author but in its nature. According to Rutherford, the nature of regeneration
is such that it is an "inward sanctificatione," whereby God "put[s] in us the lif of Christ
and renew[s] all the powers of our soul."95 By defining the nature of regeneration in this
manner, Rutherford distinguishes himself from the Arminians and, at the same time,
demonstrates his continuity with Calvin and the Reformers. And he does so primarily
in two ways.
First, in continuity with Calvin and the Reformation, Rutherford and his post-
Reformation contemporaries ascribe a fundamental place in soteriology to union with
Christ. This union is initiated at regeneration and maintained throughout the ordo salutis
by the Holy Spirit. It consists in Christ's being joined together with us and in his life
being implanted within us.96 By speaking of the life of Christ being implanted within us,
Rutherford and Calvin do not mean that the resulting union is an essential one; it is not
the divine essence that is infused within us.97 Nor is it a personal union like that
between the humanity and divinity of Christ, as the New England Antinomians wrongly
believe. Rather, it is a spiritual union, a union in which "Godis Spirit makjes] us one
with Christ" both by imputation—which applies to our justification—and by
participation—i.e., that vital union in which "Christ (by His Spirit) lives in me" and his life
becomes ours in and through the work of the Holy Spirit.98 This vital union, according
to Reformation and post-Reformation thinking, begins at regeneration and continues
through faith, repentance, justification, sanctification, and glorification, undergirding
and ensuring each step along the way.99 It is, as James Ussher says, "the soule of
95 Catachisme, 199.
96 See Wilhelm Kolfhaus, Christusgemeinschaft bei Johannes Calvin, Beitrage zur Geschichte und Lehre der
Reformierten Kirche, vol. 3 (Neukirchen: Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, 1939), 80. On union
with Christ in Calvin, see Mark A. Garcia, "Life in Christ: The Function of Union with Christ in the Unio-
Duplex Gratia Structure of Calvin's Soteriology with Special Reference to the Relationship ofJustification
and Sanctification in Sixteenth-Century Context" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Edinburgh, 2004). On union with Christ in Rutherford, see Strickland, "Union with Christ."
97 This is one of the problems that Calvin has with Osiander. According to Calvin, Osiander has
introduced the "strange monster of 'essential' righteousness," in which he claims that "we are substantially
righteous in God by the infusion both of his [Christ's] essence and of his quality." Whereas Calvin agrees
that "we are one with Christ," he denies "that Christ's essence is mixed with our own." Institutes III.xi.5,
729-31. Cf. Garcia, "Life in Christ," chapter five.
98 Catachisme, 199; SA, 179; Influences, 178. See also Strickland, "Union with Christ," 68. Dennis
Tamburello understands Calvin's doctrine of union with Christ in this same way. Union with Christ: John
Calvin and the Mysticism ofSt. Bernard (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 86-7.
99 Such is the case in Institutes III.i.1, 537-8; III.ii.24-5, 569-72; III.iii.9, 600-601; III.xi.5, 729ff; Ames,
Marrow, 123ff; Ussher, Body ofDivinitie, 192-3; Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 486-7; Perkins, 1Vork.es, 1:299-300.
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spiritual! life, and [the] fountaine of supernaturall grace" and, as William Perkins
remarks, "the ground of the conveyances of al grace."100 Those who have Christ within
them, says Rutherford, "have all things—[they] have 'the Father and the Spirit, the
word, life, and death.'"101 Those who do not have Christ within them do not have all
things, because, as Calvin explains:
as long as Christ remains outside of us, and we are separated from him,
all that he has suffered and done for the salvation of the human race
remains useless and of no value for us. Therefore, to share with us what
he has received from the Father, he had to become ours and to dwell
within us.102
The centrality of this doctrine to Reformed soteriology has led one scholar to
argue that union with Christ, rather than predestination, should be considered the
"normative dogma...of the theology of the Reformation."103 This is one reason why it
is so surprising that Rutherford devotes no space at all to discussing union with Christ
in the Examen. While this may be because there is little in the Arminian doctrine to
offend Rutherford's sensibilities directly, one cannot help but think that Rutherford's
oversight has more to do with his failure to think through the implications of the
language that Arminius is using to describe his view of union with Christ. Simply put,
Rutherford is not known for his leniency and tolerance, especially towards the
Arminians. When presented with an opportunity to lash out at them, especially one that
reveals the fundamental differences between his system and theirs, it is uncharacteristic
of him to pass it over in silence. And Arminius' definition of union with Christ quite
obviously reveals those fundamental differences, not only those that pertain to
regeneration and conversion but those that pertain to the whole of soteriology as well.
By defining union with Christ as "being ingrafted into [Christ] by a conformity
to his life," Arminius shows that he is emphasizing human activity and obedience. Our
conformity to the life of Christ is what unites us to him and, thus, makes us "partakers
of the whole [vim] power of his life, and of all the benefits which flow from it."104 But,
based upon what we have outlined above, Rutherford would argue that our union with
100 Ussher, Body ofDivinitie, 192; Perkins, Workes, 1:300.
101 Communion, 247. Cf. Institutes III.xi.5, 730-31.
1112 Institutes III.i.1, 537.




Christ depends not on our obedience but on the Holy Spirit's gracious infusion within
us. In other words, according to Rutherford, it is not that we are engrafted into Christ
by our obedience to his life but that, just the opposite, we live in obedience to Christ's
life because we are engrafted into him. Arminius' deftnidon shows his propensity to
emphasize the response of the individual over God's initiative, which propensity
ultimately arises from the world order that he believes God has put in place—the
limited world order of the potentia ordinata. The Arminian notion of creation goodness
prevents God from infringing upon human free will in any way and from acting
immediately by the Holy Spirit in uniting individuals to Christ. The covenant of grace
institutes a world order of grace, in which it is now possible for all people to unite
themselves to Christ.105 It is, therefore, surprising, to say the least, that Rutherford
would make no mention of this doctrine in the Examen. Union with Christ not only
reveals Rutherford's continuity with Calvin and the Reformers, but it also epitomizes his
soteriological dispute with the Arminians, who, as we will see next, deny the infusion of
grace into every faculty of the soul in regeneration and defend staunchly the ability of
the individual to resist God's actions in salvation.
The second way in which Rutherford demonstrates his continuity with
Reformed thinking and differentiates himself from the Arminians is by applying the
renewal of the Holy Spirit in a once-for-all-time manner to "all the powers of our
soul."106 Two tilings present themselves for our consideration here as well. First,
Rutherford extends the activity of God in the renewal our souls in regeneration to every
faculty within the human psychology. The mind, will, and affections are all immediately
corrupted with sin and in need of immediate restoration.107 And while the Arminians
prima facie do seem to follow suit by claiming to extend regeneration to "the human
mind and will" and, thus, to "the whole man," it is not at all clear that they do so in their
actual practice.108 Rutherford and others of his contemporaries, like Pierre Du Moulin
for example, accuse the Arminians of leaving the will unaffected by sin after the fall and
free from the need for regeneration. Rutherford notes that the Arminians speak
105 The Arminians, to be sure, do not believe that men and women save themselves. Divine grace is
necessary—both prevenient grace and co-operating grace. But, as we will see later in this chapter,
especially in section 4.2.1.2 below, there is a real sense in which the Arminians believe men and women
must faciunt quod in se est in order to gain salvation.
106 Catachisme, 199.
107 Examen, 324-5, 331-2.
1118 W]A, 2:194.
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accurately about each person's need for the "IUumination of the mind" and the
"Vivification of the affecdons" in regeneration but remarks that they leave the will free
to "assent and dissent" as it pleases.109 Du Moulin also has a similar assessment: "I
ftnde that they [the Arminians] determine, that by the corruption of nature, mans
understanding is darkened, and his affections are depraved; but I no where finde in their
writings, that his will is of its owne nature depraved and prone to sinne."110
The sentiments of Rutherford and Du Moulin, while ultimately grounded in the
truth, are, nonetheless, exaggerated slightiy for their polemical purposes. Both men
exploit, rather unfairly, what they perceive to be an erroneous philosophy of
anthropology among the Arminians. Lying behind the Arminian claims in regard to the
human will is a soteriological intellectualism that Rutherford and Du Moulin perceive
and eschew.111 According to this intellectualism, the mind or intellect has causal priority
over the will, to the degree that "the will follows the dictate of the intellect as it
proposes the good."112 What this means for Arminius is that the will is not immediately
affected by the fall in and of itself or, as Du Moulin says, "of its owne nature," but
mediately through the intellect. Because the intellect directs the will even after the
fall,"3 and because the intellect is itself darkened by sin, the will too carries the stain of
sin and has a corresponding need to be renewed, but only indirectly. That this is
actually the case for Arminius is confirmed by the fact that he locates choice within the
intellect and then "transfers" it to the will, because of the close relation between the
two:
The word, arbitrium, "Choice," or "Free Will," properly signifies both the
faculty of the mind or understanding, by which the mind is enabled to judge
about any thing proposed to it,—and the judgment itself which the mind
forms according to that faculty. But it is transferred from the Mind to
the Will, on account of the vert' close [unionem\ connection which
subsists between them.114
109 Examen, 333ff, 457.
110 Anatomy ofArminianisme, 291-2.
1,1 See, e.g., Examen, 333ff, 456. R.T. Kendall has asserted that Armimus is a voluntarist in regard to his
view of faith and salvation (Calvin and English Calvinism, 147-9). This claim, however, has been
convincingly, if not conclusively, refuted by Richard A. Muller in his article, "The Priority of the Intellect
in the Soteriology ofJacob Arminius," IFTJ 55:1 (Spring 1993), 55-72.
112 Muller, "Priority of the Intellect," 58.
113 On this see WJA, 2:189, 191-4; and the discussion in Muller, "Priority of the Intellect," 64-6.
114 IVJA, 2:189. This takes on further significance when we understand that Arminius defines saving faith
as assent. See section 4.2.2 below.
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Thus, while Arminius does maintain that the will is corrupted by sin after the fall, the
claims of Rutherford and Du Moulin do appear justified to the degree that sin affects
the will only indirectly through the intellect. Regeneration, then, need only concern
itself with the intellect in order to free the will from its corruption.
This is in contrast to the mainstream of Reformation and post-Reformation
anthropology, which, from at least Calvin onwards, has tended to view pre-lapsarian
human nature from an intellectualist perspective but post-lapsarian human nature from
a voluntarist perspective.115 The idea is that whereas before the fall the mind has
hegemony over the will to direct it according to a knowledge of the good, after the fall
not only has the mind lost its capability of discerning good from evil and directing the
will accordingly, but the will itself "resistfsj truth in the minde... [and] imprisonjs it] and
castjs it] in fetters."116 Arminius' post-lapsarian intellectualism precludes precisely this
hamartiological effect of the will upon the mind. The intellect, although fallen and
darkened by sin and needing illumination, remains free to operate "within the normal
[and pre-lapsarian] realm of intellective function."117 But, for Rutherford, the intellect
cannot and does not function in the same capacity before and after the fall; the rebellion
inherent in the post-lapsarian will suppresses the normal function of the intellect.
Therefore, as William Ames notes, the "enlightning of the mind [alone] is not sufficient
to produce [conversion]... because it doth not take away that corruption which is in the
will."118 Every faculty of the human psychology—mind, will, and affections—must,
therefore, be directly renewed by God in regeneration, in order to overcome the effects
of sin.
Second, when Rutherford states in his catechism that regeneration is a
"renewing [of] all the powers of our soul," he means something different than the
Arminians do in regard to the way this is accomplished. According to Rutherford,
regeneration involves an infusing of "habitual grace"—a term that is used widely in
Britain from about the 1630s and that traces its roots, with certain adaptations, back to
115 Cf. Institutes I.xv.8, 195; and RD, 240-43; with Institutes II.ii.26-3.14, 286-309. Kendall has also claimed
that Calvin's theology should be understood from an intellectualist rather than a voluntarist perspective
[Calvin and English Calvinism, 19). Muller has again convincingly argued against this claim in "Fides and
Cognitio in Relation to the Problem of Intellect and Will in the Theology of John Calvin," CTJ 25
(November 1990), 207-24.
116 HOC, 16.
117 Muller, "Priority of the Intellect," 70.
1,8 Marrow, 127.
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Thomas Bradwardine in the fourteenth century rather than to Aquinas.119 In the act of
regeneration, a "supernatural habit is infused by God supernaturally."120 Rutherford variously
refers to this infused habit (habitus) as a "habit of faith," a "habit of sanctifying grace," a
"habit of the life of God," a "habit of grace," a "habit of supernatural grace,"121 and a
"habit of sancdfication."122 Like John Owen, he defines it as "a fixed disposition
infused into the soul by the Lord, purchased by Christs merit of his death," enabling
and ensuring our "perform[ance of] supernatural duties."123 Rutherford contrasts this
supernatural habit with the "habit of corruption," which is natural to humankind after
the fall of Adam.124 In regeneration, God removes the habit of corruption—what
Rutherford expresses in biblical language as the "stony heart" (Ezek. 36.26) or sinful
nature (Eph. 2.3)—and replaces it with an infused habit of grace, or a "new heart" and a
new nature. All human actions in the economy of salvation flow from this infused habit
of grace. Were this not the case, then, to Rutherford's way of thinking, faith,
repentance, and all our acts of human obedience would flow from human merit and free
will rather than from grace. The only way faith can truly be considered "the gift of
God" and humans can truly be free in receiving this gift is for the habit of faith to be
infused within the individual at regeneration, thus enabling and ensuring that he or she
will in fact respond in faith.
Such a conception of regeneration is anathema to the Arminians, however. If
those who believe do so because they are first infused with the habit of faith, "then Free
Will would be overturned [everteretur\i'A2S Regeneration cannot consist in an infusion of
habitual grace because that would make human obedience necessary and would
119 See Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (London, 1618); Owen, Works ofJohn Owen, 3:472ff; and
John Davenant, A Treatise on Justification, or the Disputatio dejustitia habituali et actuali, trans. Josiah Allport, 2
vols. (London, 1844-6), chapter 3. Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II.1.109-14.
120 Examen, 482.
,21 Examen, 436, 455, 473, 485, 489.
122 Christ Dying, 271; SA, II, 112. Although Rutherford nowhere speaks explicidy of a definitive
sanctification, the idea lying behind such a doctrine is roughly analogous to his understanding of habitual
grace infused at regeneration. But this appears to be out of step with the doctrine as it is elucidated by
John Murray. As Murray explains, definitive sanctification is a fruit of union with Christ, which is itself
initiated at regeneration, and, so, it must be distinguished from regeneration and should not be
"subsume[d[" under it ("Definitive Sanctification," CTJ 2 [April 1967], 12). For Rutherford, however,
definitive sanctification, so called, clearly falls under the auspices of regeneration.
123 Influences, 218. For similar post-Reformation conceptions of habitual grace, see, e.g., Ames, Marrow,




eliminate true freedom. It would require God acting in a way that is contrary to the
good of his creatures, which is impossible for him after creation. The issue at hand
between Rutherford and the Arminians is not whether regeneration is an act of God,
nor whether it involves an infusion of grace, nor, even, whether this grace is necessary
for faith, but whether regeneration involves an infusion of habitual grace.126 According
to the Arminians, it cannot. This would completely rule out human freedom by forcing
the individual to live and choose according to this habit. Grace would then become
permanent and effectual, and thus irresistible, necessitating the compliance of the
human will to the will of God. But how can this be true and significant freedom?
Whether one agrees with them or not, it has to be acknowledged that they raise a point
that cannot be easily ignored. How can Rutherford and the Reformed maintain that
God regenerates by infusing a habit of grace and, at the same time, that we humans truly
have free will?
4.2.1.1: Grace and Free Will
Rutherford and the Reformed in general plainly assert the reality of human free will.
But they mean something different by freedom than do the Arminians. For Rutherford,
human freedom consists primarily in two things: a freedom from external compulsion
(immunitatem a coactio) and a freedom from natural necessity.127 In regard to the former,
there is very little, if any, difference of opinion among church fathers, Pelagians,
scholastics, reformers, papists, post-reformers, and Arminians; they are all in agreement
with Edward Leigh, that "no external principle can compell [an individual] to work"
without violating his or her free will.128 In regard to the latter, there is also very little
disagreement, at least insofar as Rutherford is defining it. Common sense (communis
sententid), Rutherford says, tells us that human freedom can only act in one of two ways.
Either it acts necessarily (necessario), that is, "naturaliter, ex interno principio"—as tire
does when it naturally and necessarily consumes everything in its path—or it acts freely,
which means that "potest vel operari, vel non."125 As Rutherford sees it, human
freedom falls into the second category. The will "namrally" has the freedom of
126 See IVJA, 1:659-64.
127 Exercitationes, 1, 6-7.
128 Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 496. See the entire discussions in Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 495-9; Vermigli, Common
Places, II.ii, 252-80; Perkins, Workes, 1:558-61, 717-46; and IVJA, 2:189-96.
12<J Exercitationes, 1.
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choosing and refusing; it can either act or refuse to act. It is not like fire, which is
forced into acting by its own "internal principle." And when it does act, the resulting
choice will be, in the words of Zacharias Ursinus, "in accordance with...its nature, and
to enjoy the good things suited to it."130
For Calvin, a freedom from internal necessity is part and parcel of what it means
to be free from compulsion. Unlike Rutherford, Calvin does not distinguish between
external compulsion and internal necessity, and thankfully so, too.131 Rutherford's view
of free will is rather difficult to grasp precisely because he uses terms like compulsion
and necessity interchangeably. Sometimes he uses the term coactio to refer to external
compulsion and at other times he uses it to refer to necessity, in an Augustiman and
Calvinian sense (of which more will be said in a few moments). At times he speaks of
natural necessity in terms of an internal principle (i.e., the example of fire) and at other
times he uses the same phrase to refer to a necessity that arises as a result of our nature
or of God's nature.132 In spite of this difficulty, however, it does appear that Rutherford
is following the lead of "Theologi nostri," among whom he includes men like Calvin,
Augustine, Bonaventure, Lombard, and Aquinas—especially insofar as the last four are
read through the interpretive lens of the Reformation.133 In order to show his
130 RD, 244.
131 In an article aimed at replying to Vincent Briimmer's views of free will in Calvin ("Calvin, Bernard and
the Freedom of the Will," Religious Studies 30 [1994], 437-55), Paul Helm has helpfully demonstrated that
"[t]o be free from compulsion is not, for Calvin, to be indeterministically free, but to be psychologically
free, to be acting in accordance with one's particular preferences." See Helm, "Calvin and Bernard on
Freedom and Necessity: A Reply to Bnimmer," Religious Studies 30 (1994), 461. Psychological freedom, so
called, would, thus, appear to take into consideration both elements of Rutherford's freedom, external
compulsion and internal necessity.
132 E.g., Rutherford states that the nature of freedom exists in "imrounitatem a coactione" and then adds
that it "naturali etiam necessitate ortam." But he has just overtly stated that freedom is both a freedom
from compulsion (coactio) and a freedom from natural necessity (e.g., fire). Cf. Exercitationes, 1, with 6-7.
133 During the Reformation, there was (and has been for centuries since then) disagreement over how
Augustine, in particular, and later scholastics, in general, were to be understood on the issue of free will.
Calvin devoted a specific treatise to answering the Dutch Roman Catholic Albert Pighius (The Bondage and
Liberation of the Will:A Defence of the Orthodox Doctrine ofHuman Choice against Pighius, ed. A.N.S. Lane, trans.
G.I. Davies [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1996]), in which he attempted to demonstrate conclusively that
his—and the Reformation's—interpretation of Augustine, and those who followed him, was the correct
one. The current thesis is, therefore, more interested in knowing where Rutherford's view of free will
stands in relation to Augustine, and to later Augustinians, as it is understood by reformers like Calvin,
than in knowing where it stands in relation to Augustine, and later Augustinians, per se, even though the
editor of Calvin's treatise, A.N.S. Lane, has stated that "it is very widely conceded today that the main
thrust [of Calvin's interpretation of Augustine] is accurate" (Bondage and Liberation of the Will, xxiv). For a
sample of the views of the above-mentioned men on free will, see, e.g., Calvin, Bondage and Liberation of the
Will, especially, xix-xxi, 67-9; Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia.82.1, Ia.83.1-3; Lombard, Sententiae, II.xxv.1-9,
1:461-9; and Augustine, City ofGod 22.30, 2:542.
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continuity with Reformation thought and to develop Rutherford's own views in more
detail, we must examine human freedom in each of the following four states of human
nature—pre-lapsarian, post-lapsarian, post-regeneration, and post-mortem.134
In the post-creation, pre-lapsarian state, Rutherford, like Edward Leigh,
identifies free will as consisting of two parts: (1) a natural freedom to choose, apart from
external compulsion and internal necessity, and (2) an inclination (inclinatio) towards
using that freedom to choose the good, or, what Leigh calls a "Sanctified freedom."1'3
The point that Rutherford, Leigh, and the Reformed are seeking to overturn, in
speaking this way, is the Lutheran and Arminian assertion that the will is indifferent in
its choosing.136 To the post-Reformation mind, the essence of freedom cannot consist
in indifference to good and evil. For, if such indifference is the determining feature of
free will, then, according to Leigh, "so God and the good Angels should not be free,
seeing they cannot will anything but that which is good."137
It is at this juncture that a slight difference arises between Rutherford and
Calvin. Whereas free will, or liberum arbitrium, is, for Rutherford, the ability of choosing
or refusing the greatest good according to the individual's nature, for Calvin, it is more
than that; it is the ability actually to choose the good.138 The only real consequence that
comes from this difference is that Rutherford can rightly say that the post-lapsarian
individual still has liberum arbitrium, whereas Calvin cannot. For Calvin, the individual no
longer has liberum arbitrium after Adam's fall but only arbitrium}V) The bottom line,
however, is that no real discrepancy exists between these two men. Calvin would agree
with Rutherford, in the way that the latter is defining liberum arbitrium, and the same can
be said for Rutherford. Not only so, but the slight difference that there is all but
disappears when it is applied to the pre-lapsarian state. For both Rutherford and Calvin,
the pre-lapsarian will is not indifferent to good and evil, nor is it inclined to sin, but
wholly "inclinabatur ad Dei legem praestandam."140 And Adam's original freedom
134 Exercitationes, 6-7.
135 Body ofDivinity, 495.
136 On the Lutherans, see Muller, Dictionary, 177. On the Arminians, see the above examination of
intellectualism in Arminius and its effects upon the will (section 4.2.1) and the remainder of what follows
below. Cf. Exercitationes, 4; Christ Dying, 326.
137 Body ofDivinity, 498.
138 Helm, "Calvin and Bernard on Freedom," 459.
139 Calvin, Bondage and liberation ofthe Will, 67-9.
140 Exercitationes, 4.
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consists, for both, not in the freedom either to obey or disobey with equal propensity,
but in the freedom to obey God perfecdy.
This should not suggest, however, that Adam's will, like God's, cannot choose
anything except that which is good. Adam was created with a mutable will, one that was
dependent upon God's gracious support in order for him to continue willing the good.
In other words, while Adam does not have an inclination to evil (inclinatio ad malum) in
his pre-lapsarian state, he does have the natural power (potentia naturally to resist and
reject God's gracious support. To borrow Augustinian categories, Adam is possepeccare et
posse non peccare, despite his being inclined to the good. Following the general trend
among the Reformed—including such men as Calvin, Polanus, Leigh, Cocceius, and
Perkins—Rutherford could, therefore, say that Adam's fall into sin is the result of the
mutability of the powers of his will rather than of the nature of the liberum arbitrium.
Adam sins not because his will, which is indifferent to good and evil, somehow selects
the latter over the former, but because the powers of his will change from consenting
with to rejecting both God and his gracious support.141 Perkins helpfully explains this
by saying that, in addition to "the goodnes of his will," Adam also "received of God a
power constantly to persevere in goodnes, if he would." But, God himself did not
actually preserve Adam in his original state. Rather, "the act of perseverance was left to
the choice and liberty of his [Adam's] own [mutable] will."142 And, as a result, Adam
fell, and he and all those he represents in the covenant of works lost the inclination to
good and, along with it, the natural power of obeying God.
In turning to look at the post-lapsarian individual, we are confronted once again
with the above-mentioned difference between Rutherford and Calvin. For Rutherford,
the post-lapsarian will is free, in that it is not forced to act by external compulsion or by
internal necessity. Although Calvin would agree with this definition as it is given, it is
not the way he chooses to speak. For Calvin, the post-lapsarian will is no longer free, in
the sense that it cannot, as a result of the fall, freely choose the good—i.e., it cannot
please God. It remains "self-determined" and free from coercion, but it is now
"bound" by "man's innate wickedness."143 And while Rutherford would agree that the
post-lapsarian will cannot please God, he would attribute this not to a loss of free will
141 Exerdtationes, 2-7. Cf. RD, 242-8; Calvin, Bondage and Eiberation of the Will, 67-9; Institutes I.xv.8, 195-6;
and Perkins, Workes, 1:727-8.
142 Workes, 1:728.
143 Calvin, Bondage and Eiberation ofthe Will, 69.
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per se, but to a loss of Adam's original inclination to good and to the acquisition of a new
and sinful nature.
Even taking this difference into account, there is still a sense in which the post-
lapsarian individual is both free and not free for Rutherford and Calvin. He or she is
free, insofar as each retains the natural freedom to choose or to refuse according to the
greatest good without any external compulsion or internal necessity forcing the decision
(arbitrium, for Calvin, and liberum arbitrium, for Rutherford). But he or she is not free,
insofar as each has lost what Leigh referred to as "Sanctified freedom." This means, in
both Calvin and Rutherford, that the post-lapsarian individual has lost the ability to use
natural freedom in the way that he or she ought, i.e., in the way that God commands.
Although the individual can still choose the greatest good—that is, the best option
which is contained in the mind—he or she cannot choose God's good. In addition to
this, the "Sanctified freedom" of Adam's pre-lapsarian nature has now, as a result of the
fall, been replaced with a sin nature, such that Rutherford can say in language that is
reminiscent of Calvin and Luther, "servitus quidem & vitiosa ad peccandum inclinatio
inest homini," and he or she is powerless to do anything about it.144
Thus, according to Rutherford, and this is where the complexity comes in, the
post-lapsarian person is free from external compulsion and from internal natural
necessity but is not free from the necessity of his or her sinful nature. The will is "self-
determined," insofar as it "voluntarily" wills of its own accord, but it wills necessarily as
it is in bondage to sin and death.143 This necessity, for reformers like Calvin, Luther,
and Vermigli, and for post-Reformation theologians like Perkins, Leigh, and Rutherford,
all of whom are consciously following in the way of Augustine, does not preclude the
idea of human freedom, because, as we have already seen, God himself wills freely and,
yet, necessarily for good and not for evil.146 Human freedom after the fall consists in the
absence of compulsion, for Calvin, and in the absence of both external compulsion and
internal natural necessity, for Rutherford and for Leigh, but not in the absence of the
necessity of our sinful nature. To use biblical language, the post-lapsarian individual is
dead in sins and trespasses and wholly incapable of any spiritual good. To use
144 Exertitationes, 5. Cf. Institutes II.iii.5, 294-6; idem, Bondage and Liberation of the Will, xx; and Luther, De
servo arbitrio, in WA 18:600-787.
145 Exertitationes, 4-5; Calvin, Bondage and Liberation of the Will, 69.
146 See, e.g., the discussions in Calvin, Bondage and Liberation of the Will, xix-xx, 69; Vermigli, Common Places,
II.ii.6, 256; Perkins, Workes, 1:558; Leigh, Bodj ofDivinity, 496.
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Augustinian language, he or she is non posse non peccare. Even the best deeds that he or
she may perform are now simply "splendid sins,"ul because they either spring from sinful
motivations (rather than a love for Christ) or are done for sinful purposes (rather than
to give all glory and praise to God). Our only hope is Deus in nobis, granting us a new
power (nova potentia)—but not, in Rutherford's thinking anyway, a new freedom (nova
libertas)—by implanting within us a sanctified inclination (a habit of grace) and removing
from us the inclination to sin (the habit of corruption), so that we can once again live in
conscious dependence upon God.
Although the post-regeneration individual has received the sanctified inclination,
as Rutherford would refer to it, or the restored liberum arbitrium, as Calvin would, this
does not mean that he or she is thrust back into the very same condition as pre-lapsarian
Adam. For one thing, the new inclination, or freedom, is not perfect, as it was in Adam.
It exists in seed form only and will grow in a process of sanctiflcation that lasts the
entire course of the believer's life.148 For another thing, while it is true that the root of
sin has been destroyed in the removal of the inclination to sin, the branches still remain
and are alive and well in every faculty of the human psychology. Here too, the process
of dealing with branch-sin is part and parcel of progressive sanctification. The infused
habit of grace is effectual unto salvation; it ensures that the individual will freely but
necessarily embrace Christ by faith and freely but necessarily persevere in that faith. It
also ensures that the believer is capable of obeying God. Even though sin and, thus,
disobedience, remains, the new inclination ensures that the Christian is, in the words of
Augustine, posse non peccare. Once the process of sanctification is complete, however, the
individual will enjoy perfection in the final state—post-mortem—in which it will be
impossible to sin (non posse peccare), not only because he or she is fully sanctified (as was
Adam) but also because the individual's will is no longer mutable.149 Free will exists in
these two final states, for Rutherford and for Calvin, insofar as it free from compulsion
but not from necessity.
As far as the Arminians are concerned, such a conception of freedom wholly
misses the mark. Freedom, they say, cannot consist in necessity of any kind,
"whether.. .from an external cause compelling, or from a nature inwardly determining
147 Examen, 347.
148 Section 4.3.2 below discusses sanctification in more detail.
149 Exercitationes, 4-5. The post-mortem will is immutable, because God himself provides the ingredient
that was missing from the Garden of Eden, perseverance. See Perkins, Workes, 1:728.
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absolutely to one thing."150 In either case, the will would not be free to choose but
would simply be operating according to predetermined criteria. The Arminians see any
kind of necessity as undermining "man's proper dignity" by making him "a puppet" and
not free.151 Freedom from necessity, Arminius claims, "is by nature situated in the will,
as its proper attribute, so that there cannot be any will if it be not free."152 The will
must, therefore, be equally able to choose either the good or the evil presented to it by
the mind, both before and after the fall.
These statements, more than anything else, are products of Arminius' desire to
reconcile human freedom with the grace and justice of God. Contrary to what
Rutherford might think, Arminius is not trying to detract from the glory of God's grace.
He explicitly states that he in no way wishes to do "the least injury to Divine Grace, by
taking from it any thing that belongs to it." And, so, he peppers his writings with
phrases that exalt divine grace by teaching the utter impossibility of salvadon apart from
it. But, at the same time, Arminius is wrestling, and quite commendably so, with how it
is that God could be just and yet create individuals who have no chance at all of being
saved, as Rutherford's system would seem to require.153 How could God justly require
certain things of all people if he knows that it is impossible for them to fulfill those
things? How could God do this all the while holding the sole efficacious means of
anyone's fulfilling them? The only thing that makes sense of these issues, according to
the Arminians, is for human beings to be free from all necessity and, thus, for grace to
be resistible.
For in vain and without cause doth he [God] command this Obedience,
and require it of another, and promise to reward the Obedience, who
himself both ought and will work the very act of Obedience by such a
force as cannot be resisted; and inepdy & against reason is he rewarded,
as one truly and really Obedient, in whom this very Obedience is
effected by such a kind of force of another's. Lastly, punishment,
especially eternal, is unjusdy and cruelly inflicted on him, by whom this
Obedience is not performed through the sole and alone defect of that
irresisdble Grace.134
150 WJA, 2:190.
151 Sell, The Great Debate, 17.
152 WJA, 2:190.
i" WJA, 2:52, 189-96, 700-701; 1:659-60. Arminius is desirous to protect God's right to will what he
pleases to will, but not at the cost of his justice. For Arminius, God's will is "circumscribed within the
bounds of justice." Sell, The Great Debate, 13.
154 Confession, 206.
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In Rutherford's opinion, however, grace does not have to be resisdble in order
for humans to be genuinely free. Grace does not compel the will to act against its
desires. It changes its desires so that it will necessarily but freely and always choose for
God. The key, for Rutherford, lies in the will's desires or inclinadon. Once the Holy
Spirit gives a new inclinadon, infuses a new power into the will, and illumines the mind
to understand the greatest good (not just subjectively speaking, as before regeneration,
but objectively speaking as well, i.e., God himself), the will freely and assuredly chooses
that greatest good. But, having said this, it should be obvious that what lies at the heart
of Rutherford's expression of free will and the irresistibility of grace is the premotionism
that we discussed in chapter three. God's grace is irresistible because it "moves [movet\
free will [libsram voluntatem] in such a way that it [i.e., the will] would move itself most
freely to that same [end] to which it is pre-moved \praemovetur\ by God." Note that
Rutherford does not say that grace moves liberum arbitriunr, that would be compulsion.
Grace moves the voluntas, or the faculty of the will. The voluntas then chooses freely
('liberum arbitrium), but necessarily, according to its new inclination and power.155
In his treatise against Albert Pighius (c. 1490-1542), John Calvin expresses an
identical opinion concerning the relationship between human freedom and divine grace:
We acknowledge that the human mind sees, but when it has been
enlightened. [We acknowledge that] human judgment decides and
chooses, but under the control of the Spirit's guidance. [We
acknowledge that] the human heart is willing, but after it has been
remade by the hand of God. [We acknowledge that] man himself
endeavours and acts and applies his powers to obedience to God, but in
accordance with the measure of the grace which he has received.156
When we contrast this kind of thinking with the Arminian cooperationism, we see the
theological basis upon which the differences between Rutherford and the Arminians are
founded. God's grace is not needed to pre-move the individual in the Arminian system.
God creates humankind with the necessary freedom and ability to will and move in
cooperation with him. The Arminian cooperationism is no less gracious than the
premotionism of the Reformed, but it is more resistible, in fact, altogether so.
Rutherford believes that the Arminian understanding of grace and free will
contradicts the teaching of Scripture and right reason. He demonstrates this by offering
155 Examen, 486-7.
156 Bondage and Liberation of the Will, 200.
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no less than nineteen proofs that establish—to his way of thinking anyway—the
irresistibility of grace. His arguments can be condensed into three overarching
categories. First, the Bible teaches that God's grace always operates according to divine
omnipotency, which cannot be resisted. Thus, God is said to bring about (efficit) "faith
in us by his own strength andpower, [the same strength and power] by which he raised Christ
from the dead, Eph. 1.18, 19;" to obtain the salvation of many "by [his own] will and
power" (Matt. 19.16; John 10.29; Rom. 1.16; 11.23; 15.13; 16.25; Jude 24; 1 Pet. 1.5);
and to work out unfailingly his own "decrees of election," "his plans," and "his
intentions" (Psal. 33.10; Isa. 14.26-7; 46.10-11). Secondly, God's salvific grace is
irresistible by definition. When God regenerates, he necessarily "takes away both
resistance and resistibility," by removing "the stony hearC—which is "the habitual
principle \principium\ of resisting the calling of God"—and replacing it with a "new
heart," thereby ensuring (efficit) that his creatures will respond in obedience to his call.
Because regeneration, by definition, involves an infused habit, all who are thus
regenerated are invariably justified and glorified.157 Thirdly, Rutherford argues that the
doctrine of resistible grace creates two pastoral problems: it renders prayer for
conversion meaningless, and it ultimately detracts from the glory of God by ascribing it
to the individual instead. While all of these arguments are slightly exaggerated,
especially the claims in regard to the pastoral problems caused by Arminianism, it is still
fair to say with Rutherford that the Arminian understanding of grace and free will is
"diametrically opposed" to his own.158
More than anything else, the aforementioned arguments in support of the
resistibility of grace only confirm to Rutherford that the Arminians are indeed "New
Pelagians,"159 In the Examen, Rutherford repeatedly accuses the Arminians of
Pelagianism and even enters into a five-page diatribe in which he associates the
doctrines of Arminianism with those of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, raising eleven
points of similarity.160 Rather than entering here into an exhaustive examination of each
of these points to determine its validity—a digression that would take us well beyond
what we can do here—we will instead concentrate on three factors that should help us
157 In order to prove this point, Rutherford cites the following biblical texts: Ezek. 11.19-20; 36.26-7;
Deut. 30.6; Jer. 24.7; 31.33-4; John 6.44-5; 14.16; Phil. 2.13; and Rom. 8.29-30.
158 Examen, 458-64.
159 Christ Dying, 326; Examen, 504.
1611 Examen, 357-62.
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to evaluate Rutherford's claims and, in addition, his relationship to Calvin and the
Reformation. First, it must be said that Arminius goes to great lengths to differentiate
his views from those of the Pelagians. In regard to free will, for example, he says that it
"is unable to begin or to perfect any true and spiritual good, without Grace." And then
he adds: "That I may not be said, like Pelagius, to practise delusion with regard to the
word 'Grace,' I mean by it that which is the Grace of Christ and which belongs to
regeneration."161 Although there are areas of similarity between Arminius and the
Pelagians, which Arminius himself acknowledges, there are also areas of similarity
between the Calvinists and the Manicheans and Stoics. Both Rutherford and the
Arminians are painstaking in distinguishing themselves from Manicheism or Stoicism,
on the one hand, and Pelagianism, on the other. Second, Arminius' professed intention
in crafting his doctrine of free will is to get at Christian truth by charting a via media
between the Scylla of Pelagianism and the Charybdis of Manicheism, the very thing that
Augustine himself was attempting to do as well.162 Third, Rutherford's association of
the Arminian doctrines of free will and grace with the heresy of Pelagianism is itself
enough to stand him in close approximation to the Reformation. If, as Susan Schreiner
argues, the Reformation is basically "a continuation of late medieval attacks on the
resurgence of semi-Pelagianism" and if, as Schreiner says, its theology is chiefly a
reaction to the Pelagian doctrines of human nature and justification, then it follows that,
in directing his life's efforts to refuting the Arminians—-who were self-professed semi-
Pelagians—and to overturning the Pelagian doctrines of human nature and justification
that he perceived in their theology, Rutherford is demonstrating a clear affinity with
men like Luther and Zwingli, and even Calvin himself.163
In light of these three facts, it would appear that Rutherford perceives that he is
taking up the mantle of the reformers by fighting a similar battle over similar views
regarding grace and free will. He sees himself as representing the theological seed of the
Reformation and as taking up arms against the progeny of Erasmus and Pighius. But he
also reveals a deep-seated intolerance towards Arminian theology. Rutherford is not
161 W]A, 2:700. Later Arminians effectively embraced the Pelagian heresy by denying that "the effective
operation of inward grace is necessary for conversion." Vorstius is to be numbered among this group.
See William Ames, De conscientia IV.iv.10 (Oxford, 1659), 172; Du Moulin, Anatomy ofArminianisme, 299-
300.
162 IVJA, 2:56-7.
163 Susan E. Schreiner, "Pelagianism," in The Oxford Engclopedia of the Reformation, ed. Hans J. Hilderbrand,
4 vols. (New York: Oxford University, 1996), 3:238-9. See Calvin, Bondage and Liberation of the Will, e.g.,
189-91; and Luther, De servo arbitrio.
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interested in engaging in a meaningful dialogue with the Arminians. Dialoguing with
them would only give them a measure of credibility, something he apparently is not
willing to have happen. By employing the epithet "Pelagian" in describing Armiman
theology, Rutherford is placing himself in league with the pious and the orthodox of the
Reformation and the Arminians in league with the devil and untruth. The significance
of this will be more apparent in chapter five, after we examine the grounds for
Rutherford's systematic opposition to Arminianism.
Rutherford's intolerance of the Arminian view of grace and free will aside, it
must be said in defense of their view that it is just as biblically-derived and just as
biblically-defended as is Rutherford's view. Both parties in this dispute are wrestling
with the relationship of God's sovereignty to human freedom without diminishing
either, and all within the bounds of biblical Christianity. But the answers they give in
order to resolve this relationship are diametrically opposed to one another. Whereas
Arminius' theistic intellectualism requires that he perceive human free will as significant
and divine grace as resistible, Rutherford's voluntarism ensures that he will see both
from the opposite perspective. Because God is good and just, the Arminians believe, he
cannot impose upon human free will in any way after creation. To do so, by requiring
free will to act necessarily, is unjust for God and a contradiction of creation goodness.
On the other hand, Rutherford's theistic voluntarism understands the divine will to be a
rule unto itself. God can do whatever he pleases, and because he pleases to do it, it is,
therefore, right and just. This means that, for Rutherford, it is no violation of divine
justice or goodness for God to decree an individual's end absolutely, without regard to
his or her free choice. The Arminian system emphasHes the justice and goodness of
God towards humankind more than the justice and goodness of God towards himself.
Rutherford perceives that the Arminian system places too much weight on the human
side of the continuum, and so he consciously sets up his camp on the opposite side. He
would "rather contend for the Lord and grace, than for the creature and free will."164
4.2.1.2: Calling and Preparation
Many contemporary theologians, who embrace the idea of an ordo salutis, place calling
before regeneration in logical order.165 But Rutherford, following Calvin, places it under
164 Christ Dying, 330.
165 Among the theologians who do this are, Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: Bos,
21906-11), IV; John Murray, Redemption Accomplished andApplied (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1955), 87;
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the umbrella of regeneration, broadly speaking.166 A similar tendency is also reflected in
Perkins' A Golden Chaine, in Ames' Marrow of Sacred Divinity, and in the Westminster
Confession of Faith, which has no separate chapter on regeneration but speaks of
calling as being synonymous with it.167 According to Rutherford, "Godis proper work"
in regeneration is one in which he calls his people to himself in two ways: "He calleth us
by the Word outwardlie"—what the reformers and reformed orthodox both referred to
as a vocatio externa—and he "infuseth in us grace to obey the calling, qlk [quhilk = which]
is his inward calling"—or vocatio interna.168 In other words, God accomplishes the
regeneration of an individual by first calling him or her externally, through the preaching
of the Word and, thereby, preparing him or her to receive his internal call, which is the
infusion of habitual and effectual grace into every faculty of the soul. Whereas the
external call is inefficacious—although it is preparative—the internal call is wholly
effectual in producing the faith and obedience that God requires.169
Recently, Charles Bell has argued that Rutherford's emphasis on preparadon
going before effectual calling is proof posidve that J.B. Torrance is correct in his claim
that federalists, like Rutherford, reversed Calvin's emphasis on grace coming before law
in God's saving economy.170 Bell cites from Rutherford's catechism and sundry others
of his works as evidence that Rutherford places "preparation for faith [as a step before
effectual calling] in his ordo salutis, thereby subordinating grace and gospel to law."171
And,primafacie, from the statements Bell cites, it does seem as though he is correct. For
instance, in response to the question ofwhether preparation goes before God's effectual
and Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (London and Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1883),
2:639; and 3:3.
166 Calvin refers to regeneration as the beginning of salvation and defines it in terms that are virtually
identical with Rutherford. See Institutes II.iii.6, 297; and Ronald S. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian
Life (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 88.
167 Perkins, Workes, 1:9-116; Ames, Marrow, 126; WCF chapter 10, specifically cf. § 1 with § 3. Ames
actually speaks of calling, conversion, and regeneration interchangeably. It is not until later in the
seventeenth century that regeneration becomes distinguished from calling. See, e.g., the work of Owen in
this regard (IWorks of]ohn Owen, 3:188-366).
168 Catachisme, 199.
16<J Examen, 476-7.
170 Torrance's claims appear in a series of articles, including: "Covenant or Contract?," 51-76; "The
Covenant Concept," 225-43; "Strengths and Weaknesses ofWestminster Theology," 40-53; "Incarnation
and 'Limited Atonement'," 83-94; and "Interpreting the Word by the Light of Christ or the Light of
Nature? Calvin, Calvinism and Barth," in Calviniana: Ideas and Influence ofJean Calvin, ed. R.V. Schnucker
(Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal, 1988), 256-67.
171 Bell, Calvin and Scottish Theology, 77.
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calling, Rutherford says: "Yes, God casteth us downe with the terrours of the law,
making us see our miserable estait."172 In Christ Dying, Rutherford also affirms that
certain preparations must precede faith, even going so far as to use absolute language to
express their necessity in this process:
[It is] unpossible, that any can beleeve, but some preparation fore-going
there must be; and because all sinners as sinners have not such preparation,
all sinners as sinners are not at the first clap, to beleeve in the soule
Physitian Christ, but onely such as in Christs order are plowed, ere Christ
sow on them, and selfe-condemned ere they beleeve in Christ}11
When these statements are reflected upon more deeply, however, and especially when
they are juxtaposed with other statements from his writings, and particularly from the
Examen, Bell's conclusions (and those of Torrance as well) are shown to be suspect.
The following three arguments will not only demonstrate this but will also provide a
necessary jumping-off point for us to examine some of the differences between
Rutherford and the Arminians in more detail.
First, Rutherford's comments regarding preparation must be interpreted in light
of his conviction that God is in no way required to avail himself of external preparations
in calling an individual inwardly and effectually to himself. This is simply the norm that
he chooses to employ to do so. God ordinarily (ordinarie) uses external means, "such as
to read and to hear the word," in preparing an individual to receive his grace.174 But, in
keeping with his theistic voluntarism, Rutherford believes that God retains the freedom
to work without regard to such external devices, according to his good pleasure: "I dare
not peremptorily say, that God useth no prerogative Royall, or no priveledges of
Soveraignty, in the conversion of some."175
Secondly, the suggestion that Rutherford places law before grace is one that
completely overlooks the overt comments that he makes in regard to the gracious
nature and intention of the law. As we saw above in regard to Rutherford's view of the
covenant of works,176 and as E.F. Kevan has conclusively demonstrated in the theology
172 Catachisme, 201.
173 Christ Dying, 103.
174 Examen, 337.
175 Christ Dying, 244.
176 Bell correctly recognizes the gracious nature of the covenant of works by pointing out that Rutherford
disregards Robert Rollock's terminology, "natural covenant." But he incorrectly claims that Rutherford
undoes this gracious emphasis and reverts back to a legalist interpretation. Bell, "Saving Faith and
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of the Puritans, the law was not so much intended as an end in itself but as a means of
grace and of pointing ahead to Christ.177 Rutherford has no trouble at all in attributing
the preparations of the law to divine "Grace," although they can neither merit nor
ensure salvation in any way. Those men and women who are called externally by the
gospel are led physically and materially (conducentiam Physicam & materialem) "by the grace
of God." But Rutherford is clear that this grace is of a different kind than "saving
grace."178 Preparations, while gracious, do not guarantee that saving and effectual grace
will be applied to us, because they "have no effective influence to produce our
conversion;" nor do they have "any promise of Christ annexed to them."179
This is actually a key question for Rutherford in the Examen in his dispute with
the Arminians. As he understands it, the Arminians believe that "preparations have, of
themselves, necessary connections \nexum\ with the grace of Conversion." Because of
this, Rutherford associates the Arminian doctrine of preparation with the Jesuit view of
facere quod in se est, as it is classically set forth by Luis de Molina in his Concordia liberi
arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobationef0 And
while Rutherford makes no effort to substantiate his claim or to be charitable to the
Arminians in the least, his contention does appear to be justified in the main. The
similarities between the Jesuit Molina and Arminius extend beyond their common
acceptance of cooperationism and scientia media. Both Molina and Arminius disregard
"Luther's insight into the nature of grace as the unmerited favor of God," and prefer
instead to think of grace "as a sort of divine assistance or power given to men to enable
them to perform certain [preparatory] acts, which they in their corrupted natural state
could not do" in and of themselves. Such grace is prevenient and universally available
to all people without exception. It assists them facere quod in se est in such a creative way
that grace can seemingly remain the cause of human good and, yet, significant human
freedom can be maintained. God's "particular concurrence" in prevenient grace differs
Assurance of Salvation in the Teaching of John Calvin and Scottish Theology" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Aberdeen University, 1982), 105.
177 The Grace ofTaw, especially 119 26. Cf. COL, 2-3.
178 Examen, 338; Tiyal, 225.
179 Christ Dying, 240-41.
180 Examen, 335, cf. 334-42. Heiko Oberman has traced the origins of the phrase facere quod in se est to the
Ambrosiaster, "which interprets the justice of God as the merciful acceptance of those who seek their
refuge with him." The phrase appears to have exerted tremendous influence within scholasticism
generally, beginning with Alexander of Hales and the old Franciscan school, but with slight nuances.
Harvest ofMedieval Theology, 132-45.
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slightly from his "general concurrence," which we outlined in the previous chapter. In
the particular divine action of prevenient grace, God acts on the will rather than with it,
as he does in his general concurrence. In effect, then, God pre-moves—to borrow the
language of the premotionist—once and for all time in a universal way to grant all
people the ability to respond to (or to reject) his divine initiative in salvation.181 The
individual who freely responds, faciendo quod in se est, and, thus, shows a "[sjerious sorrow
on account of sin," can be assured that God, "according to the multitude of his
mercies," will be "moved to bestow [efficacious, secondary, subsequent, and saving]
grace" upon him or her.182 The genius of this position, however, is lost on Rutherford,
who sees it as ascribing a status to post-lapsarian human ability that is far too grandiose
and, therefore, entirely unwarranted.
Rutherford's contention is that such a view exalts human ability to the status of
being a co-operator with God in salvation. True it does not exalt human activity above
divine grace, because all human action unto salvation is founded upon God's grace,
whether that "grace \praevenit\ goes before, accompanies, [or] follows" after human
action.183 But it does make God's efficacious grace, and, thus, his salvific will (his
voluntas beneplaciti), to be dependent upon human liberum arbitrium. God is not able to
show mercy on whom he will and to harden whom he will; he is required to show mercy
to those who "do what is in them" with the help of prevenient grace, and he is
prohibited from showing mercy to those who do not "do what is in them."184 And
while there is truth in this, the Arminian would counter by saying that God chooses
those upon whom he will and will not show his saving mercy, by choosing those whom
he will and will not create, having foreknown their free decisions ahead of time by his
divine scientia media. As we will see, it is when this emphasis on facere quod in se est is
wedded to an Arminian understanding of faith and justification that the real problem of
Arminian theology is laid bare.
Rutherford believes that God extends his external call to all people without
exception. All who hear the gospel preached or who read Scripture for themselves are
thereby called externally to respond to the Lord in faith. But since God only intends to
181 Craig, The Problem ofDivine Foreknowledge, 204-5.
182 WJA, 2:18.
183 WJA, 2:700.
184 Examen, 336, 337.
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save his elect, he calls them alone with an effectual and inward infusion of grace, thereby
ensuring that they will respond in faith.185 This, Rutherford says, is the only thing that
makes sense of Scripture, which teaches that many people are externally called by the
Word who have no ability to come to him in faith until and unless God calls them
internally by his regenerating grace. Thus, God is said to have "called the Jews externally
by word, signs, and trials', and yet he has notgiven them a heart to know, nor ears to hear, nor eyes to
see, even to this day, Deut. 29.3, 4." They are unable to respond to God's vocatio externa,
because "he has not called them with an internal calling."186 Post-lapsarian individuals
are portrayed in Scripture as having no ability in things pertaining to salvation. While
God calls all externally, he only calls the elect internally by the infused and effectual
grace of regeneration. The universal extent of the vocatio externa means that preparation
is not limited to the elect alone. All who are externally called could theoretically
undergo preparation under the preaching of the gospel. Such preparation, however, will
only be efficacious for the conversion of the elect.187
Thirdly, by way of expounding on the inefficacious nature of preparations,
Rutherford argues that they merely represent a step in the typical order that the Lord
follows in the application of salvation: "The Lord's order is to cast downe, and then to
convert; first he draweth away some of the ill bloud and rancke humours, and pricketh
the heart; and then bringeth the sicke to the Physician, the trembling Publicane to his
Saviour."188 Here Rutherford is saying, in a way similar to Perkins before him,189 that
preparation is not a step within conversion (gradus in re), nor its formal beginning (initium
formale), but a step towards it (gradus ad rem), materially (initium materiale). It is how God
generally works. He does not generally "convert people in an instant, the way water is
185 Examen, 477.
186 F.xamen, 476. Rutherford also cites other biblical texts: John 12.37, 39; 1 Cor. 2.14; Matt. 11.25, 26, 27;
1 Cor. 1.23, 24; Jer. 5.8; Isa. 28.9; 2 Cor. 4.4; Matt. 13.15; Acts 17.32; 26.24; 2 Pet. 3.1, 2; and 2 Cor. 3.14,
15, 16.
187 William Ames even allows for an "inward offer" of Christ to be granted "sometime, and in a certaine
manner" to the non-elect under the rubric of preparation. This inward offer, he says, is a "spiritual!
enlightning, whereby [the] promises [of the gospel] are propounded to the hearts ofmen." Marrow, 125-6.
188 SA, II, 3.
189 Perkins differentiates between the beginning of preparation and the beginning of conversion, saying:
"Beginnings of preparation are such, as bring under, tame, and subdue the stubburnnesse of mans nature,
without making any chaunge at all." These things, "though they go before to prepare a sinner to his
conversion following, yet arc they no graces of God," i.e., they are not necessarily works of God's Spirit
unto conversion. In contrast to this, he says: "Beginnings of composition, I tearme all those inward
motions and inclinations of Gods spirit...out of which motions the conversion of a sinner ariseth."
Work.es, 1:638; cf. 2:13. See also Ames, Marrow, 125.
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changed into wine; and [he does not typically convert them] without [any] knowledge"
of him and his gospel; "and [he does] not [convert] unwilling and reluctant" people;
"but he converts people who are prepared, humbled, and downcast and broken by an
awareness [consaentla] of sin and the terrors of the Law."190
By speaking in this way, Rutherford shows that he is keen to adopt the Lutheran
emphasis on the second use of the law, the usus pedagogus, also embraced by Calvin and
post-Reformation theology in general.191 Part of the reason for this is to be found in
Rutherford's own conversion experience. If we follow John Coffey in seeing his
conversion as the result of his being charged with fornicadon and removed from office
as regent in Edinburgh's town college—which certainly appears to be the case—then
there can be no doubt but that Rutherford would have had profound experiences of
humiliadon and law-consciousness and that this would have heavily influenced his own
understanding of divine grace and conversion.192 Perhaps it is because Rutherford's
conversion is of a more dramadc nature—more like Luther's than Calvin's—that
Rutherford's emphasis seems to gravitate towards the former and the ususpedagogus more
than is true for the Genevan reformer.193 Rutherford unmistakably follows Calvin in
ascribing a normadve role to the law in the life of the Christian. In his catechism, he
explicitly records his approval of Calvin's tertius usus legis and subsequentiy launches into
a detailed exposition of the ten commandments to prove it. But, perhaps because of
Rutherford's own experience, he seems to side with Luther in emphasizing the second
use of the law more extensively than did Calvin. Rather than citing from Calvin in order
to defend his position against the Antinomians in his Survey of the Spiritmll AntiChrist,
Rutherford chooses instead to rely almost exclusively upon Luther in a diatribe that lasts
nearly one hundred pages.194 If Rutherford were keen on emphasizing the third use of
1,0 Examen, 337-8, 344. Cf. Christ Dying, 241.
191 Post-Reformation theology tended to speak of three uses for the law of God: ususpoliticus, as a means
of restraining sin in society; usus pedagogus, as a tool in leading the individual to Christ; and usus normativus,
as a rule guiding the believer in living the Christian life (see Kevan, The Grace ofCaw, 38). On Calvin's use
of the law, see Institutes II.viii.10, 358-9.
1,2 Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions, 84-5.
193 On Calvin's conversion, see Wendel, Calvin, 37-45, where he argues that although Calvin's conversion
was "an awakening to the consciousness of sin," it was "far less dramatic" than Luther's experience. The
current author is, thus, not saying that Calvin had no place for the second use of the law. As we have
already stated, he clearly did, and his experience would have ensured this. What the current author is
saying is that Rutherford's experience seems to parallel Luther's more than Calvin's, and, as a result, his
theological emphasis does as well.
mSA, 68-163.
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the law as the "principal one," as Calvin does, then one wonders why he would cite
Luther throughout his dispute with the Andnomians, when Luther gives very little, if
any, attention to the third use of the law in his writings.195 And it is Luther, rather than
Calvin, that Rutherford turns to in order to substantiate external preparations: "Yea
though Euther be against all preparations of merits, yet is he cleare for preparations of
order against the Antinomians."m
Not only is Rutherford's experience different than Calvin's, but the context into
which he is writing is different as well. And this also explains why Rutherford and
British theologians in general at this time, place great emphasis on the doctrine of
preparation. Whereas Zwingli had believed that baptized covenant children were not
necessarily elect, Reformed theologians after Zwingli began insisting that they were with
increasing levels of conviction. Heinrich Bullinger, for example, opted for the view that
covenant children were probably elect.197 Calvin's own view appears to be even more at
odds with Zwingli:
The offspring of believers are born holy, because their children while yet
in the womb, before they breathe the vital air, have been adopted into
the covenant of eternal life. Nor are they brought into the church by
baptism on any other ground than that they belonged to the body of the
Church before they were born.198
While neither Bullinger nor Calvin argued that every single covenant child would
necessarily be saved, it was, nonetheless, the case that "a large portion of the Reformed
community gradually came to believe that a covenant child should be considered
regenerate until 'the contrary became plainly evident.'"199 According to John and
Jonathan Gerstner, the result was that the Zwinglian "distinction between regenerate
and unregenerate covenant children was almost totally obscured," which in turn
"frequently led to a state of dead orthodoxy because the children (along with their
There is uncertainty among scholars as to whether or not Luther accepted the tertius usus legis (see the
discussions in Kevan, The Grace of Law, 38-9; and H.H. Kramm, The Theology ofMartin Luther [London:
James Clarke, 1947], 61-6). Calvin's priority on the third use can be seen in his Institutes II.vii.12, 360-61.
SA, 114.
197 Norman Petit, The Heart Prepared: Grace and Conversion in Puritan Spiritual Life (New Haven and London:
Yale University, 1966), 36.
198 Corpus Reformatorum, 35:619, cited in Louis Bcvens Schenck, The Presbyterian Doctrine of Children in the
Covenant (New Haven: Yale University, 1940), 13.
199 John H. Gerstner and Jonathan Neil Gerstner, "Edwardsean Preparation for Salvation," WTJ 42:1
(Fall 1979), 7, cidng Peter Y. Dejong, The Covenant in New England Theology, 1620-1847 (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1945), 56.
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parents) tended to assume their salvadon, though many never had experienced God's
regenerating grace."200 It was into this context that Rutherford began his own ministry
in 1627 in Anwoth, where he found the people so apathetic towards spiritual things that
he complained of it "being spiritually winter in Anwoth." The cure? His parishioners
needed an experience of conversion in which they were first prepared by law-work and
deep humiliation; they needed to be "downcast and broken by an awareness of sin and
the terrors of the Law."201
After reviewing the doctrine of calling in Rutherford, we can at least say in
regard to Bell's and Torrance's assertions, that although Rutherford unambiguously calls
preparation a step towards (gradus ad rem) conversion, this should not be taken to mean
that he sees it as a separate step in the ordo salutis. Preparation is part of God's vocatio
externa, which is itself subsumed under regeneration in Rutherford's ordo. It cannot be
considered a separate step, because all who are prepared are not necessarily converted,
and all who are converted are not necessarily prepared. But, more significantly, Bell and
Torrance overlook the gracious character and intention of the law in Rutherford's
thinking. And one can readily understand how they do so. It is quite easy to interpret
Rutherford's doctrine of preparation in a legalistic manner. During the early eighteenth-
century Marrow Controversy, the legalistic opponents of the "Antinomian" Marrowmen
interpreted Rutherford in the same way as have Bell and Torrance, appealing to his
perceived legalism in order to support their assertion that forsaking sin was necessary
"in order to our coming to Christ."202 But David Lachman has argued in his definitive
study of this controversy that it is the Marrowmen who were most likely right in
claiming Rutherford for their side. Rutherford takes great pains to protect himself
against incipient legalism by teaching that preparations are only typical means to
conversion. They are never meritorious.203 There is no theological shift here between
Rutherford and Calvin, though there does seem to be a slight change in emphasis.
Because of Rutherford's own dramatic conversion experience and the context in which
he lives and writes, he tends to stress the second use of the law more so than Calvin
does.
200 "Edwardsean Preparation," 7.
201 Letters, 6; Examen, 338.
202 Memoirs of the Life, Time, and Writings of the Reverend and Lamed Thomas Boston, A.M., ed. George H.
Morrison (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, 1899), 317.
203 David C. Lachman, The Marrow Controversy, 1718-23 (Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 1988), 14.
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It is probably his tendency to emphasize the second use of the law and a deeply
experiential view of conversion that led Rutherford to the extreme position of
questioning whether or not the Arminians were themselves genuinely converted. To his
way of thinking, no one who has genuinely experienced the converting grace of God
could exalt human freedom and human nature and diminish the sovereignty of divine
grace to the extent that the Arminians did. Divine preparations would ensure that all
Christians would have a proper view both of themselves and of divine grace and that
they would "fall in love with" God's grace and be "loath to say anything against it." But
because, as Rutherford believed, the whole Arminian system ran counter to this, he
could only conclude that the Arminians knew "nothing of the grace of God
themselves."204
4.2.2: Our Response of Faith
In order to bring our discussion of conversion to a close, we need to examine the
doctrine of faith. Rutherford does not devote a separate chapter to treating this
doctrine in the F-xamen.2(b But he does take it up in connection with the central tenet of
Protestantism—justification. The likely reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand,
the differences between Rutherford's view of faith and that of the Arminians are
relatively inconsequential, as we will soon see. The real issue is not faith per se but faith
as it relates to justification. On the other hand, the fact that Rutherford does not
include a separate chapter on faith to refute the Arminians regarding the nature and
object of faith but discusses it under the auspices of justification instead is significant in
light of the polemical thrust of the Examen and the grounds of his opposition to
Arminianism. After all, justification is, according to Reformation thinking, the "chief
article.. .which preserves and governs every doctrine of the church."206 By casting
aspersion on the Arminian doctrine of justification, Rutherford is suggesting that their
whole system is corrupt and worthy of being rejected together with Roman Catholicism.
While this is not entirely true, it is, as we will see in the next chapter, quite instructive
for determining the grounds of Rutherford's opposition to Arminianism.
204Quaint Sermons, 332.
205 This is in contrast to the WCF, which devotes chapter fourteen to "Of Saving Faith."
206 B.A. Gerrish, The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1982), 303n2, citing Luther, whose precise comment is: "Articulus iustiflcationis est magister et princeps,
dominus, rector, et iudex super omnia genera doctrinarum, qui conservat et gubernat omnem doctrinam
ecclesiasticam et erigit conscientiam nostram coram Deo." WA 39 I, 205.
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We have opted to examine Rutherford's doctrine of faith under the heading of
conversion in this chapter rather than under justification. The primary reason for our
doing so is that Rutherford himself regards faith as part of conversion. There are two
acts in conversion, for Rutherford: God's initiatory act in regeneration—which includes
internal and external calling—and our responsive act in faith. In his conflict with the
Arminians, his emphasis clearly falls upon the former, since the Armimans place their
emphasis on the latter. But, citing Calvin, Rutherford also acknowledges that we are "co-
laborers [consortes laboris] with God' in our conversion, to the extent that "we and we alone
are the ones who will and believe" to be saved.207 Not only is the "act of believing"
ours, but there is "some moral property \proprietas\" that is ours as well when we
respond in faith. This is apparent, he says, because "Christ praises the faith of the
Canaanite woman, the Centurion, Abraham, and others, and rewards it." The "principal
causality" of our conversion, however, resides not in ourselves but in "the power of
God." God infuses us with the habit of faith, which "dominates, determines, and
effects the wilP so that it will respond freely, but necessarily, in faith.208 Thus
Rutherford can say that although the "consummation \actus secundus] of our Conversion
to God, which is commanded to us as our duty," is "the free act of believing," the
essence of our conversion is to be found actu primo "in the infusion of new life." The
Arminians, as he sees it, take the opposite tack. They locate (locant) the essence of
conversion "in the free act of believing alone."209 Rutherford makes this assertion,
despite explicit statements to the contrary on the part of the Arminians,210 because they
deny that regeneration is an infusion of habitual grace and because they believe that
grace can be resisted by human free will. If grace can be resisted in conversion, then the
decision to believe or not to believe, as well as the power to accomplish either,
ultimately resides in the will of the individual rather than in the will of God. This, for
Rutherford, is wholly unacceptable.
Undergirding and empowering Rutherford's disagreement with the Arminians
over the essence of conversion is a distinctive view of the nature and object of faith.
Ultimately the differences between them are inconsequential, as far as the doctrine of
207 Examen, 472. Perkins also speaks of us as God's "co-worker" in this step. Work.es, 1:558.
208 Examen, 472.
209 Examen, 481.
2i° Even the later Arminians explicitly state that a person is not "born again or converted by the power of
his own free will." Confession, 203.
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faith itself is concerned. But they set the stage for more profound differences that will
arise in regard to justification. In order to demonstrate this, we will briefly turn our
attention to the nature and object of faith in both Rutherford and the Arminians and
then to the implications they have for justification.
4.2.2.1: The Nature of Faith
Rutherford defines faith in bis catechism as "ane assurance of knowledge that Christ
cam into the world to die for sinners.. .and a resting and a hanging upon Christ with all
the heart for salvation."211 By defining it in this way, Rutherford shows that he, like
Calvin, stands within a tradition extending at least as far back as Aquinas, which teaches
that faith has both an intellectual and a voluntaristic aspect.212 But whereas Aquinas
emphasizes the intellectual over the voluntaristic, Rutherford and Calvin, following
Duns Scotus (or at least the later Scotists), assign predominance to the will. Like Luther
and Zwingli, they understand that faith includes both information (notitia) and assent
(assensus). Thus, Rutherford explains the reason why faith is an "assurance of
knowledge" by saying that it is merely "a blind gessing," and not faith at all, "to beleeve
as the kirk beleeveth quhen [when] we know not quhat [what] we beleeve." Faith
necessarily and in the first instance involves the intellect. Certain facts must be known
and believed to be true.
But saving faith is more than that, because "it is not enough to salvation [simply]
to beleeve that God is true in his Word."213 Saving faith also contains the voluntaristic
element of trust or fiducia. And, in continuity with Calvin, specifically, and Reformation
and post-Reformation thinking generally—including such men as Musculus, Ursinus,
Ames, Leigh, Ussher, and Maccovius—Rutherford places fiducia at the very center of his
definition of faith:2'4
211 Catachisme, 203.
212 Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia.82.2. While Thomas believes that "faith is lodged in the intellect," he
admits that the intellect "receive[s] its specification and motivation from the will." See Reginald
Garrigou-Lagrange, The Theological Virtues, 2 vols., trans. Thomas a Kempis Reilly (St. Louis, MO: Herder,
1965), 1:273-4.
213 Catachisme, 203.
214 Calvin says that faith is more than cognitio and assensus and ascribes the "chief part of faith" to jiducia
(see Institutes III.ii.1-2, 542-5; lII.ii.6-7, 548-51; III.ii.33, 581; and Joel R. Beeke, Assurance ofFaith: Calvin,
English Puritanism, and the Dutch Second Reformation [New York: Peter Lang, 1991], 47-9). For a more
complete look at Calvin's doctrine of faith, see W.E. Stuermann, "A Critical Study of Calvin's Concept of
Faith" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tulsa, 1952); and Victor Shepherd, The Nature and
Function ofFaith in the Theology ofJohn Calvin (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983). Although there
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True Faith in the Scriptures is not merely a firm assent [assensus] to the
way of worshiping God, which is prescribed by Christ,; this is the
Historical and dogmatic faith of the Papists; but more than an assent
[assensus] of the mind, true faith is determined by the heart's trusting
[fiduciam\ in God through the Mediator, and by a fiducial [fiducialis]
leaning upon him.
To prove this, Rutherford launches into a detailed and protracted exegedcal survey of
biblical texts, cidng from the Hebrew and Greek originals, even down to the tenses of
the verbs. His conclusion: to believe is to "lean upon God in Christ, as though we were
a weary pilgrim [viator] with a staff or a rod," and to roll (convolvit) and turn (contorquet)
ourselves and our burdens upon him.215
The Arminians disagree with this understanding of faith. Rather than seeing
faith as containing both an intellectual and a voluntarisdc character, with the emphasis
being on the latter, they define faith in almost exclusively intellectualist terms. This is
not to suggest that the Arminians remove volitional aspects from faith entirely; they do
not. But they do confine faith to knowledge (notitia) and assent (assensus) alone,
relegating fiducia to a "necessary consequence or effect" of faith.216 Richard Muller has
cogently argued that the reason why Arminius "wants to set the final, purely
volitional/affective confidence or tmst \fiducia\ outside of the definition of faith properly
so called," is that he is seeking to remove the "lower affections [or, in the words of
Arminius, the "irascible" affections] from the definition, leaving faith a matter of both
intellect and will, [but] with the primary emphasis on the intellect."217 It is important to
are slight differences between Reformation and post-Reformation theologians in regard to how they
define faith—i.e., Calvin speaks of faith as knowledge, but one that includes cognitio, assensus, and fiducia,
with the chief emphasis on the latter, and Beza speaks of faith in terms of assensus, but includes a fiducial
component within it—many, but not all, still locate the "essence" of saving faith in its fiducial aspect.
The above-mentioned men are among those who do (Musculus, Common Places, 474-5; Ames, Marrow, 5-6;
Leigh, Body of Divinity, 500; Ussher, Body of Divinitie, 199-200; Maccovius, Foci communes, chapter 71; and
RD, 532-5). William Perkins, however, is an example of one who does not. He defines saving faith in
intellectual terms—it is "a supernatural! gift of God in the minde, apprehending the saving promise with
all the promises that depend on it"—and then locates the essence of it in "apprehension," which he
defines as a "particular perswasion, whereby a man is resolved that the promise of salvation belongs unto
him, which perswasion is wrought in the minde by the holy Ghost." Workes, 1:123-4.
215 Examen, 544-5. In proving his claims, Rutherford cites such biblical texts as Prov. 3.5; Isa. 3.1; 10.20;
31.1; 48.2; 50.10; Psal. 22.8; 37.5; 71.6; 112.8; 125.1; 2 Sam. 1.6; 22.19; Jer. 34.4; Gen. 29.10; John 1.12;
6.37, 46; 14.1; Matt. 11.28-9; and Rom. 10.11.
216 W]A, 1:176 note.
217 "Priority of the Intellect," 61-2. Muller explains that irascible affections, in scholastic terminology,
"have to do with aversion or repulsion and their opposites, expectation and attraction, and are placed,
together with the concupisciblc affections (i.e., desire, joy in attainment and their negative, lust) below the
will in its operation." See "Priority of the Intellect," 62n23.
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note, however, that although Arminius defines saving faith only in terms of notitia and
assensus, he does include an affecdve and volitional aspect by placing initial movements
of the will and affections "together with the intellect in the act of assent."218 The result
is a definition of faith that is very similar to that of Rutherford and the Reformed,
perhaps even more so than is the view ofWilliam Perkins:219
Evangelical faith is an assent of the mind, produced by the Holy Spirit,
through the Gospel, in sinners, who through the law know and
acknowledge their sins, and are penitent on account of them: By which
they are not only fully persuaded within themselves, that Jesus Christ has
been constituted by God the author of salvation to those who obey Him,
and that He is their own Saviour if they have believed in Him; and by
which they also believe in Him as such, and through Him on God as the
Benevolent Father in Him, to the salvation of believers and to the glory
of Christ and God.220
In spite of the fact that Arminius' definition of faith contains both intellectual
and volitional elements, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the intellectual. This can be
seen from the fact that he defines faith as "an assent of the mind" or, perhaps better, of
the "rational soul" (the word he uses is animus)}11 But it can also be seen from the fact
that he portrays the ground of faith in terms that are wholly intellectual:
The foundation on which...faith rests, is two-fold,—the one external
and...the other internal (1.) The external foundation of faith is the
truth itself as spoken \enunciantis\ of God, who can declare nothing that is
false. (2.) The internal foundation of faith is two-fold,—both the
common conception \communis notio] by which we recognize that God is
true,—and the knowledge [notitia] by which we recognize that this word
is from God.222
And while he does acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is the "Author of faith," he
articulates the work of the Spirit in establishing faith within the individual as one in
"which the Spirit proposes" the sense (sensum) of the gospel "concerning God and
Christ...to the intellect" and then persuades (persuadet) the intellect.223
318 "Piiuiily of the Intellect," 62-3. Cf. IVJA, 1:177.
219 See note 214 above.
220 WJA, 2:400.
221 See Arminius, Opera theologica (Leiden, 1629), Disp. priv. 44.3.
222 WJA, 2:400, as modified according to the original Latin, Disp. priv. 44.2. Cf. Muller, "Priority of the
Intellect," 64.
223 WJA, 2:401; again, see the Latin, Disp. priv. 44.6.
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It is precisely this intellectualist approach to faith that gets Arminius into trouble
with Rutherford and the Reformed orthodox, not per se, because Perkins defines faith in
strikingly similar terms, but because he combines this intellectualist view of faith with an
anthropological or soteriological intellectualism. Whereas Perkins acknowledges that
the post-lapsarian will suppresses intellecdve funcuon, Arminius admits of no such
negadve influence of the will upon the intellect. And, as we have already seen, it is
precisely because the post-lapsarian will exerts no such negative influence that both the
intellect and the will are left free facere quod in se est in accepting the divine grace of
regeneration, or in rejecting it. "In other words," for Arminius, as Muller has again
pointed out, "in its fallenness, the intellect does not know the truths of the gospel, but it
is not the case that the will prevents their appropriation. The gospel must simply be
heard, understood, and approved, all within the normal realm of intellective function."
As a result, the causal antecedent to faith, for Arminius, is the knowledge that is
"instrumentally communicated by the gospel to the mind."224 Rutherford himself
criticizes the later Arminians in this same way by pointing out a twofold antecedent
causality that is wholly intellectual: "they require only two things for faith to be
generated [in us], 1) Plausible arguments, 2) Docility," which is, in Episcopius' own words,
an "honesty of Mind" or "teachableness."225
For Rutherford, however, and for Perkins as well, the causal antecedent to faith
can only be the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, giving the individual the ability
to believe. The Spirit must quicken (animans) "the mind, will, and affections," granting
each faculty a "new power" to function.226 Prior to the quickening work of the Spirit,
the faculties of the soul were able facere quod in se est-, but since what is in them was a
"habit of corruption" and an "inclination to sin," this only and always meant that they
chose to sin.227 In Rutherford's opinion, the will and affections not only suppress the
natural knowledge of God that is contained in the intellect—the semen religionis or sensus
divinitatis that we saw in chapter two—but they also work to prevent the intellect from
appropriating future truths about God and the way of salvation.228 The Spirit's
regeneration must first breathe new life into the "powers of the soul"—by removing the
224 "Priority of the Intellect," 70. Cf. WJA, 2:192-3, 400-401; 3:459.
225 Examen, 473; Confession, 148.
226 Examen, 476, 478-9. See Perkins' comments in Workes, 1:124.
227 Examen, 454; Exercitationes, 5.
228 Examen, 326-7. Also, see the section on the duplex cognitio Dei in chapter two above.
204
old habit and infusing a new one, a habit of grace and faith, and inclining the will
towards the things of salvation—before these powers are able to appropriate and
understand the gospel and then to choose to embrace Christ by faith.229 It is, therefore,
primarily Arminius' intellectualist definition of faith that Rutherford is reacting against
here. Such an approach to faith affects its nature by overemphasizing assent and
relegating jiducia to a mere consequence of true faith. But it also affects the object of
faith, because the two are integrally related.
4.2.2.2: The Object of Faith
In the course of Rutherford's dispute with the Arminians over the nature of faith, which
is in itself relatively minor, at least one thing stands out: there is more at stake here than
a mere difference of opinion over the way faith is to be defined. By denying that fiducia
is of the essence of saving faith, the Arminians are, as Rutherford sees it, placing their
emphasis on the rational rather than on the experiential. This is not necessary with an
intellectualist view of faith—as we have seen in the example of Perkins, whose view of
faith is clearly intellectualist and, yet, whose theology is profoundly experiential. But, as
we have also seen previously, the Arminians go the extra step beyond Perkins and wed
their intellectualist view of faith to a post-lapsarian anthropological intellectualism. As a
result, the Christian life becomes primarily a rational pursuit rather than an intimate
relationship with the God of this universe involving every faculty within the individual.
That this is the case with Arminian theology is confirmed, to Rutherford's way of
thinking, by the fact that they reduce the object of faith merely to factual information
that must be personally understood, believed, and trusted in. Such a view, according to
Rutherford, is wholly "misleading" and "futile,"
[bjecause the object of Faith, in this way of thinking, is not Christ...but
the History of the Gospel, by which I firmly believe that I avoid hell and
obtain eternal life only through Christ and his reasoning [rationem\, as
prescribed in the Gospel... [and because] to believe in Christ in this way is
merely to believe in Christ recounting [narranti] that people obtain eternal
life by repentance and faith: But this is an Historical faith, which is in the
Demons and many of the reprobate.230
Rutherford is not completely justified in calling the Arminian conception of
faith "an Historical faith." As we have just seen, Arminius quite explicitly includes
229 Examen, 478-9.
23(1 Examen, 542, 544.
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actions of both the will and the affections within his understanding of assent.231 But, in
spite of this, Rutherford does seem to be justified in arguing that because the Arminians
define the nature of faith in intellectualist terms, they, as a result, characterize the object
of faith in more intellectualist terms as well. Although this is not always the case in
actuality, as is apparent from the example of Perkins, who in spite of defining faith in
intellectualist terms, goes on to speak of the object of faith in terms that are identical to
Rutherford, it is, nevertheless, true in theory that an intellectualist definition of faith best
coincides with an intellectualist view of the object of faith.
In continuity with Calvin, Rutherford acknowledges that there is unequivocally a
rational or intellectual component to faith, which must always rest on God's Word. For
both of them, faith is essentially knowledge, with the overarching emphasis on the
fiducial.232 In the language of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, faith receives Christ
"as he is offered to us in the gospel."233 There is in Rutherford's theology, then, an
intellectual component to the object of faith. Scripture, or, more accurately, the
promises of Scripture, is the objectum quo fidei, the object in which we believe. But this can
never be separated from Christ himself, the objectum quod fidei, the object that (or, on
whom) we believe, because all of Scripture's promises find their ultimate fulfillment in
him. Christ is the living Word, the sum total of the written Word, all of which is "yea
and amen" in him.234 To concentrate wholly on the intellectual element of faith when
defining the nature of faith is, as Rutherford sees it, to concentrate wholly on the written
Word—rather than on the living Word—when distinguishing the proper object of faith.
Saving faith not only involves receiving and trusting Christ's promises in the Word; it
also, and more importantly to Rutherford and Calvin, among others, involves receiving
and trusting Christ himself.
231 Arminius differentiates between three kinds of assensus. "Intellectual Assent is that which assents to a
true proposition, without any consideration whether that proposition also contains any good;" an "Assent
ofthe Ajfections occurs, when the proposition is both true, and has something good joined with it which we
are desirous or inclined to obtain;" and, lastly, a "Practical Assent occurs, when the proposition is true, and
when it also proposes a good which must be performed by us." According to Arminius, faith belongs to
the assent of the affections. IVJA, 1:177.
232 Rutherford's embrace of Calvin's duplex cognitio Dei ensures this link. Cf. Calvin with Catachisme, 161,
174; and SA, 310.
233 WCF, 310. Cf. Calvin, The Gospel according to St. John 1-10, trans. T.H.L. Parker, Calvin's Commentaries,
eds. David W. Torrance and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 83-4; idem,
Commentary on Psalms, 2:145-7.
234 Examen, 499, 541, 544. Cf. Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book ofMoses called Genesis, trans. John King
(Edinburgh: CTS, 1847), 1:404-10; idem, Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists, 1:125-6; and Joel
Beeke's discussion in Assurance ofFaith, 47-8.
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As we mentioned in chapter two, Rutherford, in keeping with the overall trend
among the Puritans, is much more concerned with the experiential side of faith (with
praxis rather than contemplatio). Although theology is partly a speculative discipline for
him, it is not merely nor even primarily so. All theology is directed towards the practical
end of pious living, in order that the individual might "glorify God, and.. .enjoy him for
ever."235 This experiential emphasis in faith is reflective of the Augustinian tradition in
general and English Ramists, like Perkins and Ames, in particular.236 That is what makes
it all the more surprising that Perkins would define faith intellectually. From
Rutherford's point of view, such a conception of faith would seem to run counter to the
deeply personal, even intimate, relationship between Christ and the believer that lies at
the very heart of the Christian life.237 Granted, Perkins minimizes the differences
between himself and Calvin and Rutherford by confessing that he has defined faith in
intellectual terms only because he cannot understand how it is that "one particuler and
single grace should be seated in divers parts or faculties of the soule" (i.e., the mind and
the will together, as in Rutherford and Calvin) and by explicitly stating that the person
of Christ is the proper object of faith, as he is revealed in his written Word.238 The
Arminians, however, do not take these protective measures. In fact, they run in the
opposite direction by linking an intellectual view of faith with an intellectual view of
post-lapsarian anthropology. The upshot is that they deemphasize the experiential
element of faith in favor of the rational. Here again is reason why Rutherford could
brashly maintain that the Arminians were unconverted. Their emphasis on the
intellectual aspect of faith completely overlooks the fiducial and experiential nature of
saving faith. The Christian is not the one whose head is fully stocked with all the right
doctrines but the one who is full of love for Christ, to such an extent that "nothing is
fixedly sought after, but God, he onely [sic] feared and served... [he] only desired... [he]
only loved... [whose] soul [is] sick of love [i.e., lovesick] for only only Christ...he only
trusted in."239 To be fair to the Arminians, however, it should be noted that they do
emphasize the fiducial aspect of faith, and, thereby, the person of Christ as a proper
object of faith, but this appears in their theology only as a necessary consequence of true
235 WCF, 287.
236 See PRRD, 1:343-7.
237 See section 4.3.2 below.
238 Perkins, Workes, 1:124.
23<-> COL, 152.
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and saving faith, which is itself intellectual. And it is just this fact that gets them into
trouble with Rutherford and the Reformed in regard to justification.
4.3: Living by Faith
We will look at Rutherford's understanding of justification and the related topic of
sanctificadon under the common heading of "living by faith." Following Calvin,
Rutherford "defines what we receive from Jesus Christ by faith as a 'double grace,' or a
twofold benefit [duplicemgratiam\, the whole of which can be summed up for the purpose
of theological discussion under two headings: Justification and Sanctification." The
former explains how it is that we live or are made alive by faith, whereas the latter
relates to how we go on living by faith. Again following Calvin's lead, Rutherford
believes that "^justification and sanctification together comprise a 'twofold cleansing
(double lavement),'" giving us, respectively, an imputed purity and an actual purity {purete
actuelle).240 These doctrines form two sides of the same coin, so to speak, and will,
therefore, be treated under the same heading.
While Rutherford devotes a chapter of the Examen to discussing justification in
some detail, he, like Calvin, does not formally address the issue of sanctification at all.
When Rutherford does mention it, he does so only in passing. This is not unexpected,
however, as the Arminians' view of progressive sanctification closely mirrors that of
Rutherford. Both parties view it as a joint venture between God and the individual.
The only real difference between them is that the Arminians place their emphasis on the
human side of the equation, whereas Rutherford places it on the divine. This will be
seen more fully in our discussion of unconditional perseverance, which follows below in
the section on assurance. For now, we will limit our examination to presenting
Rutherford's understanding of justification and sanctification and to exploring the
differences between him and the Arminians in regard to the former of these.
4.3.1: Justification
In his catechism, Rutherford defines justification in a way that is typical of the
Reformation and post-Reformation periods. His definition reads almost word for word
with those of Ames and Ussher. It is, as Rutherford says, "the gracious sentence of the
judge of the world esteeming beleeving sinners to be pardoned and righteous for the
240 Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine ofthe Christian Life, 23.
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satisfaction of Christ their cautioner, quho died for them."24' Two main things need to
be mentioned here in connection with this definition. First, justification is, for
Rutherford and for Reformation theology in general, a forensic declaration; it is the
"gracious sentence of the judge of the world."242 In justification,
[our] sins are removed.. .Legally... [in a way that is] plainly judicial and
forensic, not [in such a way] that they might not exist, hut that they might not be
imputed, as Augustine says. And for this reason, justification causes no
Physical change in the justified person; but only a moral or legal change,
in which the individual is released from the obligation to punishment.243
The forensic nature of justification demonstrates how an individual can be said to
remain, in the well-known words of Luther, simul justus et peccator, after his or her
justification; it is because justification does not effect a physical change within him or
her but only a change in legal status.244 The individual is now once and for all
pronounced to be sinless and in right standing before the tribunal of God. But the
physical or ontological presence of sin is not dealt with by this doctrine. That happens
only in sanctification.
Before moving on to look at the second feature of Rutherford's view of
justification, one criticism needs to be raised at this juncture. Because he perceives
justification as a wholly forensic declaration concerning an individual's legal status
without regard for what is really or ontologically the case, Rutherford opens himself up
to the charge that he makes it purely a legal fiction. Rutherford protects himself against
this charge to some degree by making both justification and sanctification to be
products of our initial vital union with Christ. Both are "act[s] of the life of Christ,"
which is first infused within us at regeneration.245 As far as justification is concerned,
this means:
241 Catachisme, 205. See also SA, II, 105. Rutherford speaks of justification in two ways: 1) a "universall"
justification, which is not tied to the individual's act of faith in time but takes place once for all the elect
when Christ makes atonement for their sins upon the cross; and 2) a "partiall" or "formal" justification,
which occurs in order of time when each individual actually believes in Christ for himself or herself. The
latter idea is what Rutherford generally means by justification, because, as he says, this is the sense of the
Apostle Paul in .Scripture (Jryal, 161-2). Cf. Ames, Marrow, 130; Ussher, Body ofDivinitie, 193.
242 RD, 543 ff.
243 Examen, 539.
244 On Luther and justification, see Carl R. Trueman, "Simul peccator et iustus-. Some Reflections upon
Martin Luther and Justification," paper delivered to the 10th Edinburgh Dogmatics Conference,
Rutherford House, 25-28 August 2003; and Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther's Theology: Its Historical and
Systematic Development, trans, and ed. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1999), 74-8, 258-66.
245 Christ Dying, 271; SA, II, 112.
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before we be actually in Christ, by justification, and branches in him, by
order of nature; first, wee so farre find favour in the Lords eyes, or
please him, or rather he is of free grace pleased with us, that he giveth his
holy Spirit to us, and upon the same ground may we, being yet not
justified; and so, in that sense, not in Christ, by order of nature, first
beleeve, before we be justified; nor is it justification that formally united
us in this actuall union, as branches to the Vine tree, but union is a fruit of
life, as is the joyning of soule and body together, and so a fruit of the
infused life of God, or of the habit of sanctification, and thus it
followeth not, that we beleeve before we be united to Christ; as branches
to the Vine tree, but onely that we beleeve, by order of nature, before we
be justified, which the Scripture saith.246
In spite of this, however, it remains true that Rutherford safeguards himself only
implicitly from the charge that he makes justification to be a legal fiction. Modern-day
theologians like John Murray, as if sensing the susceptibility of the Reformed orthodox
conception of justification to the legal fiction charge, have taken an extra step beyond
Rutherford and have further protected themselves against such an indictment by
explicitly establishing a special category of sanctification that is coordinate with
justification—definitive sanctification. According to this extra step, a definitive
righteousness is said to be infused within the individual at the same time that he or she
is justified but in an act that is distinct from justification.247
The second characteristic of Rutherford's view of justification is again a
hallmark of Reformation teaching, and that is double imputation. There are, he says,
two "pairts of our justification...first the not reckoning or counting our sinnes to be
ours...and [second] the counting of Christ's righteousness [to be] ours."248 In other
words, in justification our sins are first of all imputed to Christ, and he is treated as we
deserve to be for our sins. He is punished in our stead and in our place (vice et loco nostri).
And, second of all, Christ's perfect obedience, his "Surety-righteousness \justitia
Fidejussoria]" or "active and passive righteousness," is imputed to us, and we are treated
as he deserves to be for his record of sinless perfection.249 In strongly Calvinian
246 SA, II, 113, emphasis added.
247 See Murray's article, "Definitive Sanctification." Rutherford's "habit of sanctification" fulfills a similar
general purpose in his theology as definitive sanctification does in Murray's. But Rutherford does not
develop this idea anywhere near to the extent that Murray does. It remains only an implicit part of his
thinking.
248 Catacbisme, 206. Cf. Institutes III.xi.2-4, 726-9; Musculus, Common Places, 541; Ames, Marrow, 130;
Perkins, Workes, 1:567; Ussher, BodyofDivinitie, 193-6.
249 Examen, 506-7. Rutherford helpfully calls active and passive obedience "Surety-righteousness,"
thereby clarifying what he means by the former terms. Theologians like Rutherford and Perkins
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language, Rutherford says that as a result of our justification, we stand before God with
our "debtis.. .payed" and as those who are "maid rich and clothed in fair apparel."250
For the Arminians, however, such a view of imputation is contrary to right
reason, because it insists that the "righteousness of Christ is imputed to us for
righteousness." But whatever is imputed for righteousness cannot be righteousness
itself. Since "the righteousness of Christ, which He hath performed in obeying the
Father, is righteousness itself strictly and rigidly taken: Therefore it is not imputed for
righteousness." Rather, according to Arminius, the fourth chapter of Romans teaches
that faith is imputed for righteousness.251 This does not mean that Arminius denies that
Christ's righteousness is imputed in justification. He holds both statements to be true:
"The righteousness ofChrist is imputed to us" and our "Faith is imputed for righteousness."
In order to illustrate how this can be, he gives the following example: "if [a] man owe[s]
a hundred florins and pay[s] only ten, then the creditor, forgiving him the remainder,
may justly say, 'I impute this to you for full payment; I will require nothing more from
you.'"252 From this example, it would seem that Arminius believes Christ's
righteousness to be imputed negatively in justification, insofar as it eliminates the
remainder of the ninety-florin debt, and the individual's faith to be imputed positively for
righteousness, just as the ten-florin payment is imputed for the full one-hundred.
Christ's righteousness cannot be imputed positively in any way. If it were, righteousness
would be imputed for righteousness, which right reason eschews.
To sum up, then, while the Arminians do appear to favor a double imputation in
their doctrine of justification, it is not a double imputation in the way that doctrine had
typically been understood. The Arminians limit the imputation of Christ's righteousness
only to his passive obedience and replace the imputation of his active obedience with
the imputation of the individual's faith.253 In his customary polemical manner,
understood that there was overlap between the terms active and passive obedience. Christ's active
obedience was at times passive, and his passive obedience was active. See Perkins, Workes, 1:567.
250 Catachisme, 206. Cf. Institutes III.xi.2, 726-7.
251 The Arminians are not alone in this; even Reformed theologians like Richard Baxter understood
justification to be an imputation of our faith for righteousness. See J.T. Packer, The Redemption &
Restoration of Man in the Thought of Pochard Baxter A Study in Puritan Theology (Vancouver, BC: Regent
College, 2003), 251.
252 IV]A, 2:44-5. Cf. Confession, chapter 10. Arminius' example would seem to suggest that he, like
Socinus, thinks of sin more as a pecuniar}' debt than a break in relationship.
253 Recently, advocates of a so-called New Perspective on Paul have argued, quite persuasively, for a new
understanding of justification that in some ways parallels the Arminian doctrine. Among the most prolific
of these advocates is N.T. Wright, who asserts that justification, while it is a forensic declaration, only
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Rutherford condemns this idea in the Arminians as justification by works, lumping them
together with "Papists" and "Socinians" and dismissing them all with a wave of his
hand.224 To his way of thinking, when the Arminians say that faith, which is by
definition our act of believing, is imputed as our righteousness in justification, it is the
same thing as saying that something we do becomes our righteousness before the divine
tribunal. And, what is this but a justification by works?
In keeping with the Westminster Confession, Rutherford denounces the notion
that faith is imputed to us in justification as our righteousness.255 We are not justified
because of our faith or on account of it but by it or through it.256 Faith is not
considered as our righteousness; rather, as Calvin says, it is the "vessel" or "the
instrument" by which we lay hold of Luther's justitia aliena, i.e., the righteousness of
Christ.257 The fourth chapter of Romans should not, Rutherford insists, be understood
in a wooden sense but according to the pattern of "metonymical and figurative speech."
Just as when "someone says, my hand has made me rich" and means by it, "my acquired
riches have grown by the diligence [industrial ant^ labor of my hands," so when the
Apostle Paul says "that Abraham believed God and it was imputed to him for
righteousness," he means "that which [Abraham] apprehends [i.e., Christ and his active
and passive obedience] is imputed.. .for righteousness."258
Whether or not this interpretation of Romans 4 is to be preferred over the one
offered by Arminius is beyond the scope of this study. What matters is whether or not
entails a single imputation—our sins are imputed to Christ—and who then claims that justification is a
present declaration in anticipation of the future verdict that will be pronounced on the basis of our own
righteous works, thereby incorporating in a loose sense both aspects of the Arminian "double
imputation." See Wright, "New Perspectives on Paul," paper delivered to the 10th Edinburgh Dogmatics
Conference, Rutherford House, 25-28 August 2003. For more on Wright's Hews of justification, see his
"Romans and the Theology of Paul," in Pauline Theology, eds. D.M. Hay and E.E. Johnson (Minneapolis,
MN: Fortress, 1995), 30-67; and The letter to the Romans: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections, in The New
Interpreter's Bible, vol. 10 (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2002), 393-770. For responses to Wright's
claims, see Simon J. Gathercole, Where is Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul's Response in Romans 1-5
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002); and Donald Macleod, "How Right are the Justified? or, What is a
Dikaios}," Scottish Bulletin ofEvangelical Theology 22:2 (Autumn 2004), 173-95.
254 Examen, 500-501.
255 WCF, § 11.1, 57.
256 Here again the Arminians have an ally among the Reformed in Richard Baxter, who unabashedly
speaks of faith as the causa sine qua non of justification. Packer, Redemption &Restoration ofMan, 254-7. Cf.
Catachisme, 206.
257 Institutes III.xi.7, 733-4; Lohse, Martin Euther's Theology, 69.
258 Examen, 510.
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Rutherford is warranted in denouncing Arminius' view that our act of believing is
imputed for our righteousness. Is he justified in calling this idea a justification by
works? While it is true that Rutherford is rather uncharitable in his dealings with the
Arminians (i.e., he overlooks the fact that Arminius explicidy states that divine grace is
necessary in order for us to believe and in order for our faith to be accepted by God as
righteousness, as well as the fact that Arminius says that "God is the primary Cause of
justification"),259 it is, nonetheless, true that, as Richard Muller has acknowledged, there
is "the smallest possible opening for human initiative in the work of salvation" in
Arminius' teaching on justification.260 This opening is the result principally of Arminius'
intellectualist understanding of faith.
Because, as we saw previously, the Arminians believe that the post-lapsarian will
does not affect the operation of the intellect, both the fallen intellect and the fallen will
are able facere quod in se est in receiving God's special grace of illumination and
regeneration. "In other words," as Muller has summarized, "in its fallenness, the
intellect does not know, the truths of the gospel, but it is not the case that the will
prevents their appropriation. The gospel must simply be heard, understood, and
approved, all within the normal realm of intellective function."261 When this
intellectualist view of faith is then combined with the idea that our faith is imputed for
righteousness, we are left with a human activity in which the fallen faculties of the
understanding and will faciunt quod in se est in appropriating the divine grace to believe,
and, as a result, the individual is counted as righteous in God's sight. While it may not
be fair to call this a synergistic salvation, it does grant the smallest of openings for the
charge to be made.
In opposition to the Arminians, Rutherford staunchly defends the Reformation
doctrine of justification by grace alone through faith alone in Christ alone, to the extent
that everything is of grace. We do not offer a payment of ten florins towards a
hundred-florin debt, as Arminius has suggested. Rather, Christ pays the full one
hundred on behalf of all "those for whom he has offered bail and surety."262 And then,
to continue the analogy, Christ gives the elect his personally acquired bank balance,
259 W]A, 2:49.
2co "Priority of the Intellect," 69.
261 "Priority of the Intellect," 70.
262 Examen, 508-9.
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which gift can only be received by faith. This is not because there is an "innate power,
merit, excellence, or dignity" in faith, but because "faith apprehends... Christ, who is our
righteousness by imputation \imputative\."2 3 It is faith, apart from any work, that receives
the justification that is merited by Christ.
But it is not a faith without works that receives this justification. Saving faith
necessarily produces the fruit of good works. It is not the fruit that justifies, but only
the faith. The fruit is the proof of the genuineness of the faith. Because of this,
Rutherford, in continuity with Calvin and others of the Reformers, could argue that
works are necessary for salvation, not in the sense that they are meritorious causes of it
but insofar as saving faith will never be lacking good works. Citing "our Calvin,"
Rutherford calls "good works the inferior cause of the actual possession of eternal life."
This is because good works ordinarily precede the possession of eternal life in the divine
"order of dispensadon," not because they merit eternal life in and of themselves. In this
sense, good works are "means" of "gaining the crown" of eternal life, but only
ordinarily.264 Someone may believe "at the nick of the extremity of his twelfth and last
houre" and not have the opportunity to perform good works before his death.
Following Luther, Rutherford therefore argues that the presence of good works is
necessary to salvadon necessitatepraecepti alone not necessitate medii2bS
At the heart ofArminius' intellectualist understanding of faith and his belief that
faith is imputed for righteousness in justification is his theistic intellectualism. The
divine justice that prevents God from acting contrary to an individual's free will also
prevents him from imputing Christ's righteousness to another. For, this would impose
a guaranteed salvation on people without regard to their ultimate perseverance in the
faith.266 It would remove all possibility of their freely choosing not to persevere and,
thus, of their rejecting God's justification. Since free will cannot be compelled by any
necessity and must remain free, Arminius concludes that the Reformed conception of
263 Examen, 500. Faith, according to Rutherford, is "a palsie hand under Christ to receive him...as an
almes" (Tryal59). It does not offer anything but receives everything.
264 Examen, 531; Institutes III.xiv.21, 787. Calvin borrows Aristotelian causal categories to explain that "the
efficient cause of our salvation consists in God the Father's love; the material cause in God the Son's
obedience; the instrumental cause in the Spirit's illumination, that is, faith; the final cause, in the glory of
God's great generosity." And to these he adds good works as "inferior causes." In addition to Calvin,
Rutherford also cites Bernard of Clairvaux, Martin Bucer, Jerome Zanchi, and Gisbertus Voetius in
support of the inferior causality of works (Examen, 531-2). See also Institutes III.xvi.1, 798.
265 SA, II, 62; Strickland, "Union with Christ," 77n4.
266 Examen, 506, citing from Arminius' Letter to Hippoljtus, in W]A, 2:685-705.
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justification must be in error. Rutherford's voluntarism, on the other hand, makes no
such demands upon the doctrine of justification. Instead, it places its emphasis on
God's freedom to work where and when he pleases for his own glory and to be the sole
cause of human justification. Because the Arminians emphasize human freedom over
the divine in justification, Rutherford accuses them of "detracting] from the glory of
the merits and death of Christ and from mercy and [divine] grace" by substituting the
glory of free choice in its place.267
4.3.2: Sanctification
Rutherford's doctrine of sanctification is again quite typical for Reformation and post-
Reformation thinking. He is very much in fine with Calvin and with his contemporaries
Perkins, Ames, Leigh, and Ussher. Although they use several different terms to refer to
this doctrine—among them, glorification (Ussher), repentance (Calvin, at times, and
Perkins), and regeneration (Calvin and Rutherford)—there appears to be unanimity as
to what sanctification means, where it comes from, what its parts are, and how it differs
from justification.268 Whereas in justification our sins are removed legally and by
imputation, Rutherford says, in sanctification our "[s]ins are removed really and
Physically... [but] only by parts and successively; just as the early morning light or the
first light of dawn expels the darkness of night only successively and by degrees."
Justification is a once and for all act. Sanctification is a continuous work that remains
"imperfect.. .in this life."269 According to Ames, "it admits of divers degrees, of
beginning, progresse, and perfection."270 As we have seen earlier in this chapter,
Rutherford and Calvin and Reformation soteriology in general locate the foundation of
sanctification in union with Christ. "By partaking of him," Calvin says, "we principally
receive a double grace," the second of which, sanctification, begins, broadly speaking, at
regeneration with the removal of the habit of corruption and the infusion of a new
sanctified habit.271 No longer does the regenerated person have a sinful nature. He or
she is now a new creation, once dead in sins and trespasses but now made alive together
267 Examen, 502, 459.
268 Ussher, Body of Divinitie, 202; Institutes III.iii.3, 595; lll.xi.l, 725; Perkins, Workes, 1:455-7; Catachisme,
199, 201. Cf. Ames, Marrow, 140-44; Leigh, Body ofDivinity, 535-49.
269 Eximien, 539-40.
270 Marrow, 140.
271 institutes Ill.xi.l, 725; Catachisme, 199.
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with Christ. Yet, in spite of this, sin still remains in the new creature, tainting every
faculty of the person. Even though some righteousness has been infused at
regeneradon and, with it, a new inclinadon for spiritual things, sin, or, in the words of
the Aposde Paul, the sinful flesh, remains. Progressive sanctificadon is essentially, then,
in Reformation and post-Reformation thinking, the life-long struggle to purge the new
creature of his or her remaining sin. Almost without exception it involves a twofold
process: mortification and, its positive counterpart, vivification.
Perhaps it is because of his own conversion experience and the humiliation he
endures for his public sin of fornication that Rutherford places his overwhelming
emphasis on the first of these—mortification.272 Whatever the reason, he remains
consciously aware throughout his lifetime of the extent of his own sinfulness and of his
need to put sin to death for the sake of Christ. In The Covenant ofLife Opened, he devotes
twenty pages to the issue of mortification, beginning with a definition:
[Mortification] is a deadning of the whole powers and inclinations of the
soul in their bentnesse and operations, in order to things forbidden by
the Law of God, or in things indifferent and commanded. Hence, not
the affections only, but the understanding and mind must be deadned.
And therefore this is no mortification until sin original be subdued in its
damnation by Christs death, and in its dominion by the Spirit of
Sanctification.273
In other words, according to Rutherford, mortification does not begin until a person is
justified before God and the legal condemnation for his or her sin is removed, and it
does not end until sanctification is complete. This should not imply, however, that
sanctification flows from justification in Rutherford's thinking, but only that it follows
after justification in the ordinary dispensation of God's temporal order. As we have
already indicated, both justification and sanctification flow from union with Christ. And
because sanctification flows from union with Christ, so does mortification:
Hence, from our being crucified with Christ crucified, something is to be
said in a practicall way of our mortification; for mortification flows
originally from Christs death, we being crucified in him and with
him....Christ dying doth merit by blood the Spirit, and infused grace,
272 Rutherford rarely, if ever, speaks of vivification as such. He does, however, use the synonym
"quickening" and, at times, speaks of mortification in a positive way, as when he says: "Yet acts of
sanctified reason and lndustery [sic] spiritualized with the infused life of Christ, and informed with the pure
light of faith beholding Christ crucified, doe work mortification." See Catachisme, 201-2; and SA, 341.
273 COL, 261. Rutherford then lists no fewer than twenty-seven ways for us to engage in mortifying the
sin that remains in us (COL, 268-81).
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which deadens the whole life of sin. [Nothing else accomplishes
mortification.] But in the infusing of the life of God, Christ applyes the
reall principle ofmortification.274
Rutherford's emphasis on mortification and vivification in the Christian life
extends to anything and everything that may distract one from the experiential love of
Christ. Above all else, God's chief aim "in all His dealings with His children" is for
their love of "the world" and "earthly delights" to be mortified, so that their love of
Christ can be vivified.275 In continuity with medieval mystics like Bernard of Clairvaux,
Rutherford believes that the ultimate goal of the Christian life is union with God.276
Thus, the purpose of sanctification is to wean the Christian from other loves and to fix
his or her love on Christ alone.277 Again following Bernard, and, before him, Origen,
Rutherford ascribes a central place in this process to the affections.278 Although he
virtually equates the affections with the emotions, he is careful to stipulate that they are
not wholly "irrationall.. .fit[s] of madnesse, that hath no reason, but its owne fire." In
other words, the affections are not animal passions, but, prefiguring Jonathan Edwards'
(1703-1758) momentous Treatise on Religious Affections (1746), he says that they are
informed by the intellect and closely allied to the will.279 The affections are central to
the Christian life, because "God detesteth lukewarmnes, and coldnes in his matters" and
demands "all the heart, all the soul, [and] all the strength" of his people.280 The Christian life
is the life-long process of fixing the affections on Christ alone and keeping them there,
274 COL, 261-2.
275 Letters, 70.
276 The term mystic is quite slippery. As Martin Thornton comments, it is "usually undefined and often
misunderstood." At times in history, he notes, any show of affection in a prayer or sermon has been
enough to earn one the label "mystic" {English Spirituality: An Outline ofAscetical Theology according to the
English Pastoral Tradition [London: SPCK, 1963], 12-13). See also Ray C. Petry, ed., Late MedievalMysticism
(London: SCM Press, 1957), 17-22; and David Knowles, The English Mystical Tradition (London: Burns &
Oatcs, 1961), 1-3. In this thesis, the term will be used to refer to elements of Cistercian mysticism in
general and to Bernard of Clairvaux in particular.
277 Rutherford's fear of idolatry extends even to benefits or gifts of Christ, lest anyone should fall in love
with these instead ofwith Christ himself.
278 See Ann E. Matter, The Voire ofMy Beloved: The Song ofSongs in Western Medieval Christianity (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 1990), 128.
279 Christ Dying, 363. Edwards too links the affections to the will and the mind and speaks of "holy
affections" as being central to the Christian life. See George M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New
Haven and London: Yale University, 2003), 284-90. The Yale edition of his works explicitly credits
Rutherford as influencing Edwards to some degree on the issue of the "importance of affections and
'heart religion'." See the editor's introduction to The Works ofJonathan Edwards, vol. 2, ed. John E. Smith
(New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1959), 72.
280 HOC, 17, 23.
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so that, as we said earlier, "the soul [is] sick of love for only only Christ."281 Such a
process requires sustained mortification and vivification.
Rutherford's emphasis on the importance of the affections in sanctification is
also reflected in his preaching and in litis letters to friends and parishioners. Echoing
another characteristic of Cistercians like Bernard, Rutherford embraces the frankly
sexual language of the Song of Songs in order to communicate the essence of salvation,
union with Christ, to the affections of his hearers and readers.282 Granted, part of the
reason for his use of the Song of Songs in his preaching could be linked to the vast
illiteracy rate in rural Scotland in the seventeenth century. Margo Todd has estimated
that only ten to twenty percent of the rural population at that time could read. Because
of this fact, sermons became the primary means of conveying biblical truth to the
illiterate. The more effective the preaching, the longer the people would listen, and the
more biblical truth could be conveyed. And, as Todd has remarked, the "sign of an
effective preacher [at this time] was his ability to transfer his own emotional intensity to
the auditory;" and the sign of effective preaching, "in the absence of icons in the kirk,"
was the use of "language to draw pictures in the imagination."283 Rutherford's use of
the Song of Songs would have fulfilled both requirements. It allowed him to preach
affectively and pictorially.
But, more than this, there are theological reasons as well for his homiletical use
of the Song—which should not surprise us in the least given Rutherford's emphasis on
praxis in theology rather than on contemplatio. As we demonstrated earlier in the chapter,
Rutherford believes that post-lapsarian free will is the ability to choose the greatest good
according to the inclination of the will. While this is relatively straightforward both
before and after the fall, it takes on a new twist after regeneration. The new convert has
a spiritual nature or inclination but two competing desires—to live according to the
spiritual nature or to live according to the sin that remains in him or her. These
competing desires vie for supremacy within the individual in the lifelong process of
sanctification. What determines which one he or she will follow? Quite simply, it is the
"disposition" of the affections.
281 COL, 152.
282 According to Ann Matter, the entire history of the tropological interpretation of the Song of Songs is
one of "passion and union" and of "conscious eroticism." Voice ofMy Beloved, 138, 140.
283 Margo Todd, The Culture of Protestantism in Early Modern Scotland (New Haven and London: Yale
University, 2002), 25, 48, 53-4.
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The affections are like the needle, the rest of the soul like the thread; and
as the needle makes way and draws the thread, so holy affections pull
forward and draw all to Jesus. The affections are the ground and lower
part of the soul, and when they are filled they set all the soul on work;
when there is any love in the affections, it sets all the rest of the faculties
of the soul on work to duty, and when there is any corruption in the
affections, it stagnates the soul, will, mind, and conscience. Affections
are the feet of the soul, and the wheels whereupon the conscience runs.
When a man is off his feet he cannot run or walk; so when the affections
are lame, the soul moves on crutches.284
Rutherford, therefore, believes that every minister should preach in such a way as to
appeal to and excite all the faculties of the soul, but especially the affections. A sermon
that concentrates only on the presentation of information to the mind fails to excite the
affections and, thus, leaves its hearers no better off in their pursuit of sanctification.
Truth must be crafted and presented in such a way so as to encourage love in the
affections for Christ. What better way to do this than by adopting the vivid and
strongly affective language of the Song of Songs? After all, the Song was read
tropologically by Rutherford, and by others in the Cistercian tradition, as representing
the relationship between Christ and the individual Christian. Adopting the highly
affective language of the Song of Songs enabled the preacher to put, in the words of
Richard Sibbes (1577-1635), "lively colours upon common truths" and, by doing so, to
present the truth in such a way that it "hath oft a strong working both upon the fancy
and our will and affections."285
It is vital to note here that what is important in sanctification, for Rutherford, is
not the affections in themselves but the "disposition" or state of those affections. By
dispositions, Rutherford means "moveable qualities of the soul," which can be either
sinful or gracious. When the affections are hot with love for Christ, they are operating
according to a gracious or "heavenly" disposition. When they are cold or dead towards
Christ, they are operating according to a sinful or "ill" disposition. While it is possible
that "under such [ill] dispositions there may be some stirring of the habit of grace, and
204 Communion, 316.
285 Richard Sibbes, "The Soul's Conflict with Itself," in The Complete Works ofRichard Sibbes, D.D., 7 vols.,
ed. Alexander Grosart (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1862-4), 1:184. The relationship between preaching
and sanctification in Rutherford reflects his belief that there is no ordinary salvation apart from the
church. Mirroring the Augustinian emphasis also found in Calvin, Rutherford states that when we are
united to Christ in salvation, we become members of his "mystical body" and are, therefore, united to
others who are themselves united to Christ. The church is "a fragment and a piece of mysticall Christ," a
piece which is on earth rather than in heaven. Just as the head of the body (Christ) cannot forget the rest
of his body, so the members cannot forget one another. See Christ Dying, 529; PP, 31; Letters, 43, 336.
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of the new creation," the soul will, nonetheless, to use Rutherford's words cited above,
"move on crutches." The key to the Christian life, therefore, is keeping "heavenly"
dispositions in the affections of the soul. And Rutherford lists five ways of doing this:
Now the way to get heavenly dispositions is 1. to be much in perusing
the word and promises: Davids meditating 2. Learning. 3. Observing,
loving the testimonies of God, prove that David was a heavenly disposed
man, Psal. 119.
2. Keep communion with God in praying, hearing, reading,
conferring. He who is much and daily among the oyntments of the
Apothecaries, smels shall cleave to him whether he will or not, Luke
24.34. John 7.45, 46. Cant. 2.4, 5, 6, 7.
3. Mind much, seek much the things that are above, Col. 3.1, 2, 3.
4. Cherish the Spirit, obey him, grieve him not, work with him, be
instrumental under his breathings, follow sweetly and willingly his
drawings. See Ephes. 4.29, 30. I Thess. 5.19, 20. Cant. 5.8, 9, 10, 11,
12, &c.
5. Beware of frequent smoaring [smothering] divine light; deal
tenderly with the light of the natural conscience, and tenderly with
convictions and warnings; if so, you can hardly want divine dispositions
and suitable influences, I Sam. 24.4, 5, 6.286
Seen in this light, it is not hard to understand why Rutherford would believe in
preaching that extends to the affections. Such preaching would encourage and motivate
the individual to pattern his or her life according to these five ways and, thereby, to get
and keep heavenly dispositions. And it is principally the disposition of our affections
that determines whether we will choose and act according to the new spiritual
inclination or the old remnant of sin.
Rutherford's doctrine of sanctification balances on the tightrope between two
extremes: Antinomianism, on the one hand, and Arminianism, on the other. Whereas
the Antinomians wrongly define sanctification in terms of the imputed righteousness of
justification and, as a result, deny the necessity of on-going human activity and
obedience in salvation,287 the Arminians go to the opposite extreme by attributing the
deciding role in sanctification to human effort. In contrast to the former group,
Rutherford maintains the necessity of human activity in sanctification. Just as a "bow
286 Influences, 240-50, 301-2.
287 For a thorough and helpful treatment of Antinomianism in the Puritan era, especially as it developed in
the years leading up to the civil war in England, see David R. Como, Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the
Emergence ofan Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil-War England (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2004).
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cannot bend itself, [but] a man's arm must do it; [and just as] it cannot shoot itself, [but]
a hand must put the arrow on the string, and draw and loose it;" so also "ye must learn
the gate [i.e., the way] to heaven."288 The Christian life is anything but sedentary. It
involves actively working out our salvation in fear and trembling. In contrast to the
latter group, the Arminians, Rutherford, reflecting his Calvinian roots, emphasizes that
sanctification is founded upon union with Christ and the infused habit of grace. We
work in our sanctification, to be sure, but we do so because God is active in us enabling
us to work according to his will and ensuring that we will in fact do so.
Any problems that Rutherford may have had with the Arminian doctrine of
sanctification are completely overlooked in the Examen. He has no substantive
examination of progressive sanctification anywhere on its pages. Instead, he is content
to confine his invective to regeneration and to the Arminians' denial of infused habitual
grace, both of which we have discussed above. For the related issues of perseverance
and assurance, however, the story is altogether different. Rutherford dedicates a
substantial chapter of the Examen to defending the unconditional promise of the
perseverance of the saints and, then, follows that with a chapter devoted to the
assurance of salvation. Because these two topics are related, we will present them both
together under the heading of assurance. The differences that will arise between
Rutherford and the Arminians here will summarize much of what has already been said
thus far.
4.4: Assurance
The issue of the assurance of salvation represents a major area of contention not only
for Rutherford and the Arminians during the seventeenth century but also for many
scholars in our own day who see this as a prime example of how the post-Reformation
orthodox like Rutherford distorted the theology of Calvin and the early Reformers.
Among these modern-day scholars, Basil Hall and R.T. Kendall, along with others like
Charles Bell, have argued that Beza and Perkins initiated an avalanche in regard to the
doctrine of assurance that plunged away from Calvin with greater violence and speed
until it culminated in Rutherford's and the Westminster Confession's ultimate betrayal
of Calvin's own beliefs.289 While Calvin believes that assurance is of the essence of
288 Communion, 183.
289 Hall, "Calvin against the Calvinists," 19-37; R.T. Kendall, "Living the Christian Life in the Teaching of
William Perkins and His Followers," in Living the Christian Life (London: The Westminster Conference,
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faith,290 they say, Rutherford "separates assurance of salvadon from faith, and teaches
that certainty is achieved only as a result of self-examination and syllogisdc
deduction."291 The Westminster Confession sanctions this "distinction between faith
and assurance" with "apparently unquestioned acceptance," because "'Faith' was one
heading in the Confession, and 'Certainty of Salvation' another."292 Recently, however,
such claims have been roundly criticized by Joel Beeke, in particular, who has argued
that the "discrepancy between Calvin and Calvinism on faith and assurance was largely
quantitative and methodological, i.e., a matter of emphasis and method, rather than qualitative
or substantialT293 In drawing this chapter to a close, we will use Rutherford to support
Beeke's thesis in the main. In doing so, we will interact with the Arminian
understanding of assurance at the same time by first exploring the relationship of
assurance to faith and then the grounds of assurance. And we will conclude by
examining some of the differences between Rutherford and the Arminians.
4.4.1: Assurance and Faith
In Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himselfe, Rutherford remarks: "that faith is
essentially a perswasion and assurance of the love ofGod to me in Christ, its more then I
could ever learne to bee the nature of Faith, a consequent separable I beleeve it is."294
When we contrast such a statement with one from Calvin, in which he says that faith is
"a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence toward us...in Christ,"295 it
certainly appears, prima facie, that Kendall and Bell are correct in finding Rutherford and
1974), 45-60; idem, Calmn and English Calvinism; idem, "The Puritan Modification of Calvin's Theology,"
199-214; Bell, Calvin and Scottish Theology, especially chapter 3; idem, "Saving Faith and Assurance of
Salvation in the Teaching of John Calvin and Scottish Theology." Other scholars who agree with Hall,
Kendall, and Bell to some degree include: Brian Armstrong, Karl Barth, John Beardslee, Ernst Bizer,
James Daane, Johannes Dantine, Edward Dowey, Otto Griindler. Philip Holtrop, Walter Kickel, Donald
McKim, Philip McNair, Jurgen Moltmann, Charles Munson, Wilhelm Niesel, Norman Pettit, Pontien
Polman, Jack Rogers, Holmes Rolston III, and Hans Emil Weber. See Joel R. Beeke, Assurance ofEaith,
5n3.
29H For more on Calvin's view of assurance as the essence of faith, see Institutes III.ii.7, 551; III.ii.16, 561-2;
III.ii.42, 590-91; Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 19; Beeke, Assurance ofFaith, 49-51.
291 Bell, Calvin and Scottish Theology, 83-4.
292 Kendall, "The Puritan Modification'ofCalvin's Theology," 214.
293 Beeke, Assurance ofFaith, 21. See also idem, "Personal Assurance of Faith: The Puritans and Chapter
18.2 of the Westminster Confession," WT] 55:1 (Spring 1993), 1-30. And, cf. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the
Christian Life, 299-306; Paul Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1982), 23-31; and
R.M. Hawkes, "The Logic of Assurance in English Puritan Theology," WT] 52:2 (Fall 1990), 247-61.
294 ChristDying, 85.
295 Institutes III.ii.7, 551.
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Calvin on opposite sides of the issue. Whereas Calvin sees assurance as essential to
faith, Rutherford, in agreement with Puritan thought in general, argues that it is a fruit
of faith instead.296 But if we look more deeply into both Rutherford and Calvin, we will
see that the differences between them are a matter of emphasis and method rather than
of substance.
It bears repeating at this point that both Rutherford and Calvin describe faith in
terms of intellectualism and voluntarism, as we saw in our discussion of the nature of
faith above. Not only so, but Rutherford's definition of faith, as both "ane assurance of
knowledge that Christ cam into the world to die for sinners" and a "resting and hanging
upon Christ with all the heart for salvation," demonstrates that he believes assurance to
be essential to saving faith, at least intellectually. It is at least necessary that the
Christian be assured of the object and content of his or her faith, because saving faith is
never simply a "blind gessing."297 There are at least certain basic facts that the Christian
must not only know but also be assured of in his or her own experience.
But more than this, when removed from the context of his dispute with the
Antinomians, Rutherford comes even closer to Calvin's understanding of assurance and
faith. In the Jfxamen, for instance, he first differentiates between an objective or
ontological (entitativa) certainty, "by which the things [raj of the faith arc most certain in
themselves," and a subjective certainty, "by which a thing [res] is certain to me and in my
apprehension." Then, he subdivides subjective certainty into two components:
intellectual, "by which I am certain about all the truths in the Word of God;" and fiducial,
"by which we [are certain that we] recline and hope in God." Both components,
according to Rutherford, are essential to saving faith to some degree. An intellectual
certainty is necessary, as can be seen from the way that he defines faith; but a fiducial
certainty is also necessary in principle. This does not mean that saving faith will
necessarily have a fiducial certainty that "always and at all times exclude [s] every fear
[fortnidinembut it does mean that an "habitual certainty [will] always remain" within
the believer, which is itself essential to a true and saving faith.298 In other words, for
Rutherford, there is a difference between fiducial certainty in principle and in experience.
All Christians will necessarily have fiducial certainty in principle, because this is of the




essence of saving faith, but not all will actually experience this certainty in the normal
course of their lives.
Paul Helm and Joel Beeke have argued that this distinction between fiducial
certainty in habit and in experience is a key for unlocking the relationship between faith
and assurance in Calvin. They maintain that Calvin cannot be accurately understood on
this issue unless we distinguish between "the definition of faith" and "the reality of the
believer's experience" or between faith "in principle" and faith "in practice."299 Whereas
Calvin defines faith in terms that bind it together with assurance, he clearly admits that
the believer's experience of faith is "something far different." In principle, faith is tied
to assurance, but, in practice, it "is tossed about by various doubts, so that the minds of
the godly are rarely at peace."300 To borrow the language of the Hxamen, then, this
means that Calvin believes that there is an habitual fiducial certainty, which is essential
to a true and saving faith, but which is not always experienced by the Christian in this
life. Calvin's point, thus, appears to be the same as that emphasized by Rutherford and
others of the post-Reformation period, namely, that the principle of faith is always
directed towards full assurance, even if it may not actually achieve it in practice.301
Echoing Calvin, Rutherford denounces "the Papists" for teaching that the Christian
"could, [and] indeed ought to, ordinarily fear and doubt whether he or she would be in
grace."302 Such a position runs counter to the habitual principle of assurance within the
believer. Although faith might ever be "tinged with doubt, or...assailed by some
anxiety," ideally, for both Rutherford and for Calvin, it "ought to be certain and
assured."303
But if it is true that Rutherford and Calvin speak of faith in the same way in
principle and in practice, then how are we to explain the differences between them?
299 Beeke, Assurance ofFaith, 54-5; Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists, 25-6.
300 lnstitutes Ill.ii. 17, 562; Beeke, Assurance ofFaith, 55.
301 Cf. Institutes Ill.ii. 17, 562; with Examen, 627. William Perkins says that "to bee certaine, and to give
assurance, is of the nature offaith" (emphasis added) but then acknowledges that the believer will not always
experience this: "We hold that with assurance of salvation in our hearts is joined doubting; & there is no
man so assured of his salvation, but he at sometime doubteth thereof, especially in the time of
temptation" (Workes, 1:563-4). These revealing statements teach us that, if Bell is right about the
relationship of faith and assurance in Rutherford (which he does not appear to be), then rather than a
Calvin-Calvinist divide, we should perhaps look for a Perkins-Perkinsist divide instead, because Perkins—
a "Calvinist"—explicitly employs the language of Calvin.
302 Examen, 627.
303 Institutes Ill.ii. 17, 562.
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How do we explain Rutherford's unambiguous comment that assurance is not of the
essence of faith but a consequent of it instead? Before we attempt a reply to these
questions, we need first to examine the grounds of assurance in both Calvin and
Rutherford. After doing so, we will be in a better position to formulate an answer.
4.4.2: The Grounds of Assurance
Rutherford, in continuity with Calvin and the Puritans, distinguishes between the
objective and subjective grounds of assurance but ascribes a primary role to the
objective grounds.304 Contrary to the Arminians, who "teach that the whole certainty of
Perseverance [in salvation] is ultimately resolved in the steadfastness [constantia] of Free
Will [.Liberum A.rbitrium\, which [of itself] has the power to persevere or not to
persevere," Rutherford argues "the opposite, namely, that every such certainty is
established in the Veracity, Immutability, and Steadfastness [Constantia] of God; in the
Intercession of the Mediator, and in the sealing of the Holy Spirit."305 At least two things
are apparent from this. The first is the explicitly trinitarian framework in which
Rutherford expresses his thoughts as to the proper grounds of assurance. As certain as
are the promises of God the Father, the redemptive work of God the Son, and the
application of redemption by God the Holy Spirit, so certain is the believer's final
perseverance and, thus, his or her assurance that faith will in fact gain the victory in its
struggle against unbelief. The second thing to note in what Rutherford says about the
grounds of assurance is their unconditional nature. This is especially clear in the
Examen, where Rutherford takes particular aim at the conditionality in the Arminian
doctrine of assurance. Because the Arminians are keen to protect human freedom, they
acknowledge only a temporary "hypothetical" assurance that is possible so long as the
individual is persevering in the Christian life. But such an idea is anathema to
Rutherford, because, as we will see, it cuts across the heart of his doctrine of God and
of his understanding of soteriology.
The Arminian notion of conditional certainty, i.e., an assurance conditioned
upon the individual's perseverance, is, in the first place, a reductio ad absurdum, according
to Rutherford, because it makes no distinction between the elect and the reprobate.
Under the Arminian schema, assurance of salvation would apply equally to Christian
304 See Catachisme, 213.
305 Examen, 640.
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and non-Christian alike. But surely it is problematic, says Rutherford, if one's definition
of Christian assurance applies to both Christians and non-Christians equally. In the
second place, and more notably, a conditional certainty based upon a conditional
perseverance detracts from the glory of God. It "is in conflict with God's immutability
and veracity," since it subjects his promises to preserve us to the condition of our
perseverance. God's promises to elect, to enter into and remain in covenant, and to
atone for sin are not absolute promises, for the Arminians, but are conditioned upon
human free will. Such an idea has two important consequences. First, it removes God
from his rightful place at the center of the universe by denying his sovereign power to
work according to his own will in salvation: "Not even Christ, bj his own intercession and
prayers, nor God the Father, by bis owngracious keeping [custodia\ andprotection, nor the Holy Spirit,
by his own superlatively powerful grace, can procure my Perseverance and, thus, my eternal glory; if I
have discarded the grace ofGod andfaith." Secondly, it removes all possibility of comfort for
Christians in this life. If the Arminians are right, then "this suggests that true believers
[will experience] terror, fear of hell, wretched desperation, and the melancholy [tristitia]
of the Devil, and [will be] without every consolation."306 The chief end of humankind
envisioned by the Westminster Shorter Catechism, "to glorify God, and to enjoy him
for ever," would become altogether impossible.
In opposition to the Arminians, Rutherford argues for an unconditional
certainty based upon an unconditional salvation:
Indeed, the certainty of salvation, according to the word of God, is as
absolute and certain.. .as is the promise of God that he would not cover the
earth again with the waters of Noah, Isa. 54.9-10, and as is the faithful
Covenant of God with respect to the succession of the nights and the
days, and the movements of the Sun and the Moon,Jer. 31.35-6.307
The salvation of the Christian is certain, because "the eternal predestination of God,"
the "intercession of the Son," and the "sealing of the Holy Spirit for the day of
redemption," are as absolute, unconditional, and certain as are all the other promises of
God, as certain as the sun rising in the morning and setting in the evening.308 In his
chapter on perseverance in the Examen Rutherford enters into a lengthy dialogue with





unconditional.309 Although Rutherford does believe that Christians are free and active
agents and, as such, are responsible for actively working out their salvation in fear and
trembling, he explicitly maintains that they will ultimately continue to do so only
because God promises that they will persevere to the end in the Christian life (re: the
mutability of the human will).310 The primary grounds of assurance, for Rutherford,
contra the Arminians, are the objective, absolute, and unconditional promises of God,
which are themselves founded upon the character of God.
In light of this, it is rather perplexing thai R.T. Kendall can argue that the
Westminster Confession's doctrines of faith and assurance are "crypto-Arminian"
instead of Calvinistic.311 Rutherford's clear denunciation of Arminian conditionality
should be enough to overturn any such claim. While it is true, as men like Charles Bell
and J.B. Torrance have reminded us,312 that Rutherford speaks of faith as a condition of
the covenant, it is also true that he uses the word condition in a different sense than
does Arminianism or, even, Baxter's neo-nomianism.313 As Rutherford sees it, a
condition is not something that is required of us which must then be fulfilled by us.
Rather, a condition is something that is required of us but that is fulfilled in us by God:
"God hes promised to call us by his grace to doe our pairt...and so [he] fulfilleth both
his pairt of the covenant and ouris." This is not to say that we can "sleepe and fold our
handis and commit all the cair to God of our salvatione." God fulfills our part of the
covenant, but he does so by regenerating us so that we will necessarily exercise faith in
Christ and then by working in us so that we are "carefull to work out our salvatione in
fear and trimbling.'"14 Torrance's apparent concern to protect the Christian message
from a conditional gospel, i.e., one that says that repentance or forsaking of sin is a
309 Examen, 549-624.
310 E.g., Rutherford says things like this against the Arminians: "There is, therefore, no condition in
Perseverance: For [if there were] then God would promise that Saints will unfailingly persevere provided
that they would persevere." Examen, 554-5.
311 Calvin and English Calvinism, 209.
312 Torrance, "The Covenant Concept," 225-43; idem, "Covenant or Contract?," 51-76; Bell, Calvin and
Scottish Theology, 76.
313 J.I. Packer states: "Whereas orthodox Calvinism taught that Christ satisfied the law in the sinner's
place, Baxter held that Christ satisfied the Lawgiver and so procured a change in the law." This law-
change meant, for Baxter, that the condition for justification under the new covenant is faith, which, he
says, is "all out of Christ in ourselves." Later in his life, Baxter even called faith and the life of faith,
merit. See Packer, Redemption & Restoration ofMan, 254-62; and Richard Baxter, Aphorismes oj Justification
(London, 1649), 121 ff, 137ff.
314 Catacbisme, 213.
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necessary pre-condition to salvation, is both legitimate and honorable. But he is
incorrect to find such a conditional gospel in federal theology. Although Rutherford,
the so-called "prince of the federal theologians,"315 speaks of conditions in the
covenant—as do others like William Ames—he explicitly states that God himself fulfills
those conditions by working in us. As John Von Rohr maintains in regard to the
Puritans, the covenant had,
a twofold nature, that is, it was conditional and it was absolute. The
conditional character of the Covenant is, of course, expressed in the idea
of compact and mutual obligation. The Covenant is of grace because
God's gifts within it are those of mercy to the undeserving, but it is
conditional because the promises are to those who present a faith, a
sincerity, a "pitching on Christ." Grace is given if conditions are
fulfilled. But to leave the covenant idea at that point [is] to commit
grievous error and to be guilty of serious absurdity in Puritan
understanding Faith is required as a condition within [the covenant]
antecedent to salvation, but that faith is already granted by [the covenant]
as a gift consequent of election.316
It is the Arminians, not Puritans like Rutherford, who endorse a conditional covenant
and a conditional gospel. Rutherford's thinking in the Examen is the polar opposite of
Arminian theology. Its unconditionality allows us no room for calling Westminster
theology "crypto-Arminian."
It is precisely because the covenant is unconditional that it can function as an
absolute and objective "anchor" for the Christian's assurance in Rutherford's
understanding. Christians ultimately rest assured because their salvation is not founded
upon anything that they do but wholly upon what God has promised to do in and
through them. Since, as we previously mentioned, all of soteriology finds its causal
foundation in the covenant of redemption, the believer's assurance is bound up together
with intratrinitarian promises and commitments made between the Father and the
Son.317 The salvation of the elect is as absolute, certain, and incontrovertible as is the
Godhead itself. Such an emphasis on absolute election, however, naturally raises a
315 Bell, Calvin and Scottish Theology, 70.
316 John Von Rohr, "Covenant and Assurance in Early English Puritanism," CH 34 (1965), 200-201.
William Ames expresses this fact as follows: "the condition of the Covenant is also promised in the
Covenant." And, for this reason, he could also say that the covenant is wholly God's act. Ames' words
are cited in The Covenant of Grace, not Absolute, but Conditional, Modestly Asserted, and the Preachers thereof




question: how are we to know the elect from the non-elect? It should be no surprise
that this was the question that haunted people in the wake of the Reformation. In order
to answer it, Rutherford and many of his post-Reformation peers pointed towards
certain subjective grounds whereby the Christian might gain an assured answer to his or
her query into divine election.
This tendency of the post-Reformation orthodox to implement subjective
grounds for conveying assurance, especially the use of the practical syllogism/18 is
perhaps the principal reason why scholars like Kendall argue for discontinuity between
Calvin and his successors. Following this characteristic Puritan methodology,
Rutherford remarks:
But we contend against them [the Arminians] that people ought to be
certain about their own eternal Election, not, to be sure, with an a priori
certainty (for who has known the mind of God?) but with an a posteriori
certainty....Because all who are elected unto glory are also predestined to
Conversion and Adoption as Sons of God, Eph. 1.5-6. But God has
given us many TEKpqpia, proofs, by which we should know that we are
converted; Therefore, also by which we should know that we are elected
unto glory/19
The practical syllogism is designed to enable the individual to draw a conclusion about
the reality of his or her faith from certain TEKpqpta, or proofs, by using logic as follows:
"The one who overcomes the world and observes the commands ofGod, believes (as in 1 John 5.4-5 and
James 2.18); But I have overcome the world and observed the commands of God; Therefore, I
believeT320 The purpose of such syllogisms is to help those who are struggling with
assurance by pointing to evidence for the reality of their conversion and, thus, of their
election.
According to Wilhelm Niesel, the use of practical syllogisms like this to grant
personal assurance is an altogether foreign concept in Calvin.321 But, as Karl Barth has
318 Practical syllogisms should be differentiated from mystical syllogisms. The former bases assurance on
logical deductions made from external criteria, i.e., the fruit of faith, whereas the latter bases it on
deductions made from internal criteria. On this, see Barth, CD, 11/2, 333-40; and Weber, Foundations of
Dogmatics, 2:358-62.
319 Examen, 638-9. For examples of the practical syllogism in the post-Reformation orthodox, see Perkins,
Workes, 1:87, 510, 529, 547; Dickson, Tberapeutica sacra, 4, 216, 407; David Pareus, Theological Miscellanies of
Dr. David Pareus (London, 1645), 808.
32(1 Examen, 21.
321 Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, 170-81; idem, "Syllogismus practicus?'' in Aus Theologie und Geschichte der
reformierten Kirche (Neukirchen: K. Moers, 1933), 158-79.
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pointed out, Niesel's conclusions are overstated. Although the use of the practical
syllogism may not have appeared in Calvin formally, it is not "possible to
deny.. .that.. .the syllogismus practicus did constitute one element in the theology of
Calvin."322 Indeed, Calvin, at least on occasion, speaks in much the same way as does
Rutherford:
Therefore, as it is wrong to make the force of election contingent upon
faith in the gospel, by which we feel that it appertains to us, so we shall
be following the best order if, in seeking the certainty of our election, we
cling to those latter signs which are sure attestations of it.323
Luther, too, according to Bernhard Lohse, speaks on occasion of our works as "signs of
faith" from which we can "ascertain and recognize.. .true faith" and, thus, be assured of
our salvation.324
That being said, there can be no hiding the fact that Rutherford and the Puritans
place greater weight on the use of subjective signs or proofs than Calvin and Luther.
But this is due in large part to the contextual differences between the eras of the
Reformation and post-Reformation. It should be no surprise that their emphases and
methodologies differ somewhat if the questions that they are seeking to answer are
themselves different. For Calvin, speaking primarily against the Roman Church's denial
of full assurance, the accent is understandably on the objectivity of God's benevolence
in Christ or what we have called the principle of faith.325 Whereas the Christian's
experience of faith oftentimes confirms the Roman Church's position on assurance, it is
the definition of faith that effectively counters it. But, for Rutherford and the Puritans,
the stress is upon the individual's experience of faith. Later in Christ Dying, Rutherford
seems to make just this point when he says: "The assurance of Christ's righteousnesse is
a direct act of faith, apprehending imputed righteousnesse: the evidence of our
justification we now speak of, is the reflect light [sic], not by which wee are justified, but by
which we know that we are justified."326 William Ames is even more to the point:
322 CD, II/2, 335.
323 institutes III.xxiv.4, 968. See Wallace's discussion in Calvin's Doctrine ufthe Christian Ufe, 301-3.
324 Lohse, Martin Luther's Theology, 265-6.
325 See Beeke's discussion of assurance in the Roman Church up to the Council of Trent (Assurance of
Faith, chapter 2). There were, of course, differences of opinion within the Roman Church both at Trent
and after it. For more on these intra ecclesial variances, see William Cunningham's discussion of
Catharinus and Bellarmine in "The Reformers and the Doctrine of Assurance," in The Reformers and the
Theology of the Reformation, 143-5.
326 Christ Dying, 111, emphasis added.
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This justifying Faith of it[s] own nature doth produce, and so hath
joyned with it a speciall and certaine perswasion of the grace and mercy
of God in Christ: whence also justifying Faith is oftentimes not amisse described by
the orthodox [i.e., Calvin et al.] by this perswasion, especially when they doe oppose
thatgenerall Faith to which the Papists ascribe all things: but 1. This perswasion
as touching the sense of it, is not alwayes present. For it may and often
doth come to passe, either through weaknesse of judgement, or through
divers tentations and troubles of mind, that he, who truly believeth, and
is by Faith justified before God, yet for a time may thinke according to
that which hee feeles, that he neither believeth, nor is reconciled to God.
2. There be divers degrees, of this perswasion, so that neither all
believers have altogether the same assurance of the grace and favour of
God, nor the same believers at all times.327
This explains how it is that Rutherford can define faith in the same basic terms
as Calvin, especially when speaking against the Roman Church, and then explicitly state
that assurance is not of the essence of faith, in the context of his dispute with the
Antinomians. He is talking primarily about the individual's experience of faith, or the
reflex act of faith, while Calvin is concentrating on faith's direct act. Whereas
Rutherford's context demands that faith and assurance be articulated in such a way as to
avoid certain errors of Christian living, or of sanctification, Calvin's warrants an
expression of faith aimed against wrong conceptions of justification.328 As we
previously mentioned, the Reformed emphasis on absolute predestination probably also
played a role in bringing about this contextual change. It increasingly brought to the
fore questions of whether or not individuals were themselves elect. Subjective aspects
became more prominent in Rutherford than they did in Calvin, because they were
needed to cope with the exigencies of the time in which he lived and ministered.
In developing the subjective characteristics of faith and assurance, however,
Rutherford accentuates three important features that draw his thinking closer to the
327 Marrow, 132-3, emphasis added.
328 It is primarily the Antinomian denial of sanctification as a basis for providing assurance that drives
Rutherford and his contemporaries to place their emphasis where they do. In The Tryal <& Triumph of
Faith, Rutherford complains of Tobias Crisp (1600-1643) in much the same way that John Winthrop
(1588-1649), during the American Antinomian controversy, complains of Ann Hutchinson's (1591-1643)
"two dangerous errors: (1) That the person of the Holy Ghost dwells in a justified person. (2) That no
sanctification can help to evidence to us our justification" (Perry Miller, ed., The American Puritans: Their
Prose and Poetry [New York: Anchor Books, 1956], 50). Winthrop's and Rutherford's positions are in
direct opposition to such views. See, e.g. in Rutherford, Tryal, 132. On the American Antinomian
controversy, see David D. Hall, ed., The Antinomian Controversy 1636-1638 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University, 1968); James W. Jones, The Shattered Synthesis: New England Puritanism before the Great Awakening
(New Haven and London: Yale University, 1973); and Michael P. Winship, Making Plenties: Militant
Protestantism and Free Grace in Massachusetts, 1636-1641 (Princeton: Princeton University, 2002).
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priorities of Calvin. First, Rutherford substantiates the use of practical syllogisms by
appealing to the example of Scripture:
1 John 2.3, By this we know that we know [God], if we keep his commands; and
3.14, We know that we havepassedfrom death to life, because we love the brothers-, 1
John 5.2, Bj this we know that we love the sons ofGod, since we love God and keep
his commands-, 1 John 4.16, And we know and believe the love that God has toward
us [W]e know that we are called and justified [by God] by our peace of
conscience, by our napppcna, boldness, by our sense of the love of God
poured out in our hearts, by our hope, which is not ashamed, and by our
boasting in our afflictions, Rom. 5.1-4; and 8.15-17.329
Scripture delineates certain proofs whereby we may know that we possess saving faith.
And Scripture also substantiates the application of the rules of logic in drawing
conclusions from its premises. In Matthew 21.31-2, Jesus himself argues "from an
Antecedent to a consequent by naturall logick" and critckes the religious leaders of the
day for not having done the same thing themselves.330
Second, Rutherford links the use of practical syllogisms to the objective grounds
of assurance by way of the ministry of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit testifies with our
spirits that we possess the signs or proofs given by God in Scripture and, thus, that the
objective promises of salvation apply to us personally. This reflex knowledge is not
discernable by the human mind or free will alone but is as much a work of the Spirit as
faith itself is:
As Faith which is the direct act of knowing and relying on Christ for
pardon, is a worke of the Spirit, above the reach of reason; so also the
reflect act ofmy knowing and feeling, that I beleeve and am in Christ.. .is
a supernaturall work, above the compasse and reach of our Free-wil, and
is dispensed according to the spirations and stirrings of the free grace of
God.m
But the Spirit does more than simply testify to the presence of the signs or proofs of faith
within us. He enables the entire syllogistic process: "while the Holy Spirit brings it about
\efficit] that we would know and perceive by a reflex act that we believe, repent, and




331 Christ Dying, 86.
332 Examen, 23.
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Third, Rutherford seems to attach greater significance to the direct testimony of
the Spirit than to the reflex testimony just described. Joel Beeke has rightly noted that
Rutherford falls into the category of divines who, along with William Twisse and
Thomas Goodwin, distinguish the Spirit's "witnessing to the believer's spirit by direct
applications of the Word" from the Spirit's "witnessing with the believer's spirit by
syllogism." But he then claims, rather perplexingly, that Rutherford "stresses that the
reflex act of faith is as a rule 'more spiritual and helpful' than are direct acts."3"3 It is
true that Rutherford tends to emphasize the reflex testimony of the Spirit more so than
the direct testimony. In light of his context, this ought not to surprise anyone. But it is
not at all evident that Rutherford sees the reflex testimony as, therefore, somehow more
important or "more spiritual and helpful" than the direct testimony, as others of the
Puritans do.334 The phrase "more spiritual and helpful" does not, as far as the current
author has been able to tell, occur in any of the writings of Rutherford, at least not in
those cited by Beeke. Not only so, but when Rutherford is presented with the
opportunity to declare which testimony is most important to assurance, he stresses the
direct over the reflex. In answer to the question, "How ar wee assured of our
continuance in grace in our owne conscience?," Rutherford responds by saying "Godis
Spirit witnesseth with our spirit that we ar Godis sonnes and heiris." But then he
defines this "witnes of Godis Spirit" as the direct testimony: "the voyce of Godis Spirit
accompanying the Word, so speaking to the heart and making all the promises of God
to be myne as if the new covenant wer ritten and spokin to me by name." And he
clearly distinguishes it from the reflex act of faith.335 Why would Rutherford answer this
specific catechism question about how we subjectively gain assurance by referring to the
Spirit's direct testimony if he truly believes that the reflex witness is "more spiritual and
helpful," as Beeke has claimed? It must be because he believes that the direct witness is
more significant to the Christian's assurance, even though his methodology is to
emphasize the reflex witness when addressing the needs of his culture.
All this is to say that Rutherford's understanding of faith and assurance, while
differing from Calvin's understanding in emphasis and method, is substantially the same,
perhaps even more so than is the case for others of his contemporaries. He defines
333 Assurance ofFaith, 170-71.
334 Beeke cites Anthony Burgess and Thomas Brooks as warning against relying upon the direct testimony
of the Spirit. Assurance ofFaith, 203nl49.
335 Catachisme, 213-14.
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faith, principially, as assurance, both intellectually and fiducially. And, even though he
emphasizes the subjective grounds of assurance more than Calvin does, he places great
stress on the testimony of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit directly testifies to the believer's
spirit, applying the absolute and unconditional promises of God to him or her directly.
And the Holy Spirit also testifies with the spirit of the Christian, allowing him or her to
discern certain subjective signs or proofs and then to draw the appropriate conclusions
from them. Although Rutherford's methodology favors the latter, the reflex testimony,
his theory favors the former, the direct testimony. This strongly pneumatological
emphasis in Rutherford certainly seems to parallel Calvin's own perspective, which can
be seen in the following quote: "the Spirit of God affords us such a testimony that our
spirit is assured of the adoption of God, when He is our Guide and Teacher. Our mind
would not of its own accord convey this assurance to us, unless the testimony of the
Spirit preceded it."336 It does, therefore, seem best to conclude with Beeke that there is
no substantial difference between Rutherford and Calvin on the doctrine of assurance.
The criticisms of Bell and Torrance—although offering conclusions that are
questionable—do, nonetheless, contain well-founded warnings. Despite Rutherford's
good intentions and his care to link the practical syllogism to the work of the Holy
Spirit, there can be no doubt but that such a subjective emphasis actually served in
succeeding generations to exacerbate the believer's struggles over assurance and to push
him or her to look intra se rather than ad Christum. This, when later coupled with a
harmful sacramental theology, resulted in a profoundly paralyzing introspection within
the Scottish kirk, the effects of which can still be seen in some regions of the Highlands
today. Rutherford himself, however, clearly warned against putting too much stock in
these subjective external signs as over against the objective promises of God, even going
so far as to say that "it is Adultery to seek a signe, because we cannot rest on our
Husbands word."337 Others of Rutherford's contemporaries, like George Gillespie for
instance, were even more patent in their warnings against relying upon subjective and
external signs: "Beware that marks of grace do not lead us from Christ, or make us look
upon ourselves as anything at all out of Christ."338 The Puritans were aware of the
problems associated with guiding believers to look within themselves for landmarks of
3,6 Calvin, Romans and Thessalonians, 170.
337 Tryal, 10.
338 George Gillespie, A Treatise ofMiscellany Questions, in The Works of George Gillespie, 2 vols. (Edinburgh:
Robert Ogle and Oliver and Boyd, 1846), 2:104.
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saving faith, and they warned against such problems. But they persisted in using such
TEKpppta because they could not stand seeing their parishioners excessively burdened
with unnecessary anxiety and fear and because they—like Calvin—believed that
assurance was principally of the essence of faith.
The significant thing to note in Rutherford's treatment of faith and assurance, as
far as this thesis is concerned, is that it summarizes many of the central differences that
exist between him and the Arminians. The Arminians teach a conditional or
hypothetical assurance which is based decisively upon human free choice, and they fit
their view of divine sovereignty in around that. God's sovereign promise that the
Christian will persevere is, according to them, conditional upon the individual's free
perseverance in the faith. Having begun in the faith, a person can freely choose to reject
the faith and, thus, render the promises of God that were initially given to him or her
null and void. But Rutherford teaches an unconditional assurance based upon the
sovereign promises of God, and he fits his view of human freedom in around that.
Evidence for this can be found in the God-centeredness of Rutherford's grounds for
assurance. Every grounds for assurance given by Rutherford ultimately finds its end in
God. The primary objective grounds are presented within a framework that is wholly
trinitarian, and the secondary subjective grounds are inextricably tied to the ministry of
the Holy Spirit, so much so that it is "above the compasse and reach of our Free-wil."339
Rutherford and the Arminians are diametrically opposed to one another. The
Arminians offer a theology that defends human freedom, while Rutherford tenders one
that exalts God in ever)' conceivable way.
339 Christ Dying, 86.
Chapter 5: Rutherford's Theology and the Grounds for his
Opposition to Arminianism
Margo Todd has helpfully pointed out that a common error among historians is their
tendency to read history through their own "interpretive structures" and, in doing so, to
lose "the thread of the story" that a certain era in history is trying to tell.1 What is true
for historians, however, can also be said about theologians who try to read theology
without regard for the historical context in which it is written: they lose sight of the
story that a particular individual or era is telling. In the case of Rutherford and his tirade
against Arminian theology in the Examen, there is indeed a story that needs to be told,
and we miss it if we concentrate purely on the theological elements of the debate. But
the theological elements are themselves a vital part of the process, because the particular
story comes to light only through questions that are raised by Rutherford's theology and
his reaction to the Arminians.
By examining Rutherford's theology systematically beginning with his
understanding of revelation and the distinction between theologia archetypa et ectypa—the
terminus a quo for our study—and ending with his view of assurance as grounded in the
unconditional and absolute promises of God—our terminus ad quem—we have painted a
picture of a God that is radically transcendent, even breathtakingly so. Rutherford's
voluntarism, which considers the will of God to be a rule unto itself, limited only by
divine immutability or the law of non-contradiction, is so austere that it can leave one
wondering how he actually escapes accusations of divine caprice, as he insists he does.
Rutherford's supralapsarian predestinarianism, although not as strict as it perhaps could
be nor as some have assumed it to be, is still quite severe, insofar as it teaches that God
creates some people unto destruction without regard to their sin, having already decreed
to pass them over. Such an exalted view of the will of God seems to call into question
the New Testament picture of Jesus as one who is full of love and compassion and
concern for the justice of all. Rutherford's understanding of salvation, likewise, exalts
the freedom of God's will over human freedom. The divine will, rather than the human
will, is the final arbiter in matters of salvation. Although humankind is said to have true
freedom, this freedom can never be such that it encroaches upon divine freedom in any
way.
1 Margo Todd, '"All One with Tom Thumbe': Arminianism, Popery, and the Story of the Reformation in
Early Stuart Cambridge," CH 64 (1995), 563.
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The significant thing to notice here is that these doctrines in Rutherford are
diametrically opposed to Arminian theology. Rutherford's voluntarism direcdy
contradicts Arminian intellectualism, and his overwhelming emphasis on divine freedom
runs counter to the prominence the Arminians give to human freedom. While
Rutherford's God reigns and rules on high in the current world order, the Arminian
God voluntarily places himself in subjection to his creatures. The two systems lie on
opposite ends of the continuum. This is true not simply theologically, however; it is also
true attitudinally. The Examen does not contain a friendly disagreement between two
brothers trying to work out their petty differences but an outright frontal attack, an
internecine feud. Rutherford has no tolerance whatsoever for Arminian theology.2 He
is not interested in dialoguing with the Arminians but in annihilating their views. And in
his bid to do this, he associates their theology with the beliefs of practically every known
group that has espoused heretical or, at least, anti-Reformational ideals, including:
Anabaptists, Antitrinitarians, Arians, Atheists, Dominicans, Epicureans, Jesuits,
Libertines, Papists, Pelagians, Pseudo- Lutherans, Separatists, Socinians, and Tritheists.3
This immediately raises several questions. Why is Rutherford opposed to
Arminianism to such an extent that he is altogether intolerant of it? Why does he spend
most of his lifetime writing against it? And, why does he devote his classroom lectures
to refuting its doctrines? These questions become further intensified if David Muilan is
correct in his claim that there was a Calvinist consensus in Scotland in the seventeenth
century.4 If Muilan is right that very little actual Arminianism existed in Scotland at this
2 Rutherford is not a man known for his tolerance. He is, instead, overtly dogmatic and uncompromising,
even in matters that may seem trivial to us today. During the Protester-Resolutioner controversy, for
instance, Rutherford absented himself in protest from the General Assembly of the church and never
attended again for the last ten or so years of his life; he dissolved intimate friendships with fellow-
Calvinists David Dickson and Robert Blair, because they disagreed with him over what stance should be
taken towards Charles II and the Scots army; he printed a scathing denunciation of his opponents in the
preface to his Survey of the Survey of that Summe of Church Discipline; and he uncompromisingly persisted in
verbally accosting James Wood, a colleague at St. Mary's College, until Wood became "wearie of his place
exceedingly" and moved to St. Salvators College in 1657 (Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions,
56-60).
3 See, e.g., Examen, 5-9, 15-16, 46, 87-8, 94-7, 162, 166, 196-7, 200, 210, 212, 221, 223-5, 230-31, 234-5,
265, 305, 307-8, 310-11, 313-14, 316, 319, 321-3, 325, 327, 337-8, 353, 356-63, 369, 371, 375, 386, 398,
400, 431, 436, 453, 457, 488, 492, 496-8, 500, 501, 503-5, 507, 511, 517-18, 520, 527, 530, 541, 543, 545-6,
550, 553, 591, 596, 622, 625, 628, 630, 643-6, 662, 664-5, 675, 677, 679, 691-2, 709-10, 716-17, 721-6, 728-
30, 753, 759.
4 David G. Mullan, "Theology in the Church of Scotland 1618-c. 1640: A Calvinist Consensus?," SCJ 26:3
(1995), 595; idem, Scottish Puritanism, 1-2. In seeing a Calvinist consensus in Scotland, Muilan is following
those who argue for the same thing in England: e.g., Peter G. Lake, "Calvinism and the English Church
1570-1635," Past and Present 114 (1987), 32-76; Tyacke, Anti-Calvinistr, David R. Como, "Puritans,
Predestination and the Construction of Orthodoxy in Early Seventeenth-Century England," in Conformity
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time and that the term "Arminian" was simply an epithet used by jus divinum
Presbyterians like Rutherford "to denounce the other [Episcopalian] faction," then one
is left wondering why Rutherford could be so completely preoccupied by a system of
thought that posed no threat whatsoever in itself.5 Was Rutherford deceived? Or, was
he simply being disingenuous? Part of the answer to our questions lies in the fact that
Rutherford is not to be understood merely from a Scottish perspective. He lived, was
educated, and wrote in a continental context, one that transcended the bounds of his
native Scotland. But to confine our answer to this is to miss the primary grounds for
Rutherford's opposition to Arminianism and, thus, to overlook our story. In this final
chapter, we will survey those grounds and tell that story and then conclude by drawing
out relevant implications not only for the Calvin-Calvinist debate but, more practically,
for the church in the twenty-first century as well.
5.1: The Grounds for Rutherford's Opposition to Arminianism
5.1.1: The Two Strands of Arminianism
In November 1638, the first "true" General Assembly in thirty-six years convened in
Glasgow.6 The moderator for this momentous Assembly, Alexander Henderson (1583-
1646), initiated its proceedings by pointing to two strands of Arminianism, each of
which he believed ran to a different end:
One is that which hes troubled the Low Countries, and hath spred itself
so farr, and that is nothing but the way to Socinianisme, and Socinianismus
inchoatus is Arminianismus consociatus. Certainlie no man that will consider
aright of the poyntes of Arminianisme, but he will see more nor [than]
the seids and grossnesse of Socinianisme. There is ane uther
Arminianisme mentioned by some in England, and uthers in Scodand,
and that runs in ane uther way—it runs to Papistrie, and is inchoatus
Papismus,7
and Orthodoxy in the English Church, c.1560-1660, eds. Peter Lake and Michael Questier (Woodbridge,
Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2000), 64-87; Dewey D. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant
Theology, 1525-1695 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1982); Patrick Collinson, The Religion
ofProtestants: The Church in English Society, 1559-1625 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
5 Mullan, "Theology in the Church of Scotland," 595.
6 Each of the six Assemblies held during this thirty-six year interval (1606, 1608, 1610, 1616, 1617, 1618)
were condemned as "illegal," because they were "so overborne with by royal interference." Among the
first acts of the 1638 Assembly was to declare these "pretended" Assemblies "null and void forever."
Alexander Peterkin, ed., Records ofthe Kirk ofScotland (Edinburgh: John Sutherland, 1838), 14, 24-6.
7 Peterkin, Records of the Kirk ofScotland, 155. Robert Baillie makes a similar statement in his Antidote against
Arminianism, 18.
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David Mullan cites these words by Henderson as proof that what existed in Scotland in
the early seventeenth century was not in fact true Arminianism.8 He argues that these
words suggest that Scottish "Arminianism" had no clear association with the errors of
the Remonstrants and was, instead, a polemical ploy to denounce William Laud and his
prelatic party for their ecclesial convictions. While it is beyond question that Mullan's
work on the whole represents a significant contribution to our understanding of the
church in early modern Scotland, his claims about Arminianism are, nonetheless, rather
unsatisfactory for at least the following three reasons.
First, according to Henderson, what existed in England and Scotland at this time
is at least similar enough to the theology of the Remonstrants to be classified under the
genus of Arminianism. The mere fact that Henderson refers to two strands of
Arminianism by the same name is indicative of doctrinal similarities between the two
groups. And this should be enough in itself to overturn the idea that Arminianism in
Scotland was somehow not actual Arminianism. But Robert Baillie goes even further
than Henderson and explicitly connects the Scottish variety of Arminianism with the
Dutch strain by characterizing the errors of the former in terms of the five articles of
the Remonstrants.9
Second, although modern scholarship is divided as to whether William Laud was
himself an Arminian,10 it is clear that he was perceived as such by his Reformed
contemporaries in Scotland on theological grounds, not simply because of his ecclesial
innovations. The reason that Laud was perceived as an Arminian by men like
Rutherford is because his theology was distinguished by an unambiguous embrace of
conditional predestinarianism.11 In speaking out against the Puritan view of
predestination, Laud demonstrates this conviction: "almost all of them say that God
from all eternity reprobates by far the greater part of mankind to eternal fire, without any
8 Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 227.
9 Antidote againstArminianism, 22-3; Tadensium autokatakrisis, 8-32.
10 Nicholas Tyacke has offered solid evidence in favor of understanding Laud as an Arminian (Anti-
Calvinists, 266-70; and idem, "Archbishop Laud," in The Early Stuart Church, 1603-1642, ed. Kenneth
Fincham [London: MacMillan, 1993], 51-70). Tyacke's view has been challenged by Kevin Sharpe (The
Personal Paele ofCharles I [New Haven: Yale University, 1992], 286-92), Julian Davis (The Caroline Captivity of
the Church [Oxford: Clarendon, 1992], 95-103), and Peter White (Predestination, Polity and Polemic
[Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992], 276-86). The scholarly divide over Laud is largely the result of
Laud's ambiguity in expressing his own position in regard to the doctrines of grace, which, according to
Peter Lake, is itself typical of English Arminians. See his "Calvinism and the English Church," 72.
11 The same can be said for the Aberdeen Doctors, a group Mullan uses to prove that Arminianism in
Scotland referred more to an individual's ecclesial beliefs. See note 43 on pp. 247-8 below.
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eye at all to their sin. Which opinion my very soul abominates."12 According to Robert
Baillie, this is all that is necessary to label an individual an Arminian. He or she does not
have to embrace overdy all five articles of the Remonstrants in order to be guilty of
Arminianism, because all five articles are connected logically as "a chaine, any one link
whereof, but speciallie the first, will draw all the rest."13 It is only necessary, therefore,
that someone embrace the conditional predestinarianism of the first article for the
charge of Arminianism to apply. Even if not explicitly sanctioned, the other four
articles are implicit within the first, such that the only thing that could prevent an
individual from accepting the entire Arminian system, according to Baillie, was logical
inconsistency.14 Because Laud unambiguously endorsed the conditional
predestinarianism of the first article, he would have been perceived as believing in all
five and, thus, as being an Arminian, irrespective of his claims—or the lack thereof—or
of his ecclesial beliefs. When we couple this fact with Laud's Arminian-like emphasis on
reason in matters of faith—as we saw in chapter two—we have good cause for
concluding, with Nicholas Tyacke, that Laud was, in fact, an Arminian or, at least if not
an Arminian, then one who clearly embraced several characteristic elements of that
system.15
Third, it is clear from the proceedings of the Glasgow Assembly of 1638 that
Arminianism was in fact present in Scotland. Many of the bishops who were brought
before this Assembly for trial were closely allied with Laud and the "Canterburians."16
Even so, the most common charge leveled against men at the Assembly was that of
Arminianism. David Mullan admits that over two-dozen men were so charged.17 In
12 The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Faud, ed. James Bliss, 7 vols. (Oxford: John Henry
Parker, 1847-60), 6:133, emphasis added.
13 Baillie, Fadensium autokatakrisis, 18.
14 Richard Mullcr's research confirms this. He notes: "By the beginning of the seventeenth century, early
Reformed orthodoxy had produced a fairly comprehensive summation of doctrine, an enclosed system of
theology...in which no major locus of doctrine could be altered without effecting a modification of the
entire system." See Muller, "Federal Motif," 102; and "The Christological Problem," 146. To apply this
to the Arminians: one cannot deny, say, limited atonement without also making significant modifications
to total depravity, the irresistibility of grace, and the perseverance of the saints. Alterations at one point
would necessarily create alterations at other points as well.
15 See the discussion on the role of reason in Laud and the Arminians near the end of section 2.2.2 above.
16 Such was the case with Thomas Sydserff, John Crighton, John Spottiswood, John Maxwell, Walter
Whiteford, and James Wedderburn. See Peterkin, Records of the Kirk of Scotland., 163-73; Gordon
Donaldson, The Making of the Scottish Prajer Book of 1637 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1954), 41-
59; MacMillan, The Aberdeen Doctors, 109-10.
17 David G. Mullan, "Arminianism in the Lord's Assembly: Glasgow, 1638," RSCHS 26 (1996), 22. See
also Peterkin, Records ofthe Kirk ofScotland., 154-83.
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many of the cases in which men were accused of Arminianism, the charges were further
explained by particular reference to the errors of the Remonstrants in regard to the
doctrines of grace. David Mitchell (d.1663), for example, a minister in Edinburgh, was
thus accused "that his doctrine is the doctrine of the remonstrances that they avowed at
the Counsel! of Dort...for he defends universal! grace, resistabilide of Grace—efftcacie
of Christs death—[and] apostacie of the Saints."18 Although many men were charged
with Arminianism in Glasgow, others were not. At least eight other bishops and
ministers were not charged with Arminianism. They were charged instead with
episcopacy, popery, or immorality, and sometimes with all three.19
For these three reasons, it would seem best to conclude that Arminianism—or
at least certain aspects of it—was recognizable in Scodand in the early seventeenth
century, that it was not uncommon, that it was integrally related to the errors of the
Remonstrants in regard to the doctrines of grace, and that it was not simply a polemical
tool used to discredit those who held to episcopacy. David Mullan is probably correct
in his analysis that a Calvinist consensus prevailed in early modern Scotland. Very few
men, relatively speaking, explicitiy embraced the full Arminian system.20 But his thesis
too quickly dismisses the fact that Arminianism was a common charge leveled against
men for their erroneous views in regard to the doctrines of grace.21 Mullan trivializes
the presence of Arminian doctrines in Scodand in order to preserve the existence of
Calvinist hegemony. But, as Peter Lake has reminded us, "hegemony is not monopoly,"
and, thus, a Calvinist consensus can perfectly coexist with the presence of and-Calvinist
18 Peterkin, Records of the Kirk ofScotland, 160. John Crighton and James Fleck are two among others who
were likewise accused of Arminiamsm and charged with teaching universal grace and the free will of
mankind. Records of the Kirk ofScotland, 163, 165; Robert Baillie, The Tetters and journals ofRobert Baillie, ed.
David Lang, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: Robert Ogle, 1841), 1:149; MacMillan, Aberdeen Doctors, 110-11.
19 Peterkin, Records of the Kirk of Scotland, 165-6, 170-73. "Hary Scrymsoure" is one interesting example.
He was accused of, in addition to other things, "venting of sundrie tenets of false doctrine." He was
never accused of Arminianism, however, and were it not for some sort of personal dispute, he probably
would have continued on in his pastoral charge (Records of the Kirk ofScotland., 182; Mullan, "Arminianism
in the Lord's Assembly," 13).
20 Mullan reports: "Even if our listed ministers were all guilty as charged, and we were to extend the list by
a few names, one is not struck by a massive, 'systemic,' infection" ("Arminianism in the Lord's
Assembly," 22-3). It must be said, however, that we are not looking for a "massive, 'systemic,' infection"
of Arminianism in Scotland. All we are looking for is the presence of a controversy over its doctrines to
show that Arminianism did in fact exist and that it was not uncommon.
21 Matgo Todd notes that "Mullan...finds litde outright Arminianism in Scotland and he is probably right,
but the complaints brought in the 1630s against ceremonialists like Maxwell, Sibbald, and Forbes do
include their theological positions on free will" (The Culture of Protestantism, 411n25). Moreover,
Rutherford, in a couple of letters written from Aberdeen, made clear distinctions between Arminianism
and episcopacy when describing his disputes with several of the Aberdeen Doctors {Tetters, 239, 275).
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sentiment.22 There is no reason to discount the charges of Arminianism in Scodand by
sweeping them under the proverbial rug. We need instead to determine why the
presence of Arminianism provoked such an intense reaction.
One part of the explanation for the reaction against Arminianism is the close
theological association that was perceived to exist between it and Roman Catholicism.
The association between ''Arminianism and popery" is so frequent in the literature of
the seventeenth century that Mullan insists it "acquired the tone of a liturgical
formula."23 The "formula" appears regularly in the sermons and writings ofmany of the
leading men of the day.24 And Rutherford is no exception to this. In the Examen,
Rutherford links the Arminians theologically with the Roman Church no fewer than
seventy-five times in connection with the following core doctrines: the authority of
Scripture, grace and free will, justification, and scientia media.
As we saw in chapter two, Rutherford perceives that the Arminian doctrine of
the liberty of prophesying undercut the Reformation's emphasis on sola Scriptura by
denying, along with Roman Catholicism, the objective authority of Scripture. Both
Arminianism and Roman Catholicism denied the Reformation's three-fold approach to
biblical interpretation, which was designed to preserve the objective authority of
Scripture to judge in matters of controversy. Although Arminianism was reputed to be
part of "Tradition I" (Heiko Oberman's category to describe those who believed in a
single-source theory of doctrine), it actually rejected "Tradition I," according to
Rutherford, and adopted the Roman Catholic "Tradition II" (or two-sources theory) by
introducing a second source of authority—to which they ascribed the status of ultimate
authority in matters of controversy—the interpreting individual.25 For Rutherford, the
Arminian denial of sola Scriptura was far more troubling than that of the Roman Church,
because the Arminian denial occurred from within the bounds of "Tradition I." Unlike
the Roman Church, the Arminians claimed the same presuppositional starting point as
did Calvinists like Rutherford but reached conclusions that were, at times, far different.
22 "Calvinism and the English Church," 31.
23 Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 227. Mullan tends to overlook the theological justification for the link
between the Arminians and the Papists and concentrates on the polemical.
24 See, e.g., David Calderwood, A Re-examination of the Vive Articles Enacted at Perth, anno 1618 (n.p., 1636),
A2r; Bailhe, Eadensium autokatakrisis, passim; idem, Antidote against Arminianism, passim; George Gillespie,
A Dispute against the English-Popish Ceremonies, A4r; Peterkin, Records of the Kirk of Scotland, 155-159; and
Andrew Ramsay, A Warning to Come out ofBabylon (Edinburgh, 1638), passim.
25 See Harvest ofMedievalTheology, 371; and the above discussions in sections 2.3, 2.3.3, and 2.4.
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In regard to grace and free will, Rutherford links the Arminians with Roman
Catholic theology by showing that their understanding of the relationship between
preparation and grace is drawn directly from the Jesuit view offacere quod in se est. Both
Luis de Molina and Arminius reject "Luther's insight into the nature of grace as the
unmerited favor of God" and opt instead to think of it "as a sort of divine assistance or
power given to men to enable them to perform certain acts, which they in their
corrupted natural state could not do."26 This "divine assistance" is granted to men and
women generally and universally, and it enables them facere quod in se est and, thereby, to
gain for themselves the gift of eternal life.27
The Arminian emphasis on faciendo quod in se est becomes even more problematic
for Rutherford, and even more like Roman Catholic theology, when it is seen in the
light of their doctrine of justification. As we saw in chapter four, the Arminians believe
that the post-lapsarian will does not exert any negative influence upon the function of
the intellect. This means that both the fallen will and the fallen intellect are able facere
quod in se est in receiving the divine grace of regeneration. When this is combined with
the Arminian belief that our faith is imputed for our righteousness, we come face to face
with a doctrine that teaches that we are righteous in the sight of God as a result of a
human action (faith), which is accomplished by the will and intellect "doing what is in
them" in their appropriating of divine grace.28 Theoretically speaking, there is not much
that separates this understanding of justification from the Roman Catholic
understanding of it.
But when it is placed alongside a view of conditional predestination that is
derived from divine scientia media, the link with Roman theology becomes unavoidable.
In the first place, this is because the Arminians' embrace of scientia media itself, according
to Karl Barth, places them squarely within a tradition that was consciously in direct
opposition to Luther and Calvin and the Reformation.29 Arminius' contemporaries,
both friends and foes, evidently perceived this and pointed to his reliance upon scientia
26 Craig, The Problem ofDivine Foreknowledge, 20-1 5.
27 "Doing what is in them" does not direcdy gain salvation for men and women, in Arminius'
understanding. As we saw in chapter four, it gains God's co-operating or saving grace. But, since there
are "necessary connections" between faciendo quod in se est and the "grace of Conversion," it can be said
that by "doing what is in them" individuals can and will receive eternal life. See the discussion in section
4.2.1.2 above.
28 See section 4.3.1 above.
29 See section 3.1.3 above.
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media as that aspect of his theology which demonstrated "catholic influences" most
clearly.30
In the second place, and more significantly, this is because the Arminian view of
predestination unambiguously introduces an element of conditionality into the economy
of salvation, one in which God bases his decision to predestine and then to justify in
time upon the condition of faith in the individual. If we take into account the Arminian
view of justification and their intellectualist understanding of faith, then this can only
mean that the deciding factor that determines whether or not an individual will
believe—and, thus, be predestined by God and then justified in time and space—given
the fact of his or her creation, is ultimately whether or not that particular individual
chooses to believe. It is for this reason that Robert Baillie could say that Arminius, like
the papists, makes "Election and Justification to depend on Faith, not as it is an
instrument applying Christ, but as.. .a saving quality of it selfe.. .a true worke."31 And it
is what induces Rutherford to pronounce: "The Arminians answer right downe, the one
[person] is converted [and, thus, predestined by God and justified in time], because he
wills, and consents; whereas he might, if it pleased him, dissent and refuse the calling of
God; and the other [person] is not converted [and, thus, not predestined and justified],
because he will not be converted but refuses."32
The concern among the Reformed orthodox in regard to the Arminian doctrine
of conditional predestination is not, therefore, first and foremost a concern about
predestination itself. It is first and foremost a concern about how that doctrine affects
the cardinal doctrine of Protestantism, justification by faith alone. This was the case
even before the Synod of Dort in the Collatio Hagiensis of 1611, as Louis Praamsma has
shown.33 And it was the case in England for William Twisse, when he took his fellow
30 Dekker, "Was Arminius a Molinist?," 350n60. Caspar Sibelius, a student of Arminius from 1608-1609,
and Franciscus Gomarus, a fellow professor in Leiden, both indicated this feature of Arminius' theology
(Dekker, "Was Arminius a Molinist?," 350n60; H.W. Tijdeman, "Caspar Sibelius, in leven Predikant te
Deventer, volgens zijne onuitgegeven eigen-levensbeschrijving," Godgeleerde Bijdragen 23 [1849], 522). In
1612, Andre Rivet alerted Robert Boyd to the fact that "Arminius is a firm disciple of the Jesuites Molina,
and De Fonseca; and that he hath learned all his slights, cunning, and termes, from them" (Robert
Wodrow, Life ofRobert Boyd, 346, cited in Mullan, Scottish Runtamsm, 214).
31 Antidote againstAmiinianism, 35-6, 65.
32 Christ Dying, 311. Cf. Tryal, 152; Christ Dying, 78.
33 Louis Praamsma, "The Background of the Arminian Controversy (1586-1618)," in Crisis in the Reformed
Churches: Essays in Commemoration of the Great Synod ofDort, 1618-1619, ed. Peter Y. Dejong (Grand Rapids,
MI: Reformed Fellowship, 1968), 35-6. Praamsma notes that the Contra-Remonstrants were subdued in
their discussions about absolute predestination and much more concerned about what a denial of this
doctrine would do to justification by faith alone.
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Puritan John Cotton (c.l 585-1652) to task for what he perceived to be an Arminian •
view of predestination. David Como, who has examined Twisse's treatise against
Cotton, traces the crux of the issue between them to Cotton's doctrine of conditional
reprobation. Como explains:
By suggesting an intrinsic quality in man that caused God's decree of
reprobation, Cotton was in Twisse's opinion slipping unwittingly into an
argument that [ultimately] compromised the concept of justification by
faith alone. To put the argument more simply: no absolute
predestination, no justification by faith; no justification by faith, no
Protestantism.34
Anyone who questioned the doctrine of absolute predestination—whether an Arminian
or a Puritan—attracted the wrath of post-Reformation theologians like Rutherford and
Twisse, because, by questioning it, they were calling into question the very
underpinnings of Protestantism. By denying sola Scriptura and by embracing the Jesuit
ideas offacere quod in se est and scientia media, Arminianism consciously took up a position
that was in direct opposition to Reformation thinking and that threatened the very heart
of Reformation theology. Arminianism logically endangered everything that the
Reformation stood for. It was seen as a step onto the slippery slope that would plunge
the kirk towards popery and, as such, had to be resisted with all the strength one could
muster.
A second part of the explanation for the intense reaction to Arminianism in
Scotland—besides the theological similarities that existed between it and Roman
Catholicism—is the fact that this movement entered the Scots nation largely as a result
of the "south-winds" that proceeded from William Laud and his Canterburians.35 It is
possible that the relatively little Arminianism that was present in Scotland would never
have provoked the response that it did from men like Rutherford were it not for the fact
that it was coupled together with an imposed episcopacy and an imposed liturgy. The
Scottish kirk had dealt with the issue of episcopacy once before in 1576, which had
resulted in the publication of the Second Book of Discipline two years later.36 It was a
relatively simple matter then: all other forms of church government besides
Presbyterianism were decried as lacking the divine imprimatur. After sixty years,
34 "Puritans, Predestination and the Construction ofOrthodoxy," 84.
35 See Baillie, Tadensium autokatakrisis, 11-12, 21; idem, Antidote against Arminianism, 17-18; and the
discussion in section 1.2.3.
36 See James Kirk, ed., The Second Book ofDiscipline (Edinburgh: St. Andrews Press, 1980).
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however, the issue had become more complex. It was not just episcopacy but liturgy
that was being imposed on Scodand. "Laud's Liturgy," which was introduced in 1637 in
an effort to bring about religious uniformity,37 was seen by many in Scodand to mark a
return to popery. Andrew Cant (1590-1663), speaking at the 1638 General Assembly,
summari2ed the sentiments of the Presbyterian party in regard to Laud's Liturgy by
saying: "I think the Booke of Canons full of Popishe and Pop-lyke tyrannie ...[and] the
Service Booke full of superstition and massing Poperie."38 This reaction to the liturgy
was typical for many Scottish Calvinists, who, as John Morrill argues, perceived that it
was part of a "Popish Plot to subvert the Protestant identity of the Church of England
as a prelude to the reclamation of [all of] Britain for Catholicism." By imposing this
liturgy on Scotland, Charles I and William Laud were seen as mere puppets in the hands
of a "Catholic conspiracy."39 In Rutherford's own words, the "Episcopacie, and
humane Ceremonies" exemplified in Laud's Liturgy were "the gold ring" and "love
tokens" left behind by "the Whore of Babylon" when she "was cast out of the Church"
at the beginning of the Reformation. It was part of the Roman Church's "policy" to
"leave a token behinde her, that she might finde an errand in the house againe."40
Rutherford's fear was that it was just a matter of time before this policy would be
carried out and the Scottish kirk would fall prey to Rome's counter-Reformation.
Episcopacy with its loathsome liturgy thus represented the final step on the slippery
slope leading towards popery.
5.1.2: The Two Ends of Arminianism
When the ceremonies and traditions of Laud's episcopacy were joined together with
Arminianism in Scotland, the resulting union was, in Alexander Henderson's words,
"inchoatus Papismus." The perception was that if the doctrine of the kirk (i.e., the
Arminianism that was present within the church) reflected Roman Catholic theology,
37 John Morrill argues that the "best term" to describe the policy of James VI (and I) and Charles I in
regard to the church in Scodand is "congruity." Rather than seeking to "anglicanize" the church in
Scodand, he says, Charles sought to gain "uniformity of practice" {The Nature of the English Revolution [New
York: Longman, 1993], 101). There can be no doubt, however, that from the perspective of the Scottish
kirk—especially jus divinum Presbyterians like Rutherford—Charles' (and thus Laud's) insistence on
congruity and uniformity of practice would have been seen as an imposition of English liturgy and
practice and thus as anglicanization.
38 Peterkin, Records of the Kirk ofScotland, 164, 287-8.
39 Morrill, The Nature ofthe English Revolution, 37.
40 HOC, 18.
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and the practice of the kirk (i.e., the liturgical episcopacy of Laud and his party) reflected
Roman Catholic practice, then there was nothing left to differentiate the Scottish church
from Rome except the pope himself. This was Alexander Henderson's precise warning
to the Glasgow Assembly in 1638:
if ye consider this, how our doctrine, and the particulars of our
Confession of Faith, taught by the Ministers of the Kirk of Scotland
since the Reformation, how thir pointes began to be depraved by
Arminianisme, and poyntes of Poperie, joyned with their poyntes of
Arminianisme, and next consider how that the externall worship of God
was in changeing by the Service Booke, I see nothing deficient for the
whole bodie of Poperie but the Pope himselfe—Convertion of a
Sinner—universalitie of the matters of Christs death—justification by
workes—falling away of the saints; and then, if we had receaved the
Service Booke, what difference had beene 'twixt the Romane faith and
ours, if we had subjected ourselfes to the Pope?41
Since, according to Peter Lake, most Protestants in the seventeenth century
regarded the Roman Church as an "anti-religion, a perfectly symmetrical negative image
of true Christianity," which "rose by stealth and deception, pretending piety and
reverence while in fact inverting and perverting the values of true religion," it was,
therefore, perceived to be the most serious threat to the newly-established Reformed
kirk.42 It should be no surprise, then, that the National Covenant of 1638—largely
written by Henderson himself—began by recalling the Negative Confession of 1581,
and that almost half of the document itself consisted of the Negative Confession and
other acts of Parliament that were directed against popery. It should also be no surprise
that Rutherford reacted the way he did towards Arminianism and that he devoted his
labors and his lectures to refuting its doctrines. And it should be no surprise that the
Aberdeen Doctors—who were probably more Calvinistic than Arminian but who
embraced conditional reprobation, just like John Cotton, and favored episcopacy over
Presbyterianism—were still mercilessly run out of the church, thanks in no small
measure to Rutherford's testimony against them.43 The Reformation that had started in
41 Pctcrkin, Records of the Kirk ofScotland, 155.
42 Peter Lake, "Anti-popery: the Structure of a Prejudice," in Conflict in Earlj Stuart England: Studies in
Religion and Politics 1603-1642, eds. Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (London and New York: Longman,
1989), 73.
43 Many have claimed that the Aberdeen Doctors were exponents of Arminianism and that Aberdeen
itself was its hub. Donald MacMillan asserts that the Doctors had all "drunk deeply of the stream" of
Arminianism (Aberdeen Doctors, 58); Andrew Stevenson contends that they were "choked" with it (The
History of the Church and State ofScotland [Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1840], 435); and Rutherford himself
even goes so far as to claim that in Aberdeen, "all are corrupt" (Letters, 275). David Mullan and G.D.
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1560 was seen to be hanging in the balance almost eighty years later as popery crept into
the Scottish church masquerading as the twin angels of light, Arminianism and
episcopacy. Both had to be exorcised; neither could be ignored. No quarter could be
given, and no tolerance could be shown. Arminianism, with its similarities to Roman
Catholic theology, was encroaching upon the Scottish church united with Laud's
liturgical episcopacy and its similarities to Roman Catholic practice. Everything
Rutherford and his forebears had staked their lives and livelihoods on in reforming
Scotland was at stake. This, more than anything else, is the difference between the
Arminianism in Scodand and the Arminianism in the Netherlands. Whereas the latter
tended towards Socinianism, the former tended towards "Papistrie" and was "inchoatus
Papismus."
But popery was not the only end result of Arminianism that threatened early
modern Scotland, even though it was probably the most pressing. A second threat to
the Calvinist worldview was spawned by Arminian teaching, viz., theological scepticism.
By advocating toleration for a wide range of beliefs within the church—including those
of the "Arians, Socinians, Papists, Pelagians, Antitrinitarians, and all Heretics who want
\postulant\ to be called Christians'''—and by undercutting objective biblical authority,44
Arminianism helped to introduce a "seventeenth-century Pyrrhonian crisis, as to
whether truth can be known and, if so, in what measure."45 While this crisis may have
been less of an direct issue in Scotland than it was in England and on the continent, it,
nevertheless, still posed a tremendous threat to covenanters like Rutherford, who
Henderson, however, have concluded that outright Arminianism was not actually present among the
Aberdeen Doctors (Mullan, Scottish Puritanism, 224-6; Henderson, Religious Life, 90-92; idem, Burning Bush,
75-93). They argue that the Doctors were more Calvinist than Arminian and were charged with
Arminianism primarily because of their moderate Episcopal beliefs. This is not necessarily the case,
however. Quite probably their ecclesial beliefs did contribute to their demise, but it is at least suggestive
that all of the Doctors appear to have believed either in conditional predestination, outright, or in
conditional reprobation. And as we have seen with the example of Twisse and Cotton, conditional
reprobation would have been regarded by Rutherford as Arminianism, in that it, like Arminianism,
jeopardized the doctrine of justification by faith alone. On the trials of the Doctors and their convictions,
see James Gordon, History of Scots Affairs, from 1637 to 1641 (Aberdeen: Spalding Club, 1841), 3:274-82;
MacMillan, Aberdeen Doctors, 113-14, 272-6, 279-92; John Forbes, Instmctiones historico-theologicae de doctrina
Christiana (Amsterdam, 1645), 405; and John Spalding, The History of the Troubles and Memorable Transactions
in Scotlandfrom the Year 1624 to 1645 (Aberdeen: Evans, 1792), 1:245.
44 Examen, 8.
45 Tyacke, "Arminianism and English Culture," 106. Pyrrho (c. 365-C.275 BC) was a Greek sceptic who,
according to Thomas Harriot, did not "affirme or deny any knowledge to be true or false" (Tyacke,
"Arminianism and English Culture," 107). On the development of scepticism in the early modern period,
see Richard H. Popkin, The History ofScepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (New York and London: Harper &
Row, 1968).
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believed that there was only one incontrovertible interpretation for every text of
Scripture, and who saw theological certainty and objectivity as the foundation on which
their vision for a unified and uniform church would be established, not only in Scotland
but in England and Ireland as well.46 The Arminian liberty of prophesying threatened to
destroy this foundation by introducing a "Pyrrhonian Vacillation and Uncertainty," a
"perpetual fluctuation," in which individuals were "alwajes learning, and never comming to the
knowledge of the truth?'47 By embracing this liberty of prophesying, in which the individual
engaged with Scripture wholly on a personal level, and by relegating the interpretive
decisions of the church to a "Discretionary.. .not Authoritative" status,48 the Arminians,
along with other sectarian groups within the Erasmian tradition, individualized biblical
interpretation and opened Pandora's box releasing "millions of faiths with millions of
senses [of Scripture], and so no faith at all."49 This put the work of the Reformation at
risk by fulfilling Rome's predictions that sola Scriptura would foster the hermeneutical
abuse of Scripture and provide no basis for differentiating between varying
interpretations. But it also put the Christian faith itself at risk, because, for Rutherford
as for Calvin, certainty was of the essence of faith. To undermine certainty was,
therefore, at least to introduce grave pastoral problems into the church and, at most, to
undermine the work of the Christian faith itself.50 More than placing the work of the
Reformation at risk, Arminianism engendered a loss of theological certainty, which also
endangered the work of the Reformation, and threatened to shatter the covenanters'
hopes and dreams for a religiously unified society, and offered, instead, a future in
46 That the goal of the Scots was religious unity and uniformity is perhaps best seen in the intentions that
were behind their involvement in the Westminster Assembly. Robert Baillie points out that when the
English approached the Scots for help in 1643, the Scots seized the opportunity to gain religious
uniformity. Whereas the English were only after a "civill League," the Scots undertook to form a
"religious Covenant." Letters andjournals, 2:90.
47 Due Right, 366, 369. The pages in this treatise are terribly corrupted. They are numbered in the
following sequence: 1-208; 229-68; 259-454; 451-97; 484; and 185-468. The abovementioned references
are cited from the latter group of pages.
™ACS, 1:39.
49 PLC, 28.
50 This is one reason why Hugh R. Trevor-Roper has argued that the Erasmian tradition of scepticism,
tolerance, and freedom—which tradition he sees continued in the Arminians—was the main source of the
eighteenth-century Enlightenment. While this is not entirely accurate, insofar as other factors clearly
contributed to this dynamic, it is true that the Erasmian tradition was one important factor in the
development of the Enlightenment. Cf. Trevor-Roper, Religion, the Reformation and Social Change (London:
Macmillan, 21972), 193-236; with Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1967), especially 161-90; and W.R. Ward, "Orthodoxy, Enlightenment and Religious Revival," in Religion
and Humanism, ed. Keith Robbins (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 275-96. See also Coffey, Politics, Religion and
the British Revolutions, 256-7.
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which God would be driven "from his sovereign's throne,"51 only to be replaced by the
autonomous creature. No longer would God be Deus absconditus; no longer would he
reign and rule on high. Arminianism and the theological scepticism it helped to
introduce offered a God who was limited in the current world order by the freedom of
each and every individual he created. It was for these reasons that Rutherford
considered Arminianism "a most serious heresy [haeresis gravissima]," one that was
diametrically opposed at every point to the theology of the Reformation and to his own
hopes and dreams for a religiously unified society.52
This was the threat that faced the Calvinism of Rutherford's day. It was a threat
that attacked everything Rutherford wanted, everything he believed, and everything for
which he, and his Reformation forebears, had worked for over three generations. It was
a threat that backed him and his Calvinist brethren into a corner and put them on the
defensive. The Calvinism of Rutherford's day was not the vibrant Calvinism that many
think it to be. It was a Calvinism in battle array, vehemently striking out and seeking to
maintain its hegemony at all costs. Sadly, it was only at the end of Rutherford's lifetime,
when he knew his own death was imminent and the cause for which he had been
fighting so stridently all his life was hanging on the precipice of defeat, that he realized
the mire in which he and many others had been wallowing and expressed regret, saying:
Blessed is the servant whom the Master when he cometh shall finde
watching, praying, believing, not tossing and raising the dust of debating
and multiplied Replies and Duplies, since the peace andjoy of believing that
we may abound in hope through thepower ofthe holy Ghost, is of great price with
those in whom the meekness and gentleness of Christ hath place it would
appear that there is less of Christ and more of Self'm our sickness of over-
loving these truths, which suffer most bruising and grinding...between
the Milstones of Sides, Opinions and Contradictions of Parties, as if that
were the choicest verity which the mans own engine hath taken out of an
Adversaries hand ...with his bowe and his sword For when the head is
tilled with topicks, and none of the flamings of Christs love in the heart,
how dry are all disputes? for too often, fervour of dispute in the head
weakens love in the heart. And what can our Paper-industry adde to the
spotless truth of our Cord Jesus? O that Opinions were down, and the
Gospel up; and Sides and Parties might fall, and Christ stand; and that all
Names, Sects and Ways were low, and the Cord alone exalted.53
51 Mullan, "Masked Popery and Pyrrhonian Uncertainty," 177.
52 Examen, 46.
53 A Survey of the Survey of that Summe ofChurch Discipline, A2.
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Rutherford died in 1661 with many of his ambitions unfulfilled and others of them
overturned by the new Restoration government. His vision for religious uniformity
ended as a failed dream. His lifetime of work against Arminianism and its logical ends,
popery and theological uncertainty, ultimately came up short. This was true in his own
lifetime—as he died before he could see episcopacy defeated in Scotland and
Presbyterianism adopted in its place—and it has perhaps become even more so since
then—as theological scepticism and a worldview of tolerance and freedom have
increasingly pushed religion and the church to the periphery of society, at least in
comparison to Rutherford's day anyway. For these reasons, John Coffey appears to be
right in claiming that Rutherford's life "was more of a tragedy than a romance."54
5.2: Concluding Thoughts on the Calvin-Calvinists Debate
But was Rutherford's Calvinism really Calvinism at all? Or, was what he believed and
espoused something altogether different from the thinking ofJohn Calvin? In order to
answer these questions, this thesis has attempted to point out areas of continuity and
discontinuity between Rutherford and Calvin throughout its examination of
Rutherford's theology and to devote special attention to evaluating those specific areas
where significant discontinuity was suspected. All that remains for us to do now is to
summarize these findings and draw the relevant conclusions.
With the possible exception of limited atonement, every doctrine that we have
surveyed in Rutherford is in substantial continuity with the Genevan reformer's
theology. There is not one doctrine, not even limited atonement, that is in clear
discontinuity with Calvin's thinking.55 In those areas where there has been suspected
discontinuity—i.e., accommodation, the role of reason, the verbal inspiration of
Scripture, the authority of Scripture, the will of God, predestination, limited atonement,
the covenant of works, the use of preparations in salvation, and the assurance of
salvation—we have shown that there is actually substantial theological continuity.
Where there are elements of discontinuity—and there are—we have shown that the
54 Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions, 257.
55 As we mentioned in chapter three, it is difficult to determine precisely where Calvin would come down
on the issue of limited atonement. It was not a question that he faced in his own day, and scholars are
divided as to what his actual response would have been had the question been put to him. But, as Karl
Barth has acknowledged, the doctrine of limited atonement does flow logically from Calvin's
understanding of predestination, which is itself in substantial continuity with Rutherford's own beliefs.
Barth, CD, IV/1, 57.
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discontinuity is not so much a theological discontinuity as one of method and emphasis.
When we move from Calvin to Rutherford, we see, in the first place, an evident increase
in theological systematization and in the use of logical categories and deductions. We
see this most clearly in Rutherford's doctrine of Scripture (though this doctrine is not
yet in its fullest expression, as it will be in Princeton theologians B.B. Warfield and A.A.
Hodge, it is, nonetheless, more systematized than is Calvin's view), in his formulations
of the divine will and his use of scholastic phrases and categories (though this too is in
Calvin, we see a further development in Rutherford), in his application of federal
theology as the architectonic principle of Scripture, and in his extensive use of the
practical syllogism in providing assurance of salvation. Furthermore, when we move
from Calvin to Rutherford, we also see a shift in theological emphasis. Predestination,
limited atonement, the second use of the law, covenant theology (especially the
covenant of works), and subjective assurance all have a greater prominence in the
theology of Rutherford than they did in Calvin.
But these things should not lead us to conclude that a vast chasm exists between
Rutherford and Calvin, even in regard to method and emphasis. Although there is clear
discontinuity here, the discontinuity itself is not the result of a sharp break with the
Reformation but, as Richard Muller has convincingly argued, "the product of a gradual
development that had roots not only in the Middle Ages but also in the Renaissance and
the Reformation."56 What is more, we should expect to see a development in method
and emphasis as we move away from the Reformation and into the succeeding
generations. Leonard Trinterud has explained that because the reformers rejected the
authority of the Roman Church, they were required to re-establish "a new basis...for
personal and public religious life and morals, educations, civil governments, family life,
and even international relations."57 In other words, he says, the reformers were required
not simply to expound one or two isolated doctrines but to construct a comprehensive
and cohesive system of faith. Thus, we would expect to find a move towards
systematization even within Calvin himself—as Muller in fact has—which would then
be carried through to the post-Reformation period and into the thinking of men like
Rutherford.'8 In terms of emphasis, moreover, a shift should be expected in light of the
56 Muller, "Calvin and the 'Calvinists'," 366.
57 "Origins of Puritanism," 38.
58 Muller notes that whereas the early versions of the Institutes contained a "simple and catechetical
structure," the final edition of 1559 contained a "more formal, more systematic presentation" of theology
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changing climate of the culture in which Rutherford lived. Because he lived in a
different period, he fought different battles, which produced different emphases in his
theology. But, as we have already seen, the seedbed for Rutherford's understanding of
predestination, limited atonement, federal theology, and assurance of salvation, as well
as other aspects of his theology, are all found in the writings of Calvin. In speaking of a
discontinuity in method and emphasis, then, we must be careful not to draw too sharp a
divide between Rutherford and Calvin; even the discontinuity between them is best
expressed in terms of both discontinuity and continuity.
In by far the greater number of doctrines, however, there is an overwhelming
continuity between Rutherford and his Genevan predecessor. Both Rutherford and
Calvin stand squarely within the schola Augustiniana moderna\ both hold consciously to sola
Scripturn, both are more interested in qualis sit Deus? than an sit Deux? or quid sit Deus?;
both place great emphasis on the sovereignty of the divine will and, thus, on the
ultimate incomprehensibility of God; both are strikingly similar, if not indistinguishable,
in their understanding of the order of the divine decrees; both have the same basic
views of natural theology, the Trinity, predestination, the sinfulness of humankind, free
will, regeneration, faith, justification, sanctification, and the necessity of good works;
both place union with Christ at the center of their respective soteriologies; both speak
of assurance in the same terms, principially and experientially; and both assign a place of
great prominence to the work of the Holy Spirit in their theologies. Such continuity is
not wholly unexpected. Rutherford consistently quotes Calvin throughout the Examen,
citing mainly from his Institutes twenty times during the course of his theological diatribe
against the Arminians (see the appendix). He calls Calvin one of "our Theologians" and
believes himself to be standing in continuity with "Calvin and the Reformed
Churches."59 He cites from Calvin's favorite source, Augustine, more often than any
other author in the Examen, apart from Arminius and Episcopius, against whom he is in
polemic (again, see the appendix). And in the rest of his writings, the same pattern
holds true. According to estimates provided by David Strickland, Rutherford refers to
Calvin and Augustine at least twice as much as the next nearest individual.60 These two
(Christ and the Decree, 17). Muller then goes on to trace the continuation of this tendency towards
systematization into the succeeding generations after Calvin (in part two of Christ and the Decree).
59 Examen, 602, 606; see also, 310, 353.
60 Strickland has estimated the number of times Rutherford cites Calvin to be at least 132, Augustine, 116,
and Beza and Chyrsostom, 58. Even though Strickland's counts are only approximate—as is apparent
from his use (or, perhaps better, non-use) of the Examen—they do provide a good idea of those authors
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theologians stand head and shoulders above every other author in the entire Rutherford
corpus.
What can we say, then, about the claims of scholars like Brian Armstrong, T.F.
Torrance, and Charles Bell? Can Rutherford's theology righdy be considered to be at
odds with Calvin? Can it rightly be considered hyper-Calvinism? Several things bear
mentioning at this point in answer to these questions. In the first place, one wonders
why it is that Calvin, rather than, say, Vermigli, Musculus, or Luther, is the benchmark
against which theology is to be evaluated. Rutherford certainly did not see himself as a
"Calvinist." But he did see himself as standing squarely within the tradition of the
Reformation, especially as it found expression in Calvin but also in men like Vermigli,
Musculus, and Luther as well. Moreover, Rutherford would never have wanted his
theology to be held up to the light of Calvin (neither, for that matter, would Calvin have
wanted the theologies of others to be held up to his own); he wanted his theology to be
evaluated in the light of Scripture. That was his ultimate authority; that was his
principium cognoscendi theologiae.
In the second place, contrary to Armstrong's claims, Rutherford's theology
appears to be balanced, biblical, humanistic, and experiential, in at least a similar way as
Calvin's.61 While there are, to be sure, severe elements in Rutherford's theology—
perhaps most especially, his understanding of the sovereignty of the divine will—he
balances those elements with a warm and experiential spirituality. Like the Puritans in
general and, before them, Peter Ramus, Rutherford's overarching emphasis is on
making a practical and experiential use of theology, rather than on engaging in a
theoretical and speculative exercise of the mind. Furthermore, as we have already
mentioned above and seen in the Examen, the most important thing for Rutherford was
that his theology be biblical. Granted, he may have, at times, gone beyond what
Scripture says in order to try to explain how two doctrines that would appear to be
contradictory can, in fact, be compatible—doctrines like the sovereignty of God and
human free will, for example. But oftentimes this is because the Arminians, whom he is
refuting, themselves go beyond Scripture to explain the compatibility of the two
doctrines in a way that Rutherford believes is unscriptural.
Rutherford is relying upon most. See Strickland, "Union with Christ," Appendix II; and cf. the enclosed
appendix.
61 Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresj, 32.
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In the third place, Armstrong's definition of scholasticism does not appear to be
broad enough to take into consideration the presence of scholasticism both in the
Reformation and in those later theologians who explicitly disagreed with the content of
Calvin's theology. In the course of this thesis, we have pointed out several elements of
Calvin's theology that display scholastic tendencies, most notably, his formulation of the
divine will, his use of the syllogism in assurance, and his own movement towards
systematixation in his writings over the course of his lifetime. We have also pointed out
elements of scholasticism in others of Calvin's peers, most especially, Peter Martyr
Vermigli and Wolfgang Musculus. It is chiefly for these reasons that Richard Muller's
comments would seem to be in order: "Neither Calvin's own theology nor the theology
of various significant predecessors, like Luther, Zwingli, and Bucer, or Reformed
contemporaries, like Vermigli and Musculus, can be understood apart from the positive
impact of elements of the medieval scholastic background."62 But, more than this, there
are also elements of scholasticism that are present in later theologians who vehemently
disagree with the content of not only Calvin's theology but that of Luther, Zwingli,
Bucer, Vermigli, and Musculus as well. Arminius himself is one such theologian. His
theology clearly evidences the distinguishing marks of scholasticism in his view of the
fourfold causality of Scripture, his formulations of the divine will, his use of logical
syllogisms, and his consistent reliance upon scholastic distinctions, albeit oftentimes
with a different meaning than we see in Rutherford and the Reformed.
In the fourth place, and finally, it is difficult to appraise precisely Torrance's and
Bell's claims that Rutherford is a hyper-Calvinist, because neither offers a definition of
what he means by the term hyper-Calvinist. Peter Toon's work has shown that there
has historically been much confusion over the use of this term. In an effort to bring
clarity to the confusion, he offers this definition for hyper-Calvinism:
It was a system of theology, or a system of the doctrines of God, man
and grace, which was framed to exalt the honour and glory of God and
did so at the expense of minimising the moral and spiritual responsibility
of sinners to God. It placed excessive emphasis on the immanent acts of
God—eternal justification, eternal adoption, and the eternal covenant of
grace. In practice, this meant that "Christ and Him crucified", the
central message of the apostles, was obscured. It also often made no
distinction between the secret and the revealed will of God, and tried to
deduce the duty of men from what it taught concerning the secret,
eternal decrees of God. Excessive emphasis was also placed on the
62 Muller, "Calvin and the 'Calvinists'," 360.
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doctrine of irresistible grace with the tendency to state that an elect man
is not only passive in regeneration but also in conversion as well. The
absorbing interest in the eternal, immanent acts of God and in irresistible
grace led to the notion that grace must only be offered to those for
whom it was intended. Finally, a valid assurance of salvation was seen as
consisting in an inner feeling and conviction of being eternally elected by
God. So Hyper-Calvinism led its adherents to hold that evangelism was
not necessary and to place much emphasis on introspection in order to
discover whether or not one was elect.63
Even if we were to compare Rutherford's theology with this definition and ignore the
patent continuity that we have seen between Rutherford and Calvin, it would still be
evident that Rutherford is not a hyper-Calvinist. Although his theology may tend
towards hyper-Calvism, insofar as it is "framed to exalt the honour and glory ofGod," it
does not emphasize divine glory at the expense of human freedom and responsibility.
Rutherford repeatedly underscores the responsibility of the individual to believe in
Christ for his or her salvation and, having done so, to work out diligently his or her
sanctification. This can be seen in his work against the Antinomians and in the priority
he gives to the importance of keeping one's affections fixed upon Christ by studying the
Bible and striving after communion with God. In fact, Rutherford places so much
emphasis on human responsibility in salvation that scholars like J.B. Torrance have
criticized him for it, claiming that, by doing so, he jettisons Calvin's emphasis on the
eternality of the covenant. What is more, Rutherford's theology is thoroughly Christ-
centered and is distinguished by a particular belief that the gospel of Christ ought to be
freely offered to all people without exception. He, like Calvin, clearly distinguishes
between the secret will of God and the revealed will of God and, also like Calvin,
encourages Christians to order their lives according to the latter. Assurance of salvation,
for Rutherford, should never be based upon some sort of internal feeling but upon the
objective and certain promises of God, which themselves were based upon the person
of God.
It would seem best to conclude that the reappraisal school is right, that there is
substantial continuity between the Reformation and post-Reformation periods—and,
specifically, between Rutherford and Calvin—and that "scholasticism" should be
understood as a term that refers primarily to a method of approaching or arranging the
content of theology, rather than of developing or determining the content itself.
63 Peter Toon, The Emergence ofHyper-Calvinism in English Nonconformity 1689-1765 [London: The Olive Tree,
1967], 144-5.
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5.3: The Legacy of Rutherford's Theology
In bringing this thesis to a close, one question remains to be answered: so what? After all
this, where are we to go from here? After tracing out the contours of Rutherford's
theology and the intricacies of his dispute with the Arminians, is there anything that we,
in the twenty-first century, can learn? What kind of legacy has Rutherford left us?
Without pretending to be comprehensive in our answer to this question, we will,
nevertheless, suggest four areas in Rutherford's theology from which the church today
can gain benefit. This is not to suggest that the church ought to agree in every way with
Rutherford in these four areas but only that it can learn something from him in regard
to them. The first is his emphasis on the sovereignty of God. If there is one thing that
characterizes Rutherford's theology, beyond any shadow of doubt, it is an overwhelming
emphasis on divine sovereignty. This is especially evident in the context of his
opposition to Arminianism, where Rutherford radically exalts the freedom and
sovereignty of God and reads virtually every other doctrine through that lens. While we
do not pretend, by any means, to advocate every aspect of Rutherford's view of divine
sovereignty, there may be, in spite of this, something here that has been overlooked by
the church in our day, which has perhaps lowered the focus of our theology somewhat
in a more anthropological direction. Without diminishing the importance of the
anthropological dimension of theology, perhaps it is time that we recapture something
of Rutherford's vision of a God who is transcendent and worthy of both our worship
and our service.
Secondly, Rutherford is a Christ-centered theologian and preacher. His doctrine
of God, as T.F. Torrance has approvingly observed, is "thoroughly Christ-centred," so
much so that Torrance perceives it as "modif[ying] the federal conception of God as
Law-Giver and Judge." In Christ, "mercy and judgment, grace and law coincide," such
that Christ becomes the embodiment of divine mercy and grace.64 In him, the love and
compassion of God are graphically and, yet, compellingly portrayed for all to see. So
graphic and compelling was this sight to Rutherford that he could not but preach about
it. According to historian Robert Wodrow, Rutherford developed a reputation, far
above his contemporaries, for preaching "the loveliness of Christ" and for doing so with
intense fervor and profound animation.65 One of his friends even went so far as to say
64 Scottish Theology, 94.
65 Amlecta, III, 3-4.
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that it often looked like "he would have flown out of the pulpit" when he was speaking
about Christ.66 Unfortunately, however, Rutherford's Christ-centeredness did not
always find expression in his actions. One need only think of the bitter invective he
unleashed on fellow-Christians who disagreed with him in theological controversy in
order to see this. But, despite his inconsistency, Rutherford remains a helpful example
for us to learn from today. His emphasis on Christ as the centerpiece of both his
theology and his preaching is something for us in the church to take note of and
attempt to apply more consistendy than he did.
Thirdly, the significance that Rutherford gives to the role of the affections in
Christianity demonstrates die cohesiveness of his theology overall. In Rutherford we
see a rigorous theology combined with a warm and inviting spirituality. Many have
wondered how these two extremes could exist together in one person.67 Rutherford
himself even acknowledged, with some incredulity, the fact that he was "made of
extremes."68 In his doctrine of the affections, however, we see how it is that these
extremes could come together and form a cohesive whole theologically. Perhaps this
doctrine and the cohesion it reflects may also give us in the church helpful insight not
only into the nature of the Christian life but also into the practice of contemporary
homiletics as well.
Fourthly, Rutherford's overriding intolerance of the Arminians and of other
fellow-believers who disagreed with him on even the most trivial of issues, ought to
teach us—by way of a negative example at least—the importance of appreciating
different points of view and of dialoguing with other traditions. In describing
Rutherford as a man who was "quite incapable of compromise, even when it might have
served [his] cause better than a dogmatic insistence on first principles," Ronald Cant has
succinctly captured the nature of the man we have seen on the pages of the Examen.''9
But, before we are too unforgiving of Rutherford's intolerance, we need to remember
that he lived in a day unlike our own, a day that was rife with intolerance and religious
tension. A day in which people frequently died for what they believed. As Clarence
Pott has aptly reminded us, those who stand up for their convictions and are "willing to
66 letters, 5.
6' E.g., A. Taylor Innes, Studies in Scottish History: Chiefly Ecclesiastical (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1892),
15-16.
68 See Whyte, Samuel Rutherford and Some ofhis Correspondents, chapter 2.
69 Cant, University ofSt. Andrews, 72.
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be burned for [their] causes have frequendy been willing to burn others."70 Maybe,
rather than evaluating Rutherford's intolerance by the standards of the twenty-first
century, we can, instead, learn from it for our own day and, possibly, even appreciate the
strength of his convictions from which it flowed.
70 Clarence K. Pott, "Erasmus and the Reformation," in The Heritage of]ohrt Calvin, ed. J.H. Bratt (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1973), 201-2.
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Appendix: List of Authors Cited in the Examen
This appendix provides an alphabetical list of the individuals cited by Rutherford in the
Examen by page number, excluding biblical references. All individuals are recorded
here, whether or not Rutherford cites from a specific work of theirs. The top 20 most
frequently cited authors are distinguished by numerical ranking to the left of their
names.
Author Page number in the Examen
Almain, Jaques (d. 1515) 695(x2), 696, 698, 704, 705, 706
Altissiodorensis 62
Alvarez, Diego (d. 1631) 265, 457
Ambrose (d. 397) 652
20. Ames, William (d. 1633) 25, 26, 32, 37, 573, 575, 638
Anselm (d. 1109) 664
Aristides (d. c.2nd cent.) 605
Aristotle (d. 322 BC) 28, 54, 67,169, 193, 329, 330,
370-71, 496, 679(x2)
2. Arminius, J ames (d. 1609) 83, 146, 147(x2), 149(x2), 150,
153, 154(x5), 162, 173(x2), 181,
184, 185, 186(x2), 189, 204, 218,
219, 233, 234, 236(x2), 247, 281,
300, 302, 305, 311, 325, 349, 350,
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Arnobius (d. 320)
Arriaga, Rodrique de (d. 1606)
Arrubal, Peter (d. 1608)
Athanasius (d. 373)
3. Augustine (d. 430)
Azor, Juan (d. 1603)
Banez, Dominico (d. 1604)
Barclay, William (d. 1606)
Basil (d. 379)
Becanus, Martin (d. 1624)
358, 360, 363, 370, 373, 389, 406,
408, 411, 424(x2), 425, 428, 429,
430, 442, 457, 473, 480, 497, 506,






55, 74, 75(x2), 76,155,167,
229, 256(x2), 317-18, 342,
347(x2), 353, 358(x3), 359(x2),
360(x3), 387, 463(x2), 466(x3),
466-7, 468, 470, 474, 476, 495,
516(x2), 517, 527, 539, 555, 588,
589, 635, 652, 654, 680, 721
519





5. Bellarmine, Robert (d. 1621)
Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153)
Bertius, Petrus (d. 1629)
11. Beza, Theodore (d. 1605)
Bonaventure (d. 1274)
Boniface VIII, Pope (d. 1303)
Bradwardine, Thomas (d. 1349)
Bucer, Martin (d. 1551)
Bullinger, Heinrich (d. 1575)
Cajetan, Tommaso de vio (d. 1534)
7. Calvin, John (d. 1564)
Cameron, John (d. 1625)
Casaubon, Isaac (d. 1614)
11,16,18, 23,51,66, 204, 230,
316, 317, 375(x2), 408(x2), 475,











626, 642, 652, 691
10, 32, 35, 38, 54, 65, 72,81,
464, 472, 530, 531, 551,602,606,
624, 627, 654, 726, 758
19, 29, 30, 742
7,8
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Cassander, George (d. 1566)
Cassian, John (d. 435)
Castellio, Sebastian (d. 1563)
Catharinus, Ambrosius (d. 1553)
Chemnitz, Martin (d. 1586)
Chillingworth, William (d. 1644)
Chrysostom, John (d. 407)
Cicero, Marcus Tullius (d. 43 BC)
Clement VII, Pope (d. 1534)
Complutensian Codex
Complutensian Doctors (University ofAcala)
(c. 17th cent.)
Coninck, Aegid de (d. 1633)
Constantius of Lyon (d. c.480)







635, 642, 652, 654, 680, 689







175,217, 239, 259, 272, 301-2,
307, 311, 344, 358(x2), 359, 360,
362, 363(x2), 370, 411,415-16,
422, 424, 427, 428, 450, 451, 454,
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